



The Market for Corporate Control and 


































The Market for Corporate Control and 
Corporate Governance Regulation 
in Europe 








ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Tilburg, 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof.dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van een door het college voor 
promoties  aangewezen  commissie  in  de  aula  van  de  Universiteit  op 




MARINA VLADIMIROVNA MARTYNOVA 
 

























This dissertation is the result of my work at the Department of Finance and CentER Graduate 
School of Tilburg University during 2002-2006. I gratefully acknowledge the stimulating research 
environment  of  Tilburg  University  and  the  financial  and  organizational  support  I  have  received 
there.  I  also  acknowledge  support  from  the  European  Commission  via  the  ‘New  Modes  of 
Governance’-project (NEWGOV) led by the European University Institute in Florence. I would like 
to  thank  the  many  individuals  whose  unstinting  support,  guidance  and  encouragement  were 
instrumental in making this work as fruitful and gratifying as it finally came to be. 
My special words of appreciation go to my supervisor Prof. dr. Luc Renneboog. I had always 
wanted to do PhD under the supervision of excellent professionals in the field that interests me the 
most: corporate finance. Therefore, I felt deeply honoured and excited that Luc kindly agreed to be 
my supervisor. Since then, he has given me outstanding academic and personal support, and has 
always been a source of inspiration and encouragement. I am particularly indebted to him for aiding 
my development as an academic researcher. He and I developed a fascinating project on mergers and 
acquisitions and corporate governance regulation in Europe, which has resulted in at least ten joint 
papers at the last count, part of which comprise this dissertation. I hope to continue this fruitful 
teamwork in the coming years. I am grateful to Luc for his guidance and forward-looking advice that 
were vital in getting me where I am today. I also thank him for helping me with whatever problems I 
had, even when this required him to call the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to sort out my visa 
problems, or come (from Belgium) to the university at 11 pm to bring his laptop charger when mine 
was broken. I have never seen a professor more committed to his students and I am delighted to have 
been one of them. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to the members of my dissertation committee: 
professors Hans Degryse, Julian Franks, Marc Goergen, and Steven Ongena. I deeply appreciate 
their  interest  in  my  PhD  thesis.  This  dissertation  benefited  enormously  from  their  valuable 
comments and suggestions, which are gratefully acknowledged. It is an honor to have them on my 
committee.  
I am indebted to Iryna Kaminska and Andrey Medvedev for being my best friends and giving 
me magnificent support during my (and their) doctoral years. My time as a PhD student will always 
remain one of the nicest periods of my life thanks to them. I would not be here without the advice 
and help of Romana Negrea either. I am obliged to her for encouraging me to enrol in an MPhil 
program in Prague, and to move to Tilburg afterwards. That I acquired the English skills essential to 





It would have been impossible to imagine my professional development (in terms of both 
research  and  teaching)  and  my  life  in  Tilburg  without  my  colleagues  Chendi  Zhang,  Marta 
Szymanowska,  Crina  Pungulescu,  Peter  Szilagyi,  Viorel  Roscovan,  Valeri  Nokolaev,  Igor 
Loncarski,  Norbert  Hari,  Esther  Eiling,  Mark-Jan  Boes,  and  Ralf  Koijen  among  many  others.  I 
enjoyed spending time with them enormously both during and outside working hours; they certainly 
made  my  life  in  Tilburg  more  colourful.  Special  thanks  go  to  Esther  Eiling  for  being  a  great 
officemate and providing me an excellent guide to Dutch culture. I would also like to thank Peter 
Szilagyi and Viorel Roscovan for agreeing to be my paranymphs at the defence ceremony. 
My deepest gratitude goes to my friends in Russia. This dissertation has often been a reason 
for missing their weddings and other celebrations. I am grateful to them for their understanding and 
for  remaining  my  close  friends  despite  the  huge  distance.  This  PhD  has  been  inspired  by  their 
sincere faith in my abilities. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family who have given me tremendous motivation in life. 
To see them proud of me has been the best reward for my work. I am eternally indebted to my 
mother who has endured a long period of my absence and provided me with outstanding support 
during my studies. I hope my PhD will be a nice present for her 65th anniversary.  
I dedicate this thesis to my sister Tatiana as a return on her invaluable personal investments 
in  my  education.  She  convinced  me  to  go  on  to  university  after  high  school  and  helped  me 
enormously during my university studies in St. Petersburg. Without her help I would not have been 
able to continue my studies abroad. She has always supported me when I needed it most and remains 



















Chapter 1.   INTRODUCTION  13 
 
Chapter 2.   THE HISTORY OF M&A ACTIVITY AROUND THE WORLD: A SURVEY 
OF LITERATURE 
1.  Introduction  16 
2.    The history of takeover waves  17 
2.1 The early waves of the 1890s and the 1910s-1920s  17 
2.2 The wave of the 1950s-1970s.  18 
2.3 The wave of the 1980s  20 
2.4 The wave of the 1990s  21 
2.5 A new wave?   23 
2.6 Summary of historical overview  25 
3.   Theoretical explanations for M&A clustering  25 
3.1 Neoclassical models  25 
3.2 Hubris, herding, and agency problem models  26 
3.3 Market timing models  27 
3.4 Summary of theoretical explanations for takeover waves  28 
4.   Empirical evidence on the drivers of takeover activity  28 
4.1 Profitability of takeovers  29 
4.1.1 Benchmarking takeover gains  29 
4.1.2 Short-term wealth effects   30 
4.1.3 Long-term wealth effects  37 
4.1.4 Operating performance  42 
4.1.5 Summary of the evidence on takeover profitability  45 
4.2 Rational explanations: industry and technology shocks   46 
4.3 Non-rational explanations of takeover waves: hubris, herding and 
agency costs   48 
4.4 Evidence of market-timing explanation for takeover waves   49 
4.5 Explaining diversifying takeovers  51 
4.6 Explaining hostility in takeovers   53 
4.7 Summary of empirical evidence on the determinants of  
  takeover waves  55 




Chapter 3.   MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN EUROPE: OVERVIEW 
1.   Introduction  57 
2.   The evolution of takeover activity in Europe  57 
3.   Cross-border versus domestic acquisitions  59 
4.   Industry clusters, and focus versus a diversification strategies  61 
5.   Means of payment  63 
6.   Hostile takeovers  66 
7.   Conclusion  67 
 
Chapter 4.   THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM THE 5
TH TAKEOVER WAVE  
1.   Introduction  67 
2.   The determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements  69 
2.1 Predictions of the existing literature  69 
2.2 Continental European versus UK corporate takeovers: potential 
differences  70 
2.2.1. Opportunistic takeover strategies    71 
2.2.2. The role of bidder’s large blockholders in takeovers  71 
2.2.3. Takeover regulation    72 
2.2.4. Insider trading    72 
3.   Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology  76 
3.1 Sample selection  76 
3.2 Sample summary statistics  77 
3.2.1. Sample composition by deal characteristics  77 
3.2.2. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms 80 
3.2.3. Characteristics of the bidding and target firms  81 
3.3 Methodology      84 
3.3.1. Abnormal returns and test statistics  84 
3.3.2. Correction for potential sample selection bias   84 
4.  Market reaction to takeover announcements (Univariate analysis)  85 
4.1. Market reaction to takeover announcements: total sample  85 
4.2. Market reaction to takeover announcements by deal characteristics 90 
      4.2.1. Geographical scope of transaction  90 
      4.2.2. Type of acquisition  90 
      4.2.3. Form of and attitude towards the bid  90 
      4.2.4. Bid completion status  91  
10 
 
      4.2.5. Legal status of the target firm  91 
      4.2.6. Industry scope  92 
      4.2.7. Means of payment  92 
      4.2.8. The sub-periods of the 5
th takeover wave  93 
4.3. Market reaction to takeover announcements by the legal origin of 
bidder and target  93 
  4.3.1. Domestic acquisitions    94 
  4.3.2. Cross-border acquisitions    94 
5.   Determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements  
  (Multivariate analysis)    96 
5.1 Bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns  97 
5.1.1. Bidder pre-announcement returns  97 
5.1.2. The bidder’s announcement effect  101 
5.1.3. Bidder post-announcement returns  102 
5.2 Target’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns  103 
5.2.1. Target pre-announcement returns  103 
5.2.2. The target’s announcement effect  106 
5.2.3. Target post-announcement returns  107 
6.   Conclusions   108 
 
Chapter 5.   SOURCES OF TRANSACTION FINANCING IN CORPORATE 
TAKEOVERS 
1.   Introduction  112 
2.   Motivation and Hypotheses  114 
2.1 Cost of Capital considerations (CC)  115 
2.2 Agency Problems between corporate claimants (AG)  117 
2.3 Means of Payment considerations (MP)  120 
3.   Sample Selection, Data Sources, and Sample Description  121 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources  122 
3.2 Sample description  124 
3.3 Capturing the regulatory environment   127 
4.   Methodology  130 
4.1 Estimating the valuation effect of the bidder’s financing choice  130 
4.2 Empirical models of the financing(-payment) choice  131 
4.2.1 Multinomial logit model of the financing choice  131 
4.2.2 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing  
choice  132  
11 
 
5.   Results  133 
5.1 Valuation effects of the bidder’s financing decision  133 
5.2 The determinants of the bidder financing decision  136 
  5.2.1 Univariate comparison  136 
5.2.2 Multinomial logit model  143 
5.2.3 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing  
choice  146 
6.   Conclusions  148 
 
Chapter 6.   CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGENCE: EVIDENCE FROM 
TAKEOVER REGULATION REFORMS IN EUROPE 
1.  Introduction  156 
2.  The evolution of corporate governance regulation: the convergence  
  debate  157 
3.  The corporate governance functions of takeover regulation  160 
4.  Reforms of takeover regulation and corporate governance convergence  162 
5.   Devices of takeover regulation  164 
5.1 The mandatory bid rule  165 
5.2 The principle of equal treatment   166 
5.3 Transparency of ownership and control  167 
5.4 The squeeze-out and sell-out rules  168 
5.5 The one-share-one-vote principle  169 
5.6 The break-through rule  170 
5.7 Board neutrality and anti-takeover measures  171 
6.   Reforms of takeover regulation in Europe over the period of 1990-2004  175 
7.  Conclusion  182 
 
Chapter 7.   A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX: CONVERGENCE AND 
DIVERSITY OF NATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REGULATIONS 
1.   Introduction  183 
2.   The role of corporate governance regulation  185 
2.1. Agency problems between corporate constituents   185 
2.2 Why do we need corporate governance regulation?  186 
2.3 Evolution of legal systems and corporate governance regimes  188 
3.   Corporate governance database  190 
4.   Corporate Governance indices  190  
12 
 
4.1 Regulatory provisions addressing management-shareholder  
relations  191 
4.1.1. The appointment rights strategy  192 
4.1.2. The decision rights strategy  195 
4.1.3. The trusteeship strategy  196 
4.1.4. Transparency  197 
4.2 Regulatory provisions addressing majority-minority shareholders 
relationship  197 
4.2.1. Appointment rights strategy  198 
4.2.2. The decision rights strategy  198 
4.2.3. The trusteeship strategy: Independence of directors from 
controlling shareholders  199 
4.2.4. The affiliation rights strategy  199 
4.3 Regulatory provisions aimed at creditor rights protection  200 
5.   Evolution of corporate governance regulations around the world  201 
5.1 Ownership structure around the world  201 
5.2 The protection of shareholder rights  202 
5.3 The protection of minority shareholder rights  207 
5.4 The protection of creditor rights  212 
6.   Conclusion  212 
 
Samenvatting (Dutch Summary).  215 
List of References.  217 
Data Appendix 1.  230 









There are two polar systems of corporate governance: the shareholder-based system and the 
blockholder-based system. The former prevails in the UK, US and the Commonwealth countries, 
and relies on legal rules largely resulting from case law and on the effective legal enforcement of 
shareholder rights. The blockholder-based system of Continental Europe relies on codified law and 
emphasizes rules protecting stakeholders such as creditors and employees. The two systems differ 
not only in terms of the rationale behind their legal rules, but also in terms of their ownership and 
control. Most Continental European companies are characterized by majority or near-majority stakes 
held by one or few investors. In contrast, the Anglo-American system is characterized by dispersed 
equity. A growing literature advocates that the corporate governance system influences economic 
behavior  and  the  governance  of  firms,  which  have  impact  on  the  cost  of  capital,  corporate 
performance, and the distribution of benefits among corporate stakeholders (e.g. La Porta et al., 
1997, 2002; Mork et al., 2000; and Levine, 1998, 1999). This raises the question as to whether and 
to what extent one can transpose the insights and findings of the US and UK empirical corporate 
finance literature to the European one.   
The two main constituents of any corporate governance system are corporate governance 
regulation and the market for corporate control. Their impact on economic growth, the development 
of  markets,  and  the  governance  of  firms  is  widely  studied  both  theoretically  and  empirically. 
However, empirical research in this field remains mostly confined to the UK and US and there is 
little known about the effects of takeover market and corporate legislation in Continental Europe.  
The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, we provide a comprehensive overview of the market 
for corporate control and corporate governance regulation in European countries and document their 
evolution during the past 15 years. The second purpose is to investigate the impact of corporate 
takeovers and regulatory environment in European countries on companies’ profitability and the 
choice  of  financing  sources.  We  document  that  there  substantial  differences  between  Anglo-
American  and  Continental  European  markets  for  corporate  control  and  legal  systems  and  these 
differences  have  significant  impact  on  economic  growth,  the  development  of  markets,  and  the 
governance of firms. The overall analysis is presented in this thesis in six chapters. 
Chapter two of the thesis is a literature overview titled ‘The History of M&A activity Around 
The World: A Survey of Literature’. It focuses on the cyclical wave pattern the market for corporate 
control exhibits and addresses questions such as: Why do we observe a systematic rise and fall in 
M&A activity over time? Why do corporate managers herd in their takeover decisions? Is takeover  
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activity fuelled by capital market developments? What caused the formation of conglomerate firms 
in the wave of the 1960s and their de-conglomeration in the waves of the 1980s and 1990s? Why do 
we observe time- and country-clustering of hostile takeover activity? And finally, does a transfer of 
control generate shareholder gains?  
Chapter  three  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  European  market  for  corporate 
control  during  1990-2001.  It  characterizes  the  main  features  of  the  domestic  and  cross-border 
corporate takeovers involving European companies in the period 1993-2001 and contrasts them to 
those of takeovers in the second takeover wave of 1984-1989. We provide detailed information on 
the size and dynamics of takeover activity in 28 Continental European countries and the UK and 
Ireland.  
The material of the third chapter has also further developed into the fourth chapter ‘The 
Performance  of  The  European  Market  for  Corporate  Control:  Evidence  From  The  5
th  Takeover 
Wave’,  in  which  we  examine  market  reaction  to  takeover  announcements  facing  European 
companies in 1990-2001 and investigate the reaction’ determinants. We find that European M&As 
are expected to create takeover synergies since their announcements trigger substantial share price 
increases. However, most of the takeover gains are captured by the target firm shareholders. We 
establish  that  the  characteristics  of  the  target  and  bidding  firms  and  of  the  bid  itself  have  a 
significant impact on takeover returns. While some of our results have been documented for other 
markets of corporate control (e.g. US), a comparison of the UK and CE M&A markets reveals that 
the corporate environment is an important factor affecting the market reaction to takeovers: (i) In 
case a UK firm is taken over, the abnormal returns exceed those in bids involving a CE target. (ii) 
The presence of a large shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on the 
takeover returns in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. (iii) Weak investor protection 
and  low  disclosure  environment  in  Continental  Europe  enable  bidding  firms  to  invent  takeover 
strategies that allow them to act opportunistically towards target firm’s incumbent shareholders; 
more specifically, partial acquisitions and acquisitions with undisclosed terms of transaction.                  
Chapter  five  investigates  the  sources  of  transaction  financing  in  European  corporate 
takeovers  launched  during  the  period  1993-2001  (the  fifth  takeover  wave).  While  the  means  of 
payment in takeovers has been a focal point in the takeover literature, what has been ignored is the 
analysis of how the takeover bid is financed and what its impact is on the expected value creation of 
the takeover. Using a unique dataset, we show that the external sources of financing (debt  and 
equity) are frequently employed in takeovers involving cash and mixed payments. Acquisitions with 
the same means of payment but different sources of transaction funding are quite different. For 
instance, the market reaction to the announcements of acquisitions fully paid with cash but financed 
by equity issues is similar to the market reaction to the announcements of acquisitions fully paid 
with  equity.  Moreover,  a  negative  price  revision  follows  the  announcement  of  any  corporate 
takeover involving equity financing (including cash-paid and mixed-paid takeovers). In contrast, this  
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price  correction  that  takes  place  subsequent  to  the  debt-financed  bids  is  insignificant.  The 
multinomial logit and nested logit analyses show that the decisions regarding the payment method 
and sources of takeover financing (conditional on the chosen means of payment) do not coincide. 
Instead, these decisions are made to solve different problems. We also document that the financing 
choices are very sensitive to the differences in the legal environment (regarding shareholder, creditor 
and minority shareholder protection as well as corporate transparency) across countries. 
Chapter six focuses on the regulatory environment surrounding corporate takeovers. This 
chapter provides a detailed description of the takeover regulation provisions in European countries 
and  their  evolution  over  the  last  15  years.  I  investigate  whether  the  recent  reforms  of  takeover 
regulation in Europe are leading to a harmonization of the national legislations. With the help of 150 
corporate governance lawyers from 30 European countries, I collected the main changes in takeover 
regulation.  I  assess  whether  a  process  of  convergence  towards  the  Anglo-(American)  corporate 
governance system has  been started and find that this is the case.  I make predictions as to the 
consequences  of  the  reforms  for  ownership  and  control.  However,  I  find  that,  while  in  some 
countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may result in dispersed ownership, in others it may 
further  consolidate  the  blockholder-based  system.  The  paper  is  published  in  Oxford  Review  of 
Economic Policy (2005).  
The final, seventh, chapter ‘A Corporate Governance Index: Convergence and Diversity of 
National  Corporate  Governance  Regulations’  has  further  developed  the  analysis  of  regulatory 
environment in Continental Europe and the UK. In this chapter we provide a detailed analysis of 
corporate governance regulatory systems and their evolution over the past 15 years. We construct a 
number  of  corporate  governance  indices,  which  capture  the  various  potential  agency  conflicts 
between  shareholder  and  managers,  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders,  between 
shareholders and bondholders etc. The 15-year time series of constructed indices and large country-
coverage (32 European countries and the US) enables us to draw conclusions about the convergence 




CHAPTER 2.  
 






It is now a well-known fact that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) come in waves. Golbe and 
White (1993) were among the first to empirically confirm the cyclical pattern of M&A activity. Thus 
far, five obvious waves have been examined in the literature: those of the early 1900s, the 1920s, the 
1960s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. Of these, the most recent wave was particularly remarkable in 
terms of size and geographical dispersion. For the first time, continental European firms were as 
eager to participate as their US and UK counterparts, and M&A activity in Europe hit levels similar 
to those experienced in the US. The figures by Thomson Financial Securities Data are no doubt 
commanding: the total number of American
1 and European
2 deals amounted respectively to 119,035 
and 116,925 over the 1990s, almost four (US) and nine (Europe) times more than during the fourth 
takeover wave of 1983-1989. This fifth wave is similarly impressive in monetary terms, with total 
(global) transaction value adding up to around US$20 trillion
3, more than five times the combined 
total for 1983-89. Since mid-2003, M&A activity has been on the rise since its abrupt decline in 
2001, which could well indicate that a new takeover wave is the making. This new hike in takeover 
activity raises many questions: Why do we observe a systematic rise and fall in M&A activity over 
time? Why do corporate managers herd in their takeover decisions? Is takeover activity fuelled by 
capital market developments? What caused the formation of conglomerate firms in the wave of the 
1960s and their de-conglomeration in the waves of the 1980s and 1990s? Why do we observe time- 
and country-clustering of hostile takeover activity?  And finally, does a transfer of control generate 
shareholder gains? We will later find that the answers to these questions are embedded both in 
economic and regulatory developments.  
Some existing surveys on takeover activity gather all available evidence on one particular 
wave  (e.g.  Jarrell,  Brickley  and  Netter,  1988;  Bruner,  2003).  In  this  chapter,  we  specifically 
concentrate on the determinants of M&A activity, and compile the findings for all five waves since 
the end of the 19
th century for the US, the UK as well as Continental Europe. We find that takeover 
activity is usually disrupted by a steep decline in stock markets and a subsequent period of economic 
                                                 
1 These include all takeover bids in which either a bidder or a target, or both are from the US. 
2 These include all takeover bids in which either a bidder or a target, or both are European. 
3 The figure stands for the total value of all domestic and cross-border M&As worldwide.  
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recession,  while  we  observe  considerable  heterogeneity  in  the  triggers  of  takeover  activity. 
Takeovers  usually  occur  in  periods  of  economic  recovery.  They  coincide  with  rapid  credit 
expansion, which in turn results from burgeoning external capital markets accompanied by stock 
market booms. The takeover market is also often fuelled by regulatory changes, such as anti-trust 
legislation in the early waves, or deregulation of markets in the 1980s. Finally, takeover waves are 
frequently driven by industrial and technological shocks. We also show that managers’ personal 
objectives can further influence takeover activity, to the extent that managerial hubris and herding 
behaviour increases during takeover waves, often leading to poor acquisitions.  
The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  we  provide  a  historical  overview  of 
takeover waves. Section 3 focuses on the theoretical models that explain the drivers of M&A activity 
and the clustering thereof. Section 4 reviews the existing empirical evidence on the rise and fall of 
M&A activity; we distinguish between the rational reasons for takeovers (like technological shocks), 
and the behavioural reasons (like agency problems, managerial hubris, and market timing). Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2. The history of takeover waves 
 
2.1 The early waves of the 1890s and the 1910s-1920s 
 
In the US, the history of takeover waves goes back to the 1890s.
4 O’Brien (1988) argues that 
the  first,  so-called  Great  Merger  Wave  was  triggered  by  an  economic  depression,  new  state 
legislations on incorporations, and the development of trading in industrial stocks on the NYSE. 
This  first  wave  was  largely  characterized,  both  in  the  US  and  Europe,  by  the  consolidation  of 
industrial production. Stigler (1950) describes this consolidation as ‘merging to form monopolies’. 
According to Lamoreaux (1985), these mergers were mainly motivated by the desire of the merging 
firms to reduce price competition rather than to exploit scale economies. Horizontal integration led 
to the creation of many giant companies which grabbed the bulk of market power in their respective 
industries.  The  Great  Merger  Wave  came  to  an  end  around  1903-05,  when  the  equity  market 
crashed. The First World War later kept M&A activity at a modest level until the late 1910s.    
The monopolization efforts that marked restructuring activity under the Great Merger Wave 
raised public concern. Around 1910, this translated into anti-trust legislation both in the US and 
Europe. Sudarsanam (2003) argues that the enforcement of these anti-trust laws was responsible for 
                                                 
4 While the early US merger waves are well documented, reliable evidence about M&As in Europe is only available 
from the early 1960s for the UK and from the beginning of the 1980s for the Continental Europe. Still, the lack of data 
and empirical studies about European takeovers prior to the 1960s does not necessarily mean that merger activity was 
not  present  in  that  period.  Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2004)  suggest  that  first  European  merger  wave  started 
approximately in 1880 and ended in 1904, parallel with the first US wave although the European wave was smaller 
than that of the US. As in the US, European M&A activity in that period was fuelled by the radical changes in 
technology and industrialisation processes.  
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the onset of the second takeover wave, which started in the late 1910s, continued through the 1920s, 
and collapsed in 1929 with the stock market crash and the ensuing worldwide depression. As anti-
trust  policy  was  aimed  at  cracking  monopolies,  dominant  firms  were  broken  up  and  their  parts 
divested.  Subsequently,  firms  focused  on  expansion  through  vertical  integration.  Stigler  (1950) 
assesses the second wave as a move towards an oligopolistic structure, as industries were no longer 
dominated by one giant firm but by two or more corporations. In contrast to the horizontal mergers 
of the first wave, which aimed at increasing market power, the horizontal mergers and the resulting 
holding companies/conglomerates of the 1920s focused on achieving economies of scale
5.  
 
2.2 The wave of the 1950s-1970s. 
 
The worldwide economic depression of the 1930s and the subsequent Second World War 
prevented the emergence of a new takeover wave for several decades. The third M&A wave took off 
only in the 1950s and lasted for nearly two decades. It peaked in 1968 and collapsed in 1973, when 
the oil crisis pushed the world economy into another recession. According to Sudarsanam (2003) the 
pattern of this third wave was different in the US and the UK: while US takeovers focused on 
diversification  and  the  development  of  large  conglomerates,  transactions  in  the  UK  emphasized 
horizontal integration.
6  
In the US, the beginning of the third M&A wave coincided with a tightening of the antitrust 
regime in 1950
7. Shleifer and Vishny (1991) claim that this regulatory reform largely contributed to 
US firms pursuing diversification objectives when undertaking M&As. The new antitrust regulation 
made horizontal expansion more problematic, leaving acquisition-minded firms with the only option 
of purchasing companies outside their own industries. However, Matsusaka (1996)  contests this 
conjecture  by  demonstrating  that  countries  without  a  tough  antitrust  policy,  such  as  Canada, 
Germany, and France, also experienced diversification waves in the 1960s. A primary reason for 
conglomerate strategies is given by Sudarsanam (2003): merging for growth
8. During the 1960s, 
companies were searching for growth opportunities in new product markets unrelated to their core 
business in order to enhance company value and reduce earnings volatility. Sudarsanam proposes 
that new managerial theories such as the multidivisional form (M-form) of organization developed 
                                                 
5 Detailed studies of the first and second merger waves can be found in e.g. Eis (1969), Markham (1955), Nelson (1959), 
Stigler (1950), Thorp (1941), and Weston (1961). 
6 Fairburn (1989) suggests that the industrial policy adopted in the UK during the 1960s was responsible for the high 
frequency of horizontal mergers in the 1960s. In 1964, the British government introduced a new policy promoting the 
creation of “national champions” which would be able to compete on world markets. The Industrial Reorganization 
Corporation (IRC) was founded to assist mergers of firms in the same line of business. The IRC could exempt merging 
firms from the antitrust scrutiny. In the following decade (1970s), the policy to promote national champions was 
abandoned and the focus was on conglomerate integration as in the US. 
7 In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act amended Section 7 of the 1914 Clayton Act to prevent anticompetitive mergers. 
8 See also Gort (1962), Rumelt (1974), Meeks (1977), Steiner (1975).  
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by  Chandler  (1962)  provided  much  inspiration  for  managers  to  seek  growth  objectives  through 
conglomerates mergers.  
Several  authors  starting  with  Williamson  (1970)  provide  alternative  explanations  for  the 
diversification  wave  observed  in  the  US.  First,  diversification  strategies  may  help  sidestep 
imperfections in the external capital markets. Bhide (1990) states that capital markets in the 1960s 
could not be relied upon to allocate resources efficiently. Hubbard and Palia (1999) add that ‘relative 
to the current period, there was less access by the public to computers, databases, analyst reports and 
other  sources  of  company-specific  information;  there  were  fewer  large  institutional  money 
managers; and the market for risky debt was illiquid. As access to external funds was often severely 
limited, companies tried to overcome fund-raising problems by developing internal capital markets. 
Better  monitoring,  informational  advantages,  reduced  costs  of  capital,  and  improved  resource 
allocation were believed to be the benefits of such internal capital markets. Furthermore, as the 
conglomerate structure allowed the reduction of earnings variability (Lewellen, 1971) and the risk of 
bankruptcy (Higgins and Schall, 1975; Shleifer and Vishny, 1992), a higher level of leverage could 
be sustained.  
Another explanation for diversification through takeovers is the ‘managerial synergy’ theory 
(Matsusaka, 1991). Managerial synergies are obtained if the expertise of the target management is 
complementary to that of the acquiring firms. A distinctive feature of M&A activity in the 1960s 
was that the number of acquisitions where the bidder retained the target management was high. 
Matsusaka  (1993)  interprets  this  as  evidence  supporting  the  managerial  synergy  theory,  which 
assumes  that  the  managerial  labour  market  in  the  1960s  was  riddled  with  inefficiencies,  costly 
enough to force companies to find managerial talent via the expensive mechanism of the takeover 
market.  
Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1991)  contribute  to  the  debate  on  the  drivers  of  the  conglomerate 
takeover  wave  by  asserting  that  the  third  merger  wave  was  also  largely  driven  by  the  personal 
objectives of managers. They consider diversification as the outgrowth of agency problems between 
managers and shareholders. Likewise, Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that managers diversify in 
order  to  decrease  their  companies’  earnings  volatility,  which  enhances  corporate  survival  and 
protects their own positions. In addition, if the managerial compensation scheme is based on growth 
benchmarks, managers are incentivized to pursue diversifying acquisitions (possibly at the expense 
of  corporate  value).  Therefore,  Jensen  (1986)  argues  in  favour  of  returning  free  cash  flow  to 
shareholders, rather than overinvesting in value-destroying projects that foster diversification. The 
common feature of the agency models is that managers forgo the value maximization objective and 
acquire (unrelated) businesses in order to pursue their personal interests.
9  
                                                 
9 This is also in line with Donaldson and Lorsch (1993), Donaldson (1994), and Jensen (1986, 1993) who argue that, 
prior to the 1980s, managers had insufficient incentives to focus on shareholder concerns.  
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Some empirical evidence seems to  contradict the agency view. Markets were sometimes 
found to react consistently positively to diversification announcements. This suggests that markets 
looked favourably upon some diversification strategies, and did not seem to oppose (or be aware of) 
acquisitions associated with potentially high agency costs.  
In sum, the above studies show that there is no unique explanation for the third wave of 
mergers  and  acquisitions,  or  its  peculiar  diversification  pattern  observed  in  the  US
10.  Unrelated 
diversifications  in  the  1960s  are  attributed  to  aggressive  antitrust  regulation,  underdeveloped 
external capital markets, weak shareholders control mechanisms, and inefficiencies in the labour 
market, along with political, economic, social and technological developments.  
 
2.3 The wave of the 1980s 
 
The fourth takeover wave started in 1981, when the stock market had recovered from the 
preceding economic recession, and ended in 1989. The wave was set off by changes in antitrust 
policy, the deregulation of the financial services sector, the creation of new financial instruments and 
markets (e.g. the junk bond market), as well as technological progress in the electronics industry. 
The market for corporate control was characterized by an unprecedented number of divestitures, 
hostile  takeovers,  and  going-private  transactions  (leveraged  buyouts  (LBOs)  and  management 
buyouts (MBOs)).  
Bhagat et al. (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explain how the fourth takeover wave 
emerged  with  the  reversal  of  the  previous  wave’s  inefficient  unrelated  diversifications.  A  less 
stringent antitrust environment, more competitive capital markets, and improved shareholder control 
mechanisms  stimulated  companies  to  de-diversify  and  refocus  on  core  business  (Blair,  1993). 
Moreover, when companies failed to recognize the flawed nature of their diversification strategies, 
or were not fast enough to refocus their operations, hostile raiders were ready to do the restructuring 
job for them.  
Supporters of the internal capital market explanation for the conglomerate wave of the 1960s 
argue that, as a consequence of economic, technological, and regulatory changes during the 1980s, 
the external capital market had become more efficient. Hence, the cost of external finance had fallen 
such that internal capital markets became an unnecessary and costly configuration (Bhide, 1990). 
The presence of an inefficient internal capital market was often considered to be responsible for the 
conglomerate discount (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995).  
In addition to the problems induced by internal capital markets, the earlier conglomerate 
wave had become associated with a number of further issues, such as rent-seeking behaviour by 
divisional  managers  (Scharfstein  and  Stein,  2000),  bargaining  problems  within  the  firm  (Rajan, 
                                                 
10 For additional explanations of the motives underlying the third takeover wave: see the early studies e.g. Lintner 
(1971), Lynch (1971), Markham (1973), Nelson (1966), Reid (1968), and Steiner (1975).  
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Servaes and Zingales, 2000), or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). These disadvantages of 
diversification  may  have  outweighed  the  alleged  advantage  of  internal  cross-subsidisation  and 
forced companies to re-organize in the 1980s. 
Another reason why the conglomerate structure was increasingly perceived to be inefficient 
was its inflexibility to react to industry shocks (Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996).
11 These shocks were 
caused by deregulation, political events, social policy changes, and economic factors. For instance, 
the air transport and broadcasting sectors were deregulated in the early 1980s, when long-standing 
barriers for mergers and consolidation were removed. After the introduction of a new reimbursement 
policy in 1983 in the US, the medical services and pharmaceuticals sectors experienced intense 
takeover activity to take advantage of cost reductions. A wave of corporate restructuring in the oil 
sector was triggered by political events such as the OPEC embargo in 1973 and the Iranian oil 
export cut-off in 1979. Restructuring in the food-processing sector was triggered by the low rate of 
population growth in the 1980s, which pushed firms to sell excess capacity.  
Holmström and Kaplan (2001) conclude that a combination of industrial shocks, the limiting 
of managerial discretion, and the trend of deconglomeration were responsible for the takeover wave 
of the 1980s. The surge in takeover activity was further catalysed by the intensifying disclosure of 
corporate information to the market, which also forced companies to focus on the maximization of 
shareholder  value.  According  to  Donaldson  (1994),  the  prime  driver  of  takeovers  in  the  de-
diversification wave was the emergence of empowered institutional investors and the shift in power 
from corporate stakeholders to shareholders. This was also reflected by the high incidence of hostile 
takeovers. Holmström and Kaplan (2001) regard hostile takeovers and going-private transactions of 
the  1980s  as  the  main  corporate  governance  mechanisms  necessary  to  reduce  agency-related 
corporate  inefficiencies.  However,  the  success  of  these  governance  devices  and  costly  forms  of 
corporate  restructuring  would  not  have  been  possible  without  the  increased  availability  of  debt 
financing, through banks and the liquid junk bond market. Not only did increased leverage make 
more  M&A  deals  possible,  but  also  inflicted  more  discipline  on  management  and  reduced  the 
agency problems associated with high free cash flow.   
 
2.4 The wave of the 1990s 
 
The fifth takeover wave started in 1993. Like all previous waves, it surged along with an 
economic boom and halted as a consequence of the equity market collapse in 2000. The magnitude 
of the fifth wave (1993-2001) is unprecedented both in terms of takeover value and the number of 
M&A deals. According to the Thomson Financial Securities Data, during this wave, 119035 M&A 
deals were recorded in the US and 116925 deals in Europe (including the UK). By contrast, there 
                                                 
11 See Jensen (1986), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), Jensen (1993), Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), Andrade and 
Stafford (2004), and Harford (2004).  
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were only 34494 and 12729 such transactions in the US and Europe, respectively, during the fourth 
merger wave (1983-89). The fifth wave is impressive in monetary terms as well, since its total 
(global) value added up to US$20 trillion, more than five times the combined total of the fourth 
wave.  
A first striking feature of the fifth takeover wave is its international nature. Remarkably, the 
European  wave  was  about  as  large  as  its  US  counterpart,  and  an  Asian  takeover  market  also 
emerged. Second, a substantial proportion of M&As were cross-border transactions, reflecting the 
growing globalisation of product, services, and capital markets. Domestically-oriented companies 
resorted to takeovers abroad as a means to survive the tough international competition created by 
global markets. Expansion abroad also allowed companies to exploit differences in tax systems, and 
to capture rents resulting from market inefficiencies such as national controls over labour markets. 
Third,  trends  such  as  deregulation  and  privatisation  triggered  cross-border  acquisitions  in  the 
financial, utilities, and telecom sectors. Fourth, the exorbitant costs of R&D research and the fact 
that its payoff only emerges over the long run gave further boost to international takeovers in high 
tech industries, biochemistry, and pharmaceutics.  
The Thomson Financial Securities Database shows that during the fifth wave, both cross-
border and domestic M&A activity tended to occur between firms in related industries. Although the 
number  of  divestitures  in  the  1990s  remained  high,  their  proportion  in  M&A  deals  gradually 
decreased. The dominance of industry-related (both horizontal and vertical) takeovers and the steady 
decline in the relative number of divestitures during the fifth wave indicate that the main takeover 
motive  was  not  specialization  or  corporate  restructuring  but  rather  growth  to  participate  in 
globalized markets. Andrade and Stafford (2001) confirm that the takeover activity during the fourth 
wave is predominantly motivated by industry restructuring in response to emerging excess capacity, 
whereas the 1990s merger activity appears to involve more frequently companies with high capacity 
utilization.    
Expansion, often taking the form of mega-deals, requires substantial financing and forces 
cash-constrained firms to issue equity or debt. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) emphasize the relation 
between the bull market of the 1990s and the overwhelming use of equity as a method of payment in 
M&A deals. Overvalued bidders used equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) 
targets. This suggests that the so-called mispricing premium was an important source of value in 
M&As of this period. In addition, the market for corporate bonds grew rapidly in the 1990s. Low 
bank interest rates and a more receptive bank attitude toward risky borrowers also facilitated deal 
making during the merger wave. Jensen (2004) also associates M&A activity in the late 1990s with 
the financial markets boom. He describes how overvaluation pushed managers to make takeover 
bids even if these deals did not create synergistic or other benefits: when the market values the stock 
price  above  the  future  performance  expected  by  management,  it  is  encouraged  to  undertake  
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acquisitions. This merger-for-growth trap is nicely illustrated by DeJong et al. (2005) for the Dutch 
multinational Ahold. 
The number of hostile bids
12 in the UK and US significantly fell in the 1990s compared to 
the  takeover  wave  of  the  1980s,  according  to  the  Thomson  Financial  Securities  Database.  This 
decline in hostile takeover activity can also be attributed to the bull market, as target shareholders 
are more prone to accept a takeover bid when their shares are overpriced. A second important reason 
for the reduction in hostile takeover activity was the regulatory changes that took place in the late 
1980s. The increasing use of anti-takeover measures in some US states such as Delaware made 
hostile acquisitions virtually impossible. Holmström and Kaplan (2001) also suggest a third reason: 
that hostile takeovers are no longer needed as a corporate governance device, given that there are a 
sufficient number of alternative governance mechanisms (e.g. stock options, shareholder activism, 
non-executive director monitoring) that encourage management to focus on shareholder value, and 
to voluntarily restructure when necessary. It is notable that in contrast to the UK and US, the number 
of  hostile  bids  in  Continental  Europe  actually  increased  over  the  1990s.  Interestingly,  hostile 
takeover activity emerged even in countries where it had been completely absent.   
Overall,  it  is  widely  believed  that  the  globalisation  process,  technological  innovation, 
deregulation and privatisation, as well as the financial markets boom spurred the fifth M&A wave. 
The recent literature suggests that takeovers were mainly preoccupied with cost cutting, expanding 
into new markets, or exploiting a mispricing premium. However, an increasing number of empirical 
studies provide evidence that many M&A deals undertaken in the late 1990s actually destroyed 
value (e.g. Moeller et al., 2005). This confirms that many of those transactions suffered from the 
agency problem induced by the overvaluation of equity.   
 
2.5 A new wave?  
 
Since mid-2003, takeover activity (including a large number of cross-border deals) has again 
picked up in the US, Europe, and Asia continuing the international industry consolidation of the 
1990s. The takeover wave coincides with the gradual recovery of economic and financial markets 
after the downturn that began in 2000. According to the Thomson Financial Database, the volume of 
M&As  rose  by  71%  in  2004  compared  to  2002.  In  2004,  the  acquisitions  by  US  companies 
amounted to US$ 1.1 trillion from US$ 517 billion in 2002. European M&A activity follows a 
similar trend. The value of takeover announcements by European bidders totalled to US$ 758 billion 
in 2004 overtaking the value of US$ 517 billion in 2002. Since the beginning of 2002 until the 
middle of 2005, cross-border acquisitions account for more than 43% of the total value of all M&As 
                                                 
12 One should be cautious about statements on the degree of hostility: Schwert (2000) shows that the definition and 
number of hostile takeovers vary across databases.   
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by European bidders and 13% of the total value of all M&As by American firms.
13 The annual 
volume of cross-border takeovers by Chinese companies has grown spectacularly over the last 3 
years, from about US$ 3 billion in all of 2002 to almost US$ 19 billion in the first half of 2005.  
The telecom sector experiences an intensive M&A activity. At least 10 takeovers between 
the largest European telecom operators
14 have been consummated in the first part of 2005, 8 of 
which were cross-border affaires. American telecom companies are consolidating
15 as well, although 
they remain focused on domestic market. Apart from the telecom sector, hectic takeover activity is 
seen in the oil and gas, retail, pharmaceutical, utilities, and sport clothes industries.
16  
In contrast to the 1990s and 1980s, the recent hostile takeover activity in the US and Europe 
is at its lowest level. Thomson Financial Database records 28 contested takeover attempts launched 
by US acquirers in 2002-2005. In contrast, there were 229 American hostile bids in the first three 
years of the previous wave (1993-1996), and 217 in the beginning of the fourth wave (1983-1986). 
Similarly, the European acquirers seem to prefer friendly negotiations to the aggressive bidding. 
Since the beginning of 2002, the total number of hostile bids in Europe amounts to 32 (17 of which 
are  in  the  UK),  notably  less  than  106  and  62  bids  during  the  periods  1993-96  and  1983-86, 
respectively. Also, hostile takeovers emerge in Japan
17 and China.
18       
Although it is early to  draw conclusions on the driving  forces behind this new wave of 
takeovers, some trends are already emerging. First, growth in takeover activity is largely being fed 
by transactions that had been delayed in the preceding period due to the downturn of  financial 
markets and increased uncertainty following the September 11
th terrorist attacks. Second, companies 
that have been unable to digest the market crash of 2000 have, or may become potential targets. The 
supply of potential target firms has also been increased by some governments selling important share 
                                                 
13 The number of cross-border acquisitions account for almost 40% of the all bids made by European bidders and nearly 
20% of the bids made by US firms.  
14 These include, a merger between KPN and Telfort (both the Netherlands); acquisition of Meteor by Eircom (both 
Ireland), of Wind (Italy) by an Egyptian consortium, of Song (Sweden) by TDC (Denmark), of Amena (Spain) by 
France Telecom (France), of Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri (Turkey) by TeliaSonera (Sweden), of several Czech and 
Romanian mobile operators by Vodafone (the UK), and of Cesky Telecom (Czech Republic) by Telefonica (Spain).  
15 Among the largest US bids are takeovers of MCI (the former WorldCom) by Verizon (a former subsidiary spun out of 
AT&T), and of AT&T by SBC Communications.  
16 In August 2005, Adidas announced the acquisition of Reebok. The market expects that, as a response to the Adidas-
Reebok bid, the two firms’ industry rival Nike would shortly announce the acquisition of Puma (The Economist, 6 
Aug 2005). 
17 An unprecedented hostile takeover battle has been seen in Japan in 2005. Livedoor, a fast-growing Internet firm, has 
bought a controlling stake in Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS). To dilute the stake of the rival and oppose the bid, 
NBS issued poison pills. Livedoor launched a lawsuit against NBS. The battle was complicated by an occurrence of a 
competing bid by Softbank Investment, an affiliate of the Japanese internet empire Softbank, which was publicly 
believed to be a white knight, although the company’s directors denied this (The Economist, 31 Mar 2005). For a 
discussion on the emerging Japanese hostile takeover market, its drivers, and consequences for regulatory reforms see 
Milhaupt (2005).    
18 On February 18 2005, China’s top Internet company Shanda Interactive Entertainment announced that it had acquired 
a stake of 19.5% and is going for control in Sina.com, one of the biggest web portal in the country. In response, Sina 
issues  a  poison  pill  to  dilute  Shanda’s  acquired  stake.  Both  the  aggressive  bidding  strategy  and  the  target  firm 
opposition to the bid were unprecedented for the Chinese industry (The Economist, 24 Feb 2005).   
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stakes in major national companies. This is especially the case in Asia (more specifically in China). 
Third, the growth in M&As is spurred by the fact that cash-rich firms seek opportunities to expand 
into new markets. Finally, private equity investments have  also soared, in the retail industry in 
particular.  
 
2.6 Summary of historical overview 
 
This  historical  overview  has  demonstrated  that  each  M&A  wave  is  characterised  by  a 
different set of underlying motives. A number of common factors can nonetheless be found. First, all 
waves occur in periods of economic recovery (following a market crash and economic depression 
caused  by  war,  an  energy  crisis  etc.).  Second,  the  waves  coincide  with  periods  of  rapid  credit 
expansion and booming stock markets. It is notable that all five waves ended with the collapse of 
stock  markets.  Hence,  it  seems  that  a  burgeoning  external  capital  market  is  an  indispensable 
condition for a takeover wave to emerge. Third, takeover waves are preceded by industrial and 
technological shocks often in form of technological and financial innovations, supply shocks (such 
as oil price shocks), deregulation, and increased foreign competion. Finally, takeovers often occur in 
periods when regulatory changes (e.g. related to anti-trust or takeover defence mechanisms) take 
place. 
 
3. Theoretical explanations for M&A clustering 
 
In the previous section, we described the trends in and main characteristics of M&A activity 
for a period extending over more than a century. We now turn to the theoretical models which 
attempt to capture the motives for takeovers.  
Broadly speaking, the theories on takeover waves can be classified into three groups. First, 
neoclassical models suggest that takeover waves emerge due to industrial, economic, political, or 
regulatory shocks. A second group of models propose that takeover clustering is driven by self-
interested managerial decisions, based on herding, hubris, and agency problems. Finally, a third 
group of more recent models attribute takeovers to the development of capital markets, and propose 
that waves occur as a result of (over)valuation-related timing by management.   
 
3.1 Neoclassical models 
 
The neoclassical explanation of M&A-clustering hinges on rational economic factors that 
motivate many firms to restructure simultaneously. This view dates back at least to Coase (1937), 
who argues that takeover activity is a response to technological change. Gort (1969) adds economic 
disturbances  such  as  a  disequilibrium  in  product  markets,  which  stimulates  whole  industries  to  
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restructure. Jensen (1993) states that technological and supply shocks result in excess productive 
capacity in many industries that ought to reduce this excess capacity by way of mergers. Building on 
the  insights  of  Gort  (1969),  Jovanovic  and  Rousseau  (2001,  2002)  develop  the  Q-theory  of 
takeovers. The theory proposes that economic and technological change causes a higher degree of 
dispersion of corporate growth opportunities (measured by Q-ratios). This triggers the reallocation 
of capital to more productive firms and more efficient management.  
Sudarsanam  (2003)  develops  a  taxonomy  which  contains  the  above  theories  but  also 
incorporates the Political, Economic, Social, and Technical dimensions (PEST) influencing M&As. 
As examples of such changes, he cites tax reforms, reinforcement of anti-trust rules, deregulation, 
and  privatisation.  This  comprehensive  overview  explains  why  we  observe  different  patterns  of 
takeover activity such as the trend of monopolization in the early 1900s, the creation of holding 
companies in the 1920s, the diversification trend in the 1960s, deconglomeration in the 1980s, and 
the process of globalisation in the 1990s. 
Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2004) extend the incomplete contracting models of Hart and 
Moore  (1990)  and  Hart  (1995).  This  literature  predicts  that  a  takeover  occurs  when  there  are 
significant  complementarities  between  firms’  assets,  and  when  a  takeover  hold-up  problem  and 
underinvestment  result  from  incomplete  contracting.
19  Rhodes-Kropf  and  Robinson  claim  that 
shocks augmenting the assets’ complementarities across firms increase takeover activity.  
A small formal literature explains the emergence of takeover waves by a combination of 
industry-specific  or  regulatory  shocks,  and  the  availability  of  sufficiently  low  cost  capital.  For 
instance, Harford (1999) stresses the importance of a reduction in financial constraints: his model 
predicts that M&As occur when companies build up large cash reserves or when their access to 
external financing is eased. As this is most likely to happen in periods of capital market growth, 
takeover clustering occurs in such periods.  
The models in this section explain takeover clustering by industry, by country, and through 
time, by way of considering the simultaneous responses of firms to specific shocks, namely the 
competition for the best combination of assets. Alternatively, takeover waves can result from the fact 
that  firms  respond  sequentially  to  the  actions  of  their  competitors.  Thus,  a  series  of  successful 
M&As wets other firms’ appetite to do a takeover, whereas a series of unsuccessful takeovers leads 
to the decline in takeover activity (Persons and Warther, 1997).  
 
3.2 Hubris, herding, and agency problem models 
 
                                                 
19  When  two  parties  have  complementary  projects,  they  must  reach  agreement  to  get  a  sufficient  return  on  their 
individual projects. Given that incomplete contracts cannot deal with possible opportunistic behaviour by either party, 
a merger may eliminate such behaviour and any holdup problems resulting from a costly bargaining process.  
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As  the  empirical  literature  concludes  that  a  significant  proportion  of  M&As  destroys 
corporate value, some theoretical models attempt to explain this phenomenon by including irrational 
managerial decision-making or managerial self-dealing in the M&A process.  
Jensen  (1986,  2004)  gives  an  agency  explanation  for  the  existence  of  value-destroying 
takeovers:  the  overcapacity  generated  by  industrial  shocks  or  by  booming  financial  markets. 
Managerial hubris is the key element in Roll’s (1986) explanation of value-destroying takeovers: 
overconfident managers overestimate the creation of synergetic value.  This hubris hypothesis in 
combination with herding
20 is also able to explain the cyclical patterns in M&A activity. Herding 
predicts that firms tend to mimic the actions of a leader. In the case of a takeover wave, the first 
successful takeovers encourage other companies to undertake similar transactions. Since the main 
motive for the other companies is to mimic the actions of the leader rather than take action based on 
a  clear  economic  rationale,  most  of  their  takeovers  suffer  from  managerial  hubris.  Hence,  the 
combination of herding and hubris predicts that inefficient takeovers follow efficient ones.  
Auster  and  Sirower  (2002)  develop  a  behavioural  explanation  for  takeover  waves.  They 
argue that these are composed of three distinct stages: development, diffusion, and dissipation. The 
interaction between macro factors and a competitive environment determines the way a takeover 
wave develops. First, changes in the macro and competitive environment augment the uncertainty 
and  increase  the  likelihood  that  takeovers  occur.  Second,  reports  of  positive  results  of  initial 
takeovers promote M&A transactions. In the third stage of a takeover wave, limited information 
processing, hubris, and managerial self-interest fuel the diffusion of M&As. Once it becomes clear 
to the market that M&A activity  yields negative economic outcomes, takeover activity declines 
rapidly.  
In  contrast,  the  model  by  Gorton,  Kahl,  and  Rosen  (2000)  shows  that  value-destroying 
takeovers can also precede a wave of profitable ones. Key in this model is that managers prefer 
keeping their firms independent. Managers use an active takeover policy as a defensive mechanism 
in order not to be taken over themselves. The authors conclude that a defensive (and to some extent 
inefficient) takeover wave may occur when managers anticipate an effective takeover wave in the 
near future.  
 
3.3 Market timing models 
 
Two  recent  theoretical  papers  develop  models  in  which  takeover  waves  result  from 
managerial timing.
21 In line with Myers and Majluf (1984), managers take advantage of a temporary 
                                                 
20 Examples of herding models in finance: Scharftein and Stein (1990), Graham (1999), Boot, Milbourn and Thakor 
(1999). Devenow and Welch (1996) provide an excellent survey of papers on rational herding in financial markets.  
21 For a well-structured survey of literature on market timing and other behavioral corporate finance phenomena see 
Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004).  
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overvaluation of equity during financial market booms, to use it as cheap currency for acquiring real 
assets.  
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that clustering in takeover activity occurs because financial 
bull  markets  tend  to  overvalue  stocks  in  the  short  run,  and  the  degree  of  overvaluation  varies 
significantly across companies. Hence, the management of the bidding firm takes the opportunity to 
buy the real assets of a less overvalued target firm using their own overvalued equity. The bidder 
takes advantage of the mispricing premium over the longer term, when the overvaluation will be 
corrected. The model hinges on the assumption that target managers maximize their own short-term 
private benefits. This explains why they are willing to accept an all-equity bid even if it is at the 
detriment  of  (long-term  oriented)  target  shareholders.  Overall,  the  model  predicts  that  takeover 
waves are pro-cyclical in relation to the stock market value, because managers of the overvalued 
companies take advantage of the window of opportunity offered by temporary market inefficiencies.  
Although the model by Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanatan (2004) leads to similar predictions, it 
departs from the previous model in that target managers maximize shareholder wealth and rationally 
accept overvalued equity in a takeover offer. The reason why target managers accept such an offer 
results from the fact that uncertainty about takeover gains is correlated with the overall uncertainty 
in the market. In other words, targets accept all-equity bids, because their managers also tend to 
overvalue potential takeover synergies as a consequence of overpricing in a soaring equity market. 
The  number  of  misvalued  bids  is  expected  to  increase  with  booming  financial  markets,  when 
uncertainty about the true value of firms is especially pronounced, and better-informed bidders can 
exploit their informational advantage at the expense of less-informed targets.   
 
3.4 Summary of theoretical explanations for takeover waves 
 
Takeover  activity  occurs  as  a  result  of  external  economic,  technological,  financial, 
regulatory, and political shocks. When takeovers are a response to such shocks and managers take 
the shareholders’ interests at heart, M&A activity is expected to lead to profit optimisation and 
shareholder value creation. In contrast, models which explicitly include herding, managerial hubris, 
and other agency costs allow for the possibility that value destroying takeovers follow M&As which 
create value.  
 
4. Empirical evidence on the drivers of takeover activity 
 
This section addresses the question of whether or not the theoretical predictions of Section 3 
are empirically supported. For this purpose, we survey the existing empirical evidence on M&A 




4.1 Profitability of takeovers 
 
The empirical literature on M&A profitability is extensive. Each takeover wave has inspired 
academic researchers such that, since the beginning of the 20
th century, hundreds of papers have 
been published on this topic. Several surveys help overview the literature: Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
on M&As prior to 1980; Jarrell et al. (1988) on the 1980s takeover wave; Bruner (2003) on the 
1990s wave; and Sudarsanam (2003) covering studies over several decades in his M&A handbook. 
In this section, we complement the earlier surveys and focus on new insights. 
 
4.1.1 Benchmarking takeover gains 
To determine the success of a takeover, one can take several perspectives. First, we can 
evaluate  M&As  from  the  perspective  of  the  target’s  shareholders,  the  bidders’  shareholders,  or 
calculate the combined shareholder effect. Second, a wider range of stakeholders is affected by the 
takeover,  e.g.  bondholders,  managers,  employees,  and  consumers.  As  the  interests  of  these 
stakeholders diverge, a takeover may be beneficial for one type of stakeholder but detrimental for 
other types. Finance theory usually considers shareholder wealth as the primary objective, because 
shareholders are the residual investors of the company and a focus on shareholder value yields an 
efficient evaluation criterion.  
Event  studies  analysing  short-term  shareholder  wealth  effects  constitute  the  dominant 
approach in the  field since the 1970s.
22 The approach hinges on the assumption that the M&A 
announcement brings new information to the market, such that investors’ expectations about the 
firm’s prospects are updated and reflected in the share price. An abnormal return is equal to the 
difference  between  the  realized  returns  and  an  expected  (benchmark)  return,  which  would  be 
generated in case the takeover bid would not have taken place. The most common benchmarks are 
calculated using asset pricing models such as the market model, or the Fama-French-Cahart four-
factor model. A similar approach is applied to assess the long-term shareholder wealth effects of 
M&As, but this has several disadvantages. First, over longer periods it is more difficult to isolate the 
takeover effect, as many other strategic and operational decisions or changes in the financial policy 
with an impact on the share price may have meanwhile arisen. Second, the benchmark performance 
often  suffers  from  measurement  or  statistical  problems  (Barber  and  Lyon,  1997).
23  Third,  most 
methods rely on the assumption of financial market efficiency, which predicts that the effect of 
mergers should be fully incorporated in the announcement date returns and not in the long-term 
abnormal returns. This implies that a negative or positive long-term wealth effect occurs as the 
                                                 
22 The first paper to use the event study methodology (albeit in the different context of stock splits) was Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969). 
23 See also Fama (1998), Barber et al. (1999), Brav (2000), Brav et al. (2000), and Loughran and Ritter (2000) for a 
discussion of the various methods. The commonly accepted methodology is the firm-matching approach of Barber and 
Lyon (1997).  
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market  corrects  its  initially  inefficient  predictions.  Therefore,  if  the  long-term  wealth  effect  is 
significant, one could conclude that the analysis of the short-term wealth effect is misleading, as the 
market is inefficient in the short-run. 
Apart from abnormal returns measured over the short and long run, some studies calculate 
the operating performance of the merging firms. This usually consists of a comparison of accounting 
measures prior and subsequent to takeover. Such measures include: net income, sales, number of 
employees, return on assets or equity, EPS, leverage, firm liquidity, profit margins, and others. The 
Achilles heel of this approach is that operating performance is not only affected by the takeover but 
also by a host of other factors. To isolate the takeover effect, the literature suggests an adjustment 
for the industry trend. Alternatively, one could match the M&A sample by size and market-to-book 
ratio with non-merging companies, and examine whether merging companies outperform their non-
merging peers prior and subsequent to the bid.  
 
4.1.2 Short-term wealth effects  
The empirical literature is unanimous in its conclusion that takeovers create value for the 
target  and  bidder  shareholders  combined,  with  the  majority  of  the  gains  accruing  to  the  target 
shareholders. The evidence on the wealth effects for the bidder shareholders is mixed; some reap 
small positive abnormal returns whereas others suffer (small) losses. Table 1 gives an overview of 
64 studies that have reported the abnormal returns around takeover announcements. The findings in 
the table refer to successful domestic M&As between non-financial companies.
24 Panels A, B, and C 
summarize the evidence related to the third, fourth, and fifth waves, respectively, while panel D 
presents the results of studies comparing several takeover waves.  
 
Target-firm stockholder return 
Table 1 shows that the share prices of target firms significantly increase at and around the 
announcement of a bid. Eckbö (1983) and Eckbö and Langohr (1989) report the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAARs) of the announcement day and the subsequent day. They show that these 
CAARs amount to 6% for the US and 16% for France, respectively. Panels B and C of Table A-1 
show that the size of the announcement effects is similar for the fourth and fifth takeover wave. 
Goergen  and  Renneboog  (2004),  for  example,  report  that  target  shareholders  in  large  European 
takeovers gain 9% on the announcement day during the fifth takeover wave. Andrade, Mitchell and 
Stafford (2001) test the differences between the target returns of the three most recent takeover 
waves, and confirm that these differences are not statistically significant.  
Schwert (1996) shows that the share price reactions of target shareholders are not limited to 
the announcement day but commence already 42 working days prior the initial public announcement 
                                                 
24 We exclude the studies analysing unsuccessful, financial, and cross-border M&As to enhance comparability across 
studies.   
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of  the  bid.  Six  studies  report  that  the  price  run-up  is  substantial  and  often  even  exceeds  the 
announcement effect itself: the run-up amounts to 13.3% to 21.78% over a period of one month prior 
the bid. These returns imply that the bids are anticipated, and result from rumours, information 
leakages, or insider trading.  
 
Table A-1. Short-term effects around M&A announcements. 
 
This table presents the  market reaction to M&A announcements. The results are for successful domestic takeovers 
between non-financial firms. The following notation is used.  
Types of mergers and acquisitions: T - tender offer, M - merger, MA - M&As, HMA - horizontal M&A, VMA - vertical 
M&A,  RMA - related M&A (non-conglomerate), UMA  - unrelated M&A (conglomerate or diversification),  A  - 
acquisition, FA - friendly acquisition, HA - hostile acquisition, Stock - all-stock offer, Cash - all-cash offer, Mixed - 
combination of stock and cash offer, Public (Pub) - Target company is public, Private (Priv) - Target company is 
private.  
Benchmark Return Models: MM - Market model; MAM - Market-adjusted model; CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing model; 
BMCP -Beta-matched control portfolio (CRSP); FFM - Fama-French Model; VPE -Valuation Prediction Error; PSM - 
Probability Scaling Method; TTA - Thin-trade adjusted; EV/PA - The ratio of the change in the bidder equity value to 
the acquisition price; SBM - size and book-to-market ratio matched portfolio, following the Lyon and Barber (1996) 
methodology. ‘Close’ refers to the date when the target is delisted from trading on public exchanges 
Sample size: T/B/C stands for the number of observations for Target firms/Bidding firms/Combined firms respectively. 
If the three samples have the same number of observations, only one number is reported.  
Significance level: * - significance is not reported; a/b/c - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Panel B: Fourth Takeover Wave, 1981-1989 
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Panel C: Fifth Takeover Wave, 1993-2001 
Kohers and Kohers (2000), 
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Panel D: Takeover Waves Comparison 
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Table A-1 also reports that abnormal returns of target firms measured over a holding period 
of two weeks surrounding the announcement date range from 14 to 44%. The two-week abnormal 
returns are significantly different across the decades. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and Bhagat et 
al. (2004) show that these returns amount to 18-19% over the 1960s, 32-35% over the 1980s, and 
32-45% over the period 1990-2001. Changes in insider trading and takeover regulation introduced in 
the US in the late 1960s and 1980s may account for this difference.  
Thirteen studies included in Table A-1 analyse the abnormal returns from the first public 
announcement through the subsequent month or until the day on which the takeover is completed 
(all the shares are acquired), whichever is the latest. Table A-1 indicates that the magnitude of the 
post-announcement abnormal gains is similar across all takeover waves. US target firms realize 
statistically  significant  abnormal  gains  of  16  to  22%  in  friendly  M&As  over  the  first  month 
subsequent  to  the  first public  announcement.  On  average,  UK  target  firms  outperform  their  US 
counterparts  over  the  same  period,  as  they  realize  post-announcement  returns  of  18  to  32%. 
Expectedly,  target  shareholders  in  successful  but  initially  hostile  M&As  were  offered  higher 
premiums.  When  a  hostile  bid  is  made,  the  target  share  price  immediately  incorporates  the 
expectation that opposition to the bid will lead to upward revisions of the offer price. Servaes (1991) 
demonstrates for the US that hostile bids trigger a CAAR of almost 32%, whereas the wealth effects 
amount to only 22% for friendly bids. Likewise, Franks and Mayer (1996) find post-announcement 
CAARs of almost 30% for hostile UK bids versus 18% for friendly ones.   
 When  Schwert  (1996),  Franks  and  Harris  (1989),  partition  the  sample  of  takeovers  into 
tender offers and mergers, they find that target shareholders earn substantially higher premiums in 
tender offers. Accordingly, since the means of payment in mergers is usually equity while cash bids 
prevail in tender offers, they also find that all-cash bids are more profitable for target shareholders 
than  are  all-equity  ones.  However,  even  within  each  takeover  subsample  (mergers,  friendly 
acquisitions,  tender  offers),  Franks,  Harris  and  Titman  (1991),  Andrade,  Mitchell  and  Stafford 
(2001), and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show evidence that all-equity bids trigger lower target 
returns than all-cash bids.  
Rossi and Volpin (2004) show that legal environment and takeover regulation are important 
determinants of the takeover gains (measured as a bid price over target market value 4 weeks before  
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the  announcement).  They  report  that  takeover  premiums  are  higher  in  countries  with  higher 
shareholder protection and in countries where the mandatory bid requirement is enforced by law.    
Finally, the empirical literature offers no conclusive evidence on whether or not abnormal 
returns  to  target  shareholders  differ  between  takeovers  of  related  firms  and  those  of  unrelated, 
diversifying firms (Maquieira, Megginson and Nail, 1998). In contrast, Martynova and Renneboog 
(2006) document that the shareholders of target firms yield substantially higher abnormal returns in 
conglomerate mergers than in industry-related mergers (32% versus 24% over six-month window 
centred on the bid announcement day).  
 
Bidding-firm stockholder returns 
There is a considerable contrast between the large share price returns of target firms and the 
frequently negligible returns of bidding firms. Indeed, immediately around the announcement bidder 
shareholders realize abnormal returns insignificantly different from zero. For takeovers during the 
1960s and 1970s, Asquith (1983) and Eckbö (1983) report positive abnormal returns of 0.2% and 
0.1%, respectively (Panel A of Table A-1); for the late 1970s and the 1980s, Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny  (1990),  Byrd  and  Hickman  (1992),  and  Chang  (1998)  report  negative  abnormal  returns 
ranging from –1.2% to –0.7% (Panel B); and for takeovers occurring in the 1990s wave (panel C), 
17 studies are split almost evenly between positive and negative returns. The fact that all these gains 
and losses are statistically insignificant and do not differ across takeover waves is confirmed by the 
comparative study of Andrade, Mitchell and Stafford (2001).  
The  share  price  run-up  prior  to  a  takeover  announcement  over  a  one-month  period  is 
positive,  but  mostly  insignificant  for  bidder  shareholders.  For  the  third  wave,  Dodd (1980)  and 
Dennis and McConnell (1986) report that the abnormal bidder gains are close to zero (Panel A of 
Table A-1). Smith and Kim (1994) and Schwert (1996) arrive at analogous (insignificant) results 
(0.7% and 1.7%, respectively) for tender offers during the fourth takeover wave (Panel B). 
When one considers the wealth effects over somewhat longer time windows of one or two 
months surrounding the announcement effect, the bidders’ CAARs are significantly positive (3.2 to 
5.0%) for the third M&A wave, significantly negative (-1.0% to -1.4%) for the fourth takeover 
wave, and indistinguishable from zero for the fifth wave (panels A-C). The studies comparing the 
bidders’ wealth effects across the various waves (Panel D) confirm the above patterns.  
Table  A-1  also  reveals  that  the  bidders’  CAARs  measured  over  a  wide  time  window 
surrounding the takeover announcements largely depend on the type of acquisition, the means of 
payment, and the acquisition strategy. The CAARs of friendly takeovers are generally significantly 
higher than those of mergers, which are in turn significantly larger than those of hostile bids. Franks, 
Harris and Titman (1991), Servaes (1991) and Goergen and Renneboog (2004) show that hostile 
bids decrease the value of the bidding firm by 3 to 5%. A growing number of studies report that  
37 
 
gains to the bidders depend on the status (private or publicly listed) of the target firm, with a bid on a 
private target resulting in substantially higher CAARs to the bidders.  
The means of payment also determines the bidders’ CAARs. US studies unanimously agree 
that the announcements of all equity-financed acquisitions are associated with significantly negative 
abnormal returns on the bidder stocks, and that these takeovers substantially underperform the all-
cash bids.  
As  is  the  case  for  target  CAARs,  there  is  inconclusive  evidence  on  the  impact  of  the 
acquisition strategy on bidder CAARs.
25 Several studies, mostly covering the fourth takeover wave, 
show that bidders acquiring firms within the same industry experience significantly higher CAARs 
than the bidders diversifying into unrelated industries. For the European M&A wave of the 1990s, 
Martynova and Renneboog (2006) report significantly positive CAARs of 0.98% for the bidders that 
announce  industry-related  acquisitions  and  insignificant  CAARs  of  0.45%  for  the  bidders  that 
announce diversifying acquisition; the difference is statistically significant.  
 
Total gains from takeovers 
As  the  targets’  shareholders  earn  large  positive  abnormal  returns  and  the  bidders’ 
shareholders do not lose on average (Table A-1), takeovers are expected to increase the combined 
market value of the merging firms’ assets. Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) report that investors who 
owned an equal share in both the bidder and the target one week prior to the event date and sold their 
entire holdings one week after the event day would have earned an abnormal return of 7-8% over the 
period 1963-84. Bhagat et al. (2004) cover the subsequent period (1985-00) and find that the total 
takeover gains over this period decreased compared to the previous decades. Furthermore, Bhagat et 
al. (2004) and Harford (2003) also demonstrate that the total announcement wealth effects of M&As 
occurring in periods outside the takeover waves are always significantly lower than the gains earned 
during takeover waves. Both studies also reveal that the highest combined M&A gains are realized 
at the beginning of takeover waves. This is confirmed by Moeller et al. (2005) for the fifth takeover 
wave: the takeovers with the largest losses occurred during the second half of the wave (namely, 
from 1998 to 2001).
26  
 
4.1.3 Long-term wealth effects 
 
                                                 
25 An extensive study of diversifying acquisitions by Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) shows that unrelated acquisitions in 
the  1960s  generated  significantly  positive  abnormal  returns  to  bidder  shareholders,  but  were  found  to  be  value-
destroying in later decades. 
26 However, the profitability of unrelated acquisitions reflects a different picture. Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003) present 
evidence that the waves of unrelated diversifying takeovers are associated with insignificant abnormal returns for 
combined firms in the first half of takeover waves and with significant abnormal gains in the second half.  
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When  the  event  window  is  extended  over  several  years  after  the  announcement  of  an 
acquisition,  the  magnitude  of  the  estimated  M&A  effect  on  the  share  prices  depends  on  the 
estimation method. Table A-2 shows that the studies employing the market model (MM) tend to 
show  systematically  lower  stock  prices  over  the  three  years  following  the  M&A  announcement 
(Panels A-C of Table A-2). The studies applying other estimation techniques, such as the capital 
asset  pricing  model  (CAPM),  the  market-adjusted  model  (MAM),  or  a  beta-decile  matching 
portfolio  yield  inconsistent  results  about  the  post-merger  stock  price  returns.  Barber  and  Lyon 
(1997)  demonstrate  that  a  portfolio  matched  by  size  and  by  market-to-book  ratio  is  a  better 
benchmark portfolio. With this methodology, the more recent studies reveal insignificant long-term 
abnormal returns in tender offers and negative ones in mergers (panel D of Table A-2).  
 
Table A-2. Long-term wealth effects subsequent to M&A announcements.  
 
This table presents the share price performance of acquiring companies over the long run. The reported results are for successful 
domestic takeovers between non-financial firms. The following notation is used.  
Types of mergers and acquisitions: T - tender offer, M - merger, MA - M&As, HMA - horizontal M&A, VMA - vertical M&A, RMA 
- related M&A (non-conglomerate), UMA - unrelated M&A (conglomerate or diversification), A -  acquisition, FA -  friendly 
acquisition, HA - hostile acquisition, Stock - all-stock offer, Cash - all-cash offer, Mixed - combination of stock and cash offer, 
Public (Pub) - Target company is public, Private (Priv) - Target company is private. High, Medium and Low refer to subsamples of 
companies with corresponding high, medium and low Price to Earnings ratio. 
Benchmark Return Models: MM - Market model; MAM - Market-adjusted model; CAPM - Capital Asset Pricing model; FFM - 
Fama-French Model; TTA - Thin-trade adjusted; RATS – Returns Across Time and Securities (Ibbotson (1975)). 
Returns Measures: CAARs – Cumulative Average Abnormal returns; BHARs – Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns; CTARs - Calendar 
Time Abnormal Returns.  
Significance level:  * - significance is not reported; a/b/c - statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
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Panel B: Fourth Takeover Wave, 1981-1989 
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Panel C: Fifth Takeover Wave, 1993-2001 
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Panel D: Takeover Waves Comparison 





















































The insignificance of the long-term abnormal returns disappears when all M&A transactions 
are partitioned into subsamples by means of payment, bid status (hostile versus friendly), and type of 
target firm. Thus, M&As fully financed with equity yield significantly negative long-term returns, 
whereas all-cash bids are followed by positive returns (Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003; Loughran and Vijh, 1997). Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) show that hostile bids in 
the UK significantly outperform friendly ones over a three-year window after the bid announcement, 
while both types typically yield significantly positive returns. In contrast, over a period of four years 
after the event, Cosh and Guest (2001) find long-term abnormal returns to be negative, but these 
returns are only significant for hostile acquisitions.  
There is some (albeit weak) evidence that the long-term stock price performance is higher 
when the target is listed on a stock exchange than when the target is private. Bradley and Sundaram 
(2004)  show  that  the  two-year  post-announcement  returns  in  takeovers  of  a  public  target  are 
insignificant from zero, whereas these returns are significantly negative when the target is private. 
While all previously discussed studies examine takeover bids made by  public companies, Croci 
(2004) focuses on acquisitions made by corporate raiders. These acquisitions experience systematic 
losses in the three years after the bid.  
Two studies examine the long-term gains of related and unrelated acquisitions. According to 
Haugen and Udell (1972), both types of takeovers lead to significantly positive abnormal returns 
over the four-year period subsequent to the bid, but the acquisition of a related business eventuates  
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in higher returns. Conversely, Eckbö (1986) finds that one-year CAARs triggered by diversifying 
takeovers outperform the ones triggered by industry-related bids. The difference between findings of 
Haugen and Udell (1972) and Eckbö (1986) suggests that acquisitions between companies operating 
in the same or related industries pay off over the long run (for example, as a result of a successful 
R&D program), whereas most of the gains from diversifying takeovers only occur shortly after a 
bid’s completion.   
    The  evidence  of  this  subsection  on  long-term  abnormal  returns  demonstrates  that 
takeovers lead to a decline in share prices several years following the transaction, whereas Sections 
4.1.2 and 4.1.3 have given evidence of significantly positive total gains around the announcement of 
M&As. The literature suggests two reasons for this. First, the difference between short-term and 
long-term  returns  results  from  the  fact  that  long-term  performance  studies  may  be  subject  to 
methodological problems (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). The problems arise from the impossibility to 
isolate the pure takeover effect from the effect of other events occurring in the years subsequent to 
the acquisition. If the negative trend results from research design problems, then the conclusion 
about value destruction in M&As may be misleading. A second explanation is that the studies of 
both  long-term  and  short-term  effects  assume  capital  market  efficiency.  Consequently,  financial 
markets  frictions  may  account  for  the  difference  in  results.  Market  participants  may  tend  to 
overestimate the potential merger gains when the bid is announced, and revise their expectations 
downwards when more information about the takeover process is released over time. This second 
explanation leads to the conclusion that takeover activity destroys value on average, or can at least 
not fulfil the expectations.  
 
4.1.4 Operating performance 
Accounting studies examine the combined gains of takeovers (Table A-3). Fourteen out of 25 
studies  report  a  post-merger  decline  in  the  profitability  of  merging  firms  (e.g.  Ravenscraft  and 
Scherer, 1987), 6 papers show insignificant changes in firm profitability (e.g. Linn and Switzer, 
2001), and 5 papers provide evidence of a significantly positive increase in operating returns (e.g. 
Carline, Linn and Yadav, 2002).  
 
Table A-3. Post-Merger Operating Performance 
 
This table presents the post-merger operating performance of acquiring (or the combined) companies. The reported results are for 
successful domestic takeovers between non-financial firms.  
Types of mergers and acquisitions: T - tender offer; M – merger; MA - M&As; HM - horizontal merger; VM - vertical merger; CM – 
conglomerate merger; RMA (RTO) - related M&A (Tender Offer); UMA (UTO) - unrelated M&A (Tender Offer); 2- and 3- digit – 
degree of relatedness is based on 2- or 3- digit SIC codes; A – acquisition; FA - friendly acquisition; HA - hostile acquisition; Stock 
- all-stock offer; Cash - all-cash offer; PE – acquisition related to product expansion; NPE – acquisition for reasons other than 
product expansion. 
Results: “ ´- performance measure increases compared to its benchmark; “=” - performance measure is not significantly different 
from its benchmark; “ ´- performance measure declines compared to its benchmark. 
Event Windows: 0 – the year or day of announcement; (0, +nY) – the period of n years from the announcement; Close – the day of 
acquisition completion; (Close, +nD) – the period of n days from the completion; (1950, 1972) – the time period from 1950 to 


















(    










All MA  ROE, ROA, ROS 
Sales Growth Rate 
Total assets Growth Rate 
Leverage Growth Rate 
Employment Growth Rate 
Industry 














Scherer (1987), US 

















Expected cash flow 
Expected cash flow 
Expected cash flow 
Required rate of return 
Required rate of return 









Healy, Palepu and 
Ruback (1992), US 
1979-84  50  (0, +5Y)  Largest  Asset productivity 
Operating CF returns 









Clark and Ofek 
(1994), US 




MA in which 
Targets are 
Distressed 













Linn and Switzer 
(2001), US 
1967-87  413 
152 
NA 
(0, +5Y)  TO & M 
Stock 
RMA 
Cash Flow/Market Value  Industry    
 
 








Cash Flow Returns/Assets 
Sales Growth (SG) 
Cash Flow Margins (CFM) 
Employees to Sales (E/S) 
CFM, SG, E/S 
CFM, SG, E/S 
CFM, SG, E/S 
CFM, SG, E/S 
Industry, Size 











   
Meeks (1977), UK  1964-72  161 
73 
(0, +3Y), (0, +5Y) 
(0, +3Y), (0, +5Y) 
(0, +3Y), (0, +5Y) 














Cosh, Hughes and 
Singh (1980), UK 










Net Income/Net Assets 
Net Income/Net Assets 
Net Income/Net Assets 











Powel and Stark 
(2001), UK 








Carline, Linn and 
Yadav (2002), UK 
1985-94  81   (0, +5Y)  All MA 
Stock 
HA 



































































1962-74  21  (0, +5Y)  M  Net Income/Equity 
Net Income/Total Assets 
Total Assets Growth Rate  







Cable, Palfrey, and 
Runge (1980), 
Germany (FRG) 
1964-74  134  (0, +5Y)  M  ROA, ROE, ROS 
Assets Growth Rate 










































Janny and Weber 
(1980), France 





(0, +4Y)  All MA  Profits/Equity 
Profits/Assets 
Profits/Sales 
Total assets Growth Rate 










Peer (1980), The 
Netherlands 
1962-73  35 
31 
NA  HM and CM  ROS 
ROE, ROC 
Total Assets Growth Rate  







Ryden and Edberg 
(1980), Sweden 





(0, +3Y)  All MA  ROE, ROA, ROS 
Sales Growth Rate 
Total Assets Growth Rate 
Leverage Growth Rate 
Employment Growth Rate 
Size and 
industry 





Ikeda and Doi (1983), 
Japan 
1964-75  44  (0, +3Y)  All MA  ROE 
ROA 
Expenses/Sales (ES) 
Sales/Total assets (SA) 
Sales/Employee (SE) 
Sales Growth (SG) 
Performance of 








Odagiri and Hase 
(1989), Japan 
1980-87  33  (0, +3Y)  All MA 
All MA 
HMA 







a,   
 
The  picture  is  also  less  clear  when  post-merger  corporate  growth  is  investigated.  Cosh, 
Hughes and Singh (1980) report a systematic improvement in the post-merger assets growth rate of 
UK companies that participated in M&As over the period 1967-69. For the period covering the third 
takeover wave, Mueller (1980) presents evidence of a significant decline in the growth rate of US 
companies. This conclusion is not upheld for the fourth takeover wave, as Ghosh (2001) finds no  
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statistically significant changes in the growth rate of US companies. Similar analyses of Japanese 
and European M&As reveal no significant changes in post-merger growth rates. 
Generally,  studies  showing  a  decline  in  post-merger  profitability  employ  earnings-based 
measures,  while  studies  showing  merger  gains  are  based  on  cash  flow  performance  measures. 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989) employ both measures and demonstrate that the difference in 
benchmarks is responsible for these conflicting conclusions.  
Mueller (1985) and Gugler et al. (2003) examine whether takeovers are associated with an 
increase in the monopoly power of the acquiring firm. Mueller (1985) states that the market share of 
the  combined  firm  substantially  decreases  after  the  merger  compared  to  a  non-merging  control 
group. This decrease is substantial for both vertical and horizontal mergers. In contrast, Gugler et al. 
(2003) interpret their findings of increasing profits and decreasing sales as evidence of market power 
expansion  subsequent  to  the  takeover.  They  show  that  this  result is  primarily  driven  by  related 
horizontal takeovers.   
Nine studies presented in Table A-3 focus on the degree to which the relatedness of the 
merging firms’ businesses is associated with higher post-merger profitability. There seems to be no 
significant  difference  in  the  post-merger  profitability  of  related  and  unrelated  acquisitions,  of 
takeovers with a focus strategy and diversifying mergers, of horizontal and vertical takeovers, of 
takeovers that aim at product expansion and those that do not.  
Most  studies  show  that  the  operating  performance  of  the  all-equity  acquisitions  is 
significantly lower than of the bids made with cash (see e.g. Ghosh (2001) for the US and Carline, 
Linn and Yadav (2002) for the UK).  
It  is  worth  emphasizing  that  post-merger  operating  performance  studies  suffer  from 
measurement errors and statistical problems similar to those encountered by studies of long-term 
wealth effects. This makes it difficult to compare the conclusions not only across countries but also 
across  merger  waves.  Therefore,  these  results  should  be  interpreted  with  caution.  Moreover,  in 
addition to the various statistical problems, operating performance studies suffer from accounting 
distortions such as changes in accounting standards over time and across countries, and from noise 
in the accounting data.  
 
4.1.5 Summary of the evidence on takeover profitability 
Although  the  empirical  evidence  on  the  profitability  of  takeovers  is  extensive,  the 
conclusions do not entirely converge as to whether takeovers create or destroy company value. The 
analysis  of  shareholder  gains  at  the  announcement  of  M&As  reveals  that  a  positive  effect  is 
anticipated  by  the  stock  market.  At  their  announcement,  takeovers  trigger  substantial  value 
increases, but most of these gains are captured by the targets’ shareholders at the negotiating table. 
The magnitude of these gains and their distribution between target and bidder shareholders vary 
across the decades and depend on the characteristics of each deal.  If the increases in the market  
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values of the combined firms result from anticipated synergistic gains, then the announcement effect 
should  be  reflected  in  a  subsequent  improvement  in  operating  performance.  However,  the 
accounting studies presented in Table A-3 do not support this argument. Even more controversy is 
added  by  the  analysis  of  the  long-term  share  price  performance.  A  substantial  decline  in  the 
acquiring firms’ share prices is observed over the first five  years subsequent to the event. This 
implies that the anticipated gains from takeovers are on average non-existent or overstated.  
 
4.2 Rational explanations: industry and technology shocks  
 
As  discussed  in  Section  3.1,  M&A  clustering  may  be  driven  by  economic  motives  as  a 
response to shocks in the business environment. Golbe and White (1993) show that a series of sine 
curves provide significant explanatory power for the time series of merger activity data. They show 
that  the  parameters  characterizing  the  sine  curves  are  statistically  significant  and  reasonable  in 
magnitude. Furthermore, the fitted sine curves predict the actual timing of peaks and troughs in 
merger activity well. Several studies relate the cyclical pattern of takeover activity to business cycles 
of macroeconomic factors. Nelson (1966), Gort (1969), Steiner (1975), and Golbe and White (1987) 
unanimously conclude that changes in economic growth and capital market conditions are positively 
related to the intensity of takeover activity. Still, Schary (1991) remarks that takeover activity is far 
more volatile than macroeconomic time series. Melicher, Ledolter and D’Antonio (1983) emphasize 
that  changes  in  stock  prices  and  bond  yields  predict  future  changes  in  merger  activity  best. 
Conflicting conclusions are drawn by Shugart and Tollison (1984) and Chowdhury (1993): they 
allege that takeover activity is a random phenomenon which is not explained by macroeconomic 
factors. 
The studies examining takeover activity at the industry level have been most successful in 
explaining merger fluctuations. Nelson (1959), Gort (1969), and McGowan (1971) document that 
there is significant inter-industry variation in the rate of takeover activity during the 1950s and 
1960s.  Similarly,  Mitchell  and  Mulherin  (1996)  and  Andrade  et  al.  (2001)  report  clustering  of 
takeover activity by industry during the fourth and fifth takeover waves. Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) show that specific shocks such as deregulation, oil price shocks, foreign competition, and 
financial innovations explain a significant fraction of takeover activity in the 1980s. They interpret 
these  results  as  evidence  that  the  1980s takeover  wave  is  associated  with  ‘an  adaptation  of  the 
industry structure to a changing economy’. The 1980s therefore seem to be less about breaking up 
inefficient conglomerates than about restructuring certain industries. Furthermore, the authors note 
that if takeovers are driven by industry shocks, the post-merger performance should not necessarily 
be higher than the performance of a pre-shock benchmark or of an industry control group. That is 
consistent with the lack of empirical evidence of a post-merger increase in corporate profitability.   
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Andrade  and  Stafford  (2004)  complement  Mitchell  and  Mulherin’s  (1996)  findings  with 
evidence of a strong positive relationship between industry shocks and within-industry takeovers in 
the 1990s. Whereas the merger wave of the 1990s occurred when industry capacity utilization was 
high, takeover activity in the 1970s and 1980s was a response to excess capacity brought about by a 
variety of economic shocks. Andrade and Stafford conclude that takeover activity is stimulated by 
both firm-specific and industry-wide causes. Industry-wide shocks were dominant drivers of M&As 
in the 1970s and 80s, as they produced excess capacity and thereby forced industries to reallocate 
assets  by  way  of  mergers.  In  contrast,  M&A  activity  during  the  1990s  was  driven  by  factors 
motivating firms to expand and grow. The authors also demonstrate that takeovers in the 1990s were 
less about industry restructuring than about industry expansion, as industries with strong growth 
prospects, high profitability and production near full capacity experienced the most intense takeover 
activity.  
Maksimovic  and  Phillips  (2001)  employ  plant-level  data  to  investigate  the  intra-industry 
firm-level determinants of M&A. They find that less productive firms tend to sell their divisions at 
times of industry expansion, while efficient firms are more likely to be buyers. This redeployment of 
assets from less productive to more productive firms takes place in industries that experience an 
increase in demand. The authors show that the likelihood of an acquisition also depends on the 
company’s access to external finance, as financially unconstrained companies are more likely to 
participate in M&As.  
Harford (2004) estimates logit models to predict the start of an industry takeover wave. He 
shows that industry-specific economic shock measures predict waves – in line with the neo-classical 
explanation of takeover activity - but only when capital liquidity is high.  
 Technological change is often associated with takeovers. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002a) 
show  that  the  first  two  takeover  waves,  in  the  1900s  and  1920s,  brought  about  an  external 
reallocation of resources in response to the simultaneous arrival of two general-purpose technologies 
– electricity and internal combustion. Similarly, the waves of the 1980s and 1990s were a response 
to the arrival of the microcomputer and information technology. In a related paper, Jovanovic and 
Rousseau  (2002b)  find  that  technological  shocks  increase  the  dispersion  in  companies’  growth 
prospects (as measured by Tobin’s Q) and trigger the reallocation of assets from low-Q to high-Q 
firms.
27  
In contrast, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2004) substantiate that high-Q acquirers typically 
do not purchase low-Q targets. Merging companies have similar growth opportunities. This result 
fits the theoretical literature which predicts that firms with complementary assets merge in order to 
reduce  hold-up  problems  and  under-investment  resulting  from  incomplete  contracting.  Although 
                                                 
27 Still, while the Q-theory of takeovers can explain most waves, it cannot explain the 1960s conglomerate wave.  
48 
 
they do not test it, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2004) suggest that external shocks affect the assets 
complementarities across firms and hence lead to an increase in takeover activity.  
 
4.3 Non-rational explanations of takeover waves: hubris, herding and agency costs  
 
While  the  market  expects  takeovers  to  be  profitable  on  average,  the  evidence  of  value-
destroying takeovers is persistent across takeover waves. 
Several studies demonstrate that acquiring firms with excess cash flow tend to destroy value 
by  overbidding.  For  instance,  Harford  (1999)  shows  that  the  abnormal  share  price  reaction  to 
takeover announcements by cash-rich bidders is negative and decreases with the amount of free cash 
flow held by the bidder. In addition, cash-rich firms pursuing value-decreasing acquisitions have a 
higher  probability  of  being  taken  over  themselves  in  subsequent  years.  Lang  et  al.  (1991)  also 
support this finding.   
Another  interesting  question  is  whether  managerial  personal  objectives  drive  value-
destroying acquisitions. Lambert and Larcker (1987) find that the bidders’ stock price response to 
acquisition announcements is significantly higher when a larger proportion of managerial income 
depends on the firms’ share price performance rather than on accounting benchmarks. When the 
bidders’ management owns a substantial share stake in the bidding firm, the market reacts more 
positively  to  a  bid,  as  management  is  putting  its  own  wealth  at  stake  (Lewellen,  Loderer  and 
Rosenfeld,  1985).  More  recently,  Datta  et  al.  (2001)  show  that  acquiring  firms  where  the 
management holds equity-based compensation contracts experience significant positive stock price 
responses to acquisition announcements. These three studies conclude that when managers do not 
own equity, agency problems may be higher and acquisitions are more likely to destroy corporate 
value.
28  
The incidence of unprofitable acquisitions is also consistent with Roll’s (1986) managerial 
hubris hypothesis. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) claim that an acquisition made by a firm with a low 
market-to-book ratio (a so-called ‘glamour’ firm) is affected by managerial hubris, as management is 
likely to overestimate their abilities to manage an acquisition. In particular, they observe that in the 
short-run, ‘glamour’ bidders experience higher abnormal returns than do bidders with high market-
to-book  ratios  (the  so-called  ‘value’  bidders),  while  in  the  long-run  this  relation  is  reversed. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) design a formal test to distinguish between agency and hubris 
motives for takeovers. Analysing the correlations between target, bidder and total gains, they find 
strong evidence of hubris in US takeovers with positive abnormal returns, whereas there is evidence 
                                                 
28  Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1990)  believe  that  the  management’s  utility  function  (rather  than  the  shareholder 
objective) is responsible for unrelated diversifying acquisitions and the acquisition of growth firms. Consistent with 
this view, they find that stock market punishes acquirers that purchase a company operating in an unrelated industry or 
a company with high book-to-market ratio. Berger and Ofek (1995), Maquiera et al. (1998), Doukas et al. (2001) 
support these findings.  
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of the agency motive in the subsample with negative abnormal returns. Goergen and Renneboog 
(2004) also show that one third of the large European takeovers in the 1990s suffer from managerial 
hubris. Malmendier and Tate (2003) report yet another evidence of managerial hubris. They find that 
optimistic managers
29 participate more frequently in diversifying and less profitable takeovers.
30     
Harford (2003, 2004) reports that takeovers occurring at the later stage of the takeover wave 
trigger lower abnormal returns than those at the beginning of the wave. They interpret this finding as 
the result of herding, accompanied with hubris or agency problems. A similar decline in takeover 
profitability over the 1990s wave is documented in Moeller et al. (2005), but they do not support the 
hubris hypothesis. They claim that the evidence supports Jensen (2004): high valuations increase 
managerial discretion, making it possible for executives to make poor acquisitions when they have 
run out of good ones.  
Further empirical evidence by Gugler et al. (2003) shows that neither industry shocks nor the 
Q-theory of takeovers can explain the cyclical pattern of takeovers. They show that the number of 
takeovers  motivated  by  hubris/agency  problems  and  by  overvaluation  of  shares  increases 
significantly during stock market booms.  
 
4.4 Evidence of market-timing explanation for takeover waves  
 
The market-timing motive received growing attention in the late 1990s, as the number of all-
equity financed acquisitions increased dramatically in the US. Andrade et al. (2001) show that all-
equity acquisitions represented 32.9% of all US M&As in the 1980s versus 57.8% in the 1990s. 
Similarly,  Martynova  and  Renneboog  (2006)  document  that  equity  became  a  popular  source  of 
financing  in  European  M&As;  the  proportion  of  all-cash  acquisitions  fell  by  half  in  the  1990s 
compared to the 1980s. As equity payments (or combinations of equity and cash) dominate when 
stock market valuation peaked, it appears that companies use the temporal overvaluation of their 
shares to acquire firms (often with valuable fixed assets) and extract the mispricing premium.  
The empirical literature considers a variety of measures to capture overvaluation. The book-
to-market ratio is among the most frequently used, although some studies also use analysts’ earnings 
forecasts and accounting measures to construct a proxy for mispricing. Martin (1996) shows that 
firms paying for acquisitions with equity have lower book-to-market ratios than those using cash. 
However, the book-to-market ratio is also considered as a proxy for the firm’s growth prospects, 
where  firms with good  investment opportunities have lower ratios. Therefore, Martin’s result is 
                                                 
29 According to Malmendier and Tate (2003, 2004) managers are classified optimistic if they voluntarily retain in-the-
money stock options in their own firms. 
30 For further discussions on the role of hubris in corporate takeovers, see Hietala, Kaplan, and Robinson (2003) and 
Baker, Ruback and Wurgler (2004).  
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consistent not only with mispricing but also with the neoclassical interpretation that takeover activity 
prospers when growth opportunities are high or when firm-specific discount rates are low.   
Faccio and Masulis (2005) use a bidder’s buy-and-hold cumulative stock return over the year 
preceding the M&A announcement month (run-up premium) as a proxy for misvaluation. Similar to 
the Martin’s findings, they show that this overvaluation measure is the highest for all-equity deals 
and lowest for all-cash deals. As is the case with the book-to-market value, the run-up premium is an 
imperfect  measure  of  misevaluation  because  it  also  captures  the  firm’s  ability  to  generate  high 
returns  on  its  future  investments.  Therefore,  Dong  et  al.  (2003)  use  a  more  pure  measure  of 
mispricing: the ‘residual income’-to-market ratio. This measure is free from the impact of a firm’s 
growth opportunities because residual income includes future growth prospects of the firm (analysts’ 
forecasts of future earnings) in addition to the firm’s book value. The findings of Dong et al. (2003) 
support the hypothesis that the stock market drives acquisitions. In particular, bidders are on average 
more overvalued that their targets, the probability of an equity offer increases with the degree of the 
bidder’s overvaluation, and the probability of a hostile bid decreases with overvaluation of the target 
firm.  
Ang and Cheng (2003) complement the empirical evidence of the misvaluation motive for 
takeovers by pointing out that the above findings are robust when an industry-relative book-to-price 
ratio is used as a proxy for market misvaluation. Their findings are consistent with Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003): the management of the bidding firm takes the profitable opportunity to buy the real 
assets  of  a  less  overvalued  target  firm  using  their  own  overvalued  equity,  whereas  the  target 
managers accept the all-equity bid (unprofitable for long-term oriented target shareholders) because 
they maximize their own short-term benefits. They support this statement with evidence that all-
stock  acquisitions  are  associated  with  insignificant  three-year  post-bid  abnormal  returns  to  the 
incumbent shareholders of the bidding firm and with significant losses to the target shareholders 
who have retained the shares of the merged firm. 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Vishwanathan (2004) suggest yet another measure to capture 
misvaluation. They decompose the market-to-book ratio into three components: firm-specific error, 
time-series sector error, and long-run market value to book value. In their opinion, only the first 
component  is  expected  to  capture  misvaluation.  They  interpret  the  observed  positive  relation 
between the firm-specific error and the likelihood that a firm will make an acquisition (especially an 
all-equity one), as evidence that deviations from the fundamental value drive takeovers. Also, the 
evidence indicates that industry-wide takeover activity increases with the time-series sector error, 
the second component in their market-to-book ratio decomposition. That is, more acquisitions occur 
when the industry is over-heated. Bidders with the highest firm-specific error are responsible for the 
bulk of these acquisitions. Finally, the authors show that acquirers are valued significantly higher 
than targets by the market, with cash acquirers being less overvalued than stock acquirers. This 
evidence supports the view that the mispricing premium is an important motive for choosing equity  
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as a means of payment. This chapter also demonstrates that overvaluation drives the decision of the 
target  managers  to  accept  all-cash  offers.  When  examining  the  long-run  market-to-book  ratio, 
Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Vishwanathan find that low value-to-book bidders buy high value-to-
book firms. While this evidence is consistent with the market mispricing explanations of takeover 
activity, the authors recognize that alternative explanations exist based on asymmetric information 
theories.  
Harford (2004) designs a test to distinguish empirically between the neoclassical and market 
misvaluation explanations of M&As. He controls for a variety of factors associated specifically with 
misvaluation (industry shocks, financial liquidity) to predict the start of a takeover wave. While the 
industry  and  liquidity  determinants  appear  to  have  significant  predictive  power,  misvaluation 
variables  only  slightly  improve  the  model.  Harford  argues  that  these  results  are  consistent  with 
neoclassical models explaining takeovers as a response to changes in economic environment, while 
sufficient capital liquidity is necessary to make takeovers feasible. He concludes that the capital 
liquidity  effect,  rather  than  misevaluation,  drives  M&As  and  makes  them  cluster  in  times  of 
financial market booms.  
 
4.5 Explaining diversifying takeovers 
 
The  academic  literature  presents  ample  evidence  that  diversification  destroys  corporate 
value.
31 The following evidence support this view. First, the market favours a business focus over 
diversification. There is consistent evidence (except for the M&As of the 1960s) that a takeover 
between  companies  operating  in  the  same  or  related  industry  causes  significantly  larger 
announcement effects than a conglomerate takeover. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Maquieira, 
Megginson and Nail (1998), Martynova and Renneboog (2006), among many others report that the 
acquisition of a related  business triggers higher returns to the shareholders of the bidding  firm. 
Second, diversified companies are often traded at a discount of up to 15% relative to stand-alone 
firms (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995).
32 Third, a reversal of a diversification strategy 
pays  off.  Dittmar  and  Shivdasani  (2003)  observe  that  firms  experience  a  reduction  in  the 
diversification  discount  after  a  divestiture.  Veld  and  Veld-Merkoulova  (2004)  show  that  the 
announcement of a spin-off yields significant positive returns. John and Ofek (1995) documents that 
conglomerates  selling  divisions  improve  the  operating  performance  during  the  three  years 
subsequent to the event.
33 Fourth, there is also a systematic trend of firms undoing diversifications. 
                                                 
31 It is important to note here that a number of studies have recently questioned the evidence on value destruction in 
conglomerate mergers. These studies argue that poor performance is due to factors other than diversification. For the 
overview of these studies see Martin and Sayrak (2003). 
32 More recent evidence includes Servaes and  Lins (1999), Denis and Thothadri (1999), Lamont and Polk (2002), 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003). 
33 For more evidence see Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002), Burch and Nanda (2002), Lamont and Polk (2002).   
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Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Scharfstein (1998) show that majority of 
firms that acquired unrelated businesses have been broken up either in bust-up takeovers or through 
reorganization.
34   
Standard explanations for forming a conglomerate include agency problems and financial 
synergies, e.g., internal capital markets. There is ample evidence showing that value-destruction 
associated with diversification is caused by agency problems or inefficient allocation of internally 
generated funds. For instance, Palia (1999) shows that diversified firms are traded at a significant 
discount if the managerial compensation package contains no or only a low proportion of stock and 
options and if the firm’s board size is relatively small. In those cases, managers are more likely to be 
involved in inefficient diversification strategies. Similarly, Anderson et al. (1998) document that 
managerial compensation packages in diversified firms have lower pay-for-performance sensitivity 
than of those in non-diversified firms. Capital expenditures by a division of a diversified firm not 
largely depend on the division’s cash flow but also on the cash flow of the firm’s other segments 
(Shin and Stulz (1998)). This internal cross-subsidisation may lead to rent-seeking behaviour by 
divisional  managers,  coordination  and  bargaining  problems  within  the  firm  and  hence  result  in 
inefficient investments. These findings are confirmed by Scharfstein (1998), Rajan et al. (2000), and 
Dittmar and Shivdasani (2003). 
It is important to note that the above evidence and the discussion refer to M&As conducted 
after the 1970s. For the M&As occurred prior to this period, the empirical literature reports that the 
market  favoured  diversifications  into  unrelated  businesses.  An  extensive  study  of  diversifying 
acquisitions  by  Akbulut  and  Matsusaka  (2003)  shows  that  unrelated  acquisitions  in  the  1960s 
generated significantly  positive abnormal returns to bidder shareholders
35, but were found to be 
value-destroying in later decades. Similarly, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) observe that stock 
returns to diversifying acquisitions were statistically insignificant from zero in the 1970s but became 
negative in the 1980s.  
There is also a significant body of evidence (e.g. Lichtenberg, 1992, Liebeskind and Opler, 
1993; and Montgomery, 1994) indicating that the proportion of diversifying takeovers in the total 
M&A  activity  has  decreased  following  the  conglomerate  wave  of  the  1960s.  The  improved 
efficiency of the external capital markets in the 1980s is considered the foremost cause for this 
decline.  Baker,  Ruback  and  Wurgler  (2004)  explain  this  trend  towards  corporate  focus  and 
specialization from a behavioural corporate finance point of view. They argue that the conglomerate 
wave of the 1960s was in part driven as a managerial response to ‘a temporary investor appetite for 
conglomerates’. Baker et al. (2004) state that the investors’ demand for the shares of conglomerates 
                                                 
34  However,  Kaplan  and  Weisbach  (1992)  do  not  find  supporting  evidence  that  diversifying  acquisitions  are  less 
successful than related ones. 
35 Similar findings are reported in Matsusaka (1993), Klein (2001), Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987, 1989), Hubbard and 
Palia (1997).  
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was  high  during  the  1960s  and  the  market  greeted  diversifying  acquisitions  with  positive 
announcement returns. The reduction in the size of such announcement effects
36 since 1968 suggests 
‘a switch in investors appetite’ away from diversifications. As a response to this shift, managers 
divested unrelated segments and focused on the expansion of the firm’s core business.  
 
4.6 Explaining hostility in takeovers  
 
Until recently, the market for corporate control existed mostly in the USA (Morck et al., 
1988; Bhide, 1990; Martin and McConnell, 1991) and in the UK (Franks et al., 2001). However, as 
of the mid-1990s, an unprecedented number of hostile takeovers take place in Continental Europe 
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2006). More recently, hostile takeover activity emerged in Japan and 
China. 
Jensen (1988) defines the market  for corporate control as one  where  management teams 
compete with one another for the right to manage assets owned by shareholders. The team that offers 
the highest value to the shareholders takes over the right to manage the assets until it is replaced by 
another management team that discovers a higher value of the assets.
37  
Hostile takeovers are expected to occur when the target firm performs poorly and its internal 
corporate governance mechanisms fail to discipline managers. Evidence from Hasbrouck (1985), 
Palepu (1986), Morck et al. (1989), and Mitchell and Lehn (1990) supports this view. Hence, hostile 
takeovers are seen as an alternative corporate governance mechanism that corrects for opportunistic 
managerial behaviour (Jensen, 1988; Weisbach, 1993). 
The view that hostile takeovers function as a corporate governance mechanism is often used 
to explain the trend of deconglomeration during the 1980s. Bhagat et al. (1990) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1991) argue that hostile takeovers emerge in the 1980s as a response to the wave of the 
1960s that produced a high number of inefficient conglomerates. The decline in the proportion of 
hostile takeovers in the 1990s may also result from the fact that a sufficient number of alternative 
governance mechanisms are now available (e.g. stock options, shareholder activism, non-executive 
director monitoring) that encourage management to focus on shareholder value and to restructure 
when necessary (Holmström and Kaplan, 2001). 
In contrast, a growing number of empirical studies report that the disciplining function of 
hostile  takeovers  is  not  the  primary  motive  for  the  target  firm’s  managers  to  oppose  takeover 
attempts. Hostility may also result from a bargaining strategy to extract a higher premium for the 
                                                 
36 For evidence see Akbulut and Matsusaka (2003), Klein (2001), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), Lang and Stulz 
(1994), Berger and Ofek (1995). 
37This argument is valid in a frictionless world, but transaction costs, asymmetries of information, and agency conflicts 
can prevent efficient transfers of control.   
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target  shareholders  (Schwert,  2000)  or  from  the  target  directors’  viewpoint  that  the  proposed 
takeover is incompatible with the target’s long-term strategy (Lipton, 1979).  
Some papers document that the accounting performance of the targets of hostile bids is not 
different from that of friendly acquisitions (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Martin and McConnell, 
1991; Schwert, 2000; Franks and Mayer, 1996). Furthermore, Servaes (1994) and Goldstein (2000) 
report no evidence of pre-bid free cash flow problems for firms acquired in hostile takeovers. These 
findings are inconsistent with the prediction that hostile bids target poorly performing companies. 
Franks and Mayer (1996) and Franks et al. (2001) find no significant relation between high board 
turnover in hostile bids and underperformance in the year prior to UK bids. Instead, their evidence 
suggests that the opposition to the bid by incumbent directors reflects the disagreement over the 
price the bidder is willing to pay.   
Another possible reason for bid opposition is the target management disagreement with the 
bidder’s intentions to restructure the company (Lipton, 1979; Jensen, 1993). Holland (1996) shows 
that institutional raiders hunted for short-term excess gains by taking over firms against the will of 
the board of directors.  Lipton (2001) characterizes this kind of takeover activity as ‘two-tier, front-
end-loaded,  boot-strap,  bust-up,  junk-bond,  hostile  tender  offers.’  As  such  offers  are  likely  to 
damage the interests of the long-term oriented shareholders of the target firm
38, a hostile attitude 
may be a rational managerial response.  
The frequent incidence of bust-up hostile tender offers in the 1980s raised public concern in 
the US. This translated into the Massachusetts (1987) and Delaware (1988) anti-takeover laws that 
give unlimited power to the target managers to apply anti-takeover defence measures whenever they 
believe this is in the interests of their shareholders (Ricardo-Campbell, 1997). Since then, the use of 
statutory  and  charter  amendments  as  a  takeover  defences  by  US  corporations  is  widespread 
(Comment and Schwert, 1995). The regulatory change is believed to account for the substantial 
decline in the US hostile takeover activity in the 1990s.   
As  mentioned  earlier,  hostile  takeovers  were  almost  non-existent  in  Continental  Europe 
during the 1980s, but occurred in unprecedented numbers during the 1990s. The absence of hostile 
threats  in  the  1980s  is  largely  attributed  to  the  concentrated  ownership  structure  prevailed  in 
Continental European firms. In contrast to the predominantly widely-held UK and US companies, 
most of Continental European companies are characterized by majority or near-majority stakes held 
by one or few investors.
39 Such voting rights concentration and the absence of a breakthrough rule 
makes  these  companies  virtually  invulnerable  to  hostile  takeovers.  In  addition,  closely-held 
                                                 
38  According  to  Lipton  (1979),  hostile  takeovers  of  the  1980s  had  also  indirect  effect  via  demoralizing  corporate 
managers  and  directors.  That  is,  managers  respond  to  the  takeover  market  pressures  by  switching  to  short-term 
strategies to sustain growth, thereby forgoing beneficial long-term projects and investments.  
39 For recent evidence on ownership structure in Continental Europe and the UK, see Barca and Becht (2001), Faccio 
and Lang (2002) and the ECGI project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession Process”(2001).  
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companies have less need of monitoring by the market for corporate control, because they can rely 
on large shareholder or creditor monitoring.  
Political changes,  regulatory  reforms, and changes in business environment in the 1990s 
were the likely causes for the shift towards more hostility in European M&As. In particular, the 
increase in bid hostility in Continental Europe may be driven by: a gradual changes towards more 
ownership  dispersion,  a  reduced  complexity  in  ownership  and  control  structures,  weakened 
institutional barriers to takeovers (like the emergence of new equity markets, high  IPO activity, 
privatisation and deregulation, binding disclosure requirements, and tax reforms), and a gradual shift 
of corporate priority from a stakeholder consensus model to a model based on shareholder value 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2003). 
 
4.7 Summary of empirical evidence on the determinants of takeover waves 
 
The empirical evidence listed above indicates that no single theory is able to explain takeover 
activity and M&A waves. The most consistent finding is that takeovers occurring early in the wave 
are triggered by industry shocks. These takeovers generate substantial (short-term) wealth to target 
shareholders and the combined companies are expected to create synergetic gains. The majority of 
value-destroying acquisitions occur in the second half of the takeover wave. Unprofitable takeovers 
are  a  result  of  both  managerial  hubris  and  agency  problems.  There  is  growing  evidence  that 
overvaluation  of  the  acquiring  firms  is  an  important  determinant  of  an  increase  in  takeovers, 
especially those paid with equity or a combination of equity and cash. Finally, it is important to note 
that takeover profitability and the takeover patterns significantly vary across the M&A waves and 
across countries.  
 
5. Conclusion and implications for future research 
 
This chapter has surveyed the literature on the determinants of M&A activity, and compiled 
the findings for all five complete waves since the end of the 19
th century for the US, the UK, and 
Continental Europe. We find that each M&A wave is characterised by a different set of underlying 
motives. A number of common factors can nonetheless be found. Takeovers usually occur in periods 
of economic recovery (following a market crash and economic depression caused by war, an energy 
crisis  etc.).  They  coincide  with  rapid  credit  expansion,  which  in  turn  results  from  burgeoning 
external capital markets accompanied by stock market booms. The takeover market is also often 
fuelled by regulatory changes, such as anti-trust legislation or deregulation. Takeover waves are 
frequently driven by industrial and technological shocks. We also show that managers’ personal 
objectives can further influence takeover activity: managerial hubris and herding behaviour increase  
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during  takeover  waves,  often  leading  to  poor  acquisitions.  Finally,  takeover  activity  is  usually 
disrupted by a steep decline in stock markets and a subsequent period of economic recession. 
The bulk of M&As are expected to improve efficiency and trigger substantial share price 
increases at the announcement, most of which are captured by the target-firm shareholders. The 
difference in the pattern of M&As and their profitability across the decades may be attributed to the 
heterogeneity  in  the  triggers  of  takeover  waves.  Technological,  industrial,  political,  and  social 
shocks, all have different consequences for corporate profitability and hence for the magnitude of 
synergistic gains in takeover transactions. This implies that, when answering the question whether or 
not takeovers will create or destroy value, it is important to understand why and when merger waves 
occur. It is not only important to determine whether a takeover takes place in a period with or 
without intensive M&A activity, but also to find out in which stage of an M&A wave a takeover 
occurs. Empirical evidence shows that takeovers occurring at a later stage of the takeover wave 
trigger lower gains to shareholders than those at the beginning of the wave (Moeller et al., 2005). 
This indicates that waves tend to pass their optimal stopping point and that unprofitable takeovers 
occurring later in the wave result from limited information processing, hubris, and managerial self-
interest.  
An  important  area  which  has  received  less  academic  attention  is  the  decision  process 
companies face to determine how to reorganize (by means of takeovers, spin-offs, recapitalizations, 
workouts, institutional buyouts or other transfers of control etc.).  A joint analysis of these stories 
constitutes a prominent area for future research.  
Another  challenge  in  the  field  of  M&As  is  the  cyclical  rise  and  fall  of  hostile  takeover 
activity.  While  contested  bids  of  the  1980s  received  a  substantial  attention  from  academic 
researchers,  those  of  the  1990s  have  been  largely  ignored.  The  following  issues  remain  to  be 
addressed:  What  triggers  time  and  country  clustering  of  hostile  takeover  activity?  Why  were 
unfriendly acquisitions almost non-existent in Continental Europe during the 1980s, and occurred in 
unprecedented numbers during the 1990s? Do the pattern of contested bids and their profitability 
vary  across  the  decades  and  countries?  Do  hostile  tender  offers  bring  about  more  managerial 
discipline?              
In addition to the problems mentioned above, there are a number of other issues that have not 
been  investigated  fully  in  the  literature.  The  aspects  of  cross-border  mergers  and  acquisitions 
warrant comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis. Differences in corporate law, corporate 
governance regulation, stock exchange regulation, accounting quality may have a significant impact 
on cross-border acquisitions while research remains limited on this topic. Finally, the decision to 
takeover another company or to resist a bid may also depend on non-economic factors, like the 
remuneration structure of the managers, their education and the networks they belong to. M&A 
research on such issues is still in its infancy.     
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CHAPTER 3.  
 





It is now a well-known fact that mergers and acquisitions (M&As) come in waves. Golbe and 
White (1993) were among the first to document empirically the cyclical pattern of M&A activity. 
Thus far, five waves have been examined in the literature: those of the early 1900s, the 1920s, the 
1960s, the 1980s, and the 1990s. Of these, the most recent wave was particularly remarkable in 
terms of size and geographical dispersion. For the first time, Continental European firms were as 
eager to participate as their US and UK counterparts, and M&A activity in Europe hit levels similar 
to  those  experienced  in  the  US.  It  is  widely  believed  that  the  introduction  of  the  Euro,  the 
globalisation  process,  technological  innovation,  deregulation  and  privatisation,  as  well  as  the 
financial markets boom spurred European companies to take part in M&As during the 1990s.  
This  chapter  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  European  takeover  market.  We 
characterize  the  main  features  of  the  domestic  and  cross-border  corporate  takeovers  involving 
European companies in the period 1993-2001 and contrast them to those of takeovers in the second 
takeover wave of 1984-1989. We provide detailed information on the size and dynamics of takeover 
activity in 28 Continental European countries and the UK and Ireland.  
The rest of this chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we describe the evolution of the 
European market for corporate control in 1984-2001. Section 3 documents the intensity of domestic 
and  cross-border  intra-European  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Sections  4  and  5  analyse  industry 
composition  and  payment  structure  of  the  European  takeover  waves.  Section  6  investigates  the 
evolution of hostile takeover activity in Continental Europe and the UK. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. The evolution of takeover activity in Europe 
 
The most recent - the fifth - wave of mergers and acquisitions was particularly remarkable 
compared  to  its  predecessors.  For  the  first  time,  Continental  European  firms  were  as  eager  to 
participate in takeovers as their US and UK counterparts, and M&A activity in Europe hit levels 
similar to those experienced in the US. While the main engine of takeover activity in Europe during 
the 1990s was still the UK, M&As in Continental Europe have risen substantially both in number of 
deals  and  total  transaction  value  compared  to  the  previous  decades.  According  to  the  Thomson 
Financial Securities Data, 87,804 M&A deals were recorded for Europe (including the UK) during  
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1993-2001. In contrast, there were only 9,958 such transactions during the fourth European merger 
wave (1983-89). The fifth wave in Europe is impressive in monetary terms as well, since its total 

















Figure B-1. European takeover activity, total value of deals (in US$ trillion) 
 
As depicted in Figures B-1 and B-2, there was a pattern of strong growth in the European M&A 
market over the last twenty years. From being almost negligible in the beginning of the 1980s, the 
takeover market reached a level of 4,000 annual transactions by the end of the fourth takeover wave. 
Furthermore, it started with 7,000 M&As at the beginning of the fifth wave in 1993, and more than 



















The growing M&A activity in the late 1980s was mainly due to a significant increase in the 
number of transatlantic deals (whereby US firms were most active as acquirers). The opposite is true 
for the market for corporate control in the 1990s: the surge can be largely explained by the increase 
in intra-European transactions while the number of transatlantic M&As remained relatively stable 
(on average 2,500 per annum). Much of the change in focus towards intra-European deals can be 
attributed to the challenges brought about by the development of the single European market and the 
introduction  of  the  Euro  in  the  1990s.  Fragmented  and  mostly  domestically-oriented  European 
companies resorted to takeover deals as a means to survive the tougher regional competition created 
by  the  new  market.  The  introduction  of  the  Euro  has  put  additional  pressure  on  firms,  as  it 
eliminated all currency risks within the Euro-zone and reduced the home bias of investors. Cross-
border acquisitions are expected to yield cost advantages and are to enable firms to expand their 
business more rapidly abroad. Moreover, takeover activity was fuelled by the creation of a liquid 
European capital market which provides companies with new sources of financing (such as Euro-
denominated bonds). As a result of such economic and structural changes on the Continent, the 
market for corporate control in Europe peaked at US$ 1.2 trillion in 1999, a marked contrast with the 
peak of the fourth merger wave which amounted to merely US$ 0.15 trillion.  
 
3. Cross-border versus domestic acquisitions. 
Of the intra-European M&As of the period 1993-2001, one third were cross-border deals 
Figure B-3 illustrates that the value of the international transactions account for nearly half of the 
total investment in M&As by the end of 1999, up from 22% in 1995. The figures also reflect the 
impact of some unprecedented mega-deals such as the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone in 
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Figure B-4. Total value of M&As during    Figure B-5. Total number of M&As during 
1993-2001 by country of bidding and  1993-2001 by country of bidding and 
target firms (US$ million).                 target firms. 
 
Figure B-4 shows that the most active participants in the intra-European cross-border market 
as acquirers were British, German, and French firms, which paid together more than US$ 1 trillion 
to take over foreign firms. These deals represented 70% of the total amount spent on intra-European 
cross-border M&As over the period 1993-2001. Firms from the UK, Germany and France were also 
most frequently the targets of cross-border acquisitions; they were sold for a total of US$ 0.9 trillion 
during the 5
th takeover wave, amounting to about 60% of the overall value of cross-border M&As. 
The UK and France were the biggest net acquirers in cross-border takeovers, whereas Germany was 
a net receiver in the intra-European cross-border market. Figure B-5 sketches a similar picture based 
on the number of cross-border acquisitions. The number of cross-border deals surpassed the number 
of domestic ones in the Benelux countries, Austria, and Ireland. Another interesting observation 
relates to the Eastern European countries that joined the European Union in 2004. In these countries, 
many firms were acquired by West-European bidders, predominantly from neighbouring countries  
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(Scandinavia, Austria, and Germany). Likewise, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese firms were more 
frequently involved in M&As as targets (of German, British and French bidders) than as bidders.  
 
4. Industry clusters, and focus versus a diversification strategies. 
  
The differences in cross-border M&A patterns across the European countries partly result 
from  restructuring  needs  in  the  major  national  industries.  Processes  like  deregulation  and 
privatization have led to cross-border consolidations in, amongst others, the financial sector and the 
utilities, by allowing former state-owned companies to acquire firms abroad and to have foreign 
investors participate in their equity capital. Also, the increasing R&D expenditures gave another 
boost  to  international  M&As  in  the  high-technology  industries  including  biochemistry  and 
pharmaceuticals (see Figure B-6). Figure B-7 illustrates the amounts invested through cross-border 
acquisitions  by  industry.  Although  small  in  terms  of  the  number  of  deals,  the  takeovers  in  the 
telecommunication sector represented a total value of US$ 470 billion over the period 1993-2001. 
This accounts for a one third of the total value of cross-border acquisitions. Another 30% of such 
foreign  investments  went  to  the  banking,  natural  resources,  and  utilities  sectors  (for  a  not 
insignificant  extent  through  the  reorganization  of  former  state-owned  firms).  Figure  B-8  shows 
similar patterns for the domestic M&A markets. 
 








































Figure B-7. Total value of cross-border M&As during 1993-2001 by primary industry  
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Figure B-9. Proportion of divestitures in total M&A activity  
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Table B-1 discloses that many cross-border M&As made in the 1990s were between firms 
from the same or related industries. This confirms that international business expansion was one of 
the goals inciting firms to participate in European cross-border M&As in the 1990s. The smaller 
percentage  of  deals  within  the  telecommunication  sector  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the 
telecoms mainly engaged in vertical integration with high-tech firms. Such takeovers accounted for 
about 30% of the deals involving telecom acquirers. The fact that most of the domestic and cross-
border deals (both horizontal and vertical ones) involved firms in related industries, consolidates the 
trend to focus on core business which started in the 1980s. Figure B-9 depicts that the percentage of 
total M&A related to divestitures increased (both in terms of number of deals and of takeover value) 
until 1993 but this effect clearly decreased over the 5
th takeover wave. Thus, the steady decline in 
the relative number of divestitures is in line with the fact that the main incentive for European firms 
in  the  1990s  boiled  down  to  business  expansion  in  order  to  address  the  challenges  of  the  new 
European market.  
 
Table B-1. Intra-industry takeovers as a percentage of total number of cross-border and domestic 
European M&As  
 
This  table  shows  the  percentage  of  intra-industry  M&As  based  on  the  total  number  of  all  European  takeover 
announcements within each industry during 1993-2001. An acquisition is classified as an intra-industry takeover if 
both bidding and target firms operate in the same industry (bidder’s and target’s 2-digit SIC codes are the same). The 
sample is partitioned into domestic and cross-border acquisitions.   
 
  Cross-border bids, %  Domestic bids, % 
Media and Entertainment  79.4  78.9 
Consumer Staples  76.6  76.5 
High Technology  72.4  71.9 
Real Estate  72.4  75.0 
Industrials  70.6  68.2 
Materials  69.3  63.2 
Healthcare  67.7  70.2 
Retail  66.3  71.4 
Energy and Power  65.0  65.0 
Consumer Products and Services  62.0  62.5 
Telecommunications  48.0  41.3 
Financials  45.9  27.7 
     
 
 
5. Means of payment. 
 
Corporate growth via takeovers, often taking the form of mega-deals, requires considerable 
financial resources which forces cash-constrained firms to finance the acquisitions with equity or a 
combination of equity and debt. The boom of the stock market in the second half of the 1990s 
increased the attractiveness of equity as a means of payment for acquisitions. At the same time, the  
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European market for corporate bonds grew rapidly and provided another accessible source of funds. 
In addition, a European junk-bond market emerged. Low interest rates and a bank attitude more 
receptive to risky loans also facilitated M&A activity. Consequently, we observe a switch from cash 
toward equity and debt in the financial composition of the takeover bids.  
Figure  B-10  exhibits  that  the  proportion  of  the  total  value  of  acquisitions  paid  in  cash 
averaged about 67% in the 1980s, but declined to 40% over the 1990s. A similar pattern is perceived 
in the proportion of the number of pure cash deals, which fell by half in the last decade compared to 
the  1980s  (see  Figure  B-11).  Whereas  the  proportion  of  common  equity  used  in  acquisitions 
augmented to a high 39% of the total value of all acquisitions (in 1998), the relative number of all-
equity bids in the 1990s was still rather small. As depicted in Figure B-11, the combination of 
equity, debt, and cash became the most popular method of payments for European M&As during 
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It is commonly believed that the bull market of the 1990s caused a switch from cash to 
equity financing in M&A deals: the overvaluation of equity provides bidders with a cheap currency 
to pay for their acquisitions. Figure B-12 provides some supporting evidence: whereas the relative 
number of all-cash transactions is inversely related to the changes in the market index, the trend in 
all-equity bids is positively correlated to the market. Moreover, there is a clear relation between the 
choice of the payment method and the size of a takeover (see Figure B-13). Firms with insufficient 
cash resources to finance large acquisitions have increasingly resorted to a combination of equity 
and debt, but the very large transactions are fully financed with equity. Figure B-13 also confirms 
that the average value of the M&As, especially of the all-equity bids, augments in line with the 























MSCI MSCI-Europe, average All stock All cash
 































6. Hostile takeovers. 
 
Paying too high a price for a target firm is more likely to occur when takeover activity is 
peaking because the bids become more aggressive and trigger more frequently opposition by the 
target firm. Figures B-13 and 14 show that in 1999, at the peak of the fifth European wave, the 
average  value  of  deals  and  the  number  of  hostile  bids  are  both  standing  out.  In  that  year,  an 
unprecedented number of hostile deals with a total worth of US$ 501 billion (about half the total 
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Figure B-14. The number of European hostile takeovers 
 
Theoretically, fewer hostile takeovers are expected when the stock market is climbing, as 
target shareholders prefer to sell their shares when they are likely to be overpriced. Figure B-14 
depicts that this is indeed the case for the UK domestic takeovers. In this country, the number of 
hostile bids in the past decade significantly fell compared to the 1980s. In contrast, the domestic bids 
in Continental Europe and the cross-border bids increased in both number and value compared to the 
previous wave. Moreover, hostile takeover activity in Europe during the 1990s emerged even in 
countries in which there was none before. Many hostile bids, which would have been opposed by the 
political and financial establishment in the 1980s, were welcomed in the 1990s. This last observation 
is predominantly valid for domestic takeovers, as in the case of cross-border bids, governments still 
tend to protect national champions and erect barriers for foreign raiders.
40  
                                                 
40 It is believed that the French and Italian governments are rather successful in protecting their national champions. In 
these  countries,  hostile  cross-border  acquisitions  hardly  ever  succeeded  in  the  1990s.  The  French  and  Italian 
governments encouraged (often inefficient) mergers between national firms to create large national corporations and 
hence made these firms immune against acquisitions by foreign firms. Examples are the acquisition of Telecom Italia 
by Olivetti (although it was a hostile bid, its success was largely due to do support by Italian government. that blocked 
the bid for Telecom Italia by Deutsche Telecom) or the merger between the French supermarket chains Carrefour and 






This  chapter  provides  a  comprehensive  overview  of  the  European  takeover  market.  We 
examine the main features of the domestic and cross-border corporate takeovers facing European 
companies in 1990-2001 and contrast them to those of the takeovers of the fourth takeover wave 
(1984-1989). Our analysis reveals that (i) a substantial proportion of intra-European M&As in the 
1990s were cross-border transactions; (ii) both cross-border and domestic M&A activity tended to 
occur between firms in related industries; (iii) the financial structure of takeover bids in the 1990s 
switched from a dominance of cash to a combination of equity, debt and cash, and – specifically for 
the  largest  transactions  -  to  all-equity;  (iv)  the  number  of  hostile  bids  in  Continental  Europe 
increased over the 1990s, whereas the number of hostile transactions in the UK domestic market has 
decreased  compared  to  the  1980s  wave.  These  characteristics  of  the  M&A  sample  suggest  that 
takeovers in the 1990s mainly occurred for reasons of cost cutting, expanding into new markets, or 




CHAPTER 4.  
 
THE PERFORMANCE OF THE EUROPEAN MARKET FOR CORPORATE 
CONTROL: EVIDENCE FROM THE 5





The fifth global wave of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) which took place in the 1990s 
stands  out  as  the  largest  and  most  diverse  of  the  last  century.  For  the  first  time,  Continental 
European (CE) firms were as eager to participate in the market for corporate control as their US and 
UK counterparts, such that European takeover activity hit levels similar to those experienced in the 
US. Since the middle of 2003, takeover activity has picked up in Europe, continuing the industry 
consolidation trend of the 1990s. Despite these developments, empirical research on M&A activity 
remain mostly confined to the UK and US and there is little known about how well the Continental 
European market for corporate control performs relative to other regions.   
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The  purpose  of  this  chapter  is  twofold.  First,  we  carry  out  an  in-depth  analysis  of  the 
performance of corporate takeovers conducted by European firms during the fifth takeover (1993-
2001).  Our  sample  comprises  2,419  mergers  and  acquisitions  that  involve  companies  from  28 
European countries, including those from Central and Eastern Europe. The performance of European 
M&As is measured by the changes in the value of bidding and target firms in the period around the 
transaction  announcement.  As  potential  determinants  of  the  takeover  gains  we  consider  the 
characteristics of the bidding and target firms and of the bid itself. This study contributes to the 
restricted  literature  on  European  M&As  in  several  ways.  First,  in  contrast  to  Goergen  and 
Renneboog (2004) who examine only the largest European M&As, this chapter studies both large 
and small takeover transactions. Moeller et al. (2003) document that the focus on large takeovers 
may  give  an  incomplete  picture  of  the  impact  of  acquisitions  on  shareholder  wealth,  as  large 
acquisitions  tend  to  be  less  profitable  than  the  small  ones.  Second,  we  examine  takeover 
performance over the different phases of the firth takeover wave. Indeed, a limitation of the existing 
European M&A studies (see e.g. Campa and Hernando, 2004) is their focus on takeovers conducted 
in the peak of the fifth takeover wave. For the US, Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquisitions in 
1998-2001 generate large losses to bidding firms’ shareholders, while earlier transactions in that 
decade result in positive gains.     
The second purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether a wide range of institutional 
structures and legal rules have an impact on how takeovers are perceived at their announcement. 
Continental European transactions are conducted in a corporate environment very different from that 
of  the  UK.  In  comparison  to  their  British  peers,  companies  from  the  Continent  have  a  more 
concentrated  ownership  structure  (Faccio  and  Lang  2002)  and  operate  in  an  environment  with 
weaker  investor  protection,  less  developed  capital  markets  (LaPorta  et  al.  1998),  and  less  strict 
insider trading regulation (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2004).
41 A growing literature advocates that the 
corporate environment influences the cost of capital, corporate performance, and the distribution of 
benefits among corporate stakeholders (e.g. La Porta et al., 1997, 2002; Mork et al., 2000; and 
Levine, 1998, 1999).
42 We argue that regulation is also likely to have an impact on the patterns of 
M&A activity. Hence, the main research question we ask in this chapter is whether and to what 
extent the specifics of CE corporate governance and regulatory systems (relative to those of the UK) 
influence the anticipated performance of takeovers. 
In  a  nutshell,  our  main  findings  are  the  following.  We  find  that  European  M&As  are 
expected  to  create  takeover  synergies  since  their  announcements  trigger  substantial  share  price 
increases. However, most of the takeover gains are captured by the target firm shareholders: the 
                                                 
41 It is important to note that mentioned above characteristics of the corporate environment in CE countries are valid for 
the period of the 1990s and may be no longer true for the later (earlier) periods.  
42 The empirical literature documents that weak corporate governance combined with weak enforcement of the law 
distorts the efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability of companies to compete internationally, and 
hinders investment and economic development.  
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cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) at the announcement captured by the targets amount to 9% on 
average, considerably larger than the (still statistically significant) 0.5% accruing to the bidding 
firms. We establish that the characteristics of the target and bidding firms and of the bid itself have a 
significant impact on takeover returns. First, hostile takeovers and tender offers trigger substantially 
larger price reactions to the target shareholders than do friendly M&As. Second, investors discount 
the bidder and target’s share prices at the announcement of all-equity offers relative to cash bids. 
Third, target shareholders gain higher premiums in cross-border takeovers. Fourth, the acquisition of 
a private firm generates significantly positive abnormal returns for the bidder’s shareholders. We 
also demonstrate that takeovers occurring when takeover activity is slowing down trigger lower 
gains to both bidder and target shareholders than do deals at the beginning of the wave.  
While some of these results have been documented for other markets of corporate control 
(e.g. US), a comparison of the UK and CE M&A markets reveals that the corporate environment is 
an important factor affecting the market reaction to takeovers: (i) In case a UK firm is taken over, 
the abnormal returns exceed those in bids involving a CE target. This difference in premiums seems 
to be caused by a more strict takeover legislation in the UK than in the CE countries. The UK 
regulation protects the target shareholders better against expropriation by the bidder and gives them 
more  power  to  extract  higher  premiums  in  takeover  negotiations.  (ii)  The  presence  of  a  large 
shareholder in the bidding firm has a significantly positive effect on the takeover returns in the UK 
and a negative one in Continental Europe. This suggests that the market views the role of major 
shareholders differently in the two corporate governance regimes. (iii) Weak investor protection and 
low disclosure environment in Continental Europe enable bidding firms to invent takeover strategies 
that  allow  them  to  act  opportunistically  towards  target  firm’s  incumbent  shareholders;  more 
specifically, partial acquisitions and acquisitions with undisclosed terms of transaction. Whereas 
these types of transactions are virtually non-existent in the UK, they prevail in a large number in CE 
countries.  We  find  that  such  transactions  lead  to  substantial  losses  to  the  shareholders  of  both 
bidding and target firms.                  
The rest of the chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 2, we review the determinants of the 
share price reactions to takeover announcements and hypothesize potential differences between UK 
and CE M&As. Section 3 describes the data sources, sample statistics, and methodology, while 
section 4 investigates market reaction to takeover announcements and relates it to different takeover 
characteristics in a univariate analysis framework. In Section 5, we investigate the determinants of 
the announcement returns in a multivariate framework. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements 
 




An  M&A  announcement  brings  new  information  to  the  market,  such  that  investors’ 
expectations about the firm’s prospects are updated and reflected in the share prices.  
Both the theoretical and empirical M&A literature have shown that a variety of attributes 
affect the value of bidding and target firms at the announcement of corporate takeovers.
43 Empirical 
studies, mainly based on UK and US mergers and acquisitions, document that changes in the share 
price of the bidding and target firms at the takeover announcement depend on the characteristics of 
the transaction: the geographical scope of the takeover (domestic versus cross-border M&As), the 
form of and the attitude towards the bid (opposed bids, unopposed tender offers, friendly M&As), 
the success or failure of the negotiations (successfully completed or withdrawn bid), the legal status 
of  the  target  firm  (listed  versus  privately-held),  the  industry  scope  of  the  deal  (focus  versus 
diversification), the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, mixed offer), and the sub-period of the 
takeover wave in which the bid was announced (the run-up, the peak and the decline of the wave). 
The market combines these pieces of information into a signal about the quality of the bidding and 
target firms and of the potential value creation. The share prices are then adjusted accordingly. Table 
C-1  summarizes  the  theoretical  predictions  and  empirical  evidence  on  the  relationship  between 
takeover characteristics and the market reaction to takeover announcements.   
 
2.2 CE versus UK corporate takeovers: potential differences  
 
There are fundamental differences between the Anglo-American takeover markets, and that 
in Continental Europe: the typical CE firm has a more concentrated ownership structures (Faccio 
and  Lang  2002),  operates  in  an  environment  with  weaker  investor  protection,  and  with  less 
developed  capital  markets  (LaPorta  et  al.  1998),  and  is  subject  to  less  strict  insider  trading 
regulations (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2004).  
These differences may become apparent in several ways. First, CE biding firms may adopt 
opportunistic takeover strategies such as partial acquisitions and acquisitions with undisclosed terms 
of transaction, which are prevented by law in the UK. Second, the market may regard takeovers by 
CE  firms  with  large  blockholders  negatively,  as  these  deals  may  result  in  expropriation  of  the 
bidder’s  minority  shareholder  rights.  Such  expropriation  is  facilitated  in  corporate  governance 
regimes  with  weak  legal  minority  protection.
44  Third,  a  lack  of  efficient  takeover  regulation  in 
Continental Europe makes target shareholders less powerful relative to the bidder, which allows the 
bidder to capture a larger part of takeover gains. Fourth, CE executive directors/investors who are 
                                                 
43 For an overview of the evidence on the wealth effects of M&A activity and the motives for takeovers, see Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), Jarrell et al. (1988), Agrawal and Jaffe (2000), Bruner (2003). 
44 Weak investor protection may also have a direct impact on the market valuation of takeover benefits. Bris and Cabolis 
(2005) document that the regulatory environment in both the bidding and target firms’ countries have significant 
impact on premiums paid in M&As. The relationship between the level of investor protection and premiums paid in 
M&As is relatively complex and its analysis goes beyond the scope of this paper. We leave a detailed analysis of this 
relationship to a separate paper.      
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informed about a forthcoming takeover may turn to illegal trading on inside information, whereas 
such  behaviour  is  more  effectively  prevented  in  the  UK.  Below  we  discuss  how  these  specific 
aspects  of  the  CE  market  for  corporate  control  may  affect  the  bidder  and  target’s  share  price 
reactions to takeover announcements  
 
2.2.1. Opportunistic takeover strategies 
Weak investor protection may enable acquirers to adopt takeover strategies that allow them 
to act opportunistically towards the target’s incumbent shareholders (Bertrand et al., 2002). Partial 
acquisitions may turn the target’s incumbent shareholders into minority shareholders, whose rights 
could be expropriated by the acquirer due to poor legal protection. That is, when the protection of 
minority shareholders is not addressed at the regulatory level, bidders may be tempted to use partial 
acquisitions to extract private benefits of control at the detriment of the target’s shareholders. To 
protect the target shareholders from being expropriated by the bidder, regulators typically introduce 
a mandatory bid rule (Goergen et al., 2005). The rule obliges bidders acquiring a controlling share 
block to make an offer for all the remaining shares outstanding at a fair price.
45 For instance, partial 
acquisitions of majority control are virtually impossible. However, the number of partial acquisitions 
may  be  high  in  countries  where  the  mandatory  bid  rule  is  not  enforced  (such  as  Germany  and 
Sweden). In these countries, we expect target shareholders to dislike partial acquisitions and react 
negatively to their announcements.  
Acquisitions  with  undisclosed  terms  of  transaction  (such  as  means  of  payment  and 
transaction value) are another strategy that enables bidding firms to behave opportunistically. When 
disclosure requirements are low, the management or the controlling shareholder of the bidding firm 
may  conceal  the  details  of  the  bid.  When  a  takeover  with  undisclosed  terms  of  transaction  is 
announced, we expect investors to be aware of potential expropriation and react negatively.  
 
2.2.2. The role of bidder’s large blockholders in takeovers 
The presence of a large shareholder in bidding firms may have a significant impact on the 
market reaction to takeover announcements. However, this impact may differ between countries (it 
may be positive for UK firms and negative for CE firms), as the market views the roles of the major 
shareholders  in  the  two  corporate  governance  regimes  as  being  different.  When  ownership  and 
control  are  dispersed,  small  shareholders  cannot  effectively  monitor  management  and  mitigate 
potential conflicts of interest between management and shareholders due to coordination problems. 
Ownership  concentration resolves this problem, as major shareholders  have strong incentives to 
monitor management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks at al., 2001). Therefore, 
                                                 
45 The definitions of a controlling share block and fair price vary across countries. UK takeover regulation imposes a 
mandatory bid to be made when the bidder acquires 30% of the target firm’s equity and the fair price to be equal to the 
highest price paid for pre-bid purchases (Goergen et al., 2005).   
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investors may regard the presence of a large blockholder in a UK bidding company as a credible 
signal that the takeover decision is driven by motives of profit maximization. 
However, the gains from having the firm’s management monitored by a large blockholders 
may be wiped out by the agency costs associated with opportunistic behaviour of the blockholder 
towards minority shareholders. In takeover context, the costs arise when major blockholders use 
acquisitions as an instrument to transfer wealth from minority shareholders to themselves (Faccio 
and Stolin, 2004). This type of acquisitions is more likely to be observed in CE countries, where 
concentrated  corporate  ownership  structures  prevail  but  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders  are 
relatively low. Since minority shareholders are likely to fear potential expropriation, we expect the 
market to react negatively to the announcements of takeovers by CE bidders controlled by a major 
shareholder.   
 
2.2.3. Takeover regulation 
Takeover regulation plays a crucial role in shaping the pattern of M&A activity. Importantly, 
it affects the distribution of the bargaining power and thereby of the takeover surplus between the 
bidder and the target. Regulatory provisions that make target shareholders more powerful relative to 
the  bidder  (such  as  the  mandatory  bid  rule,  the  sell-out  right,  and  takeover  defence  measures) 
redistribute the takeover surplus from the bidder to the target shareholders (Goergen et al., 2005). 
However, in countries lacking this type of regulation, most of the takeover surplus is captured by 
bidding  firms  leaving  the  target’s  shareholders  with  lower  returns.  Similarly,  Rossi  and  Volpin 
(2004) report that targets earn higher premiums in countries where the mandatory bid requirement is 
enforced by law. Goergen et al. (2005) advocate that the UK has adopted a more strict takeover 
legislation  than  CE  countries.  Therefore,  we  expect  higher  takeover  premiums  to  be  offered  in 
takeover bids made to British companies.  
 
2.2.4. Insider trading 
When insider trading is not effectively regulated, insiders are more likely to trade on non-
public information (Bris, 2005). This implies that part of the valuation effect of takeovers is already 
incorporated in the share price prior to the announcement day (Bhattacharya et al., 2000). In this 
case, the takeover valuation effect is likely to be captured in the share price run-up realised prior to 
the bid. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2004) document that among European countries the UK has the 
toughest insider trading law. These are then CE countries where takeovers are preceded by illegal 
trading on inside information.
46                     
 
 
                                                 
46 However, Bris (2005) shows that insider trading laws make profitable to violate them, and hence countries with the 
toughest regulation may face bouts of illegal activity. 73 
Table C-1. Determinants of the anticipated gains to the bidder’s and target’s shareholders 
 
  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
       
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE:       
BIDDER & TARGET: In cross-border acquisitions, bidding and target firms are likely to benefit by taking 
advantage  of  imperfections  in  international  capital,  factor,  and  product  markets  (Hymer,  1976);  by 
internalising the R&D capabilities of target companies (Eun et al., 1996); and by expanding their businesses 
into new markets (as a response to globalisation trends). 
 






BIDDER & TARGET: Regulatory and cultural differences between the bidder and target countries may lead to 
difficulties in managing the post-merger process and hence failure to achieve merger synergies. Anticipating 
such difficulties in cross-border bids, the market  may discount the expected takeover  gains (Schoenberg, 
1999).  








       
TYPE OF ACQUISITION:       
BIDDER: Partial acquisitions are likely to take place when the acquisition is too risky or the bidding firm has 
insufficient financing capacity to acquire 100% of the target equity. Partial acquisitions are also associated 
with potential conflicts of interest that may arise between the bidder and the remaining target shareholders 
after the acquisition. Hence, the market is expected to react less favourably to partial acquisitions than to full 
acquisitions.   
TARGET: Bidding firms may use partial acquisitions (acquisitions of majority control but not of 100% control) 
to  expropriate  the  target  firms’  minority  shareholders  (Faccio  and  Stolin,  2004).  It  follows  that  such 
acquisitions may create less value and are associated with significantly lower returns to the target shareholders 
than are acquisitions in which the bidder intends to obtain full control (100% of the equity). 
Not Available   (+) M&A of 100%  (+) M&A of 100% 
       
FORM OF AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BID:       
BIDDER: Shareholders of the bidding firms fear that their firm will offer too high a premium if the target’s 
management opposes the bid or if the offer is made directly to the target shareholders (bypassing the board of 
directors). The anticipated upward revisions in the offer premium erode the synergy values accruing to the 
bidder.  
TARGET: Market expects that opposition against the bid will lead to the upward movement of the target’s share 
price at the announcement of a hostile bid. 





(-) Opposed (or 
hostile) bid 
(-) Tender offer 
(+) Opposed (or 
hostile) bid 
(+) Tender offer 
       
BID COMPLETION STATUS:       
BIDDER:  If  takeovers  are  positive  net  present  value  investments,  then  unsuccessful  bidder  returns  should 
reflect the loss of profitable investment opportunities (Ruback, 1983) 
TARGET: Withdrawn takeover bids may lead to share price increases for target firms. This increase itself may 
be one of the reasons the bid ultimately fails, as a bidder is likely to withdraw its bid if target shareholders 
demand too high a premium. The post-announcement CARs of target firms may also be positively influenced 
by the withdrawal of the bid. The reason is that investors get relieved that the bid is withdrawn and that they 









  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
anticipate other, more profitable bids.   
 
TARGET:  A  bid  withdrawal  may  lead  to  negative  market  reactions  when  investors  fear  that  their  firm’s 






  (-) Withdrawn 
BIDDER & TARGET: In pending acquisitions, the gains for bidder’s and target’s shareholders are expected to 
fall as a reaction to ongoing uncertainty 
Unknown  (-) Pending  (-) Pending 
       
LEGAL STATUS OF THE TARGET FIRM:       
BIDDER: Takeover bids for privately-held companies may lead to higher bidder returns than do bids for public 
firms. The reason is that the shares of privately-held firms are by definition illiquid that may create a price 
discount.  Also,  takeover  negotiations  with  the  owners  of  a  private  firm  may  have  a  better  chance  of 
succeeding than when a public tender offer has to be launched for a widely-held firm (Burkart, Gromb, and 
Panunzi, 1997). Moreover, an all-equity offer to a private firm may create an outside blockholder in the 
bidding firm and hence bring about more managerial discipline (Chang, 1998). 
 
Moeller et al. 
(2004); 
Faccio et al. (2004); 
Fuller et al. (2002) 
(+) Private target   
BIDDER: The acquisition of a private firm may entail considerably more risk for the acquirer due to the fact 
that the information available about the true value and growth potential of the firm may be less reliable. 
Therefore, an acquisition of a private target may be followed by negative market reaction  
Bradley and 
Sundaram (2004) 
(-) Private target   
       
INDUSTRY SCOPE:       
BIDDER:  Although  diversifying  (or  conglomerate)  acquisitions  are  expected  to  create  operational  and/or 
financial synergies, the creation of diversified firms is associated with a number of disadvantages such as rent-
seeking behavior by divisional managers (Scharfstein and Stein, 2000), bargaining problems within the firm 
(Rajan et al., 2000), or bureaucratic rigidity (Shin and Stulz, 1998). These disadvantages of diversification 
may outweigh the alleged synergies and result in wealth destruction for the shareholders of the bidding firm. 
Diversifying  mergers  themselves  may  be  an  outgrowth  of  the  agency  problems  between  managers  and 
shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). As such, they are expected to destroy value 
TARGET: Investors expect bidders pursuing diversification strategies to bid more aggressively and hence pay 
higher  takeover  premiums  than  do  bidders  adhering  to  a  focus  strategy.  This  is  because  diversifying 
acquisitions are more likely to occur when bidding firms suffer from agency conflicts and free cash flow 
problems. In the literature, there is evidence that the managers of such firms often acquire unrelated businesses 
for  personal  reasons  at  the  expense  of  shareholder  value  (e.g.  for  ‘empire  building’  purposes),  or  that 
managerial hubris leads bidding firms to pay too high premiums. 
Morck et al. (1990); 
Maquieira et al. 
(1998); 





       
MEANS OF PAYMENT:       
BIDDER: If the managers of a bidding firm are convinced that the true value of their firm’s shares is higher 
than the current share price, they will prefer not to issue equity (to finance an all-equity bid or a mixed offer) 
and will rather offer to pay with cash. Hence, the market may interpret the financing choice as a signal about a 
firm’s  under-  or  overvaluation  and  revise  the  share  price  of  the  firm  offering  cash  (equity)  upwards 
(downwards) (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, a negative price correction is expected for all-equity bids and a 
Moeller et al 
(2004); 
Andrade et al. 
(2001);  
(-) Equity payment 
(+) Cash payment 
(-) Equity payment 
(+) Cash payment  
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  Empirical evidence  Expected effect on  
Bidder’s CARs 
Expected effect on  
Target’s CARs 
(downwards) (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Thus, a negative price correction is expected for all-equity bids and a 
positive one for all-cash bids. 
TARGET: A cash bid is interpreted as a positive signal about the target firm’s quality as the bidding firm is 
buying out the target shareholders and is hence not willing to share future value increases. Hence, the target’s 
share price rises more for an all-cash deal than for an equity exchange. 
 
Franks et al. (1991) 
BIDDER & TARGET: Shareholders of the bidding and target firms get wary about the deal when the terms of 
the takeover are not disclosed. They may suspect that the transaction may lead to the expropriation of their 
rights either by the management or by the controlling shareholder. Therefore, share prices of both firms are 
expected to decline 






       
       
SUB-PERIODS OF THE 5
th TAKEOVER WAVE:       
BIDDER: The bidders bid more aggressively during the takeover wave peak, hence their gains are expected to 
decline 




(-) Peak of the 
takeover wave 
(+) Peak of the 
takeover wave 
BIDDER & TARGET: Takeovers occurring at a later stage of the wave may suffer from limited information 
processing, managerial hubris, and managerial self-interest and hence trigger lower returns to bidder and target 
shareholders than do those at the beginning of the wave (Harford, 2003) 
 
Harford (2003); 
Moeller et al. 
(2005) 
(-) Later stage of 
the takeover 
wave 
(-) Later stage of 
the takeover 
wave 
BIDDER: High valuations realized during the periods of equity market booms increase managerial discretion, 
and make it possible for executives to make poor acquisitions when they have run out of good ones (Jensen, 
2004). We expect more poor acquisitions in the later stage of the wave. 
Moeller et al. 
(2005) 
(-) Peak and later 
stage of the 
takeover wave 
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3. Data sources, descriptive statistics and methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
We select our original sample of European acquisitions undertaken during the fifth takeover 
wave (1993-2001) from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data Company 
(SDC). The SDC data were filtered down to intra-European domestic and cross-border takeovers, 
whereby both the acquirer and the target are from countries within Continental Europe and the UK. 
Our sample also includes deals involving firms from Central and Eastern Europe. We retain only 
those  M&As  that  satisfy  the  following  requirements:  (i)  the  transaction  involves  a  change  in 
control
47; (ii) either the bidder or target shares (or both) are traded on a European stock exchange; 
(iii) both parties in the transaction are independent corporations;
48 (iv) neither the bidder nor the 
target is a financial institution (bank, unit trust, mutual fund or pension fund); (v) the period between 
two  consecutive  bids  by  the  same  acquirer  is  not  less  300  trading  days;
49  (vi)  financial  and 
accounting data for at least one of the participants of the transaction are available in DataStream or 
in the Amadeus, Fame or Reach databases of Bureau van Dijk. 
The quality of the SDC data is verified by comparing its information on the announcement 
date, the companies’ countries of origin, the transaction value, payment structure, share of control 
acquired, bid completion status, and the target’s attitude towards the bid with information from the 
news announcements stored in LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva.
50 We find that the 
SDC records for M&As from our sample frequently do not coincide with those of the other sources. 
These inconsistencies have been amended by replacing contradictory SDC information with the new 
one extracted from the news announcements. All in all, amendments were made in about 36% of our 
final sample.
51   
The ownership and control structure of the bidding and target firms prior to the takeover 
announcement is collected from a variety of sources described in Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the 
book). To control for dual class shares, pyramidal ownership structures, multiple control chains, and 
cross-holdings, all of which prevail in CE companies, we focus on corporate control structures rather 
                                                 
47 We require either that the transaction leads to a combination of the firms or that the acquirer who held less than 50% 
of the target’s stock prior to the transaction acquires full control (increases its ownership position to more than 50%). 
48 Divestitures and management buyouts are not included. 
49 The reason is that we want to avoid contamination of the windows used to estimate systematic risk. Therefore, we 
exclude bids by the same acquirer within less than 300 trading days from the previous announcement (240 days 
estimation period ending 60 days before the event).  
50  We  consider  all  news  announcements  available  in  English,  French,  German,  Dutch,  Italian,  Spanish,  Swedish, 
Portuguese,  Russian,  Czech,  and  Polish  languages.  For  the  French,  German,  Italian,  Spanish,  Swedish,  and 
Portuguese, we use WorldLingo online translator (www.worldlingo.com).  
51 The percentage refers to all M&As from our sample for which at least one deal characteristic reported in SDC does not 
coincide with that from the other sources and hence it was replaced. Most of the inconsistencies found in the SDC 
records regard the bid completion status, share of control acquired, and the transaction value.   
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than  ownership  structures.  To  identify  the  ultimate  control  structure  of  a  firm,  we  follow  the 
methodology presented in Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002). First, we consider 
only shares bearing voting rights. Second, as control depends on both direct and indirect ownership 
of  voting  equity,  we  accumulate  the  voting  stakes  directly  or  indirectly  controlled  by  the  same 
ultimate shareholder. When a target company is private, we  assume that ownership and  control 
concentration in this firm amounts to 100%. 
 
3.2 Sample summary statistics 
 
Our final sample of European M&A announcements consists of 2,419 deals involving firms 
from 28 European countries. The sample characteristics are described in tables C-2 through C-4.  
 
3.2.1. Sample composition by deal characteristics 
According to panel A of table C-2, about 70% of the intra-European takeover bids target a 
domestic  firm.  The  relative  number  of  cross-border  bids  within  Europe  has  been  gradually 
increasing over time, starting with 23% in the beginning of the fifth takeover wave and reaching 
32% in its end. Moeller and Schlingemann (2004) document a similar tendency for US takeovers. 
Takeovers resulting in a full acquisition of the target’s shares comprise 60% of the sample over the 
period  1993-2001.  In  the  remaining  deals,  the  bidder  acquires  majority  control.  The fraction  of 
acquisitions of partial control has augmented near the end of the takeover wave. One reason is there 
is a high number of large M&A transactions in 1998-2001, which are relatively more risky for the 
bidding firms and requires considerable financial resources. A desire to diversify the risk of these 
mega-deals and limited financing capacity may force bidders not to bid for all the equity of target 
firms.   
Our sample comprises  162 (7%) opposed (or  hostile) bids, 473 (19%) unopposed tender 
offers  and  1,784  (74%)  friendly  M&As.  We  classify  an  acquisition  as  opposed  if  the  board  of 
directors  of  the  target  firm  reacts  negatively  to  the  bidder’s  initial  offer  for  whatever  reason.
52 
Further, within the unopposed takeovers, we also distinguish between bids conducted in form of a 
public tender offer (unopposed tender offers) and bids conducted in form of a merger or a private 
purchase of a control block (friendly M&As).
53 Panel A of table C-2 shows that the frequency of 
                                                 
52 It should be noted that a negative reaction to the bid may result either from the target’s bargaining strategy to extract a 
higher premium (Schwert, 2000), or from the target directors’ viewpoint that the proposed strategic plan underlying 
the acquisition is incompatible with the target firm’s own strategy (Lipton, 1985). 
53 An unopposed tender offer is a public offer to the target shareholders asking them to sell their shares for cash and/or 
equity at a pre-specified price or equity exchange ratio, while the board of directors of the target firm does not react 
negatively to the bid (issue negative comments about the bid). An acquisition is considered to be successful if a 
sufficient number of shares are tendered such that the bidder gains control over the target. A merger refers to the 
consolidation of the assets of two firms, which is approved by both the shareholders of the target and the shareholders 
of the bidding firms. Generally, the majority of 2/3 or more of shareholder votes of each firm is required for the  
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friendly M&As is especially high in the beginning (1993-96) and in the end of the takeover wave 
(2000-01), whereas the frequency of unopposed tender offers in highest in the period of the takeover 
wave peak (1997-99). Opposed takeovers are least frequently observed when the takeover wave 
slows down (2000-01).   
     
Table C-2. Sample composition and characteristics of M&A deals 
Panel A shows the number of all the takeover announcements and partitions this sample into: (i) domestic and cross-border deals; 
(ii) acquisitions of 100% control and acquisitions of partial control; (iii) friendly M&As, unopposed tender offers, and opposed (by the 
target’s board) bids; (iv) completed, pending, and withdrawn bids; (v) privately held and public target firms; (vi) diversifying deals 
and focus-oriented transactions, and (vii) all-cash, all-equity, mixed offers and deals with undisclosed terms of transaction. Panel B 
provides characteristics of takeover transaction for the whole sample and for the sub-samples of takeovers launched by UK and CE 
firms. Mean [Median] values of the variables are reported. All variables are defined in Appendix C-I.  
 
PANEL A: SAMPLE COMPOSITION BY M&A ANNOUNCEMENT YEAR 
  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  1993-2001 
                    %  Num 
                       
Total number of M&As  171  229  228  229  229  292  411  408  222    2,419 
% of all M&As in 1993-2001  7.1  9.5  9.4  9.5  9.5  12.1  17.0  16.9  9.2  100.0   
                       
  % OF M&A DEALS BY CATEGORY:     
Domestic bid  76.6  74.7  69.7  73.4  69.9  66.1  68.1  65.9  67.6  69.5  1,681 
Cross-border bid  23.4  25.3  30.3  26.6  30.1  33.9  31.9  34.1  32.4  30.5  738 
                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  55.6  54.1  60.5  62.9  60.3  37.7  37.2  41.7  39.6  60.0  1,451 
Acquisition of Partial Control (< 100%)  44.4  45.9  39.5  37.1  39.7  62.3  62.8  58.3  60.4  40.0  968 
                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  7.6  5.7  10.1  5.2  7.4  6.2  7.8  6.6  3.2  6.7  162 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  13.5  13.5  18.9  17.0  24.5  23.3  23.6  18.6  18.0  19.6  473 
Friendly M&A  78.9  80.8  71.1  77.7  68.1  70.5  68.6  74.8  78.8  73.7  1784 
                       
Completed bid  75.4  77.3  81.6  82.5  83.4  86.0  83.7  76.5  73.0  80.2  1,941 
Withdrawn bid  12.3  10.9  10.1  5.7  11.8  7.2  7.3  6.9  8.6  8.6  207 
Pending bid   12.3  11.8  8.3  11.8  4.8  6.8  9.0  16.7  18.5  11.2  271 
                       
Private target  69.0  69.9  62.7  72.9  62.0  62.0  54.5  62.7  62.6  63.2  1,530 
Listed target  31.0  30.1  37.3  27.1  38.0  38.0  45.5  37.3  37.4  36.8  889 
                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  65.5  56.8  63.6  57.2  66.8  70.9  67.9  64.0  63.1  64.4  1,558 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  34.5  43.2  36.4  42.8  33.2  29.1  32.1  36.0  36.9  35.6  861 
                       
All-Cash bid  28.1  32.3  36.8  39.7  43.7  38.4  43.1  40.4  39.2  38.8  938 
All-Equity bid  19.3  15.7  13.6  11.4  17.9  10.3  14.6  15.0  14.0  14.4  349 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  26.3  16.2  19.7  23.1  14.0  17.8  16.5  14.7  18.9  17.9  434 
Undisclosed terms  26.3  35.8  29.8  25.8  24.5  33.6  25.8  29.9  27.9  28.9  698 
                       
                                                                                                                                                                   
merger to succeed (the required percentage may vary across countries). A private purchase of a control block refers to 
all transactions in which the bidder purchases a controlling share block by means other than a tender offer. This 
category usually comprises acquisitions of private targets or direct purchases of a share block from a large shareholder 
of the target firm.   
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 PANEL B: CHARACTERISTICS OF M&A DEALS 
  Whole Sample  UK bidders  CE bidders 
  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med] 
       
Transaction value (US$ mln)  1,487   [24]  422     [16]  3,093   [59] 
Percentage of target shares the bidding firm intended to own after the bid  87.3     [100.0]  95.1    [100.0]  81.3     [95.0] 
Percentage of target shares the bidder accumulates prior to the bid (toehold)  4.6       [0.0]  2.3      [0.0]  6.4       [0.0] 
 Bidding firms that accumulate a toehold prior to the bid (%)  15.1  8.8  19.7 
 Size of the toehold they accumulate (%)   30.1     [33.3]  25.7    [29.4]  31.6     [34.5] 
Number of observations  2419  995  1424 
 
About  9%  of  all  takeovers  in  our  sample  ultimately  fail  as  a  consequence  of  successful 
opposition to the bid or a collapse of the friendly takeover negotiations. The rest of the sample is 
divided into successfully completed M&As (80%) and pending negotiations in which the bid has 
been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn (11%).
54 In many of the pending bids, the 
bidder announces its intention to acquire control over the target firm, but the acquisition occurs in 
several steps. That is, at the announcement, the bidder acquires a large stake of, say, 25%  and 
pledges  to  acquire  control  (the  remaining  25-75%)  in  the  near  future.  The  relative  number  of 
withdrawn bids hits the highest levels in the beginning of the fifth takeover wave (1993-95), whereas 
pending acquisitions occur with high frequency in the end of the wave (2000-01).    
Panel A of table C-2 also indicates that a large part of takeover bids are made on privately 
held target firms (63%), while the remainder (37%) are bids on publicly owned targets listed on a 
stock  exchange.  The  frequency  of  M&As  involving  public  targets  substantially  increases  in  the 
second half of the takeover wave (1997-01), reaching its peak in 1999 (46% of the deals), when the 
M&A activity was at its strongest.  
Expansion within the same industry seems to be a dominant takeover strategy during the 
1990s. Sixty-four percent of all the M&A announcements refer to bidders and targets operating in 
the same sector or related industries
55, while the remainder are diversifying acquisitions. The highest 
percent of focussed acquisitions is observed in 1997-99.  
Of the 1,721 bids where the payment method is disclosed, the majority (54%) are all-cash 
offers. This percentage is lower than the 80% reported for European all-cash M&As in Faccio and 
Masulis (2005). The difference may be driven by the exclusion of divestitures (acquisitions of other 
firms’  subsidiaries)  and  cross-border  acquisitions  of  US  targets,  which  represent  a  substantial 
fraction of Faccio and Masulis’ sample and are mostly pure cash offers. Panel A of table C-2 reports 
that, of all the bids involving equity payments, about half are pure equity-exchange offers. The other 
                                                 
54 We checked the status of all bids which were labeled as ‘pending’ in the SDC database. We used LexisNexis and 
Factiva and changed the completion status when pending bids were ultimately completed or withdrawn. For a number 
of bids, no further information was ever released in the financial press.  
55 We define ‘companies in related industries’ as firms of which the primary 2-digit SIC codes coincide. Changing this 
definition to the 3-digit SIC classification, does not materially change the results in the remainder of the paper.   
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half are mixed offers that consist of 53% cash, 47% stock, and less than 1% of loan notes, on 
average. Our sample also includes 698 bids (29% of the sample) that lack information about the 
method  of  payment  and  transaction  value.  The  highest  proportion  of  M&As  with  undisclosed 
transaction terms is observed in Austria (68% of all bids in the target’s country), Germany (67% of 
all bids in the target’s country), and Switzerland (57% of all bids in the target’s country). None of 
UK target firms is involved in takeovers with undisclosed terms of transaction, as such lack of 
disclosure would violate UK transparency regulation.      
In panel B of table C-2, the characteristics of the takeover deals are detailed. We organize 
this information according to the geographical origin of the bidding firm (UK versus Continental 
Europe).  The  average  takeover  deal  is  worth  US$  1,487  million.  This  figure  is  considerably 
influenced by outliers, as the median value of transactions barely exceeds US$ 24 million.
56  The 
average size of CE takeovers exceeds the size of their UK peers more than seven times.  
Interestingly, bidders from the Continent intend to hold only 81% (95% median) of the target 
shares after the bid completion, while UK bidders seek to own 95% (100% median).
57 Bidders’ 
preferences regarding their ultimate ownership in the target firm are affected by takeover regulation. 
For instance, UK Takeover Code obliges bidders to make a mandatory bid to purchase all shares of 
the target firm after it has acquired a share block of 30%. However, this type of requirements was 
virtually non-existent in many CE countries (such as Germany and Sweden) during most of the 
1990s.
58 Therefore, compared to their UK peers, bidders from the Continent have more freedom in 
initiating acquisitions of partial control. The impact of takeover regulation on the takeover bids  is 
further supported by evidence that the size of the toehold that UK bidders accumulate prior to the 
bid (averaged over the ones who have decided to do so) is about 25% with a median of 29%, just 
below the 30% mandatory bid threshold. The size of the toehold accumulated by CE bidders is 
somewhat higher: 32% (35% median).
59             
 
3.2.2. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms 
                                                 
56 The largest acquisitions by year are: the US$ 1.5 billion bid by Lagardere Group for Matra-Hachette (both are located 
in France); the US$ 2.5 billion bid in 1994 by Enterprise Oil for Lasmo (both are UK firms); the US$ 5.5 billion bid in 
1995 by Granada Group for Forte (both are UK firms); the US$ 30 billion bid in 1996 by Ciba-Geigy for Sandoz (both 
are located in Switzerland); the US$ 3.5 billion bid in 1997 by Rallye for Casino Guichard Perrachon (both are French 
firms); the US$ 35 billion bid in 1998 by Britain’s Zeneca Group for Sweden’s Astra; the US$ 202 billion bid in 1999 
by Vodaphone for Mannesmann; the US$ 14 billion bid in 2000 by Vodafone for Spain’s Airtel; and the US$ 7 billion 
bid in 2001 by Germany’s E.ON (formerly Veba/Viag) for Britain’s Powergen. 
57 We focus on the percentage of the target’s shares that the bidder ex-ante intends to own after the bid and not on the 
percentage that the bidder obtains ex-post because our sample comprises withdrawn and pending acquisitions, in 
which the bidder acquires less than or nothing of what it was intended. We also refer to the percent of target’s shares 
the bidder intends to own after the bid and not on the percent of shares the bidder intends to acquire because some 
firms accumulate a stake in the target firm (toehold) already prior to the bid.       
58 For a detailed overview of differences in takeover regulations across European countries and see Goergen et al. (2005) 
59 The difference in mean toeholds of UK and CE bidders is statistically significant at the 1% level. Importantly, only 9% 
of British firms actually decide to purchase a toehold. The figure is twice lower than the percent of bidders with a 
toehold in Continental Europe. 81 
Table C-3 shows that the UK is the dominant market for corporate control in Europe: half of 
the domestic takeover transactions occur in the UK and one fifth of all the bidders in intra-European 
cross-border  acquisitions  are  UK  firms.  Proportionally,  UK  firms  are  targeted  less  frequently: 
merely 12.7% of the European target firms are headquartered in the UK – a percentage similar to 
that for Germany and France. Unsurprisingly, given the dispersed nature of ownership in UK firms, 
most hostile bids are concentrated in this country: 61% of the domestic and 41% of the cross-border 
hostile bids (from the target firms’ perspective) take place in the UK. The second and third largest 
markets for corporate control in Europe are Germany and France; they respectively account for 10% 
and 13% of all domestic bids, and 12% and 15% of all cross-border bids. Not to be underestimated is 
the Scandinavian M&A market, especially in its impact on cross-border takeover activity in Central 
Europe. Relative to the other major economies in Europe, takeover activity in Italy is remarkably 
low. Firms located in the countries that joined the European Union in 2004 are attractive takeover 
targets, being involved in 15% of all cross-border M&As. In contrast, the involvement of such firms 
as bidders in cross-border acquisitions is negligible, as is the domestic takeover market in Central 
Europe.  
  
3.2.3. Characteristics of the bidding and target firms 
The characteristics of the bidding and target firms are reported in Table C-4. Relative to 
target firms, bidders in European M&As tend to be larger and to have better growth opportunities (as 
reflected  by  the  market  capitalization  and  the  Q-ratio).  Also,  bidding  firms  are  somewhat  less 
leveraged than targets (21% versus 23%, respectively). Target firms have a higher percentage of 
collateral (38%) than do bidders (31%). Table C-4 also shows that the corporate performance (return 
on assets (ROA), and cash flow to sales) and investment activity (capital investments to total assets) 
of targets and bidders are similar.  
Some  attributes  are  significantly  different  between  targets  and  bidders  from  the  UK  and 
Continental Europe. Table C-4 shows that UK firms (both bidders and targets) outperform their CE 
peers  in  terms  of  sales,  growth  opportunities,  and  ROA.  Furthermore,  UK  companies  are  less 
leveraged and have more collateral. These differences are likely to follow from differences in the 
regulatory environment of the UK and Continental Europe. A growing literature advocates that the 
legal system in the UK ensures better investor protection and corporate focus on shareholder value 
than do the corporate governance regimes of CE countries (La Porta et al., 1997). In turn, this may 




Table C-3. Sample composition by countries of bidding and target firms 
 
    Domestic deals  Cross-border deals,  
Classification by bidder country 
Cross-border deals,  
Classification by target country 


























1  Austria  11  0.7%  11  0  0  31  4.2%  30  1  0  20  2.7%  16  1  3 
2  Belgium  23  1.4%  22  1  0  34  4.6%  28  5  1  14  1.9%  11  3  0 
3  Bulgaria  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  2  0.3%  2  0  0 
4  Croatia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  6  0.8%  6  0  0 
5  Cyprus  3  0.2%  3  0  0  2  0.3%  1  1  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0 
6  Czech Rep.  9  0.5%  8  1  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  25  3.4%  25  0  0 
7  Denmark  30  1.8%  21  3  6  32  4.3%  25  6  1  21  2.8%  16  4  1 
8  Estonia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  13  1.8%  13  0  0 
9  Finland  53  3.2%  52  0  1  32  4.3%  29  2  1  20  2.7%  19  0  1 
10  France  219  13.0%  176  30  13  111  15.0%  92  10  9  89  12.0%  81  7  1 
11  Germany  175  10.4%  165  8  2  89  12.0%  71  14  4  94  12.7%  91  2  1 
13  Hungary  4  0.2%  4  0  0  5  0.7%  5  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0 
14  Ireland  11  0.7%  6  4  1  27  3.6%  18  7  2  16  2.2%  10  5  1 
15  Italy  39  2.3%  32  4  3  28  3.8%  24  3  1  44  5.9%  43  0  1 
16  Latvia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  4  0.5%  4  0  0 
17  Lithuania  1  0.1%  1  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  6  0.8%  5  1  0 
18  Luxemburg  0  0.0%  0  0  0  7  0.9%  6  1  0  5  0.7%  4  1  0 
19  Netherlands  2  0.1%  1  1  0  27  3.6%  16  10  1  45  6.1%  37  7  1 
20  Norway  58  3.5%  44  9  5  32  4.3%  29  1  2  37  5.0%  23  7  7 
21  Poland  22  1.3%  22  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  37  5.0%  34  3  0 
22  Portugal  1  0.1%  1  0  0  1  0.1%  1  0  0  11  1.5%  10  1  0 
23  Romania  2  0.1%  2  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  11  1.5%  11  0  0 
24  Russia  10  0.6%  10  0  0  3  0.4%  3  0  0  10  1.4%  9  1  0 
25  Slovenia  0  0.0%  0  0  0  0  0.0%  0  0  0  4  0.5%  2  2  0 
26  Spain  46  2.7%  33  6  7  9  1.2%  4  5  0  33  4.5%  30  3  0 
27  Sweden  102  6.1%  62  29  11  69  9.3%  59  7  3  48  6.5%  38  10  0 
28  Switzerland  22  1.3%  19  1  2  39  5.3%  26  10  3  28  3.8%  22  4  2 
29  UK  836  49.9%  483  274  79  159  21.5%  136  19  4  94  12.7%  41  40  13 
  Total  1679  100.0%  1178  371  130  740  100.0%  606  102  32  740  100.0%  606  102  32 83 
Table C-4.  Characteristics of bidding and target firms 
 
This table reports financial, accounting, and control structure characteristics of bidding and target firms and partitions this sample 
into UK and CE firms. All variables are defined in Appendix C-I. The table reports the mean [median] values of variables. For binary 
variables, medians are omitted. The variables Blockholder >20% and Blockholder >60% are binary: they equal 1 if at least one 
blockholder reaches the specified percentage of voting rights. The mean values for these variables represent the percentage of firms 
with concentrated ownership in the analyzed sample. For private target companies, we assume that a single investor owns 100% of 
control. CE stands for Central European.  
 
  BIDDING FIRM    TARGET FIRM 
  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders    All targets  UK targets  CE targets 
  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]    Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med]  Mean  [Med] 
                           
FINANCIAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
Market value (US$ mln)  2,572  [244]  2,418  [156]  2,691  [341]    929  [90]  699  [77]  1,159  [105] 
Q-ratio  2.51  [1.17]  3.20  [1.49]  2.04  [0.98]    1.50  [0.98]  1.40  [1.02]  1.62  [0.89] 
Number of observations  2,109    992    1,117      760    393    367   
                           
ACCOUNTING CHARACTERISTICS: 
Total Assets (US$ mn)  3,965  [316]  1,588  [136]  5,602  [468]    1,188  [153]  562  [103]  1,865  [245] 
Sales / Total Assets  1.23  [1.17]  1.36  [1.24]  1.14  [1.03]    1.31  [1.22]  1.44  [1.30]  1.16  [1.12] 
Cash Flow / Sales  0.07  [0.09]  0.07  [0.09]  0.08  [0.09]    0.09  [0.07]  0.05  [0.07]  0.14  [0.07] 
Investments / Total Assets  0.02  [0.01]  0.01  [0.00]  0.03  [0.01]    0.02  [0.00]  0.01  [0.00]  0.03  [0.01] 
Leverage    0.21  [0.18]  0.19  [0.15]  0.22  [0.21]    0.23  [0.20]  0.20  [0.18]  0.26  [0.24] 
Collateral   0.31  [0.27]  0.34  [0.29]  0.29  [0.25]    0.38  [0.33]  0.41  [0.37]  0.35  [0.30] 
Returns on Assets   0.28  [0.24]  0.36  [0.31]  0.22  [0.19]    0.28  [0.23]  0.37  [0.31]  0.18  [0.16] 
Number of observations  2,271    992    1,279      2,122    928    1,194   
                           
CONTROL STRUCTURE: 
Control (%)  31.7  [25.8]  13.6  [11.9]  38.8  [34.9]    78.4  [100.0]  74.2  [100.0]  81.4  [100.0] 
 Private Target  32.4  [26.7]  14.6  [10.6]  38.9  [35.0]    100.0  [100.0]  100.0  [100.0]  100.0  [100.0] 
 Listed Target  30.2  [23.0]  11.8  [8.3]  38.6  [34.9]    31.5  [26.9]  11.9  [9.9]  38.9  [34.9] 
Blockholder >20%   0.58    0.08    0.77      0.89    0.77    0.93   
 Private Target  0.60    0.10    0.78      1.00    1.00    1.00   
 Listed Target  0.53    0.07    0.75      0.67    0.08    0.81   
Blockholder >60%  0.16    0.02    0.21      0.74    0.71    0.75   
 Private Target  0.16    0.02    0.21      1.00    1.00    1.00   
 Listed Target  0.15    0.01    0.21      0.14    0.01    0.19   
Number of observations  1,582    624    958      2,006    704    1,302   
                           
 
UK and CE firms differ not only in terms of performance and capital structure, but also in 
terms of ownership and control. On average, the largest blockholder of a CE bidding firm ultimately 
controls 39% of the voting rights, which is significantly higher than the average voting stake (14%) 
held by the dominant shareholder of a UK bidding firm. For CE bidders, we detect at least one 
dominant shareholder with voting power in excess of 20% in more than three quarters of the firms, 
and a blockholder holding a large majority of voting rights (60% and more) in 21% of the firms. In 
contrast,  UK  bidders  are  characterized  by  dispersed  ownership  structures,  as  only  8%  have  a  
84 
 
shareholder with a significant blockholding of at least 20% of voting rights. The ultimate ownership 
structures of our bidders are similar to those reported for the UK and Continental Europe by Faccio 
and Lang (2002). Given that there is no mandatory ownership disclosure for privately held firms, we 
assume that the ownership concentration amounts to 100%. The reason is that many non-listed firms 
are likely to be controlled by one or a group of large investors. On average, we find little difference 




3.3.1. Abnormal returns and test statistics 
In  order  to  measure  the  short-term  wealth  effects  prior  to,  at  and  after  the  takeover 
announcement, we apply an event study methodology. That is, the short-term shareholder wealth 
effect at the takeover announcement is computed as the sum of daily abnormal returns realized in the 
period starting 60 days prior and ending 60 days subsequent to the event day.
60 We also consider 
alternative event windows within the [-60, +60] interval. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the 
difference  between  realized  and  market  model  benchmark  returns.  The  market  model  uses  the 
MSCI-Europe index and the parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.
61 To test for significance of the estimated abnormal returns, we use two 
parametric test statistics (the portfolio test and the standardized test) as proposed by Brown and 
Warner (1985) and the non-parametric Corrado test (Corrado, 1989).
62 
 
3.3.2. Correction for potential sample selection bias  
We  recognize  that  the  regression  analysis  of  the  share  price  reaction  to  takeover 
announcements may suffer from a censoring problem. The analyzed sample of successful, pending, 
and withdrawn M&As excludes deals in which bidders initially decided not to bid. Factors such as 
financial constraints, growth opportunities, and share price performance are likely to be important 
determinants of the bidder’s decision (not) to perform a takeover. In other words, we may observe 
fewer takeovers by bidders with low cash holdings, high leverage, small size, underperforming share 
price, or poor growth opportunities, which may bias our test results. To control for this potential 
                                                 
60 The event day is either the day of the announcement or the first trading day following the announcement in case the 
announcement is made on a non-trading day. 
61 Our estimates of the abnormal returns are robust with respect to the different choices of the market index (local, 
European-wide, and worldwide index) and the estimation model of the benchmark returns (the estimated beta adjusted 
for mean-reversion (Blume, 1979), and non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 1979)). Changing the market index or the 
estimation model does not materially change the results in the remainder of the paper.   
62 The portfolio test statistic assumes that the CARs are larger for securities with a higher variance. Hence, equal weights 
are given to the returns of individual securities. The standardized test statistic assumes that the true CARs are constant 
across  securities  and  gives  more  weight  to  the  securities  with  a  lower  variance  of  the  CARs.  For  reasons  of 
conciseness, we only show the non-parametric test statistics; the results of the parametric tests do not change the 
interpretation of the results and are available upon request.  85 
bias, we employ Heckman’s (1976, 1979) procedure for a sample-selection correction. Applying a 
Probit analysis on the full sample of European firms (and subsamples of CE and UK firms), we 
estimate the probability that a firm will undertake an acquisition. The resulting parameters are used 
WR FRPSXWH +HFNPDQ¶V  IRU HDFK ELGGLQJ ILUP LQ RXU VDPSOH :H LQFOXGH +HFNPDQ¶V  DV DQ
additional regressor into the regression analysis of the bidder’s CARs. If the null hypothesis that 
+HFNPDQ¶V LVLQVLJQLILFDQWFDQnot be rejected, censoring is not a significant problem in our sample 
and hence does not lead to sample selection biases in our estimation procedure.  
 
4. Market reaction to takeover announcements (Univariate analysis) 
 
In this section, we focus on univariate analyses of bidder and target CAARs realized in intra-
European M&As. We relate the CAARs to the various characteristics of target and bidding firms and 
of the bid itself: these include the location of the target (domestic versus cross-border M&As), the 
type of the takeover (a full takeover versus the acquisition of majority control), the form of and the 
attitude towards the bid (opposed bids, unopposed tender offers, friendly M&As), the success or 
failure of the negotiations (successfully completed, pending, or withdrawn bid), the legal status of 
the  target  firm  (listed  versus  privately-held),  the  business  expansion  strategy  (focus  versus 
diversification), the means of payment (all-cash, all-equity, mixed offer, or undisclosed means of 
payment), and the sub-period of the takeover wave in which the bid was announced (the run-up, the 
peak and the decline of the wave). We also investigate variation in the market reaction to takeover 
announcements across deals that involve firms of different legal origin.  
 
4.1 Market reaction to takeover announcements: total sample 
 
Table C-5 reports that the announcement of a takeover bid accrues positive abnormal returns 
to the bidder shareholders: on the event day, a small average abnormal return of 0.5% is realized on 
average, though it is statistically significant at the 1% level. Over a 10-day window centred around 
the  event  day,  the  average  CAAR  amounts  to  0.8%.  Strikingly,  the  CAARs  of  bidding  firms 
generated over the 3-month period subsequent to the bid are significantly negative (–3%).  
In comparison to the bidder CAARs, the price reactions for the target firms are substantial: 
on the event day, an abnormal return of 9% is realized on average. In addition, there is a significant 
increase in the target share price in the two months (40 trading days) prior to the initial public 
announcement. On average, investors who own shares in the target firm two months prior to the 
event day and sell their shares at the end of the event day would earn a premium of 21% above the 
expected return. The overall findings suggest that the majority of takeover deals is expected to 
generate synergy values, most of which are captured by the target firm shareholders. 86 
Table C-5. Cumulative average abnormal returns of bidding and target firms by takeover characteristics. 
 
This table reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target firms for 5 different event windows. T=0 stands for the day of the bid announcement. Abnormal returns are 
computed as the difference between the realized returns and the returns from the benchmark (the market model). The daily benchmark returns are based on the MSCI-Europe index and 
the parameters are estimated over a period of 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. A non-parametric Corrado test (Corrado, 1989) are used to assess the 
significance of the CAARs. Indicators a/b/c correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. The CAARs are classified by different characteristics of the 
takeovers bid: geographical scope, type of acquisition, form of and attitude towards the bid, bid completion status, legal status of the target firm, industry scope, means of payment, and 
the sub-periods of the 5










Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
WHOLE SAMPLE:                       
 BIDDER  0.39  (0.76)  0.53  (4.90
a)  0.72  (4.28
a)  0.79  (3.19
a)  -2.83  (-2.48
b)  2109 
 TARGET  11.49  (4.54
a)  9.13  (15.41
a)  12.47  (16.94
a)  15.83  (12.36
a)  26.70  (6.67
a)  760 
                       
GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE:                       
 BIDDER                       
Domestic bid  0.33  (0.51)  0.59  (4.36
a)  0.83  (3.95
a)  0.76  (2.56
b)  -2.49  (-1.80
c)  1456 
Cross-border bid  0.53  (0.62)  0.39  (2.25
b)  0.47  (1.72
c)  0.84  (1.90
b)  -3.63  (-1.77
c)  653 
Diff. Domestic bid – Cross-border bid  -0.20  (-6.29
a)  0.20  (5.04
a)  0.36  (5.17
a)  -0.07  (-1.13)  1.14  (23.40
a)   
 TARGET                       
Domestic bid  11.13  (10.53
a)  9.65  (13.10
a)  12.55  (15.24
a)  15.61  (16.15
a)  26.84  (12.04
a)  564 
Cross-border bid  10.58  (10.25
a)  7.74  (6.13
a)  11.52  (7.42
a)  12.17  (2.60
a)  24.99  (10.22
a)  196 
Diff. Domestic bid – Cross-border bid  0.55  (3.10
a)  1.91  (8.83
a)  1.02  (2.65
a)  3.44  (8.54
a)  1.85  (6.53
a)   
                       
TYPE OF ACQUISITION:                       
 BIDDER                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  1.32  (1.88
c)  0.61  (3.94
a)  0.92  (3.77
a)  1.04  (2.98
a)  -1.32  (-0.88)  1239 
Acquisition of Majority Control (< 100%)  -0.94  (-1.27)  0.41  (2.94
a)  0.42  (2.03
b)  0.42  (1.28)  -5.15  (-2.91
a)  869 
Diff. M&A of 100%  – M&A of Majority  2.26  (34.39
a)   0.20  (6.59
a)  0.50  (13.50
a)  0.62  (13.83
a)  3.83  (38.69
a)   
 TARGET                       
Merger or Acquisition of 100%  13.09  (12.13
a)  11.55  (15.09
a)  15.61  (18.13
a)  19.46  (19.23
a)  31.26  (15.17
a)  563 
Acquisition of Majority Control (< 100%)  6.92  (3.96
a)  2.17  (2.97
a)  3.46  (3.86
a)  5.44  (4.05
a)  13.58  (3.38
a)  196 
Diff. M&A of 100%  – M&A of Majority  6.17  (28.94
a)  9.38  (58.42
a)  12.16  (70.23
a)  14.02  (71.09
a)  17.68  (57.20
a)   
       
       
       











Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
       
FORM OF AND ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE BID:       
 BIDDER                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  1.63  (2.97
a)  -0.39  (-0.95)  -0.83  (-1.45)  -0.18  (-0.21)  -1.61  (2.29
b)  120 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  2.87  (2.55
b)  -0.37  (-1.48)  -0.45  (-1.14)  -0.29  (-0.52)  0.02  (0.01)  329 
Friendly M&A  -0.37  (-0.61)  0.78  (6.27
a)  1.06  (5.50
a)  1.07  (3.74
a)  -4.35  (-3.21
a)  1,659 
Diff. Tender Offer – Opposed bid  1.24  (4.44
a)  0.02  (0.13)  0.38  (2.04
b)  -0.11  (-0.51)  -9.19  (-19.78
a)   
Diff. Friendly M&A – Opposed bid  -2.00  (-35.35
a)  1.17  (16.82
a)  1.89  (21.74
a)  1.25  (11.91
a)  -13.57  (-61.77
a)   
 TARGET                       
Opposed (by target’s board) bid  14.86  (6.96
a)  15.47  (7.48
a)  17.62  (9.15
a)  22.36  (10.13
a)  43.85  (13.11
a)  120 
Tender offer (unopposed by target’s board)  13.97  (10.59
a)  12.07  (12.79
a)  16.12  (15.27
a)  20.19  (16.75
a)  32.24  (14.66
a)  380 
Friendly M&A  6.20  (3.95
a)  2.75  (4.28
a)  4.59  (5.43
a)  6.25  (4.96
a)  10.22  (2.58
a)  259 
Diff. Tender Offer – Opposed bid  -0.89  (-2.74
a)  -3.40  (-6.54
a)  -1.51  (-5.02
a)  -2.17  (-6.75
a)  -11.61  (-28.01
a)   
Diff. Friendly M&A – Opposed bid  -8.66  (-21.95
a)  -12.72  (-31.10
a)  -13.03  (-39.04
a)  -16.11  (-42.69
a)  -33.63  (-59.38
a)   
                       
BID COMPLETION STATUS:                        
 BIDDER                       
Completed bid  0.14  (0.25)  0.54  (4.62
a)  0.73  (4.08
a)  0.87  (3.22
a)  -2.79  (-2.13
b)  1705 
Withdrawn bid  1.08  (3.53
a)  -0.43  (-1.31)  -0.56  (-1.01)  -0.37  (-0.42)  -3.69  (-2.28
b)  162 
Pending bid  -1.05  (-0.65)  1.14  (2.77
a)  1.56  (2.37
b)  1.03  (1.22)  -6.38  (-1.98
b)  241 
Diff. Completed bid – Withdrawn bid  -0.94  (-8.16
a)  0.97  (15.26
a)  1.29  (16.05
a)  1.24  (12.39
a)  -3.88  (-17.93
a)   
Diff. Completed bid – Pending bid  1.20  (10.97
a)  -0.60  (-11.51
a)  -0.84  (-12.75
a)  -0.17  (-2.15
b)  3.59  (22.60
a)   
 TARGET                       
Completed bid  12.27  (11.57
a)  9.20  (12.83
a)  12.29  (15.39
a)  15.86  (16.12
a)  27.85  (13.42
a)  568 
Withdrawn bid  13.87  (6.49
a)  7.95  (5.46
a)  12.82  (6.31
a)  15.38  (6.98
a)  34.31  (7.29
a)  135 
Pending bid  10.60  (3.87
a)  7.36  (3.03
a)  11.38  (3.99
a)  14.56  (3.81
a)  10.68  (4.86
a)  56 
Diff. Completed bid – Withdrawn bid  -1.60  (-8.97
a)  1.25  (5.33
a)  -0.53  (-2.02
b)  0.48  (1.72
c)  -5.96  (-14.66
a)   
Diff. Completed bid – Pending bid  1.66  (2.20
b)  1.84  (2.19
b)  0.91  (1.02)  1.30  (1.28)  18.17  (11.26
a)   
                       
LEGAL STATUS OF THE TARGET FIRM:       
 BIDDER                       
Private target  -0.05  (-0.70)  0.77  (6.15
a)  1.08  (5.42
a)  1.06  (3.53
a)  -2.86  (-3.12
a)  1532 
Listed target  0.60  (3.37
a)  -0.12  (-0.56)  -0.25  (-0.83)  0.06  (0.15)  -1.35  (-0.78)  576 
Diff. Private target – Listed target  -0.65  (-13.41
a)  0.89  (26.48
a)  1.34  (32.22
a)  1.00  (20.07
a)  -1.51  (-10.56
a)   











Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
INDUSTRY SCOPE:                       
 BIDDER                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  1.43  (2.12
b)  0.63  (4.31
a)  0.85  (3.80
a)  0.98  (3.06
a)  -1.66  (-1.08)  1334 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  -1.41  (-1.85
c)  0.36  (2.35
b)  0.49  (1.99
b)  0.45  (1.19)  -5.04  (-3.00
a)  774 
Diff. Diversification – Focus   -2.84  (-42.61
a)  -0.27  (-9.01
a)  -0.36  (-9.56
a)  -0.53  (-11.43
a)  -3.39  (-33.96
a)   
 TARGET                       
Industry Focus (same 2-digit SIC code)  10.41  (9.18
a)  8.39  (11.56
a)  11.83  (13.76
a)  15.16  (14.56
a)  24.34  (10.34
a)  525 
Diversification (different 2-digit SIC code)  13.92  (8.86
a)  10.78  (9.33
a)  13.91  (11.30
a)  17.36  (11.58
a)  31.98  (10.84
a)  234 
Diff. Diversification – Focus   3.50  (15.82
a)  2.39  (14.29
a)  2.07  (11.68
a)  2.21  (11.29
a)  7.63  (26.85
a)   
                       
MEANS OF PAYMENT:       
 BIDDER                       
All-Cash bid  0.72  (0.90)  0.55  (3.55
a)  0.80  (3.47
a)  1.03  (2.74
a)  -0.90  (-0.52)  754 
All-Equity bid  2.66  (1.68
c)  0.04  (0.09)  0.12  (0.19)  0.66  (0.75)  -2.16  (-0.61)  285 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  0.01  (0.01)  0.87  (3.33
a)  1.17  (2.73
a)  1.03  (1.71
c)  -2.82  (-0.86)  412 
Undisclosed terms  -0.75  (-0.90)  0.51  (2.84
a)  0.60  (2.25
b)  0.41  (1.04)  -5.57  (-3.22
a)  657 
Diff. All-Cash bid – All-Equity bid  -1.94  (-12.90
a)  0.51  (29.70
a)  0.67  (24.93
a)  0.38  (9.71
a)  1.26  (7.64
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Mixed bid  0.70  (5.57
a)  -0.32  (-5.84
a)  -0.38  (-5.40
a)  0.00  (0.06)  1.92  (9.99
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Undisclosed bid  1.46  (15.70
a)  0.03  (0.77)  0.19  (3.71
a)  0.63  (9.80
a)  4.67  (34.24
a)   
Diff. All-Equity bid – Undisclosed bid  3.40  (21.27
a)  -0.48  (-6.10
a)  -0.48  (-4.94
a)  0.25  (2.18
b)  3.41  (14.47
a)   
 TARGET                       
All-Cash bid  13.92  (10.56
a)  11.55  (12.09
a)  15.67  (15.03
a)  20.17  (15.74
a)  32.78  (13.23
a)  405 
All-Equity bid  7.39  (4.45
a)  7.29  (5.92
a)  9.22  (6.73
a)  11.10  (7.29
a)  18.16  (5.00
a)  185 
Mixed (Cash-and-Equity) bid  13.42  (5.28
a)  10.06  (7.43
a)  14.29  (8.80
a)  17.48  (9.89
a)  35.54  (8.64
a)  92 
Undisclosed terms  8.34  (2.43
b)  0.48  (0.96)  1.31  (1.19)  2.48  (1.27)  4.66  (0.61)  77 
Diff. All-Cash bid – All-Equity bid  6.03  (23.73
a)  3.77  (17.37
a)  6.45  (28.01
a)  9.07  (36.36
a)  14.62  (40.11
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Mixed bid  -0.50  (-1.35)  -0.49  (-1.65
c)  1.37  (4.38
a)  2.69  (7.92
a)  -2.76  (-5.62
a)   
Diff. All-Cash bid – Undisclosed bid  5.07  (11.98
a)  10.57  (38.98
a)  14.36  (45.72
a)  17.69  (47.60
a)  28.12  (45.86
a)   
Diff. All-Equity bid – Undisclosed bid  -0.95  (-1.56)  6.80  (17.58
a)  7.91  (17.68
a)  8.62  (16.66
a)  13.50  (14.89
a)   
       
       
       
       
       











Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
       
SUB-PERIODS OF THE 5
th TAKEOVER WAVE:       
 BIDDER                       
1993-1996  -0.13  (-0.23)  0.32  (2.40
b)  0.46  (2.29
b)  0.65  (2.10
b)  0.52  (2.51
b)  761 
1997-1999  0.68  (2.75
a)  0.79  (4.60
a)  1.25  (4.44
a)  1.26  (3.01
a)  -1.30  (-1.58)  792 
2000-2001  0.67  (1.55)  0.45  (1.69
c)  0.31  (0.76)  0.30  (0.52)  -9.87  (-3.79
a)  555 
Diff. 1993/96 – 1997/99   -0.81  (-9.7
a)  -0.47  (-12.48
a)  -0.79  (-16.80
a)  -0.61  (-10.51
a)  1.82  (14.82
a)   
Diff. 1993/96 – 2000/01   -0.80  (-7.81
a)  -0.13  (-2.59
a)  0.15  (2.42
b)  0.34  (4.74
a)  10.39  (71.16
a)   
Diff. 1997/99 – 2000/01   0.01  (0.07)  0.34  (6.75
a)  0.94  (14.82
a)  0.95  (12.51
a)  8.57  (50.97
a)   
 TARGET                       
1993-1996  7.87  (4.94
a)  7.57  (6.14
a)  10.26  (7.80
a)  13.07  (8.60
a)  25.14  (7.13
a)  217 
1997-1999  13.17  (9.49
a)  10.26  (11.39
a)  14.40  (13.30
a)  18.06  (14.33
a)  31.08  (12.86
a)  334 
2000-2001  12.59  (6.67
a)  8.92  (7.83
a)  11.68  (8.98
a)  15.15  (8.61
a)  21.29  (5.06
a)  208 
Diff. 1993/96 – 1997/99   -5.30  (-20.39
a)  -2.69  (-12.27
a)  -4.14  (-17.78
a)  -4.98  (-19.87
a)  -5.94  (-16.29
a)   
Diff. 1993/96 – 2000/01   -4.73  (-14.07
a)  -1.35  (-4.85
a)  -1.41  (-4.85
a)  -2.08  (-6.37
a)  3.85  (7.69
a)   
Diff. 1997/99 – 2000/01   0.58  (2.09
b)  1.34  (6.16
a)  2.73  (11.55
a)  2.91  (10.99
a)  9.79  (25.16
a)   90 
4.2 Market reaction to takeover announcements by deal characteristics 
 
4.2.1. Geographical scope of transaction 
We have mentioned that 70% of the intra-European M&As are domestic deals. Table C-5 
shows that bidding firms engaging in cross-border bids experience lower announcement effects than 
do those undertaking domestic acquisitions (0.4% versus 0.6%, respectively), and the difference is 
statistically significant. Subsequent to the event day, the negative price correction for bidding firms 
is larger in cross-border bids than in domestic ones (-3.6% versus –2.5%). 
Investors of target companies also favour more domestic acquisitions. The announcement 
effect of domestic and cross-border targets amounts to 10% and 8%, respectively (Table C-5). This 
difference is statistically significant. When we add the price run-up (40 trading days prior to the 
event), the difference increases to nearly 3% and remains statistically significant. Outperformance of 
domestic acquisitions relative to their cross-border peers (both in terms of the bidder’ and target’s 
CAARs)  suggests  that  market  anticipates  difficulties  in  managing  the  post-merger  integration 
process between foreign firms and hence discount the expected takeover synergies.  
 
4.2.2. Type of acquisition 
The acquisitions of partial control have received little attention in the existing literature. This 
is because they are virtually non-existent in the US and UK. However, we find that this type of 
takeovers prevail in Continental Europe. Table C-5 compares the announcement effect of partial 
acquisitions  to  that  of  full  acquisitions.  We  find  that  bidding  firm  shareholders  do  not  favour 
majority (or partial) control acquisitions (in contrast to the acquisition of full control). Table C-5 
documents that although the announcement effect of a majority acquisition is significantly positive 
(0.4%), it is somewhat lower than the announcement effect of a full takeover bid (0.6%). Also, an 
acquisition of majority interest is associated with significant negative abnormal returns both before 
and  after  the  transaction  announcement,  whereas  a  full  acquisition  is  preceded  by  a  significant 
increase in the equity value of the bidding firm.  
Target shareholders also dislike acquisitions of partial control. At the announcement day, the 
share price of a target subject to a full acquisition rises by 12%, which is more than five times larger 
than the abnormal return of a target subject to an acquisition of majority control (see Table C-5). 
Investors who purchase target shares three months prior to a full takeover bid and sell the shares 
three months after the announcement earn a CAAR of 31%. In contrast, only 14% is acquired over 
the same period when the bid is made in order to obtain majority control only. The lower returns 
associated with bids for majority control may reflect concerns that a control transfer may lead to 
expropriation of the remaining minority shareholders. 
 
4.2.3. Form of and attitude towards the bid 91 
When we partition all bids into three subsamples based on the attitude and form of the bid: 
opposed (or hostile) bids, unopposed tender offers and friendly negotiated deals, we observe that 
bidder’s shareholders clearly react differently to the announcements of those deals. On the event 
day, bidder share prices are subject to a negative price corrections in opposed bids and unopposed 
tender  offers.  The  announcement  of  friendly  M&As  is  greeted  favorably  by  the  market,  as  the 
abnormal  returns  are  significantly  positive  (0.8%).  However,  friendly  M&As  are  followed  by 
remarkable  share  price  decline  over  3  months  subsequent  to  the  bid.  It  seems  that  the  market 
reactions at the announcement are overoptimistic and that the bidders’ shareholders have second 
thoughts about the profitability of these transactions. 
Expectedly,  takeover  bids  opposed  by  the  target’s  board  generate  the  highest  abnormal 
returns  (15%)  to  the  target  shareholders  on  the  announcement  day.  The  announcement  returns 
induced by opposed takeover bids are significantly higher than those induced by unopposed tender 
offers (12%) and friendly M&As (3%). Table C-5 also unveils that there are large differences in the 
share price run-ups between friendly and hostile takeover bids. A hostile acquisition generates a 
CAAR of more than 30% over a 2-month period preceding and including the announcement day. In 
contrast, the target share prices significantly underperform in friendly M&As relative to opposed 
bids and unopposed tender offers both before and after the announcement. Over the holding period 
of  6  months  centred  around  the  event  day,  friendly  M&As  generate  a  CAAR  of  merely  10%, 
compared with 32% in tender offers and a considerable 44% in hostile bids. 
 
4.2.4. Bid completion status 
We  also  address  the  question  as  to  whether  the  markets  are  able  to  predict  the  ultimate 
success or failure of the M&A negotiations. Table C-5 reports that the announcement effect for 
unsuccessful bidders is negative (-0.6%), but not statistically significant from zero. The total wealth 
effects (over a 6-month time span) of completed, pending, and withdrawn takeovers range between –
6% and –3%, with most losses occurring to bidding firms facing difficulties to complete the takeover 
negotiations (pending deals) or postponing the completion of the bid. 
The event-day effect for target firms is significantly larger (by 1% to 2%) for successful bids 
than for failures and pending deals. However, over the 2-month window prior to and including the 
event day, there is no difference in the CAARs between failed and successful bids (21.8% versus 
21.5%). For the same period, pending acquisitions underperform successful and withdrawn bids by 3 
to 5%.  
 
4.2.5. Legal status of the target firm 
Table C-5 shows that the announcement of a bid for a private firm induces significantly 
positive abnormal returns of 0.8% to the bidder’s shareholders, whereas the announcement of a bid 
for a public firm results in an (insignificantly) negative return of –0.1%. The evidence is similar to  
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that of Moeller et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2004). However, the post-announcement returns over 
longer time windows decline to almost -3% when the target firm is private and to -1.3% when it is 
publicly  listed  (both  are  significant  at  the  1%  level).  This  evidence  suggests  that  market  revise 
downward  potential  takeover  synergies  once  more  information  about  the  true  value  and  growth 
potential of the target firm is revealed.
63  
 
4.2.6. Industry scope 
Table  C-5  also  compares  the  announcement  period  bidder  firm  CAARs  in  diversifying 
takeovers with those in industry-related (or focus-oriented) deals. Consistent with the conjecture for 
bidding  companies  that  diversification  destroys  value  on  average  (see  table  C-1),  we  find  that 
bidding  firms  have  significantly  higher  short-run  wealth  effects  around  the  announcements  of 
business expansions within their core industry compared to the returns induced by announcements of 
diversifying acquisitions (0.63% versus 0.36%). Also, it appears that the market anticipates the focus 
strategy of the bidder, because there is a statistically significant run-up in the bidder’s share price 
over the two-month period prior to the event day. While the share price increases by 1.4% preceding 
an intra-industry bid announcement, it declines by the same percentage preceding the announcement 
of a diversifying takeover. 
When  CAARs  for  target  firms  are  considered,  regardless  of  the  length  of  the  window, 
diversifying  takeovers  outperform  deals  with  a  focus  strategy.  Over  the  period  including  the 
announcement day and the price run-up, target shareholders in diversifying takeovers enjoy a CAAR 
of about 24% whereas those in takeovers with a focus strategy earn a CAAR of about 19%. This 
confirms that bidders may overpay for unrelated target firms and engage in more aggressive bidding 
strategies in diversifying takeovers. 
 
4.2.7. Means of payment 
Asymmetric  information  between  the  bidder’s  management  and  outside  investors  may 
influence the choice of the means of payment and the consequent market reaction. A negative price 
correction is expected for all-equity bids and a positive one for all-cash bids (table C-1). Table C-5 
confirms that bidders’ shareholders perceive offers involving cash payments more favourably (0.6% 
for all-cash and 0.9% for mixed bids) than all-equity offers (for which the abnormal returns are 
insignificantly different from zero). Furthermore, in the period following the bid announcement, the 
bidder  share  prices  generally  decline,  but  decline  substantially  more  in  bids  involving  equity 
payments. The CAARs over a 6-month period in all-cash bids are not significantly different from 
                                                 
63 Due to the low disclosure requirements for privately owned companies, reliable information is not available. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the public firms, which are constantly scrutinized by different regulatory bodies, media, and 
the public.   
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zero (at –0.9%), whereas those in all-equity bids and mixed offers are significantly negative (-2.2% 
and –2.8%, respectively).  
Table  C-5  shows  that  the  target’s  share  price  reaction  is  also  sensitive  to  the  means  of 
payment in a takeover bid. Regardless of the event window, the CAARs of cash offers bids are 
significantly higher than those of all-equity offers (at the 1% significance level). Acquisitions where 
the payment method is undisclosed do not lead to a significant price change at the announcement. 
The lack of information on such bids is even penalized by the market as the share price decreases by 
4% over three-month period subsequent to the event day. 
 
4.2.8. The sub-periods of the 5
th takeover wave 
Table C-5 shows significant differences between the price reactions to bids for the three sub-
periods  of  the  takeover  wave.  The  sum  of  the  price  run-ups  and  the  announcement  effects  for 
takeover  bids  at  the  beginning,  peak  and  decline  of  the  wave  are  0.19%,  1.47%  and  1.12%, 
respectively.  However,  when  we  calculate  CAARs  over  somewhat  longer  time  windows  (e.g.  6 
months), it seems that bidder shareholders realise that the bids may have been excessive at the peak 
and at the decline over the takeover wave: the CAARs amount to 0.52% in 1993-96, -1.30% in 
1997-99 and –9.87% in 2000-01.
64 It should be noted that the substantial decline subsequent to the 
M&A peak is already corrected for the strong downward equity market movement. From the middle 
of 2000, the M&A climate turned bleak and the stock market decline made bidder shareholders very 
pessimistic about future synergistic gains. Thus, our evidence shows that from the perspective of 
bidding firms, sweet M&As turned sour due to such reasons as managerial hubris, self-interest, and 
herding (see table C-1). 
Target shareholders gain the most at the peak of the takeover wave. Table C-5 shows that, at 
the announcement day, target firms gain an average premium of 8% prior to 1997, 10% in 1997-99, 
and 9% in 2000-01. The differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The second stage of 
the takeover wave also stands out in terms of the price run-up for target firms: it amounts to 13% (up 
from 8% observed in 1993-1996). Over longer time windows, for instance over a 6-month window 
symmetrically centred around the event day, the post-1999 bids yield lower CAARs (21%) than do 
those in 1997-1999 (31%) and those before 1997 (25%). 
 
4.3 Market reaction to takeover announcements by the legal origin of bidder and target  
 
Rossi  and  Volpin  (2004)  show  that  the  legal  environment  and  takeover  regulation  are 
important determinants of the takeover gains. They report that takeover premiums are higher in 
countries with higher shareholder protection and in countries where the mandatory bid requirement 
                                                 
64 This result is unlikely to be driven by outliers, as the median value of CARs over window [-60, +60] for takeovers in 
2000-2001 equals -5.4% (Q25= -24% and Q75= 21%).   
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is enforced by law. To control for the impact of the legal environment on takeover premiums, we 
classify  all  acquisitions  into  five  groups  according  to  the  legal  origin  of  the  bidder  and  target 
countries,  following  La  Porta  et  al.  (1998).  Countries  from  the  former  communist  block  are 
classified according to their (staged) accession to the European Union, as this event has had an 
important impact on their corporate legislation.  
 
4.3.1. Domestic acquisitions 
Table C-6 shows that bidder share price reactions to domestic bids vary considerably by legal 
origin of the firm. Bidding firms of common law and German and Scandinavian civil law countries 
earn  significantly  positive  wealth  gains  at  the  announcement.  Conversely,  the  wealth  changes 
incurred by bidders from French civil law countries and the new and prospective EU entrants are 
insignificantly different from zero. Over a 6-month time window symmetrically around the event 
date, the share price movements are either negative (for firms from German civil law countries and 
the new and prospective EU entrants) or statistically insignificant (for firms from UK common law 
and French and Scandinavian civil law countries).  
Table C-6 further documents that the legal origin of the target country also has a clear impact 
on target abnormal returns in domestic deals. Target firms from English common law countries 
experience  very  large  wealth  effects  over  all  event  windows.  Importantly,  target  firms  from 
Scandinavian civil law countries where the corporate governance legislation and the institutional 
financial environment  are close to those in the UK (LaPorta  et al., 1998), also exhibit strongly 
positive CAARs (of 21% over the event day and the price run-up period). While target firms from 
the countries that either joined the EU in 2004 or are expected to join in 2007 have the lowest 
announcement  effect  (–0.5%),  those  from  French  and  German  civil  law  countries  also  earn 
particularly low CAARs of 1.7% and 2.3%, respectively.  
 
4.3.2. Cross-border acquisitions 
Turning to cross-border acquisitions in table C-6, we show that bidding firms of German, 
Scandinavian, and French legal origins earn higher announcement returns than do firms of English 
legal origin: the announcement effects are 0.5% (average across the three legal origins) and 0.2% 
respectively. The difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Companies incorporated in 
countries of Scandinavian legal origin are expected to benefit from the announcement of cross-
border takeovers most (0.8%).   
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Table C-6. Cumulative abnormal returns for bidding and target firms by legal origin 
 
Panel A reports the average values of the CARs for bidding and target firms in domestic acquisitions by legal origin. Panel B reports the CAARs for bidding and target firms in 
cross-border acquisitions classified by the legal origin of the bidder and target respectively. Countries are grouped according to their legal origin and according to the EU 
enlargement process: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal origin (Austria, Germany, Switzerland), French legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Iceland, Finland, Norway, Sweden,), EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia). T=0 stands for the day of the bid announcement. Abnormal returns are 
computed as the difference between the realized and market model benchmark returns. For each firm we calculate daily benchmark returns using MSCI-Europe index returns and 
the market model parameters are estimated over 240 days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement. A non-parametric test (Corrado, 1989) is used to assess the 










Entire period (short) 
[-5, +5] 




  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)  CAARs (%)  (t-stat)   
DOMESTIC BIDS:                       
 BIDDER                       
English legal origin  0.67  (0.73)  0.41  (2.23
b)  0.50  (1.69
c)  0.49  (1.17)  -0.72  (-0.35)  744 
German legal origin  -3.68  (-2.64
a)  0.85  (2.20
b)  0.59  (1.44)  0.36  (0.49)  -10.34  (-2.71
a)  184 
Scandinavian legal origin  3.26  (1.96
b)  1.72  (3.34
a)  2.29  (3.17
a)  2.05  (2.39
b)  0.84  (0.25)  206 
French legal origin  1.40  (0.97)  0.12  (0.57)  0.92  (2.36
b)  1.30  (2.10
b)  -1.20  (-0.43)  278 
EU enlargement   -9.31  (-2.33
b)  0.32  (0.61)  -0.09  (-0.06)  -2.40  (-1.04)  -23.38  (-2.59
b)  44 
 TARGET                       
English legal origin  14.21  (10.04
a)  13.66  (11.97
a)  17.64  (14.00
a)  21.87  (15.64
a)  36.79  (15.09
a)  306 
German legal origin  6.57  (2.11
b)  2.30  (2.68
a)  4.42  (3.17
 a)  5.71  (2.92
a)  6.40  (1.38)  48 
Scandinavian legal origin  9.72  (3.93
a)  11.10  (5.79
a)  14.78  (7.12
a)  15.56  (6.60
a)  25.65  (5.40
a)  76 
French legal origin  5.79  (2.25
b)  1.71  (3.13
a)  2.83  (3.18
a)  5.39  (3.20
a)  12.66  (1.76
c)  118 
EU enlargement   11.93  (1.65)  -0.48  (-0.45)  0.54  (0.18)  1.28  (0.41)  8.15  (0.55)  16 
CROSS-BORDER BIDS:                       
 BIDDER                       
English legal origin  -0.20  (0.14)  0.18  (0.60)  0.36  (0.62)  1.46  (1.77
c)  -1.17  (-0.56)  174 
German legal origin  2.28  (1.22)  0.43  (1.12)  0.66  (1.08)  1.29  (1.32)  -1.35  (-0.32)  137 
Scandinavian legal origin  -0.68  (-0.43)  0.78  (1.66
c)  0.67  (1.15)  0.59  (0.78)  -5.11  (-1.46)  149 
French legal origin  2.11  (1.47)  0.32  (1.18)  0.37  (0.84)  0.78  (1.10)  -1.00  (-0.33)  182 
 TARGET                       
English legal origin  23.29  (5.29
a)  13.80  (6.04
a)  19.42  (7.52
a)  26.88  (8.93
a)  48.13  (7.86
a)  57 
German legal origin  9.37  (2.88
a)  3.48  (2.34
b)  7.06  (3.46
a)  5.49  (1.15)  11.25  (2.00)  33 
Scandinavian legal origin  7.24  (1.80
c)  12.38  (3.05
a)  17.32  (3.95
a)  19.28  (4.02
a)  22.71  (3.03
a)  38 
French legal origin  10.13  (3.62
a)  4.26  (2.96
a)  7.12  (3.80
a)  13.40  (4.58
a)  26.72  (4.38
a)  52 
EU enlargement   0.52  (0.08)  0.28  (0.20)  1.52  (0.53)  4.79  (1.13)  -16.19  (-1.25)  15  
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The premiums offered in cross-border takeovers are significantly higher for the target firms 
from English common law countries than for those from the civil law countries: 13.8% versus 5.9% at 
the announcement (averaged across other countries). Adding the price run-up to the announcement 
effect, the numbers increase to even 37% and 14%, respectively. Importantly, the corresponding effect 
for targets from the new and prospective EU entrants is insignificantly different from zero. Given that 
the corporate governance regime of the bidding firm is imposed on the target firm (Bris and Cabolis, 
2004; and Rossi and Volpin, 2004), it is also important to classify the target firm wealth effects by the 
legal origin of the bidder country.
65 We find that the differences in target share price reactions are now 
less outspoken. Still, the announcement period abnormal returns remain the highest when the legal 
origin of the bidder country is English common law.
66   
 
5. Determinants of the market reaction to takeover announcements (Multivariate analysis)  
 
The  results  of  the  univariate  analysis  suggest  that  the  market  reaction  to  takeover 
announcements varies across takeover bids with different characteristics. We now turn to exploring 
which  of  the  effects  documented  in  the  previous  section  dominates  in  a  multivariate  analysis 
framework. In section 2 we conjecture that the characteristics of the takeover bid convey a signal to 
the market about the quality of the bidding and target firms and of the potential value creation in the 
takeover. Therefore, the release of information about the takeover induces investors to update their 
expectations  about  the  bidding  and  target  firms’  prospects.  Thus,  we  expect  the  takeover 
characteristics to explain a substantial part of variation in the bidder and target’s share price changes in 
the period around the takeover announcement. As additional proxies for the quality of the bidders and 
targets and potential takeover synergies we also consider the financial and operating performance of 
these firms and their corporate control structures. 
Information about takeovers is incorporated into the share prices in three steps. First, some 
investors  or  insiders  trade  on  private  information  or  rumours.  Second,  the  major  flow  of  reliable 
information is released to the market at the first public announcement of the takeover deal. At the 
announcement day, investors learn about the objective of the bidding firm, the target’s attitude towards 
the bid, and the initial terms of the deal. Third, additional information about the takeover is obtained in 
the  post-announcement  period.  This  typically  regards  the  failure  or  a  success  of  the bid,  a  better 
estimate  of  the  synergy  values,  and  the  ultimate  terms  of  the  transaction.  Since  the  information 
revealed at each step is likely to affect market expectations about the bidder and target’s prospects, we 
model  market  reaction  to  takeover  announcements  consisting  of  three  components:  the  pre-event, 
                                                 
65 According to international law, when a foreign firm acquires 100% of a domestic firm, the nationality of the latter 
changes. Hence, the target firm adopts the accounting standards, disclosure practices, and governance structures of the 
acquiring firm. 
66 The CAARs of the bidding and target firms by country of origin are available upon request.   
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announcement,  and  the  after-event  effects.  In  separate  regressions,  we  investigate  the  factors  that 
affect the CARs realized prior to the bid over the period [-60, -2] days, over the 3 days around the bid 
announcement, and subsequent to the bid over the period [+2, +60] days. Given that we expect to 
observe fundamental differences between M&As involving UK and CE firms (see section 2), we also 
run the regressions for these two types of deals separately.  
 
5.1. Bidder’s cumulative abnormal returns 
 
The  determinants  of  the  market  reaction  to  takeover  announcements  for  bidding  firms  are 
reported in table C-7 and their economic effects are in table C-8. The analysis of bidder returns may be 
subject to a sample selection bias, as bidders may already have specific characteristics (independent of 
the takeover decision) that generate a specific level of returns. To control for this potential bias, we 
apply Heckman’s procedure for sample-selection correction (see section 3.3.2).
67  
 
5.1.1  Bidder pre-announcement returns 
The  pre-announcement  returns  on  the  shares  of  a  bidding  firm  over  the  period  starting  3 
months and ending 2 days before the event are positively influenced by the bidder’s Tobin’s Q (see 
model 1 in tables C-7 and C-8). An increase in the Q-ratio by one standard deviation leads to an 
incremental rise in the bidder’s run-up premium of 1023 basis points (see table C-8). This suggests 
that investors value corporate takeovers more when the bidding firm has better growth opportunities. 
In contrast, investors are wary when a bidding firm with high cash flow reserves makes a takeover bid. 
In such cases, legitimate doubts arise about the true motives for the takeover: cash surpluses are likely 
to  be  used  for  managerial  empire  building  (Jensen,  1986).  Accordingly,  a  one  standard  deviation 
increase in the bidder’s cash flows reduces the run-up effect by 1666 basis points. 
Since  hostile  takeovers  are  often  launched  after  unsuccessful  private  negotiations  with  the 
target management, these deals are likely to be anticipated by the market due to information leakages 
or insider trading. We confirm that this is the case: the pre-announcement CAARs in hostile takeovers 
are substantially higher than those in unopposed bids (the difference amounts to 320 basis points). The 
fact that takeovers are preceded by a substantial positive increase in the share price of bidding firms 
also suggests that these deals are expected to create value. However, the announcement effect itself 
triggers  a  negative  reaction  in  bidder  share  prices  (see  Section  5.2.1).  At  this  point,  bidder 
shareholders may fear the emergence of a bidding war which may erode the potential synergistic 
value.   
                                                 
67 The fourth row from the bottom of table 7 indicates regressions for which censoring is found to be a significant problem 
and the correction for the sample selection bias is applied. The correction is needed for the pre-bid CARs in the sub-
sample of CE bids.  
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While the above findings are valid for both UK and CE bidders, the decomposition of the 
sample based on the location of the bidding firms reveals some differences (see models 2 and 3). 
Diversifying takeover bids are associated with a decrease in the pre-announcement CARs for bidding 
firms. However, this result is largely driven by CE bidders. For these firms, the run-up premium in 
diversifying takeovers is 347 basis points lower than in industry-related deals. The pre-announcement 
change in the share price of CE bidding firms also incorporates the negative effect of a forthcoming 
takeover  with  undisclosed  terms  of  transaction  (-327  basis  points).  Also,  CE  investors  favour 
acquisitions of targets with high collateral. An acquisition of a target with high collateral may increase 
the European bidder’s capacity to issue new debt at favorable terms (Rajan and Zingales, 1998). A one 
standard deviation increase in the target firm’s collateral leads to a 522 basis point increase in the run-
up premium of Continental bidders.  
For the UK sub-sample, the returns over the pre-announcement period are 366 basis points 
higher when bidders use equity as a means of payment. This signifies that bidders take advantage of a 
temporary overvaluation of their equity and use it as cheap currency for acquiring real assets.
68 As the 
takeover  wave  progresses,  it  seems  that  there  are  more  information  leakages  prior  to  the  public 
announcements of UK bids, or that takeovers in the UK are more predictable. M&As undertaken in the 
late 1990s are associated with significantly higher share price run-ups than those made in 1993-96.  
The presence of a large shareholder in bidding firms also has a significant impact on the bidder 
abnormal returns. However, this impact is positive for UK firms  and negative for CE firms. The 
presence of a blockholder with a control stake of at least 20% leads to a rise in the pre-announcement 
CARs of UK bidders by 351 basis points but to a reduction in the CARs of CE bidders by 237 basis 
points. This result confirms that the market views the roles of the major shareholders in UK and CE 
firms as being different. Investors regard the presence of a large blockholder in a UK company as a 
credible signal that the takeover decision is driven by motives of profit maximization, while minority 
shareholders of the CE bidders with a controlling shareholder fear expropriation.  
                                                 
68 If the managers of a bidding firm know that the firm’s shares are worth more than their current market price, they will 
prefer  to  pay  for  the  acquisition  with  cash.  Conversely,  if  the  bidder’s  management  believes  that  the  shares  are 
overvalued, they prefer to offer equity. Also, Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2003) 
argue that overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets to take advantage 
of  the  mispricing  premium  over  the  longer  term  when  the  overvaluation  may  be  corrected.  In  both  cases,  strong 




Table C-7. Anticipated wealth creation for bidders’ shareholders. 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for three different event windows and for the sub-samples of UK and CE (CE) bidders. Variable 
definitions are given in Appendix C-I. ‘Heckman correction’ indicates that a Heckman (1976) sample selection is applied to correct for potential bias due to bidder’s endogenous 
choice of whether to participate in M&As or not. Where sample selection bias was found insignificant, we report estimates for OLS regression without Heckman’s correction. For 
each variable we list the coefficient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. We denote the characteristics of bidding and target firms by (B) and (T) respectively. a/b/c stand 
for statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 
  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders  All bidders  UK bidders  CE bidders 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val 
Intercept  0.01  .515  0.05  .301  0.02  .520  0.00  .445  0.01  .656  -0.00  .619  0.01  .799  0.01  .613  -0.01  .821 
Cross-border bid  0.00  .704  -0.02  .324  0.01  .472  -0.00  .229  -0.00  .720  -0.01  .122  0.01  .630  0.00  .916  0.01  .601 
M&A of 100%  0.01  .764  -0.04  .112  0.03  .112  0.01
a  .000  0.02
b  .026  0.01
b  .015  -0.01  .696  -0.01  .642  0.00  .838 
Opposed bid  0.03
a  .006  0.04
b  .028  0.03
a  .009  -0.02
b  .033  -0.03
b  .023  -0.01
b  .036  0.00  .937  0.05  .229  -0.02  .627 
Tender offer  0.02  .509  0.01  .730  0.00  .904  -0.02
a  .009  -0.03
a  .008  -0.01  .504  -0.01  .530  -0.00  .965  0.01  .870 
Withdrawn bid  0.00  .848  -0.01  .743  0.01  .779  -0.01  .396  0.00  .926  -0.02  .126  -0.03  .234  -0.09
a  0.04  0.00  .913 
Pending bid  -0.03  .193  -0.03  .398  -0.02  .346  0.01  .291  0.02  .320  -0.00  .574  0.00  .814  0.01  .762  -0.00  .887 
Private target  -0.01  .663  -0.01  .725  -0.01  .731  0.01
b  .044  0.02
c  .055  0.01
b  .021  -0.02  .258  0.00  .962  -0.03  .140 
Diversification  -0.03
b  .034  -0.01  .453  -0.03
b  .042  -0.00  .316  -0.00  .763  -0.01  .215  -0.00  .968  -0.01  .424  0.01  .466 
All-equity payment  0.03
b  .013  0.04
b  .013  -0.01  .111  -0.01
c  .090  -0.02
b  .017  -0.01
c  .057  -0.01  .441  -0.02  .465  0.00  .958 
Undisclosed terms  -0.02  .200  0.00  .950  -0.03
c  .090  -0.01
b  .024  -0.01  .411  -0.01
c  .078  0.00  .814  -0.02  .659  0.02  .216 
1997-1999  0.02  .297  0.02
b  .039  0.02  .552  0.01
b  .013  0.01  .265  0.02
a  .002  -0.01  .301  -0.03  .111  0.00  .947 
2000-2001  0.04  .147  0.02
b  .035  0.05  .220  -0.00  .438  -0.02
b  .030  0.01  .286  -0.11
a  .000  -0.06
a  .003  -0.13
a  .000 
Toehold           0.04  .505  -0.08  .481  0.06  .302  0.02  .225  0.04  .181  0.01  .633  0.12
b  .013  0.01  .919  0.15
b  .014 
Run-up              0.07
b  .013  0.06
b  .044  0.09
b  .021  0.06
c  .088  0.04  .105  0.05
c  .076 
Relative size  -0.04  .253  -0.09  .650  0.07  .402  -0.02  .395  -0.00  .962  -0.04
b  .036  -0.04  .423  -0.05  .742  -0.02  .825 
(Bidder) Q-ratio  0.02
a  .000  0.02
a  .000  0.02  .300  0.00  .123  0.00  .352  0.00  .654  -0.02
a  .000  -0.01
a  .000  -0.02
a  .002 
(Bidder) Leverage  -0.03  .804  0.02  .619  -0.00  .968  -0.03  .450  -0.07  .450  0.00  .942  0.21  .116  0.23  .284  0.20  .253 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA  -1.54
a  .000  -1.46
a  .000  -1.67
a  .006  -0.11  .238  -0.34
c  .061  0.15  .493  0.53  .425  0.57  .247  0.38  .438 
(Bidder) English  0.00  .748          -0.01
c  .057          0.02
b  .021         
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      0.04
c  .059  -0.02
c  .087      -0.04  .298  0.01  .449      -0.05  .585  0.02  .606 
(Target) Collateral   -0.04  .723  -0.18  .276  0.21
b  .037  0.03  .293  0.02  .605  0.05  .070  0.08  .259  0.07  .578  0.09  .323 
(Target) CFlow/TA  0.14  .395  0.33  .205  -0.03  .848  -0.00  .958  -0.00  .965  -0.02  .186  -0.29  .370  -0.26
b  .020  -0.30  .348 
(Target) English  -0.00  .804          0.00  .945          -0.01  .802         
                                     
Heckman correction  No    No    Yes    No    No    No    No    No    No   
Nr. of observations  2109    624    958    2109    624    958    2109    624    958   
Adjusted-R
2  0.14    0.17    0.13    0.06    0.05    0.04    0.13    0.08    0.16   




Table C-8. Economic effects of the results reported in Table C-7: Predicted change in the wealth of 
the bidding firm’s shareholders around M&A announcement 
 
This table reports the economic effects of the results of the regressions of the bidder’s CARs for three different event windows and for 
the sub-samples of UK and CE bidding firms. The variable definitions are given in Appendix C-I. The numbers in the table represent the 
incremental changes in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variables) or with a one standard deviation 
change in the reference variable (level variables). The effects that are statistically significant in the regression analysis are denoted in 
bold. For each event window and each subsample of the bidding and target firms, the table also reports the average CARs.  
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 


































Reference: CAARs (%)    0.64  0.95  -0.06    0.72  0.50  0.94    -3.35  -2.15  -4.55 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variable=1): 
Cross-border bid    0.46  -2.47  1.14  +/-  -0.47  -0.23  -0.68    0.59  0.32  0.82 
M&A of 100%    0.56  -4.28  2.98  +  1.38  1.71  1.22    -0.58  -1.04  0.33 
Opposed bid    3.20  3.86  2.78  -  -1.92  -3.22  -1.18    0.23  4.99  -1.92 
Tender offer    1.53  1.00  0.39  -  -1.64  -2.69  -0.61    -0.98  -0.13  0.63 
Withdrawn bid    0.47  -1.41  1.21  -  -0.74  0.12  -1.60  -  -3.22  -8.67  0.32 
Pending bid    -2.56  -2.80  -2.30  -  0.57  2.06  -0.36  -  0.39  1.16  -0.39 
Private target    -0.82  -1.09  -0.90  +  0.78  1.59  1.49  -  -2.03  0.29  -3.40 
Diversification    -2.67  -1.33  -3.47  -  -0.31  -0.14  -0.56    -0.09  -1.33  1.23 
All-equity payment    3.18  3.66  -0.53  -  -0.89  -1.79  -0.63    -1.33  -1.65  0.15 
Undisclosed terms    -2.09  0.27  -3.27  -  -1.02  -1.03  -0.90    0.35  -1.68  2.25 
1997-1999    2.17  1.75  2.24  -  0.97  0.67  1.56  -  -1.33  -2.86  0.09 
2000-2001    3.71  2.11  4.63  -  -0.33  -1.52  0.59  -  -10.82  -6.20  -13.18 
(Bidder) English    0.14        -1.12        2.40     
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      3.51  -2.37      -3.94  1.18      -5.35  2.23 
(Target) English    -0.02        0.04        -0.50     
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a one standard deviation change in a particular takeover variable: 
Toehold             0.45  -0.68  0.82    0.25  0.34  0.14    1.36  0.09  2.05 
Run-up            1.93  1.82  2.56    3.66  3.09  4.39 
Relative size    -0.89  -1.73  1.89    0.47  -0.09  -1.08    -0.89  -0.96  -0.54 
(Bidder) Q-ratio    10.23  12.92  7.79    1.22  1.63  0.88    -10.23  -6.46  -7.79 
(Bidder) Leverage    -0.49  0.36  0.03    -0.45  -1.26  0.02    3.42  4.13  3.00 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA    -16.66  -20.10  -13.46    -1.16  -4.68  1.21    5.73  7.85  3.06 
(Target) Collateral     -1.04  -4.88  5.22    -0.54  0.54  1.24    2.07  1.90  2.24 





5.1.2  The bidder’s announcement effect 
On the announcement day, when information about the takeover bid is made public, investors 
assess (or adjust their assessment of) the potential takeover synergies and re-consider their valuation of 
the bidding and target firms. Model 4 in table C-7 shows that the announcement of a hostile takeover 
or of a tender offer triggers a significant negative price correction for bidding firms. The correction 
amounts to reductions of 192 and 164 basis points in the announcement returns for hostile bids and 
tender offers, respectively (see table C-8). This result is due to shareholder concerns that their firm 
will offer too high a premium. An all-equity offer also forces investors to adjust the bidder’s share 
price downward. Announcement CARs in all-equity deals are 89 basis points lower than the CARs in 
deals that involve cash payments. One dominant explanation is that an equity payment conveys the 
signal that the bidder’s share price is overvalued, which in turn triggers an adverse revaluation effect.  
A  significant  positive  announcement  effect  on  returns  to  the  bidding  firms  is  observed  in 
takeover bids for private targets (78 basis points). The literature formulates several explanations for 
this phenomenon (see e.g. Faccio et al., 2005). First, illiquid (privately-held) shares are likely to be 
sold at a discount. Second, private negotiations with the controlling shareholder of an unlisted firm are 
likely  to  result  in  lower  costs  of  transferring  control  compared  to  open  market  purchases  from 
dispersed shareholders (Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997). Third, an all-equity offer to a private 
firm may create an outside blockholder in the bidding firm and hence bring about more managerial 
discipline (Chang, 1998).  
Acquisitions  of  full  control  (100%  of  the  equity)  are  also  associated  with  higher  bidder 
announcement returns than are acquisitions of majority control; the difference amounts to 138 basis 
points.  Takeover  deals  with  undisclosed  terms  are  an  important  concern  for  the  investors  of  CE 
bidding firms: concealed information about the transaction value and the means of payment costs 
bidding firms 90 basis points in the announcement premium (see models 5 and 6). Investors are wary 
that the terms of the deal are not disclosed when it is aimed at expropriating their rights either by 
management or by the controlling shareholder.  
A negative price correction for CE bidders also takes place when a relatively large target is 
approached.  A  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  relative  size  of  the  transaction  reduces  the 
bidder’s announcement effect by 108 basis points. Two explanations are possible. First, this negative 
price correction expresses the information asymmetries between bidding and target firms. Uncertainty 
about  the  true  market  value  of  the  target  firm  reflects  the  possibility  that  the  bidder  may  incur 
substantial  losses  in  case  of  a  post-acquisition  adverse  revaluation  of  the  target’s  assets.  The 
magnitude of these potential revaluation losses depends on the relative size of the target firm. Second, 
as larger firms generally require a more complex management structure to operate effectively, the  
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post-acquisition integration may be a relatively more difficult process. Investors fear that their firm 
will bear additional costs associated with these difficulties and adjust the firm’s value downward.  
UK investors seem to dislike acquisitions by bidding firms holding excessive cash reserves 
(see  model  5).  A  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  bidder’s  cash  flow  is  associated  with  a 
reduction in the announcement CARs by 468 basis points. Investors fear that high free cash flow 
encourages  management  to  undertake  value-destroying  acquisitions.  In  addition,  when  takeover 
activity  was  slowing  down  in  2000-2001,  UK  deals  were  associated  with  significantly  lower 
announcement returns than similar bids in the earlier periods (the difference is 152 basis points). This 
may reflect that investors get wary when the investment climate deteriorates and the stock market 
declines. In such periods, the market (belatedly) starts realizing that there is a danger of overpaying 
due to managerial hubris and self-interest.   
 
5.1.3  Bidder post-announcement returns 
Bidding  firm  CARs  realized  over  the  three  months  subsequent  to  the  event  day  exhibit  a 
persistently  declining  trend.  Our  analysis  reveals  that  M&As  initiated  in  the  late  1990s  trigger 
significant negative returns subsequent to the event day. In these deals, the post-announcement bidder 
CARs are reduced by 1082 basis points (see model 7 in tables C-7 and C-8). The negative coefficient 
on the bidder’s Q-ratio reflects the market’s reassessment of ‘glamour’ firms. As suggested by Rau 
and  Vermaelen  (1998),  glamour  firms  tend  to  overestimate  their  ability  to  create  synergies  in 
takeovers, and are more likely to overpay than are value firms. When these circumstances of the bid 
become clear, the market reassesses the quality of the bidder and adjusts the share price accordingly. A 
one standard deviation increase in the bidder’s Q-ratio reduces the post-announcement returns by 1023 
basis points.  
There is evidence that the announcement and post-announcement valuation effects increase 
with the bidder’s share price performance prior to the takeover bid.
69 The evidence is consistent with a 
behavioural finance point of view: the positive relation between run-up and mark-up premiums may 
result from the fact that investors tend to overestimate the potential gains in takeovers launched by 
outperforming bidders.  
Withdrawn takeover bids seem to be disliked by the market.  However, this effect occurs only 
with respect to UK bidders (see models 8 and 9). Failure to complete a takeover deal costs UK bidding 
firms 867 basis points of their post-announcement returns. CE investors revise their expectations about 
takeover gains upwards if the bidder has accumulated a toehold in the target firm prior to the bid. A 
one standard deviation increase in the toehold leads to an increase of 205 basis points in the post-
                                                 
69 Although this relationship has significant predictive power for the bidder CARs, the economic significance is small. A 
100-basis points increase in  the bidder CARs prior to the bid leads to an increase in the announcement and post-
announcement premiums of merely 7 and 6 basis points, respectively.  
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announcement  CARs.  Apart  from  the  difference  in  the  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  a 
withdrawn bid and the effect of a toehold, the patterns of post-announcement share price changes in 
UK and CE bidders are very similar.  
 
5.2   Target’s Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 
Table  C-9  exhibits  the  determinants  of  target  firm  share  price  changes  around  takeover 
announcements. The economic effect of the estimated parameters is reported in table C-10. 
 
5.2.1  Target pre-announcement returns 
 Over the three months  prior to hostile bid announcements, target shareholders can pocket 
significantly  higher  cumulative  abnormal  returns  than  they  can  prior  to  friendly  M&As.  The 
anticipation of a hostile takeover is associated with a 923 basis point increase in the target’s pre-
announcement returns (model 1 in tables C-9 and C-10). This confirms that hostile bids are more 
likely to be anticipated, or that some degree of insider trading or trading on rumours takes place. Also, 
firms that were targeted during the peak period of the fifth takeover wave (1997-99) experienced a 
very substantial pre-announcement share price increase compared to the companies targeted at the 
beginning (1993-1996) and at the end (2000-2001) of the wave (the difference is 832 basis points). It 
seems that paying too high a price for a target firm is more likely to occur when takeover activity is at 
its peak because the bids become more aggressive and are more likely to trigger opposition by the 
target firm. UK targets experience significantly higher share price run-ups than do other targets in our 
sample: the difference amounts to 1106 basis points. 
Partitioning our sample into UK and CE targets, we find that the significant premiums paid for 
UK targets are mainly driven by cross-border acquisitions (see models 2 and 3). The anticipation of a 
cross-border acquisition leads to an additional run-up premium of 1327 basis points for UK targets. 
This stands in sharp contrast with the statistically insignificant reduction in the run-up of CE targets by 
169 basis points. For CE targets, pre-announcement CARs increase with collateral: a one standard 
deviation increase in the collateral leads to an 845 basis point increase in returns. Diversification also 
triggers  significant  anticipations  of  wealth  increases  for  CE  targets.  For  those  companies,  an 
incremental premium of 595 basis points is realized. Investors expect bidders pursuing diversification 
strategies to bid more aggressively and hence pay higher takeover premiums than do bidders adhering 







Table C-9. Anticipated wealth creation for targets’ shareholders. 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the target CARs for three different event windows and for the sub-samples of UK and CE targets. Variable definitions are 
given in Appendix C-I. For each variable we list the coefficient and the heteroskedasticity-consistent p-value. We denote characteristics of bidding and target firms by (B) and (T) 
respectively. a/b/c stand for statistical significance at 1%/5%/10%, respectively. 
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 
  All targets  UK targets  CE targets  All targets  UK targets  CE targets  All targets  UK targets  CE targets 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val  Coef  p-val 
Intercept  -0.03  .556  -0.05  .638  0.04  .461  0.03  .135  0.06  .349  0.01  .572  0.12
a  .001  0.00  .949  0.19
a  .000 
Cross-border bid  0.03  .418  0.13
b  .013  -0.02  .638  0.03
c  .096  0.03  .412  0.03
c  .056  -0.00  .873  0.02  .472  -0.02  .634 
M&A of 100%  0.02  .543  0.01  .918  0.03  .582  0.05  .214  0.04  .246  0.06  .118  0.05
c  .064  -0.00  .987  0.09
b  .046 
Opposed bid  0.09
b  .049  0.10
b  .028  0.12
c  .063  0.07
a  .002  0.13
b  .026  0.05
b  .034  0.07  .162  0.05  .314  0.09  .175 
Tender offer  0.06  .102  0.11  .228  0.05  .228  0.04
b  .048  0.11
b  .020  0.04  .117  0.01  .721  0.02  .726  0.01  .842 
Withdrawn bid  0.01  .762  0.07  .382  -0.03  .562  0.03  .214  0.08  .188  0.00  .928  -0.02  .596  0.06
c  .076  -0.08  .213 
Pending bid  -0.02  .703  -0.11  .656  -0.03  .647  0.03  .316  0.05  .471  0.01  .247  -0.13
a  .003  -0.22  .103  -0.14
b  .014 
Diversification  0.06
b  .036  0.05  .158  0.06
b  .032  0.02  .132  -0.00  .845  0.05
a  .002  0.01  .632  -0.02  .218  0.05  .175 
All-equity payment  -0.05  .119  -0.04  .304  -0.06  .208  -0.06
a  .000  -0.08
a  .003  -0.04
b  .028  -0.02  .439  0.02  .303  -0.05  .285 
Undisclosed terms  0.02  .281  0.02  .296  0.01  .139  -0.07
a  .010  -0.06  .485  -0.06
a  .007  -0.10
b  .016  -0.05  .941  -0.11
b  .034 
1997-1999  0.08
a  .010  0.13
a  .004  0.05
b  0.28  0.03
c  .089  0.03  .278  0.03  .104  -0.03  .203  0.03  .236  -0.13
a  .004 
2000-2001  0.08
b  .032  0.01  .573  0.09
b  .018  0.02  .356  0.03  .462  0.02  .410  -0.07
b  .016  0.00  .954  -0.16
a  .001 
Toehold           -0.17  .127  -0.15  .494  -0.19  .125  -0.12
b  .018  -0.07  .159  -0.29
b  .027  -0.22
a  .006  -0.08  .460  -0.28
b  .014 
(Target) Run-up              0.09
a  .000  0.03  .219  0.16
a  .000  0.06
c  .070  0.04  .351  0.09
b  .016 
Relative size  0.03  .783  0.04  .848  -0.04  .716  -0.03  .528  -0.10
c  .096  -0.00  .913  -0.04  .617  -0.08  .356  -0.09  .548 
(Bidder) Q-ratio  0.00  .815  0.00  .449  -0.03  .275  -0.00  .438  -0.00  .281  -0.00  .865  -0.01  .200  -0.00  .292  -0.01  .716 
(Bidder) Leverage  0.04  .712  -0.09  .644  0.16  .487  0.04  .604  0.10  .451  0.09  .434  0.01  .946  0.09  .368  -0.07  .792 
(Bidder) Cflow/TA  -0.03  .944  -0.21  .548  0.28  .741  -0.05  .776  0.12  .667  -0.30  .198  0.36
c  .078  0.21
c  .074  0.45
b  .047 
(Bidder) English  -0.06  .139          0.01  .683          0.00  .980         
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      -0.02  .289  0.00  .959      -0.01  .958  -0.04  .102      -0.01  .625  0.04  .316 
(Target) Collateral   0.00  .920  -0.16  .103  0.34
b  .013  -0.00  .765  -0.04  .411  0.04  .817  -0.04  .251  -0.01  .799  -0.06  .507 
(Target) CFlow/TA  -0.27  .123  -0.13  .630  -0.44  .159  0.03  .841  0.05  .712  0.02  .548  -0.10  .176  -0.11  .313  -0.22  .195 
(Target) English  0.11
b  .016          0.05
b  .032          -0.01  .704         
(Target) Blockh>20%      -0.03  .886  -0.01  .762      0.06  .567  0.01  .722      0.01  .870  0.06  .161 
                                     
Nr. of observations  758    251    225    758    251    225    758    251    225   
Adjusted-R
2  0.06    0.11    0.07    0.15    0.08    0.14    0.03    0.04    0.03   




Table C-10. Economic effects of the results reported in Table C-9: Predicted change in the wealth of the 
target firm’s shareholders around M&A announcement 
 
This table reports the economic effects of the results of the regression of the target’s CARs for three different event windows and for the 
sub-samples of UK and CE target firms. The variable definitions are given in Appendix C-I. The numbers in the table represent the 
incremental changes in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variables) or with a one standard deviation 
change in the reference variable (level variables). The effects that are statistically significant in the regression analysis are denoted in bold. 
For each event window and each subsample of the bidding and target firms, the table also reports the average CARs.  
 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 

































                         
Reference: CAARs (%)    13.39  17.49  12.75    12.47  17.64  10.19    3.78  4.29  2.50 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variable=1): 
Cross-border bid    2.59  13.27  -1.69  +/-  2.68  2.54  3.02    -0.40  1.87  -1.79 
M&A of 100%    2.23  0.67  2.59  +  4.85  4.42  6.02    5.41  -0.05  9.49 
Opposed bid    9.23  10.07  11.68  +  7.41  13.23  5.77    7.19  5.01  8.81 
Tender offer    6.09  10.91  4.62  +  4.47  10.96  4.38    1.07  1.63  0.87 
Withdrawn bid    1.42  7.48  -3.40  +/-  3.13  8.83  0.24  +/-  -2.09  5.75  -7.96 
Pending bid    -2.28  -10.97  -2.84  -  2.90  4.84  0.96  -  -12.87  -21.69  -14.01 
Diversification    5.78  5.44  5.95  +  2.15  -0.46  5.12    1.07  -2.43  5.31 
All-equity payment    -4.72  -4.41  -5.53  -  -6.19  -8.03  -4.27    -1.99  2.35  -4.91 
Undisclosed terms    1.95  1.64  0.86  -  -6.51  -6.11  -6.04    -9.61  -5.11  -11.28 
1997-1999    8.32  13.47  4.61  +  2.73  2.89  3.09    -3.21  2.73  -12.78 
2000-2001    7.52  1.15  8.92  -  1.56  2.78  1.61  -  -6.88  0.16  -15.75 
(Bidder) English    -6.44        1.12        0.09     
(Bidder) Blockh>20%      -1.76  0.37      -0.54  -4.33      -1.18  3.59 
(Target) English    11.06      +  5.37        -1.48     
(Target) Blockh>20%      -3.34  -1.41      6.48  1.08      0.84  6.01 
 
Incremental change in CARs (%) associated with a one standard deviation change in a particular takeover characteristic: 
Run-up                       2.45  0.78  4.65    1.63  1.04  2.62 
Toehold             -1.92  -1.28  -2.59    -1.36  -0.60  -3.95    -2.49  -0.68  -3.82 
Relative size    0.67  0.77  -1.08    -0.67  -1.92  0.11    -0.89  -1.54  -2.43 
(Bidder) Q-ratio    1.02  1.01  -11.69    0.26  0.39  0.12    -5.12  0.52  -3.90 
(Bidder) Leverage    0.65  -1.62  2.40    0.65  1.80  1.35    0.16  1.62  -1.05 
(Bidder) CFlow/TA    -0.32  -2.89  2.26    -0.54  1.65  -2.42    3.89  2.89  3.63 
(Target) Collateral     0.01  -4.33  8.45    0.02  -1.08  0.99    -1.04  -0.27  -1.49 
(Target) CFlow/TA    -3.23  -1.41  -4.84    0.36  0.54  0.22    -1.20  -1.20  -2.42 






5.2.2  Target’s announcement effect 
In addition to a considerable share price run-up, target shareholders can make substantial gains 
upon the actual announcement of a hostile bid (model 4 in table C-10). The difference in the returns of 
hostile and unopposed bids amounts to 741 basis points. The announcement of a tender offer is another 
important factor increasing the value of the target firm (447 basis points). Both results are in line with 
the hold-out argument: the bidder needs to pay a higher premium to induce small target’s shareholders to 
sell their shares. As such, the more diffuse the target’s control structure the higher is the premium paid. 
This conjecture may also explain the substantially larger wealth effects of hostile bids and tender offers 
for UK relative to CE targets (see models 5 and 6). One reason is that dispersed ownership structures 
prevail in the UK but not in Continental Europe. The difference between the announcement effects for 
UK and CE targets is further confirmed by the significant positive coefficient of the English legal origin 
indicator  variable  (model  4).  Target  companies  from  English  common  law  countries  accumulate 
markedly  higher  announcement  premiums  than  do  firms  from  civil  law  countries  (the  difference 
amounts to 537 basis points). 
The announcement premium accrued to target shareholders is 273 basis points higher at the peak 
than at the beginning and the end of the takeover wave. Higher premiums (by 268 basis points) are also 
observed in cross-border acquisitions. When the terms of the deal remain undisclosed or when the offer 
involves an equity exchange, the bidder’s share price declines by 619 and 651 basis points, respectively.    
There is a significant positive relation between the share price run-up and announcement returns 
of CE target firms. A run-up premium of 100 basis points leads to an additional return of 16 basis points 
at the bid announcement (model 6). This result stands in sharp contrast to Schwert (1996) who does not 
find such a relation for the US. Remarkably, Table C-9 does not report such a relation for UK target 
firms either (model 5). The significant relation between mark-up and run-up premiums for CE targets 
suggests that the share price run-up, frequently caused by insider trading (Schwert, 1996; Meulbroek, 
1992), is harmful to bidding firms as it significantly raises the price paid to acquire control.  
 Another feature of M&As involving CE targets is the negative relation between the bidder’s 
toehold  and  the  announcement  premium  accrued  to  target  shareholders.  A  one  standard  deviation 
increase in the bidder’s pre-bid ownership of target shares leads to a 395 basis point reduction in the 
target  announcement  returns.  Betton  and  Eckbo  (2000)  report  similar  evidence  for  US  firms.  They 
explain that a larger toehold implies a higher probability of the relatively low target payoff in the single-
bid success outcome.
70 The relation between the toehold and the announcement effect is insignificant 
however for UK firms.
71 
                                                 
70 A larger toehold reduces the overall takeover price a bidder will have to pay (Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1986).   
71 The lack of significance may be explained by the fact that only 9% of the UK bidders actually acquire a toehold in the 
target firm prior to the bid. Moreover, the average size of their toehold is less than 3%. In contrast, 20% of Continental 




We  also  observe  that  the  shareholders  of  CE  targets  are  the  main  winners  in  diversified 
takeovers. Diversifying bids are associated with a premium which is 512 basis points higher than that in 
focus-oriented deals. When a UK company is acquired, the relative size of the transaction matters: a one 
standard deviation increase in the relative size leads to a reduction of 192 basis points in the target’s 
announcement premium. Withdrawn takeover bids lead to significant share price increases (883 basis 
points) for the UK target firms. This increase itself may be one of the reasons a bid ultimately fails, as a 
bidder is likely to withdraw its bid if target shareholders demand too high a premium.  
 
5.2.3  Target post-announcement returns 
The models explaining the post-announcement returns accrued to target shareholders have low 
explanatory power because these share prices remain relatively unchanged. As model 7 in table C-10 
shows,  the  target  abnormal  returns  decrease  by  961  basis  points  when  the  takeover  terms  are  not 
disclosed, and by 1287 basis points when the bidder faces difficulties in completing the transaction. In 
contrast, the CARs increase after the announcement of a full acquisition (by 541 basis points). As in the 
case of the announcement CARs, the share price run-up positively affects post-bid target returns. This 
indicates that these are additional costs to the bidding firm triggered by pre-announcement leakages of 
information. However, the negative coefficient on the toehold variable indicates that bidding firms pay a 
lower total price when they acquire a toehold in the target firm prior to the bid. Takeover bids made in 
the period of the peak and decline of the takeover wave are associated with a significantly negative post-
announcement stock price revaluation (by 321 and 688 basis points, respectively). However, all the 
effects mentioned in this subsection are only significant for CE target companies (model 9). In the UK, 
the post-announcement CARs of target firms are positively influenced by a withdrawal of the bid (model 
8). It seems that investors are relieved that the bid is withdrawn and that they anticipate other, more 
profitable bids.   
The only common effect for both UK and CE targets is the positive relation between the targets’ 
post-bid returns and cash flows (see models 8 and 9). A one standard deviation increase in a target 
firm’s cash flow triggers an increase in the post-announcement premium of 389 basis points. On the one 
hand, this suggests that negotiations between target shareholders and the bidder are on-going and that a 
cash-rich target has better opportunities to negotiate a higher premium. On the other hand, this result is 
also in line with the conjecture that a cash-rich target is more able to apply anti-takeover measures such 
as share buy-backs or an increase in dividend payout, which make its acquisition more costly for the 
bidder. 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This chapter has examined the determinants of the market reaction to the announcements of 




document  that  the  majority  of  takeover  deals  is  expected  to  generate  synergy  values:  they  trigger 
substantial share price increases at the announcement, most of which are captured by the target firm 
shareholders.  We  find  large  announcement  effects  (of  9%)  for  the  target  firms  compared  to  a 
(statistically significant) announcement effect of merely 0.5% for the bidding firms. Analysis of pre-bid 
cumulative  abnormal  returns  reveals  that  bidder  and  target  price  reactions  are  not  limited  to  the 
announcement  day  but  commence  already  more  than  two  months  prior  to  the  initial  public 
announcement. Including the price run-up, the cumulative abnormal returns increase to 21% for the 
targets and 0.9% for the bidders. Subsequent to the event day, negative revaluations of the bidder and 
target’s share prices occur.   
We show that there is systematic variation in the valuation effects of takeovers with different 
characteristics, and these findings are valid for both UK and Continental European firms. First, hostile 
takeovers and tender offers trigger substantially larger price reactions to the target shareholders than do 
friendly M&As. Second, investors adjust downwards both the bidder and target’s share prices at the 
announcement  of  all-equity  offers.  Third,  target  shareholders  gain  higher  premiums  in  cross-border 
takeovers. Fourth, an acquisition of a private firm triggers significantly positive abnormal returns to the 
bidder’s shareholders. We also demonstrate that takeovers occurring when takeover activity is slowing 
down trigger lower gains to both bidder and target shareholders than do deals at the beginning of the 
wave.  
We  also  detect  some  fundamental  differences  between  takeovers  in  the  UK  and  Continental 
Europe:  
First, the shareholders of UK target firms are able to pocket significantly higher returns than their 
Continental European peers. We relate this difference in premiums to a more strict takeover legislation 
in the UK than in the Continental European countries, which protects the UK target shareholders from 
expropriation by the bidder and gives these target shareholders more power to extract higher premiums 
in takeover negotiations (see also Goergen et al. (2005) for an overview of takeover regulation).  
Second,  the  presence  of  a  large  shareholder  in  the  bidding  firm  has  a  significantly  positive 
impact in the UK and a negative one in Continental Europe. This evidence suggests that investors view 
the roles of the major shareholders in UK and Continental European firms as fundamentally different. 
The presence of a large blockholder in a UK bidder company is regarded as a credible signal that the 
takeover decision is driven by motives of profit maximization. In contrast, the presence of a controlling 
shareholder in a Continental European firm may be interpreted as a signal that the takeover may also 
expropriate the firm’s minority shareholders. The lack of an efficient takeover regulation and weak 
protection of shareholders in Continental Europe is likely to account for this difference.  
Third,  there  is  evidence  of  a  significantly  positive  relation  between  mark-up  and  run-up 
premiums to bidder and target firms from Continental Europe. This finding stands in sharp contrast to 
Schwert (1996) who does not find such a relation for the US. Our analysis shows that the UK market 




less regulated in Continental Europe than in the UK. Therefore, the positive relation between run-up and 
mark-up premiums indicates that insider trading is harmful to Continental European bidding firms, as it 
significantly raises the price paid to acquire target shares. This in turn, may discourage potential bidders 
from making a takeover bid. 
Finally, the Continental European market is also distinct in that there are a high number of 
takeover  bids  where  the  transaction  terms  remain  undisclosed.  Such  transactions  lead  to  substantial 
losses to the shareholders of both bidding and target firms. Similarly, acquisitions of partial control, 
virtually non-existent in the UK but prevailing in Continental Europe, trigger significantly lower share 
price reactions at their announcement. This evidence suggests that Continental European  regulators who 
want  to  facilitate  efficient  corporate  restructuring  in  their  countries  need  to  introduce  measures  to 





 Appendix C-I. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
1997-1999  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1997 and December 31, 1999 
(the climax of the 5
th takeover wave); equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
2000-2001  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 2000 and December 31, 2001 
(the decline of the 5
th takeover wave); equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
All-cash payment  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with cash, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
All-equity payment  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with equity, and equals zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Blockh>20%  Indicator equals one if the firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 20% and more prior to 
the takeover. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
Blockh>60%  Indicator equals one if the firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 60% and more prior to 
the takeover. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
CFlow/TA  Ratio of total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment activities) to total 
assets,  at  the  year-end  prior  to  the  deal  announcement.  Source:  SDC  and  Amadeus/Fame/Reach  and 
DataStream. 
Collateral  Ratio  of  tangible  assets  to  total  assets;  both  refer  to  the  year  prior  to  the  deal  announcement.  Source: 
computed based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream. 
Control (%)  Ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of 
the book).  
Cross-border bid  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target are from different countries, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
SDC and LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Diversification  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in different industries (their primary 2-digit SIC codes do 
not coincide), and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
English  Indicator equals one if the firm is incorporated in a country of English legal origin (Ireland and the UK), and 
equals zero otherwise. Source: computed based on the LaPorta et al. (1997) classification 
Investments/TA  Ratio of total investments to total assets, both refer to the year-end prior to the deal announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Leverage  Ratio of total debt to total assets at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Source: computed based on 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Friendly M&A  Indication equals one if the takeover is not qualified as an opposed (by the target firm) bid or as an unopposed 
tender offer (see Opposed bid and Tender offer); it is zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and 
Financial Times 
M&A of 100%  When CARs over windows [-60, -2] and [-1, +1] are analyzed, the indicator equals one if the bidder intends 
to hold 100% of the share capital of the target firm after the bid completion, and equals zero otherwise. When 
CARs over window [+2, +60] are analyzed, the indicator equals one if the bidder owns 100% of share capital 
of the target firm after the bid completion, and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and 
Financial Times 
Market value  Market capitalization of the bidding firm 60 days prior to the initial bid announcement. Source: Amadeus and 
DataStream 
Opposed (by the 
target’s board) bid 
Indicator equals one if the initial takeover offer meets a negative reaction by the management of the target 
firm or if a competing bid is made. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times  
Pending bid  Indicator equals one if the bid has been announced but has not been completed or withdrawn afterwards. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Private target  Indicator equals one if target firm was a stand-alone firm not listed on any stock exchange at the moment of 
the bid announcement, and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Q-ratio  Ratio of market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of debt over the sum of book value 
of equity and book value of debt. The market value of equity is taken 60 days prior to deal announcement, 
book value of equity and debt are at year-end prior to deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and 
DataStream 
Relative size  The ratio of transaction value over the sum of the transaction value plus the bidder’s market capitalization. If 
the transaction value is undisclosed, we employ the product of the percentage of share capital acquired and 
the book value of the target firm’s assets one year prior to the bid as a proxy. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, 
Factiva, and Financial Times and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Returns on Assets  Ratio  of  net  income  to  total  assets,  both  refer  to  the  year-end  prior  to  deal  announcement.    Source: 




Variable  Definition 
Run-up             Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of bidder/target over the window [-60, -2] preceding the day of the deal 
announcement. The market model is adjusted for thin-trading and reversion to the mean over the period of 
300 to 60 days before M&A announcement; the market index is the MSCI Europe index. Source: DataStream 
Sales/TA  Ratio of sales revenues to total assets; both refer to the year-end prior to the deal announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
Tender offer 
(unopposed by the 
target’s board) 
Indicator equals one if the bidder makes a public offer to purchase shares of the target firm and the takeover is 
not classified as opposed (see Opposed bid); and is zero otherwise. Generally, an unopposed tender offer is a 
public offer to the target shareholders asking them to sell their shares for cash and/or equity at a pre-specified 
price  or  equity  exchange  ratio,  while  the  board  of  directors  of  the  target  firm  does  not  issue  negative 
statements about the bid. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times  
Toehold     Percentage of the target firm shares that the bidder had accumulated prior to the bid announcement. Source: 
SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Total assets  Total  assets  of  the  firm  at  the  year-end  prior  to  deal  announcement.    Source:  DataStream  and 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
Undisclosed terms  This  indicator  variable  equals  one  if  the  terms  of  the  transaction  such  as  the  means  of  payment  or  the 
transaction  value  are  not  disclosed,  and  equals  zero  otherwise.  Source:  SDC,  LexisNexis,  Factiva,  and 
Financial Times 
Withdrawn bid  Indicator  equals  one  if  the  bid  was  ultimately  unsuccessful,  and  equals  zero  otherwise.  Source:  SDC, 





CHAPTER 5.  
 





The empirical literature has given notable attention in recent years to the choice of the means of 
payment in corporate takeovers (see e.g. Amihud, Lev, and Travlos, 1990; Martin, 1996; Ghosh and 
Ruland,  1998;  and  Faccio  and  Masulis,  2005).  In  this  literature,  the  term  ‘means  of  payment’  is 
frequently  considered  as  synonymous  to  the  ‘sources  of  takeover  financing’.  The  bidder’s  payment 
decisions are often used to test theories that explain how firms finance their investment projects (such as 
Myers, 1977; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Myers and Majluf, 1984). The classification by means of 
payment, however, typically ignores the sources of transaction financing in all-cash offers and assumes 
that these offers are entirely financed with cash. If the external sources of funds (debt and equity) are 
frequently used to finance all-cash offers, the means of payment is no longer an appropriate proxy for 
the  sources  of  transaction  financing  in  corporate  takeovers.  Therefore,  the  analysis  of  the  motives 
underlying the means of payment may lead to incorrect conclusions about the validity of the theories 
that explain the firm’s financing decision.  
This chapter contributes to the existing M&A literature by investigating explicitly the motives 
underlying the bidder’s decision how to finance a takeover bid. Based on the classification of takeovers 
by sources of transaction financing (instead of the one by the means of payment), we test a set of 
predictions derived from the dominant theories of how companies choose financing sources for their 
investment projects. Thus, in a novel way, we test whether the bidder’s financing decision is driven by 
the following explanations: pecking order (Myers and Majluf, 1984), debt overhang (Myers, 1977), 
takeover threats (Zwiebel, 1996), agency cost of equity and debt (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and 
financial flexibility (Bolton and Freixas, 2000). We also examine whether the bidder’s preferences for 
specific means of payment have an impact on the choice of the sources of funding. The overall analysis 
is  further  complemented  with  the  investigation  of  how  the  market  reacts  to  the  announcement  of 
takeovers financed with different types of capital.  
To our best knowledge, this is the first empirical study that models the sources of financing used 
in corporate takeovers. The lack of reliable data on the sources of takeover financing may have been the 
main reason why the financing decision of the bidding firms has never been investigated before. Our 
analysis is based on  a  unique hand-collected dataset of European takeover bids that were launched 




We document that external sources of financing (debt and equity issues) are frequently employed 
in takeovers that involve cash and mixed payments. In more than 850 acquisitions entirely paid with 
cash, one-third is at least partially financed with external funds (70% of which are financed with debt). 
Of the 260 firms opting to make an offer consisting of a combination of equity and cash, 37% borrow to 
finance the cash component of the takeover offer.  
Our analysis reveals that in addition to the means of payment, sources of transaction financing 
are  an  important  determinant  of  the  market  reaction  to  the  takeover  announcement.  Investors 
differentiate between information about the payment method and sources of takeover financing and take 
into account both takeover characteristics. In particular, the market reaction to the announcements of 
acquisitions  fully  paid  by  cash  but  financed  by  equity  is  similar  to  the  market  reaction  to  the 
announcements of acquisitions fully paid by equity. Moreover, we observe that a negative price revision 
follows the announcement of any corporate takeover that involves equity financing. In contrast, the price 
correction that takes place subsequent to the debt-financed bids is insignificant. We also find marked 
evidence that, in sharp contrast to the negative returns of all the other types of offers, cash-paid debt-
financed acquisitions create substantial value (about 3%) to the bidding firms over a 6-month period 
centred around the day of the takeover bid. This evidence shows that earlier research that partitioned 
takeover bids into cash versus equity offers has oversimplified reality. 
The  financing  decision  (the  bidder’s  choice  between  cash,  debt,  and  equity  financing)  is 
explained by the pecking order preferences as well as by conflicting interests between shareholders and 
creditors. In contrast, none of those factors explain the motives to use a specific means of payment in the 
takeover bid. The payment decision depends on the degree to which the bidders’ large shareholders wish 
to retain control after the takeover, on whether or not the bidders’ shareholders intend to share the risk of 
the transaction with the target’s shareholders, and on the characteristics of the takeover bid. However, 
these factors have an insignificant impact on the bidder’s financing choice once we condition on the 
payment mode. We therefore conclude that the decisions on the means of payment and the sources of 
takeover financing are not substitutes. Instead, these decisions are made to solve different problems.  
The focus on intra-European mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving Continental European 
and UK companies confers additional value to this chapter, as it allows us to explore the impact of a 
wide range of institutional settings and regulatory rules on the patterns of the financing decisions. We 
capture the differences in the regulatory corporate governance environment across European countries 
by a set of newly created governance indices. With the help of 150 corporate lawyers from 32 European 
countries,  we  have  created  a  corporate  governance  database  that  comprises  the  main  changes  in 
corporate governance regulation in all European countries over the last 15 years. For each country, we 
quantify the regulations and measure their effectiveness in mitigating the conflicts of interests between 
the various corporate constituencies: the management, the majority and minority shareholders, and the 
creditors. We also quantify the regulatory provisions aiming at improving the transparency of corporate 




in virtually every European country during the 1990s. Therefore, it is important to note that, in contrast 
to previous studies, all legal indices employed in this chapter are time-varying and reflect all changes in 
the legal environment during the analysed period.  
Our evidence demonstrates that the financing choices are very sensitive to the differences in the 
legal environments by country. As expected, the choice of equity financing is more likely in countries 
with better shareholder rights protection. When shareholder rights protection is low, companies more 
frequently resort to debt and cash as financial sources. Moreover, debt financing prevails in countries 
with better creditor protection. This evidence is in line with LaPorta et al. (1998) who argue that a better 
protection  of  financiers  from  expropriation  facilitates  the  development  of  well-functioning  capital 
markets and ensures lower costs of financing. Since the legal protection of shareholders and creditors 
affects the  cost of equity  and debt capital, it induces systematic corporate preferences for the least 
expensive sources of funding. In contrast, we find no significant impact of the legal environment on the 
choice of payment method in takeovers. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we formulate the hypotheses 
on what drives the bidders‘ choice of how to  finance the takeover. Section 3 describes the sample 
selection procedure, data sources, and sample statistics. Section 4 discusses the methodology. In section 
5, we present and interpret our empirical findings. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Motivation and Hypotheses 
 
A prominent view in the corporate finance literature is that equity issues reduce firm value. 
Indeed, share price reductions arise when equity is used as a means of payment in M&As (see e.g. 
Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001; Franks et al., 1991) or when seasoned equity offerings are 
made (see e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Mikkelson and Parch, 1986). In 
spite of the negative price reactions, equity financing has not been a rare phenomenon over the past two 
decades. In particular, a switch from cash to equity in the financial composition of takeover bids arose 
over the 1990s: Andrade et al. (2001) document that all-equity acquisitions represented 32.9% of all US 
M&As in the 1980s versus 57.8% in the 1990s.
72 Similarly, Martynova and Renneboog (2006) show that 
equity has become an increasingly popular source of financing in European M&As: the proportion of 
all-cash acquisitions fell by half in the 1990s compared to the 1980s. The question arises why all-equity 
offers or mixed offers are still so frequently used in corporate takeovers and whether these choices 
depend on the firms’ financial resources.  
An  extensive  body  of  theoretical  and  empirical  research  has  studied  the  determinants  of 
corporate financing decisions. The dominant explanations can be classified into two groups: cost of 
capital  considerations  and  agency-related  issues.  The  former  explanation  upholds  that  market 
                                                 
72 Fama and French (2002) document that issues of equity in mergers and acquisitions are much more sizeable than public 




imperfections or institutional rigidities, such as information asymmetries (Myers and Majluf, 1984), 
legal protection of shareholders and creditors (LaPorta et al., 1998), or taxes (Modigliani and Miller, 
1963) may disproportionally affect the costs of debt and equity capital and hence make one of the 
sources of financing more attractive than another. The latter explanation endorses that a firm issues 
specific securities to mitigate agency problems between its management, shareholders, and creditors 
(Myers,  1977;  Zwiebel,  1996).  At  the  same  time,  the  agency  problems  themselves  may  induce 
systematic  corporate  (management)  preferences  with  regard  to  the  sources  of  funding  (Jensen  and 
Meckling, 1976).  When the firm’s investment opportunities involve a corporate acquisition, the choice 
of  the  sources  of  financing  often  depends  on  the  preferred  payment  mode  in  the  takeover  deal. 
Therefore,  corporate  strategic  preferences  for  one  payment  method  over  another  are  also  seen  as 
important  factors  affecting  a  bidder’s  funding  decision.  We  consider  the  means  of  payment 
considerations of the bidding firm as the third dominant explanation for its financing decision. 
In the remainder of this section, we formulate the hypotheses on how the bidder’s choice of the 
sources of takeover financing depends on the cost of capital considerations, agency problems, and on the 
preferences for specific payment methods in the takeover deal.  
 
2.1 Cost of Capital considerations (CC) 
 
CC1. Pecking Order and Market Timing:  
The  negative  price  reaction  to  the  announcement  of  equity  issues  is  typically  ascribed  to 
asymmetric information. Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that investors consider an equity issue as a 
signal that a firm is overvalued which leads to a downward revision of the share price.
73 This adverse 
price effect of an equity issue increases its costs and forces firms to issue equity only when alternative 
sources of financing are unavailable or too costly. However, the value reduction induced by equity 
issues  may  be  less  severe  in  periods  of  stock  market  booms.  Not  only  do  buoyant  equity  markets 
overvalue shares in the short-run (hence making equity a relatively cheap source of financing), they also 
induce investors to under-react to negative signals about the firms’ fundamental values (Baker, Ruback, 
and Wurgler, 2004).
74 When contracting debt is no longer advantageous compared to issuing equity, 
                                                 
73 In the presence of information asymmetries between management and investors, the management has an incentive to issue 
equity  when  the  shares  of  the  firm  are  temporarily  overvalued,  as  this  would  increase  the  wealth  of  the  incumbent 
shareholders. Realizing this, outside investors consider an equity issue as a negative signal about the true value of the firm 
such that their share transactions adjust the share prices correspondingly. 
74 The overvaluation of a bidding firm’s equity may also have a bearing on the choice between cash or equity payments (and 
hence the financing) in a takeover bid. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Vishwanathan (2003) show that 
overvalued bidders use equity to buy real assets of undervalued (or less overvalued) targets. This way they hope to take 




firms are more likely to raise money for takeovers by performing seasoned equity issues (Choe, Masulis, 
and Nanda, 1993).
75 Consequently, we formulate the following predictions (CC1):  
CC1(a): An equity issue is more likely when a firm has insufficient cash funds and limited debt 
capacity to finance  takeovers. A debt issue has priority over an equity issue and is more likely when 
firms are cash-constrained but still have sufficient debt capacity.  
CC1(b): Equity financing of takeovers  is more likely in periods of a stock market booms. 
Our measure of insufficient cash funds (i.e. an internal funding deficit) is the bidder’s internally 
generated  funds  and  cash  surpluses  divided  by  the  transaction  value  (CFLOW/TRANSVAL  and 
CHLDG/TRANSVAL respectively). A ratio less than one denotes that the bidder’s internal sources of 
funds are insufficient to finance an acquisition entirely by cash. Two variables are used as proxies for 
the bidder’s debt capacity: COLLATERAL is the percentage of tangible assets in total assets of the 
combined firm (sum of tangible assets of the bidding and target firms over sum of total assets of the two 
firms).  As  tangible  assets  represent  collateral  for  outside  investors,  we  expect  firms  with  a  higher 
percentage of tangibles to attract external financing more easily (Myers, 1977; Hovakimian et al., 2001). 
The second variable, FIN LEVERAGE, is calculated as the sum of the bidder’s long-term debt and the 
transaction value, divided by the sum of the bidder’s book value of assets and the transaction value. This 
measure captures the leverage of the bidding firm if it finances the takeover entirely by debt. All the 
variables mentioned above are calculated at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Our measure 
of the bidder’s share price performance prior to the bid consists of the daily abnormal returns cumulated 
over the window starting 60 days and ending 20 days prior to the bid announcement (RUNUP). To 
control  for  stock  market  booms,  we  construct  indicator  variables  for  the  periods  1993-1996  (stock 
market recovery), 1997-1999 (stock market boom), and 2000-2001 (stock market decline).    
      
CC2. Regulatory Environment: 
A growing literature advocates that regulation is an important determinant of corporate financing 
decision. LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998), Levin (1999), and Djankov et al. (2004) argue that regulation 
affects  the  terms  at  which  financiers  are  willing  to  provide  firms  with  funds.  When  a  regulatory 
environment protects the providers of funds against expropriation by entrepreneurs, this ensures the 
availability of external finance at lower costs. Strong creditor protection assumes that lenders force 
repayment more easily, take possession of collateral, or even gain control over the firm. This results in 
lower  creditor  risks  and  hence  in  lower  borrowing  costs.  Consequently,  this  increases  the  relative 
attractiveness  of  borrowing.  Alternatively,  strong  shareholder  protection  enabling  shareholders  to 
participate in or monitor corporate decision-making reduces the risks for the shareholders and increases 
the relative attractiveness of equity financing. In addition, a bidder is more likely to issue equity in 
countries with better corporate transparency standards, as the adverse effects of equity issues are less 
                                                 
75 In line with this argument, much empirical evidence documents that an improvement in the stock market and overall 




severe  when  transparency  is  higher.  Bidding  firms  controlled  by  large  shareholders  may  be  more 
reluctant to use equity financing in countries with lower protection of minority shareholder rights. When 
minority shareholders have little influence, large shareholders may exploit private benefits of control at 
their expense. Since an equity issue may weaken the control position of the large shareholders and hence 
dilute their private benefits of control, we expect their firms to avoid financing investment projects by 
equity.  Overall, the financing choice depends on the relative magnitude of the costs associated with debt 
and equity issues. We hypothesize that: 
CC2(a): Firms are more likely to use debt financing for acquisitions in countries where the costs 
of issuing equity are substantially higher due to poor shareholder protection or where the costs of 
borrowing a relatively lower due to better creditor protection.  
CC2(b): An equity issue to finance takeovers is more likely to occur in countries with higher 
transparency standards and lower protection of minority shareholders. 
We measure the differences in the regulatory corporate governance environment (shareholder, 
creditor,  and  minority  shareholder  rights  protection,  and  transparency  standards)  across  European 
countries  with  four  newly  created  governance  indices.  The  methodology  employed  to construct  the 
indices is described in Section 3.3 and Appendix D-II. We multiply each index by a ‘law enforcement’ 
index (the Rule of law and Corruption indices of the World Bank). The reason is that good corporate 
governance regulation may be less influential if its enforcement in courts is not sufficiently strong.      
 
2.2 Agency Problems between corporate claimants (AG) 
 
AG1. Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat: 
For managers who pursue a personal agenda at the expense of value maximization a debt issue 
may be regarded as the least preferred source of financing as it restricts the availability of corporate 
funds at their disposal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In contrast, an equity issue increases the funds 
under managerial discretion and hence may be strictly preferred by the manager. This agency conflict 
between  the  management  and  shareholders  is  most  pronounced  in  widely-held  corporations  where 
shareholder  activism  and  efficient  monitoring  of  the  management  is  low  (Berle  and  Means,  1932). 
Therefore, we predict that: 
AG1(a): Firms with a diffuse ownership structure are more likely to issue equity to finance 
takeovers. 
As dispersed (atomistic) shareholders have few incentives to monitor the management directly, 
they  rely  on  external  monitoring  by  the  market  for  corporate  control.  Zwiebel  (1996)  shows  that 
entrenched managers may voluntarily opt for debt financing because of the takeover threat from the 
market for corporate control. In his dynamic model, hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and 




incentive to focus on the shareholder value maximization, and a debt issue allows them to constrain their 
own discretion over corporate funds credibly. Thus, we can formulate the following hypothesis:  
AG1(b): Managers anticipating a takeover threat are more likely to finance acquisitions with 
debt. 
We employ two variables to measure the dispersion of the bidder’s corporate control structure. 
First, CONTROL (%) is the ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. The second 
variable, BLOCKHDR>20, is a binary variable indicating the presence of a blockholder owning a voting 
stake of at least 20%. Following Faccio and Lang (2004), we assume that that 20% of the voting shares 
suffices to ensure control. If no shareholder exceeds the threshold, we consider the company is widely 
held. The measure of the bidder’s takeover vulnerability, TO THREAT, is the likelihood that the bidder 
becomes a target of a corporate takeover in the year when it makes an acquisition. It is estimated by a 
probit model applied to all European firms for the period 1993-2001.
76 
   
AG2. Debt Overhang: 
Myers (1977) argues that the conflicting interests of shareholders and creditors may encourage 
firms  to  issue  equity  rather  than  debt  to  raise  external  funds.  In  his  view,  the  wealth-maximizing 
preferences of shareholders dictate that managers undertake a project only if its expected benefits exceed 
the payments to the debtholders. This may lead to underinvestment as managers may forego positive 
NPV investment projects if the expected benefits only suffice to repay debt and leave no return to the 
shareholders. To minimize the scope of underinvestment, firms with high quality projects may limit 
leverage and hence avoid further borrowing. This leads us to the following prediction:  
AG2: Firms with high growth potential finance acquisitions by equity. 
Our  main  measure  of  the  bidder’s  growth  potential  is  Tobin’s  Q,  calculated  as  the  bidder’s 
market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of long-term debt divided by the sum of 
the book value of equity and long-term debt. Other measures employed are the average growth rate in 
sales (SALES 3YGR), in capital expenditures (CAPX 3YGR), and in total assets (TA 3YGR) over the 3 
years prior to the year of the acquisition.
77 Detailed definitions of the alternative measures are given in 
Appendix D-I.  
 
AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
In  addition  to  the  underinvestment  problem,  conflicts  of  interests  between  shareholders  and 
creditors may also lead to another agency problem; namely, excessive risk taking by the management. 
                                                 
76 The sample of European firms for the period 1992-2001 is an unbalanced panel. The dependent variable in the probit 
model equals one if the company was acquired during the year and is zero otherwise. The set of independent variables is 
taken from the prior literature explaining the probability of takeovers (Hasbrouck, 1985; Palepu, 1986; Ambrose and 
Megginson, 1992; Cremers et al., 2005). The estimated parameters of the model are available upon request. 
77 The advantage of these growth measures is that they are not affected by differences in accounting policies across firms 




Black and Scholes (1973) show that the equity of a leveraged firm is a call option on the firm’s assets 
whose value increases with the volatility of future cash flows. This implies that the management of the 
leveraged firm can maximize shareholder wealth by increasing the risk of the projects it invests in, and 
hence re-distribute wealth from bondholders to its shareholders. Higher earnings volatility increases the 
expected  bankruptcy  costs  which  creditors  may  anticipate  by  demanding  better  terms  in  the  debt 
covenants. Consequently, the cost of borrowing increases, which makes debt financing less attractive or 
even prohibitively expensive for leveraged and risky firms. This leads us to the following hypothesis: 
AG3(a): Leveraged firms with high earnings volatility are less likely to choose debt financing. 
Bolton and Freixas (2000) formulate an alternative theory. In their capital market equilibrium, 
risky firms prefer bank loans to equity financing because banks are good at helping firms through times 
of financial distress. That is, firms facing high risk of bankruptcy are more likely to establish close 
lending  relationships  with  banks.  This  provides  them  with  access  to  the  cheapest  form  of  flexible 
financing. Safer firms prefer to issue equity (and bonds) and hence avoid paying the intermediation cost 
associated with bank loans. However, Bolton and Freixas (2000) note that the riskiest firms (often start-
up firms and risky ventures) are either unable to obtain funding or forced to issue equity, as they are too 
risky to be granted bank loans. 
Whereas Bolton and Freixas (2000) distinguish between debt financing in the form of a bank 
loan and a bond issue, we are unable to follow this classification due to the data limitations described in 
Section 3.1. However, we can test the predictions of their model on the firm’s preference between equity 
and debt (bank loan) financing for the following two reasons. First, the European market for corporate 
bonds  is  small  (relative  to  that  of  the  US)  and  most  of  the  debt  financing  consists  of  bank  loans 
(common in e.g. Germany) or of private placements of loan notes (common in the UK).
78 Second, in 
terms of the firm’s ability to renegotiate debt contracts in the times of financial distress, privately issued 
loan notes (which are also frequently unsecured) are more similar to bank loans than to publicly issued 
bonds. The reason is that public debt is difficult to renegotiate due to coordination problems between 
small creditors (bondholders), whereas private debt (privately issued loan notes) - just like bank loans - 
frequently involves only one or a group of large creditors. Therefore, following predictions of Bolton 
and Freixas (2000), we hypothesize that:  
AG3(b): Firms with high earnings volatility are more likely to choose debt financing in takeover 
deals. 
AG3(c): Young risky firms are more likely to use equity financing in takeover transactions.   
To proxy for a firm’s risk, we employ the age of the bidding firm (AGE) and its exposure to the 
market risk (BETA) estimated with the market model over the period between 300 and 60 days prior to 
the takeover announcement. We expect shares of relatively young firms and firms with high beta to be 
more risky.  
                                                 





2.3 Means of Payment considerations (MP) 
 
As the bidder’s decision regarding the sources of takeover financing often coincides with or 
depends on the choice of the payment mode in the takeover deal, we complement our above analysis 
with the reasons why bidders prefer a specific means of payment in corporate takeovers.   
 
MP1. Risk Sharing: 
Information asymmetry between bidder and target are an important determinant of the means of 
payment in corporate acquisitions. In particular, high uncertainty about the true value of the target firm 
induces the bidder to pay with its own equity instead of with cash. Capital participation in the combined 
firm makes the target shareholders share the risk of downward post-acquisition revaluations. Hansen 
(1987)  predicts  that  misvaluation  of  the  target  firm  is  especially  harmful  for  the  bidders  when  the 
transaction value is high and the size of the target’s assets is comparable to that of the bidder’s assets. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
MP1:  The  probability  that  an  equity  offer  is  made  increases  with  the  absolute  and  relative 
transaction value.  
To test the risk-sharing hypothesis, we employ three variables: the market value of the bidding 
firm (MVAL) measured 60 days prior to the bid announcement, the transaction value (TRANSVAL) 
measured by the total amount the bidder pays to purchase shares of the target firm (excluding assumed 
liabilities), and the relative size of the transaction (RELVAL) calculated as the transaction value divided 
by the sum of the transaction value and the bidder’s market capitalization.  
 
MP2. The Threat of Control Change: 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) document that a change in corporate control structure in the form of 
voting power dilution and the emergence of an outside blockholder may discourage bidders from paying 
for acquisitions with equity. These findings support the theories by Harris and Raviv (1988) and Stulz 
(1988) predicting that an equity exchange is less likely to be used when an equity issue dilutes the voting 
power of the blockholders or share-owning managers of the acquiring firm. Thus, the likelihood of an 
equity  payment  is  largely  determined  by  the  control  structures  of  the  bidding  and  target  firms.  In 
particular, a cash payment is strictly preferred to an equity payment when the target’s share ownership is 
concentrated or a bidder’s largest blockholder only holds an intermediate level of voting power.
79 This 
preference is weakened if the target company is widely held or if the bidder’s dominant shareholder has 
a supermajority of voting rights. The threat of control change hypothesis can be formulated as follows:   
                                                 
79 We consider voting stakes in the range of 20 to 60 percent as an intermediate level of voting power. This is the range where 




MP2: A bidder is unlikely to make an all-equity payment if the takeover bid significantly affects 
the firm’s control structure. 
To capture the potential impact of an all-equity offer on the control structure of the bidding firm 
we consider the following four variables. CONTROL THREAT is the voting stake in the combined firm 
that the largest shareholder of the target  firm obtains provided the acquisition is entirely paid  with 
equity. This variable captures that an all-equity bid creates a new large shareholder in the merged firm 
and hence threatens the control positions of the bidder’s incumbent shareholders. To measure the extent 
of  the  control  loss  for  the  bidder’s  incumbent  blockholders,  we  employ  three  indicator  variables 
characterizing  the  bidder’s  control  structure.  Following  Faccio  and  Masulis  (2005),  we  distinguish 
between  widely  held  companies  in  which  no  blockholders  hold  at  least  20%  of  voting  rights 
(CONTROL<20), companies with intermediate control concentration in which a blockholder owns a 
voting stake between 20% and 60% (20<CONTROL<60), and firms controlled by a blockholder holding 
a strong majority of voting rights (CONTROL>60). The bidder’s control structure is likely to be affected 
by an all-equity offer if the firm is controlled by a shareholder with an intermediate level of voting 
power.  
 
MP3. Characteristics of the takeover bid: 
The  characteristics  of  a  takeover  offer  may  significantly  affect  the  choice  of  the  payment 
method. First, an equity payment is less likely to be offered in cross-border takeovers, as selling equity 
to foreign investors faces some hurdles. The seller may be reluctant to accept an equity offer from a 
foreign acquirer if the latter’s shares are not traded in the seller’s country. This could entail that the 
bidding firm(‘s quality) may be less known in the seller’s country (see e.g French and Poterba, 1991; 
Coval and Moskowitz, 1999). Also, the regulation in the target firms’ countries may impose restrictions 
on foreign equity investments (Faccio and Masulis, 2005). Second, cash offers increase the probability 
of the bid’s success in tender offers, mandatory bids, competing bids, and hostile takeovers and are 
hence preferred by bidders in such types of transactions (Fishman, 1989). Consequently, equity is less 
likely to be the means of payment for this type of takeovers. Third, the incumbent owners of an unlisted 
target are more likely to accept cash payment, as one of their primary incentives to sell the firm may be 
to cash out. Therefore, equity bids are also least likely when the target firm is unlisted or closely-held. In 
sum, we expect that:  
MP3:  An  equity  payment  is  less  likely  in  tender  offers,  hostile  takeovers,  cross-border 
acquisitions, and acquisitions of unlisted targets. 
To test this prediction we construct four binary variables, TENDER OFFER, HOSTILE BID, 
CROSSBORDER BID, and LISTED TARGET, that take value of one if the takeover transaction is a 
tender offer, hostile bid, cross-border bid, or the acquisition of unlisted target, respectively. 
 






The  study  explores  a  unique  dataset  compiled  from  more  than  10  different  databases.  We 
describe  the  sample  selection  procedure  and  data  sources,  and  provide  an  overview  of  sample 
composition  by  sources  of  transaction  financing  and  means  of  payment.  We  also  explain  how  we 
construct  the  indices  that  capture  the  regulatory  corporate  governance  environment  by  country:  a 
shareholder  rights  protection  index,  a  creditor  rights  protection  index,  a  transparency  index,  and  a 
minority shareholder rights protection index.  
 
3.1 Sample selection and data sources 
 
We  build  our  initial  sample  of  European  acquisitions  undertaken  between  1993  and  2001  – 
during the fifth takeover wave - from the Mergers and Acquisitions Database of the Securities Data 
Company  (SDC).  The  SDC  data  were  filtered  down  to  intra-European  domestic  and  cross-border 
acquisitions with both an acquirer and a target located in Continental Europe or the UK. Deals involving 
firms from Central and Eastern Europe are also considered.  The deals included in our sample fulfil the 
following requirements: (i) the takeover is completed and involves changes in control
80; (ii) the takeover 
is not qualified as a going-private transaction (LBO, MBO, etc.) or a divestiture (the target firm is a 
subsidiary of another company); (iii) neither the bidder nor the target is a financial institution (banks, 
unit trusts, mutual funds and pension funds); (iv) the bidder’s shares are traded on a European stock 
exchange (but the target firm can be  either listed or in private hands);  (v) the period between  two 
consecutive bids by the same acquirer is no less than 300 trading days;
81 (vi) financial and accounting 
data for at least one of the participants of the transaction is available from DataStream or the Amadeus, 
Fame, and Reach databases; (vii) the ownership and control structures of bidding and target companies 
one year prior to the acquisition can be identified; and (viii) information on the sources of takeover 
financing  is  found.  A  total  of  1,361  completed  European  M&As  satisfy  these  criteria.  This  covers 
M&As involving firms incorporated in 26 European countries. 
The quality of the SDC data is verified by comparing its information on the announcement date, 
the companies’ country of origin, the transaction value, payment structure, the control stake acquired, 
bid  completion  status,  and  the  target’s  attitude  towards  the  bid  with  information  from  the  news 
announcements stored in LexisNexis, the Financial Times, and Factiva.
82 We find that the SDC records 
                                                 
80 We require that either the transaction leads to a combination of businesses or the acquirer held less than 50% of the target 
company’s equity prior the transaction and obtained majority control after the bid completion. 
81 The reason is that we want to avoid contamination of the periods used to estimate the systematic risk. Therefore, we 
excluded  bids  by  the  same  acquirer  within  less  than  300  trading  days  from  the  previous  announcement  (240  days 
estimation period starting 60 days before the event). 
82 We consider all news announcements available in English, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, Portuguese, 
Russian, Czech, and Polish. For the announcements in French, German, Italian, Spanish, Swedish, and Portuguese we use 




for  M&As  from  our  sample  frequently  do  not  coincide  with  those  of  the  other  sources.  These 
inconsistencies have been double checked and amended. Amendments to SDC records were made in 
about 36% of the deals included in our final sample.
83   
The  ownership  and  control  structure  of  the  bidding  and  target  firms  prior  to  the  takeover 
announcement is collected from a variety of sources described in Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the 
book). To control for dual class shares, pyramidal ownership structures, multiple control chains, and 
cross-holdings, all of which prevail in Continental European companies, we focus on corporate control 
composition rather than ownership structures. To identify the ultimate control structure of a firm, we 
follow the methodology presented in Barca and Becht (2001) and Faccio and Lang (2002). First, we 
consider  only  shares  bearing  voting  rights.  Second,  as  control  depends  on  both  direct  and  indirect 
ownership of voting equity, we accumulate the voting stakes that are directly or indirectly controlled by 
the  same  ultimate  shareholder.  When  a  target  company  is  private,  we  assume  that  the  control 
concentration in that firm amounts to 100%. 
Three data sources are used to identify how bidders finance their takeovers. The main source is 
the news announcements from LexisNexis, Financial Times, and Factiva. We find that in addition to the 
information on the means of payment, the news announcements also frequently report the sources of 
financing in acquisitions. For instance, this announcement shows that a deal is entirely financed by debt:   
“PARIS  (AP-Dow  Jones)--French  company  Axa-UAP  said  Friday  it  sold  its 
stake  in  company  Finextel  to  Sophia  for  FF458  million.  […]  Standard  & 
Poor's  considers  that  this  operation,  completely  financed  by  debt, 
involve a deterioration of the capitalization of Sophia.” 
While extracting financing information from all news announcements surrounding the takeover 
bid doubtlessly enables us to identify the bidder’s financing decisions directly related to takeovers,
84 
most news announcements do not disclose a very detailed description of the financing arrangement. 
Consequently, we are able to identify how the bidding firm finances the deal (with internal funds, a debt 
issue, and/or an equity issue) but are unable to distinguish whether debt financing is in form of a bank 
credit  or  a  loan  notes  issue  and  whether  equity  financing  is  in  form  of  a  public  or  private  equity 
placement. Furthermore, when two or more financing sources were used, the exact proportion of the 
sources is frequently not released.  We therefore partition the financing sources as follows: internal 
funds only, equity issues, debt issues, and a combination of equity and debt issues.
85  
                                                 
83 The percentage refers to all M&As from our sample for which at least one deal characteristic reported in SDC does not 
coincide with that from the other sources. Most of the inaccuracies found in the SDC records regard the control stake 
acquired, the bid completion status, and the transaction value.  
84 When the bidding firm issues equity or debt in the period around the takeover announcement, the proceeds from the issue 
may  be  used  to  finance  the  firm’s  investment  projects  other  than  the  takeover.  Information  extracted  from  the  news 
announcements allows us to identify only those financing arrangements that were aimed at financing corporate takeovers of 
our interest. 
85 Since financing with internally generated funds is at least partially used in almost all M&As, we only differentiate between 
those transactions which are fully financed by cash (the first category) and those which also involve some sources of 




It is important to note that we focus on the ultimate financing (and payment) structure of the bid. 
That is, when the bidder offers the target’s shareholders a choice between several payment alternatives 
(cash, equity, or a combination of them) which require different sources of financing, we search for the 
news announcements that refer to the final outcome of the offer.
86 We recognize that the final outcome 
of the offer is affected by the preferences of the target’s shareholders and that the bidder’s financing 
preferences ex-ante may differ from that of the final outcome. However, for the deal to succeed the 
bidder must be satisfied with the financial structure of the deal and hence the ultimate financing (and 
payment) structure of the bid must be within the range of the bidder’s preferences. We also believe that 
the bidder may influence the target shareholder’s choice by making its preferred payment alternative 
more attractive for them. As such, the ultimate terms of the deal are expected to be in line with the initial 
bidder’s preferences.      
While the news announcements are our main source of information on how bidders finance their 
takeovers, we also explore another sources of information. First, for a sub-sample of 50 UK bidding 
firms,  we  study  annual  reports,  prospectuses,  and  circulation  letters  available  through  Thomson 
Financial Research.
87 We cross-check the takeover financing information collected from the financial 
reports with the one extracted from the news announcements. We find that the information from the two 
data  sources  virtually  always  coincides,  which  implies  that  news  announcements  are  a  reliable 
information source in this respect.  
Second, we consult the Thomson Financial SDC New  Issues database and search for public 
offerings of debt and equity by each bidding firm. We assume that when a security issue occurs with the 
aim of financing an M&A transaction it takes place in the period around the first public announcement 
of the takeover. In most cases, it is rather straightforward to identify the security issues (most likely) 
made in connection with M&As, as most of the companies from our sample very infrequently opt to 
issue public securities. However, the issues that took place in the period around the M&A announcement 
may also be aimed at financing bidder’s investment projects other than the takeover. Therefore, we 
include  financing  information  from  the  Thomson  Financial  SDC  New  Issues  database  only  when 
information from the other sources (like news announcements) is not available.     
    
3.2 Sample description 
 
                                                 
86 For example, the UK City Code obliges firms which make a tender offer to provide the target firm shareholders with a 
choice between different forms of payment: cash, equity, loan notes, or a combination of them. For more on mix and match 
facilities, see Goergen and Frecknall-Hughes (2007).  
87 Financial reports are available in electronic photocopy format and hence do not allow us to search for keywords, which 
makes data search extremely time consuming. For this reason, we first considered randomly chosen 50 companies with 
available financial reports in order to check for inconsistencies between the information from financial reports and that 
from the news announcements collected earlier. We focus on UK bidders because financial reports published in English are 
mainly  available  only  for  those  firms.  Electronic  translation  (with  WorldLingo)  of  the  reports  published  in  another 




We partition the sources of takeover financing into four general categories: internal funds only, 
equity issues, debt issues, and combinations of equity and debt issues, where the last three types may 
also include the use of some internal funds. We further refine this classification based on the means of 
payment. Financing the takeover with internally generated funds or with debt implies that the acquisition 
is entirely paid with cash.
88 In contrast, equity (and internal funds) financing may be used in acquisitions 
fully paid with equity, paid with cash and equity, or entirely paid with cash.
89 A bidding firm may either 
directly exchange its shares for the shares of the target firm (all-equity and cash-and-equity payment), or 
sell its new shares on the secondary market and use the proceeds to pay for the acquisition (all-cash 
payment).  When  the  bidder  uses  both  equity  and  debt  financing,  its  payment  choice  reduces  to  a 
combination of cash and equity and all-cash forms.
90        
Table D-1 shows the sample composition by source of transaction financing and by means of 
payment for each European country. A large part of M&A deals (43%) is fully financed with internally 
generated  funds,  whereas  the  remainder  is  at  least  partially  financed  by  external  capital  (debt  and 
equity). Internal financing is most frequently observed in Central and Eastern European countries (81% 
of all bids in the region), in Italy (79%), and in Spain (71%).  
Equity issue is the second most frequently used source of takeover financing; it is used in 34% of 
the deals. The proportion of equity-financed transactions is highest in Sweden (42% of all bids in the 
country), Norway (38%), the UK (38%), and Finland (34%). Most of the equity-financed acquisitions 
involve a direct equity payment to the target shareholders (89% of the cases) rather than a cash payment 
funded by a seasoned equity issue (11%). The percentage of acquisitions paid entirely with cash among 
the deals financed with equity is highest in Scandinavia, Central and Eastern Europe, France, and the 
UK.  
The least popular sources of financing in corporate takeovers are debt or a combination of equity 
and debt: they are employed in 13% and 10% of all M&A bids respectively. Acquirers incorporated in 
the Netherlands (29% of all bids in the country), Switzerland (23%), and the UK (17%)  rely most 
frequently on debt financing. Combinations of equity and debt are not uncommon in Ireland (20% of all 






                                                 
88 Debt-financed acquisitions may also involve payment with loan notes. However, following Faccio and Masulis (2005), we 
assume that a payment  with loan notes is equivalent to a cash payment.  In the remainder of this paper,  we do not 
differentiate between these two types of payment and refer to both as cash payments. 
89 However, this excludes payments with loan notes, as this type of acquisitions would qualify as a transaction financed with 
a combination of equity and debt.  












































                                       
Total number of M&As  1361    13  18  27  35  130  72  20  38  2  17  39  1  34  62  26  801  26 
% of the sample    100  1.0  1.3  2.0  2.6  9.6  5.3  1.5  2.8  0.1  1.2  2.9  0.1  2.5  4.6  1.9  58.9  1.9 
       
      % OF M&A DEALS IN THE COUNTRY: 
Cash Financing:  590  43.4  69.2  66.7  66.7  62.9  62.3  61.1  45.0  78.9  100  52.9  59.0  100  70.6  53.2  53.8  29.7  80.8 
Cash payment  590  43.4  69.2  66.7  66.7  62.9  62.3  61.1  45.0  78.9  100  52.9  59.0  100  70.6  53.2  53.8  29.7  80.8 
                                       
Debt Financing:  173  12.7  0.0  0.0  11.1  0.0  5.4  8.3  10.0  7.9  0.0  29.4  0.0  0.0  5.9  1.6  23.1  17.2  0.0 
Cash payment  173  12.7  0.0  0.0  11.1  0.0  5.4  8.3  10.0  7.9  0.0  29.4  0.0  0.0  5.9  1.6  23.1  17.2  0.0 
                                       
Debt & Equity Financing:  139  10.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.9  3.1  2.8  20.0  2.6  0.0  5.9  2.6  0.0  5.9  3.2  0.0  15.1  0.0 
Cash payment  42  3.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  1.4  15.0  2.6  0.0  5.9  0.0  0.0  2.9  1.6  0.0  4.0  0.0 
Cash-and-Equity payment  97  7.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.9  1.5  1.4  5.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2.6  0.0  2.9  1.6  0.0  11.1  0.0 
                                       
Equity Financing:  459  33.7  30.8  33.3  22.2  34.3  29.2  27.8  25.0  10.5  0.0  11.8  38.5  0.0  17.6  41.9  23.1  38.0  19.2 
Cash payment  49  3.6  0.0  0.0  3.7  8.6  3.1  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.1  0.0  0.0  4.8  0.0  4.2  3.8 
Cash-and-Equity payment  162  11.9  7.7  5.6  3.7  2.9  3.8  4.2  10.0  2.6  0.0  5.9  5.1  0.0  2.9  8.1  7.7  17.0  0.0 
Equity payment  248  18.2  23.1  27.8  14.8  22.9  22.3  22.2  15.0  7.9  0.0  5.9  28.2  0.0  14.7  29.0  15.4  16.7  15.4 
                                       
All Sources of Financing:  1361  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Cash payment  854  62.8  69.2  66.7  81.5  71.4  72.3  72.2  70.0  89.5  100  88.2  64.1  100  79.4  61.3  76.9  55.2  84.6 
Cash-and-Equity payment  259  19  7.7  5.6  3.7  5.7  5.4  5.6  15.0  2.6  0.0  5.9  7.7  0.0  5.9  9.7  7.7  28.1  0.0 
Equity payment  248  18.2  23.1  27.8  14.8  22.9  22.3  22.2  15.0  7.9  0.0  5.9  28.2  0.0  14.7  29.0  15.4  16.7  15.4 
                                       
 
ALL=All countries, AUS=Austria, BEL=Belgium, DEN=Denmark, FIN=Finland, FRA=France, GER=Germany, IRE=Republic of Ireland, ITA=Italy, LUX=Luxembourg, NL=The 
Netherlands, NOR=Norway, POR=Portugal, ESP=Spain, SWE=Sweden, SWZ=Switzerland, UK=The United Kingdom, OTH = Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, 







When we make abstraction of the sources of financing and partition our sample only on the 
basis of the means of payment, we observe in Table D-1 that a large majority of deals (63%) are 
entirely cash-paid whereas the remainder is at least partially paid with equity.
91 Out of all the bids 
involving an equity payment, half are pure equity exchange offers. The other half are mixed offers 
that  on  average  contain  53%  cash  and  47%  equity.  With  exception  of  the  UK  and  Ireland, 
acquirers prefer all-equity payments to the combination of equity and cash.  
 
3.3 Capturing the regulatory environment  
 
To capture the impact of corporate regulation on the financing and payment decisions, we 
construct a number of legal environment indices. With the help of 150 corporate lawyers from 32 
European countries (see Appendix F-I), we have created a corporate governance database that 
comprises  the  main  aspects  and  changes  in  corporate  governance  regulation  in  all  European 
countries (including Central and Eastern Europe) over the last 15 years. For each country, we 
quantify  the  regulation  mitigating  the  conflicts  of  interests  between  the  main  corporate 
constituencies: agency problems between management and shareholders, between majority and 
minority  shareholders,  and  between  creditors  and  shareholders.  We  also  quantify  regulatory 
provisions  aimed  at  improving  the  transparency  of  corporate  information.  The  following  four 
indices are constructed. 
The  shareholder  rights  protection  index  (SHAREHDR  PRT)  is  based  on  shareholders’ 
ability to mitigate managerial opportunistic behaviour. The index increases with the number and 
quality of legal provisions that provide shareholders with effective power to appoint and dismiss 
the board of directors and to control most of the important corporate decisions (like equity issues 
or takeovers). We also include into this index the regulatory provisions aimed at ensuring that the 
board of directors acts as an independent body operating on behalf of all shareholders to monitor 
top management. A higher index score represents a higher likelihood that management acts in the 
interest of shareholders. While the constituting elements of the index and their coding are given in 
Appendix D-II, Figure D-1 reports the mean values of the shareholder rights protection index by 
legal origin for every fifth year over the period 1990-2005.  
 
                                                 
91 This percentage is lower than the 80% reported for European all-cash M&As in Faccio and Masulis (2005). The 
difference may be driven by the fact that we exclude from our sample the divestitures (acquisitions of subsidiaries) 
and the cross-border acquisitions of US targets. These types of takeovers represent a substantial fraction of Faccio 
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Figure D-1. Shareholder rights protection index   Figure D-2. Transparency index by legal origin 
by legal origin 
       
Notes: The countries are categorized based on their legal origin and the EU enlargement process. The countries belong 
to these types: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland, UK, and US), German legal origin (Austria, Germany, 
Switzerland,), French legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), 
Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), 2004 EU Accession (Czech Republic, 
Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovenia, and Slovak Republic), 2007-09 likely EU Accession 
(Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania). The X-axis shows the mean value of each index. 
 
The  transparency  index  (TRANSPARANCY)  is  based  on  the  quality  of  information 
available about the company and the management. This index reflects the degree to which the 
market is informed about corporate policies and contracts directly related to the management and 
the frequency with which this information is released. More specifically, we quantify the extent to 
which  information  is  released  on  the  managerial  compensation  packages  (on  aggregate  or 
individual basis, if at all) and the requirement to disclose any transactions between management 
and company (e.g. consulting contracts, interest-free loans). The transparency index is also higher 
when  a  comply-or-explain  principle  is  enshrined  in  corporate  law  or  is  required  by  the  stock 
exchange regulation.  A higher index score reflects more transparency (see Appendix D-II). The 
transparency index by legal origin and its evolution over time is reported in Figure D-2.  
The creditors protection index (CREDITOR PRT) hinges on the regulatory provisions that 
allow creditors to force repayment more easily, to take possession of the collateral, or even to gain 
control over the firm in case of financial distress. In creating the creditors rights index, we closely 
follow the approach of LaPorta et al. (1998) and investigate the regulation related to the violation 
of  debt  covenants  (deviations  from  the  debtor  priority  ranking  in  case  of  bankruptcy),  the 
possibility  of  debtors  to  impose  restrictions  on  borrowers  (e.g.  limitations  on  filing  for 
reorganization/liquidation), and the creditors rights in financially distressed firms (e.g., automatic 
stay  on  assets).  The  index  also  captures  the  difference  between  creditor-oriented  and  debtor-




liquidation code by one, while leaving the index unchanged for a country with a debtor-oriented 
code.
92 The reason is that a bankruptcy code that facilitates reorganization focuses on corporate 
survival,  usually  at  the  expense  of  the  (more  senior)  creditors.  A  higher  index  score  reflects 
stronger creditor rights and the details of the creditor rights index are reported in Appendix D-II. 
Figure D-3 shows the creditor rights protection index by legal origin and its evolution over time.       
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Figure D-3. Creditor rights protection index  Figure D-4. Minority shareholders rights 
protection index by legal origin  by legal origin    
 
Note: For the classification of legal origins see notes to figures D-1 and D-2. The X-axis shows the mean value of the 
index. 
 
The minority shareholder protection index (MINORITY PRT) hinges on the regulatory 
provisions increasing the relative power of the minority shareholders in the presence of strong 
majority shareholders. In a firm with concentrated control structure, it is possible that the dominant 
shareholder  influences  managerial  decisions  to  his  own  benefit  which  may  lead  to  the 
expropriation  of  the  minority  shareholders’  rights.  To  construct  the  index,  we  quantify  the 
regulatory provisions on the minority shareholder rights (board representation, minority claims, 
extraordinary general meetings, blocking minorities), the one-share-one-vote principle (dual class 
shares, voting caps, break-through rule, equal treatment principle), ownership transparency and the 
relative decision power in case of a takeover threat. A higher index score signifies that minority 
shareholders’ interests are better upheld. The constituents of the index and their coding are given 
in Appendix D-II, while Figure D-4 reports the minority rights protection index by legal origin. 
LaPorta et al. (1998) argue that a system of strong legal enforcement may substitute for 
weaker regulation, as well-functioning courts can effectively resolve disputes between corporate 
                                                 
92 Chapter 11 in the US is the prototype of a debtor-oriented code. In the 1990s, many bankruptcy codes have been 
reorganized and now frequently include two tracks: a debtor-oriented part (e.g. administration in the UK) and a pure 




constituencies. Conversely, a law designed to uphold the rights of e.g. minority shareholders may 
be  eroded  in  case  the  judiciary  does  not  function  effectively.  To  address  such  problems,  we 
multiply the above indices by an index capturing the quality of law enforcement. We use two 
proxies for the law enforcement index: the rule of law index (RULE OF LAW) and the corruption 
index (CORRUPT), developed by the World Bank
93. The rule of law index measures the extent to 
which  agents  have  confidence  in  and  abide  by  the  rules  of  society,  and  these  include  the 
effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and the enforceability of contracts. The corruption 
index measures the extent to which one can exercise public power for private gain. Corruption is 
usually associated with a lack of respect for the rules of society, and hence represents a failure of 
the judicial system to enforce the law. A higher score of each index indicates that national judicial 
systems are more effective.
94  
    
4. Methodology 
 
4.1 Estimating the valuation effect of the bidder’s financing choice 
 
An M&A announcement brings new information to the market which allows investors to 
update  their  expectations  about  the  firm’s  prospects  are  updated  and  adjust  share  prices 
accordingly. Relevant takeover information usually comprises various takeover characteristics (the 
form  of  the  bid,  the  means  of  payment,  the  target  firm’s  attitude  towards  the  bid,  industry-
relatedness, geographical scope etc.) as well as the sources of financing. The market combines 
these pieces of information into a signal about the quality of the deal and the bidding and target 
firms.  As  such,  the  takeover  announcement  effects  consists  of  an  appraisal  of  the  takeover 
synergies based on the characteristics of the deal and a re-assessment of the bidder’s value based 
on the signal about the type of financial resources used in the deal.     
To capture the valuation effect of the bidder’s financing choice, we compute the takeover 
announcement effect on the bidder’s share price and compare it across deals financed by different 
sources of capital. Since the valuation effect may also be driven by takeover characteristics, which 
vary across deals with different financial structure, we complement univariate comparison with the 
analysis of multivariate OLS regressions to explore the true relationship between the sources of 
takeover  transaction  and  the  market  re-assessment  of  the  bidder’s  share  price  at  the  takeover 
announcement.     
                                                 
93 More information on the indices is available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
94 The World Bank indices on legal enforcement and corruption are available starting since 1996. For years prior to 
1996, we assume that the quality of law enforcement environment was no better than that of 1996. Therefore, the 
missing values of the rule of law and corruption indices for  years 1993-1995 are proxied by the  value of the 




The market reaction to the takeover announcement is computed as a sum of daily abnormal 
returns realized in the period starting 60 days prior and ending 60 days subsequent to the takeover 
announcement.
95 We also consider alternative event windows within the [-60, +60] interval. Daily 
abnormal returns are computed as the difference between realized and market model benchmark 
returns. The market model uses the MSCI-Europe index and the parameters are estimated over 240 
days starting 300 days prior to the acquisition announcement.
96 To test for significance of the 
estimated abnormal returns we use the non-parametric Corrado test (Corrado, 1989).  
 
4.2 Empirical models of the financing(-payment) choice 
 
To examine the factors driving the bidder’s choice of transaction financing and payment 
method,  we  employ  multinomial  logit  and  nested  logit  models.  The  multinomial  logit  model 
assumes that the bidder chooses a source of financing from four mutually exclusive (independent) 
alternatives:  cash,  debt,  debt-and-equity,  and  equity.  The  nested  logit  model  extends  the 
multinomial logit framework by allowing the bidder to make its financing decision conditional on 
the preferred payment method.  
 
4.2.1 Multinomial logit model of the financing choice 
In the multinomial logit framework, we assume that each financing choice j corresponds to 
the NPV - net of all direct and indirect costs associated with the use of a particular means of 
financing  -  of  the  bidding  firm  Vj(x),  where  x  is  a  vector  of  exogenous  characteristics  of  the 
takeover and firms involved, and j denotes one of the four financing alternatives: (i) cash financing 
(cash-paid/cash-financed deals); (ii) debt financing (cash-paid/debt-financed deals); (iii) debt-and-
equity  financing  (cash-paid/debt-and-equity  financed  and  mixed-paid/debt-and-equity-financed 
deals);  and  (iv)  equity  financing  (equity-paid/equity-financed,  mixed-paid/cash-and-equity-
financed,  and  cash-paid/equity-financed  deals).  The  bidder  chooses  alternative  j  if  Vj(x)  is  the 
maximum of the four possible values. Hence the probability of the choice j is:  
Prj = Prob (Vj > Vk) for all other k j. 
The  model  assumes  that  the  (unobserved)  firm  value  Vj(x)  is  a  linear  function  of  the 
observed relevant characteristics of bidder and target and of the bid itself plus random noise. A key 
assumption  of  the  multinomial  logit  model  is  that  the  random  noise  in  the  value  function  is 
independently and identically distributed (iid). This assumption implies that the choices between 
any  two  alternatives  are  independent  of  the  others,  i.e.  that  the  independence  of  irrelevant 
                                                 
95 The event day is either the day of the announcement or the first trading day following the announcement in case the 
announcement is made on a non-trading day. 
96 Our estimates of abnormal  returns are robust  with respect to the different choices of the  market index (local, 
European-wide,  and  worldwide  index)  and  the  estimation  model  of  the  benchmark  returns  (the  estimated  beta 




alternatives (IIA) property is upheld.
97 To test for the validity of the IIA assumption with respect to 
the  bidder’s  financing  decision-making  process,  we  apply  the  Hausman’s  specification  test 
(Hausman and McFadden, 1984). 
The  multinomial  logit  model  includes  three  binary  logit  models  that  are  estimated 
simultaneously.  Each  binary  logit  predicts  a  probability  of  choosing  one  of  the  first  three 
alternatives relative to the probability of opting for the benchmark alternative (which is equity 
financing). The vector of explanatory variables x is the same across all three binary logits. For each 
alternative j, the log-odds ratio is specified as follows:  
j j












Prj and Pr0 denote the probabilities that the bidder chooses alternative j and alternative 0 
respectively; x is a vector of exogenous, observable characteristics of the bidder, target, and of the 
bid;  j is a vector of unknown regression parameters corresponding to the choice of the alternative 
j. We set the coefficients corresponding to the equity-financing alternative to zero (that is,  0 = 0). 
The coefficients from each logit model represent the impact of an increase in a specific variable on 
the relative log-odds ratio.  
 
4.2.2 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing choice 
Since  the  financing  and  payment  decisions  of  the  bidder  can  be  modelled  as  a  2-
dimensional choice set and the choice of financing is likely to be conditioned by the payment 
method, we investigate the robustness of the multinomial logit model’s conclusions within a nested 
logit framework.
98 To specify the nested logit model, we partition the bidder’s choice set into two 
branches: by payment method and by sources of transaction financing (as illustrated in Figure D-
5). 
In  these  models,  we  assume  that  when  the  bidder  makes  a  financing  choice,  he  first 
considers which means of payment it should offer in the takeover bid. Only subsequently, he 
decides on the sources of financing. Thus, the model estimates the unconditional probability of 
opting  for  a  specific  payment  method,  and  the  conditional  probability  of  choosing  a  specific 
takeover-financing  source  (conditional  on  the  chosen  means  of  payment).  The  unconditional 
probability  of  the  financing/payment  choice  j  which  includes  payment  method  P  and  funding 
source  f  is  modelled  as  Prj  =  PrfP  =  PrP  Prf|P.  In  this  nested  model,  the  IIA  assumption  is 
maintained for the sources of financing within the same payment method. 
 
                                                 
97 That is, if one of the alternatives is removed from the model, the other alternatives will have a proportional increase 
in the probability of being chosen. 
98 The advantage of the nested logit model over the multinomial logit is that the former is derived when the random 
noise in the value function has a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution, which allows partial relaxation of the 
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Figure D-5. Specification of the payment-financing nested logit model 
 
The  nested  logit  model  is  estimated  using  the  full  information  maximum  likelihood 
estimation method. As is the case for the multinomial logit model, the estimated coefficients in the 
nested logit model are not directly interpretable with respect to the probability that a particular 
alternative is chosen. The coefficients from the model represent the increases (decreases) in the 
log-odds ratio (relative to the benchmark case).  
   
5. Results 
 
5.1 Valuation effects of the bidder’s financing decision 
In this section, we investigate the valuation effect of the financing choice in corporate 
takeovers. Figures D-6  – D-9 illustrate the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) for 
bidding firms over a six-month period starting 60 days prior to and ending 60 days after the initial 
bid. Figure D-6 shows the bidder CAARs by means of payment. The evidence is consistent with 
the prior empirical findings (see e.g. Moeller et al, 2004; Andrade et al., 2001; Franks et al., 1991): 
over the six-month window centred around the takeover bid day, the short term wealth effects to 
the bidder’s shareholders are significantly negative. In addition, bids involving at least some equity 
payment yield the lowest returns.
99 However, Figure D-6 indicates that the underperformance of 
the all-equity offers is largely due to a post-announcement share price correction effect. Prior to 
the bid, firms that offer equity experience a significant share price run-up, which exceeds that of 
firms offering cash.  
 
                                                 










































Figure D-6. Bidder CAARs by means of  Figure D-7. Bidder CAARs by sources of bid 
payment     financing 
 
When we partition our sample of European M&As by sources of transaction financing (see 
Figure D-7), we observe that a negative price revision follows the announcement of any corporate 
takeover that involves equity financing. Remarkably, the only type of acquisition that does not 
have a negative price correction but is expected to create a substantial value (of about 3%) to the 
bidding firms over the 6-months period is a debt-financed acquisition. This significantly exceeds 
the  negative  returns  of  M&As  financed  by  equity  and  cash  (-3.3%  and  -0.8%  respectively). 
Overall, the evidence suggests that, in addition to the means of payment, sources of transaction 
financing are an important determinant of market reaction to the takeover announcement.   
Figures  D-8  and  D-9  show  that  investors  are  able  to  differentiate  between  information 
about the payment method and sources of takeover financing and that they take into account both 
these takeover characteristics. Figure D-8 reveals considerable differences in the market reactions 
to all-cash acquisitions financed by cash, by debt, or by equity. The CAARs spanning the 3-month 
price run-up is highest for the bidders that issue equity (2.6%), followed by those that issue debt 
(2.0%). The corresponding effect for bidders using internal cash funds for takeover financing is 
significantly lower and amounts to merely 0.5%. Strikingly, bidders that decide to issue equity 
experience  a  marked  increase  in  their  share  price  of  4.1%  over  the  [-60,  -20]  window  and  a 
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Figure D-8. Bidder CAARs in cash-paid  Figure D-9. Bidder CAARs in mixed-paid 
acquisitions by sources of financing
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  the cash component 
 
The difference in the market’s assessment of the bidder’s financing choice in all-cash offers 
even augments over the post-event period: the negative price correction for bidding firms is larger 
for equity-financed bids than for cash-financed ones, whereas it is insignificant for the bidders that 
use  debt  as  a  means  of  takeover  financing  (Figure  D-8).  Notably,  the  pattern  of  the  bidder’s 
abnormal  returns  in  the  cash-paid  but  equity-financed  takeovers  is  very  similar  to  that  of  the 
returns in the equity-paid deals. Whereas an involvement of debt financing in acquisitions fully 
paid with cash is associated with significant outperformance, the reverse is observed is acquisitions 
paid with a combination of equity and cash (see Figure D-9). Nonetheless, there are consistent 
similarities  in  the  CAARs  patterns  between  cash-paid  and  mixed-paid  takeovers  when  similar 
sources of financing are involved. Thus, both types of bids financed by a combination of cash and 
equity are preceded by a positive share price run-up and followed by a significant share price 
decline. Also, the announcement of debt financing in all-cash bids and in the cash component of 
mixed takeovers is associated with an insignificant share price decline over the three-months post-
event period.  
To confirm the relationship between sources of transaction financing and the anticipated 
wealth effect, we perform OLS regression analyses of the bidder CAARs. In separate regressions, 
we investigate the factors that affect the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) realized prior to the 
bid over the period [-60, -2], at the bid announcement (over the 3 days centred around the event 
day), and subsequent to the bid over the period [+2, +60]. In order to capture the valuation effect 
of the bidder’s financing decision when the firm employs the same mode of payment, we also run 
                                                 
100  We  combine  equity-  and  debt-and-equity-financed  all-cash  offers  into  one  category  CASH  payment/EQUITY 




regressions for the subsamples of all-cash and mixed offers. The determinants of the anticipated 
wealth creation for bidding firms are reported in Table D-2. The results confirm that the sources of 
transaction  financing  are  important  determinants  of  the  bidder’s  share  price  reaction  to  the 
takeover  announcement.  Whereas  mixed-paid/debt-financed  acquisitions  significantly 
underperform the other types of deals over a 3-month period prior to the bid (the difference is -
6.72%), cash-paid/equity-financed acquisitions underperform the other deals over the 3-months 
period subsequent to the bid (the difference is -6.04%). Table D-2 also confirms that, in contrast to 
cash and equity, debt financing is associated with significantly higher post-announcement returns. 
The  announcement  and  post-announcement  valuation  effects  increase  with  the  bidder’s 
share price performance prior to the takeover announcement. Consistent with a behavioural finance 
explanation, the positive relationship between run-up and mark-up premiums may be a result of 
financial market buoyancy: investors tend to overestimate the potential takeover gains in takeovers 
launched by the outperforming bidders. The regression results also show that investors are wary 
when  a  bidding  firm  with  a  high  cash  flow  makes  an  all-cash  takeover  bid.  There  are  then 
legitimate doubts about the true motive for the takeover: cash surpluses are likely to be used for 
managerial empire building instead of being distributed to shareholders in form of dividends or 
share repurchases (Jensen, 1986).  
 
5.2 The determinants of the bidder financing decision 
 
The previous section confirms the prominent view in the corporate finance literature that 
equity issues reduce firm value, also in the context of mergers and acquisitions. We now turn to an 
analysis of why bidding firms opt for equity financing in spite of the negative consequences for 
corporate value. 
 
5.2.1 Univariate comparison 
Table D-3 exhibits the mean values of the variables which we expect to affect the bidder’s 
choice of financing sources in corporate takeovers (see Section 2). The table indicates that bidder 
characteristics vary substantially across acquisitions with different sources of financing. To test the 
null hypothesis that there are no significant differences in the mean values across acquisitions 
involving  different  sources  of  takeover  financing  and  means  of  payment,  an  F-test  (for  level 







Table D-2. The valuation effect of financing choice 
 
This table reports the results of the OLS regression of the bidder CARs for three different event windows and for the subsamples of all-cash and mixed offers. Variable definitions 
are given in Appendix D-I. For each variable, we list the regression coefficient normalized by their standard deviation (except for binary variables). As such, each number in the table 
indicates incremental change in the analysed CARs (%) associated with a particular takeover characteristic (binary variables) or with a one-standard deviation change in the reference 




c stands for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
 
  WHOLE SAMPLE  CASH PAYMENT  MIXED PAYMENT 
  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60]  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60]  CAR [-60, -2]  CAR [-1, +1]  CAR [+2, +60] 
  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val  Effect  p-val 
                                     
EQUITY PMT  1.56%  .042
 b  -0.69%  .257
c  -3.34%  .137                         
CASH PMT - EQTY FIN  2.03%  .603  0.88%  .305  -6.04%  .067
 c  3.55%  .358  0.42%  .611  -7.85%  .022
 b             
CASH PMT - DEBT FIN  1.06%  .731  1.10%  .163  3.02%  .257  2.22%  .481  0.85%  .202  1.73%  .135             
MIX PMT - DEBT FIN  -6.72%  .015
 b  0.89%  .275  1.82%  .552              -7.75%  .004
 a  0.96%  .362  5.46%  .160 
CROSSBORDER BID  -2.97%  .272  -1.12%  .136  -2.61%  .166  -1.02%  .669  -0.41%  .415  -3.40%  .107  2.80%  .670  -2.00%  .150  -1.10%  .862 
HOSTILE BID  8.74%  .004
 a  -1.64%  .034
 b  -3.98%  .322  3.33%  .031
 b  -0.83%  .458  -3.44%  .465  15.20%  .037
 b  -4.31%  .095
 c  -6.35%  .430 
TENDER OFFER  2.22%  .608  -2.67%  .005
 a  -2.65%  .337  -3.63%  .346  -0.59%  .467  0.41%  .906  12.50%  .212  -3.89%  .067
 c  -0.64%  .941 
LISTED TARGET  -1.27%  .759  0.36%  .650  1.03%  .773  1.32%  .705  0.38%  .607  3.07%  .354  -3.22%  .747  -0.05%  .980  3.76%  .547 
INTRA-IND BID  -1.39%  .181  -0.25%  .520  0.57%  .794  -2.44%  .304  -0.42%  .397  1.94%  .351  -0.21%  .968  -0.28%  .767  -1.28%  .704 
1997-1999  1.61%  .057
 c  1.61%  .051
 c  -4.89%  .010
 a  4.71%  .011
 b  0.98%  .082
 c  -3.48%  .140  -1.31%  .794  1.04%  .325  -4.33%  .014
 b 
2000-2001  4.49%  .054
 c  -0.09%  .919  -13.97%  .000
 a  3.37%  .268  0.87%  .177  -9.57%  .000
 a  5.83%  .125  -0.31%  .802  -15.78%  .000
 a 
CFLOW/TA  -3.92%  .002
 a  -0.04%  .913  2.35%  .035
 b  -8.42%  .000
 a  0.41%  .223  2.20%  .087
 c  0.44%  .873  0.22%  .811  2.37%  .347 
Q-RATIO  0.38%  .751  0.06%  .847  -4.94%  .000
 a  1.68%  .265  -0.13%  .725  -6.32%  .000
 a  2.48%  .301  -0.17%  .876  -5.79%  .010
 a 
LEVERAGE  -2.18%  .081
 c  0.37%  .273  1.27%  .242  -0.92%  .527  -0.06%  .846  -0.68  .549  -5.08%  .059
 c  1.68%  .063
 c  2.94%  .235 
TOEHOLD  -0.51%  .677  0.24%  .474  1.67%  .144  -0.07%  .961  0.50%  .095
 c  2.27%  .039
 b  -1.19%  .533  -0.34%  .586  1.97%  .216 
RUNUP       1.12%  .000
 a  2.55%  .000
 a      1.35%  .000
 a  1.34%  .000
 a      1.78%  .093
 c  3.70%  .000
 a 
                                     
N obs.  1361    1361    1361    854    854    854    259    259    259   
Adjusted-R
2  3.85    6.69    27.09    7.95    5.22    23.75    11.43    10.47    30.97   
F-value  2.59  .000
 a  7.33  .000
 a  33.84  .000
 a  3.28  .000
 a  4.14  .000
 a  18.78  .000
 a  2.85  .001
 a  5.02  .000
 a  16.43  .000




CC1. Pecking Order and Market Timing:  
In line with our expectations, Panel A of Table D-3 reports that cash-rich bidders opt to 
finance  their  M&A  transactions  entirely  with  cash  (see  column  2).  In  contrast,  firms  with  a 
shortfall of internally generated funds use external sources of financing: a debt issue (column 3), a 
combination of debt and equity (column 4) or a seasoned equity issue (column 8). Bidders in 
acquisitions entirely paid and financed with equity exhibit the weakest potential to finance their 
acquisition payment by internal sources of cash (column 11).  
Panel  A  also  shows  that  bidders  using  external  financing  have  a  higher  percentage  of 
tangible assets than those relying on internal financing, although the difference is not statistically 
significant (column 13). Among the companies raising external capital, equity issuers tend to have 
lower debt capacity, as measured by financial leverage (compare column 3 to columns 4 and 8). 
Furthermore, equity financing is preceded by a significant share price run-ups.  In addition, the use 
of equity financing is least frequently observed in the period of the stock market recession (2000-
01), whereas debt financing is less common during stock market recovery (1993-96).  
 
CC2. Regulatory Environment: 
Panel  A  of  Table  D-3  examines  whether  specific  sources  of  transaction  financing  are 
chosen in different regulatory environments. When shareholder protection is strong, bidders are 
more likely to use external sources of financing (compare column 2 to columns 3, 4, and 8). 
Creditor  protection  and  protection  of  minority  shareholder  rights  are  positively  related  to  the 
choice of debt (and equity) issues as a means of takeover financing (see columns 3 and 4). In 
addition, funding by external sources is more likely if the bidder is from a country with better 
corporate  transparency  standards.  Bidders  rely  on  internally  generated  funds  as  a  means  of 
transaction financing in countries with the weakest creditor and shareholder protection and the 
lowest corporate transparency standards (see column 2).  
 
AG1. Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threats: 
There is evidence that managers of widely-held companies (firms without a blockholder 
owning at least 20% of the voting rights) are more likely to use equity rather than cash financing. 
Panel B of Table D-3 indicates that more than a half of all acquisitions that are entirely financed by 
equity (53% of cases) are made by widely-held bidding firms (column 8) and that widely-held 




Table D-3. Average values of the determinants of choice of sources of financing 
 
This table reports the mean values of the variables expected to affect the bidder’s choice of financing sources. Columns (7) and (12) report an F-test (for level variables) and a Wald test 
(for binary variables) for the difference in means across acquisitions involving different means of payment (but the same sources of transaction financing). Columns (13), (14), and (15) 




c correspond to the statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. To assess the significance of the estimated run-up premium, RUNUP (%), 






















































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
                               
PANEL A: COST OF CAPITAL CONSIDERATIONS (CC) 
CC1. Pecking Order and Market Timing: 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL  0.96  2.71  0.21  0.26  0.21  0.27  1.2  (.306)  0.32  0.52  0.81  0.14  4.9
a (.008)  6.7
a (.000)  12.4
a (.000)  8.5
a (.000) 
CHLDG/TRANSVAL  0.80  2.81  0.59  0.17  0.09  0.20  1.9  (.163)  0.36  0.67  0.61  0.16  5.2
a (.006)  7.3
a (.000)  11.7
a (.000)  6.5
a (.000) 
COLLATERAL  0.33  0.32  0.34  0.34  0.43  0.31  0.6  (.572)  0.34  0.35  0.32  0.35  0.8  (.452)  0.8  (.492)  3.5
b (.015)  1.3  (.282) 
FIN LEVERAGE  0.34  0.26  0.32  0.43  0.47  0.42  0.9  (.422)  0.40  0.34  0.35  0.46  3.7
 b (.028)  23.2
a (.000)  8.6
a (.000)  4.5
a (.005) 









z  0.3  (.733)  3.4
 b (.017)  7.2
a (.000)  9.8
a (.000) 
1993-1996  0.34  0.34  0.25  0.34  0.40  0.31 
2=    1.9  (.382)  0.39  0.43  0.41  0.37 





2=   5.9  (.115) 
1997-1999  0.41  0.43  0.45  0.40  0.40  0.40 
2=    3.6  (.167)  0.39  0.45  0.38  0.39 
2=    3.3  (.192) 
2=    1.6  (.652) 
2=    1.7  (.630) 
2=   5.8  (.118) 
2000-2001  0.24  0.23  0.30  0.26  0.20  0.29 
2=    2.2  (.331)  0.22  0.12  0.21  0.24 
2=    4.7
c (.095) 
2=    6.1  (.104) 
2=    8.8
b (.032) 
2=   5.5  (.141) 
CC2. Regulatory environment: 
SH PRT x RULAW  65.1  58.3  73.7  73.7  72.6  77.0  8.1
a (.000)  72.4  67.9  74.2  72.8  32.9
a (.000)  65.1
a (.000)  41.3
a (.000)  1.0  (.378) 
CR PRT x RULAW  12.2  11.5  13.1  13.0  12.6  13.1  2.2  (.120)  12.9  12.4  13.0  13.1  6.7
a (.001)  27.7
a (.000)  16.7
a (.000)  0.2  (.909) 
TRANSP x RULAW  29.4  26.4  33.5  33.5  32.5  35.4  5.1
a (.007)  30.2  30.0  33.2  28.4  21.7
a (.000)  54.0
a (.000)  34.8
a (.000)  2.3
c (.079) 
MIN PRT x RULAW  61.7  60.2  64.2  64.2  61.0  65.4  3.2
 b (.043)  60.5  59.1  64.0  58.3  30.7
a (.000)  54.1
a (.000)  34.0
a (.000)  1.6  (.181) 
                               
PANEL B: AGENCY PROBLEMS BETWEEN CLAIMANTS (AG) 
AG1. Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat: 
CONTROL (%)  29.9  35.3  23.6  18.6  17.4  19.5  0.7  (.494)  27.1  30.0  23.6  28.4  1.9  (.158)  12.9
a (.000)  5.2
a (.002)  0.8  (.489) 
BLOCKHLDR>20  0.55  0.67  0.39  0.32  0.23  0.34 
2=    1.5  (.463)  0.47  0.67  0.36  0.52 






2=   1.3  (.737) 
TO THREAT  0.06  0.05  0.02  0.05  0.08  0.04  1.0  (.369)  0.10  0.06  0.10  0.11  0.1  (.872)  4.2
























































  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15) 
AG2. Debt Overhang: 
Q-RATIO  1.81  1.61  2.00  1.63  1.64  1.57  0.2  (.652)  2.28  2.65  2.54  2.01  0.9  (.407)  4.2
a (.005)  2.9
b (.034)  5.5
b (.020) 
CAPX 3YGR (%)  8.5  8.5  4.4  9.4  3.8  14.4  7.2
a (.008)  26.7  33.1  19.5  34.7  3.8
b (.023)  6.7
a (.000)  8.5
a (.000)  0.4  (.766) 
SALES 3YGR (%)  24.2  21.8  24.3  23.5  20.2  25.6  4.1
b (.045)  31.6  25.2  39.3  27.3  2.6
c (.075)  5.8
a (.000)  0.6  (.650)  4.6
b (.033) 
TA 3YGR (%)  26.8  22.2  20.7  24.7  30.9  18.0  6.6
b (.011)  39.4  34.3  38.6  49.4  3.8
b (.023)  5.5
a (.001)  6.2
a (.000)  12.0
a (.000) 
AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
BETA  0.64  0.64  0.65  0.54  0.39  0.60  5.8
b (.017)  0.66  0.69  0.58  0.73  5.1
a (.006)  1.22 (.296)  4.2
a (.006)  0.0  (.991) 
AGE  16.1  23.5  20.1  10.2  8.4  10.7  0.9  (.344)  7.4  5.3  18.0  3.6  9.4
a (.000)  7.6
a (.000)  11.5
a (.000)  2.3  (.130) 
                               
PANEL C: MEANS OF PAYMENT CONSIDERATIONS (MP) 
MP1. Risk Sharing: 
(B) MVAL (m US$)  2,249  1,952  4,400  871  1,172  761  12.5
a (.000)  2,788  1,385  513  3,913  9.7
a (.000)  17.8
a (.000)  4.7
a (.003)  1.6  (.187) 
TRANSVAL (m US$)  603  114  433  732  1,106  568  8.4
a (.000)  1,236  139  193  2,290  11.1
a (.000)  13.3
a (.000)  7.2
a (.000)  5.2
b (.023) 
RELVAL (%)  19.5  11.3  17.7  31.3  31.3  31.3  1.5  (.225)  23.3  18.8  19.9  32.9  22.1
a (.000)  23.1
a (.000)  2.8
b (.039)  11.4
a (.000) 
MP2. The threat of Control Change: 
CONTROL THREAT  (%)  10.6  6.7  8.9  20.3  19.8  20.6  1.1  (.297)  14.7  11.3  10.9  16.2  2.5
c (.085)  19.0
a (.000)  2.2
c (.087)  8.5
a (.000) 
CONTROL<20  0.45  0.33  0.61  0.68  0.77  0.66 
2=    1.5  (.463)  0.53  0.33  0.65  0.48 






2=   1.3  (.737) 
20<CONTROL<60  0.43  0.53  0.31  0.31  0.15  0.34 
2=    2.3  (.314)  0.37  0.50  0.31  0.38 





2=   1.0  (.799) 
CONTROL>60  0.12  0.14  0.08  0.01  0.08  0.00 
2=    4.9
c (.083)  0.10  0.17  0.04  0.14 




2=    2.1  (.546) 
2=   1.8  (.613) 
(T) BLOCKHDR>20  0.90  0.94  0.70  0.84  0.78  0.89 
2=    3.6  (.166)  0.90  0.97  0.95  0.85 





2=   5.2  (.157) 
MP3. Characteristics of Acquisition: 
CROSSBORDER BID  0.25  0.36  0.23  0.10  0.26  0.03 
2=  13.6
a (.001)  0.19  0.26  0.17  0.19 
2=    2.3  (.315) 
2=  56.0
a (.000) 




TENDER OFFER  0.32  0.23  0.58  0.51  0.60  0.32 
2=   17.6









HOSTILE BID  0.05  0.05  0.10  0.10  0.14  0.07 
2=    7.1
a (.008)  0.04  0.04  0.03  0.04 





2=   4.3  (.235) 
LISTED TARGET  0.43  0.38  0.61  0.48  0.57  0.29 
2=  14.5








  (.007) 
INTRA-IND BID  0.65  0.65  0.69  0.64  0.73  0.54 
2=    5.2
b (.023)  0.65  0.65  0.60  0.67 
2=    3.3  (.188) 
2=     3.0
  (.385) 
2=    1.7  (.645) 
2=   1.7  (.632) 
                               







Strikingly,  companies  with  dispersed  control  structures  dominate  among  bidders  that 
finance  their  takeovers  by  debt  (61%  of  cases).  This  is  likely  to  be  due  to  the  UK  and  Irish 
acquirers,  most  of  which  have  widely  dispersed  ownership.  The  choice  of  debt  financing  by 
companies  with  a  dispersed  ownership  structure  may  also  be  the  result  of  the  fact  that  these 
companies  are  more  vulnerable  to  a  takeover  threat  than  their  closely-held  peers.  Entrenched 
managers  of  widely-held  firms  may  voluntarily  commit  to  debt  financing  to  constrain  their 
discretion over corporate funds and hence reduce likelihood that their company be taken over 
(Zwiebel,  1996).  However,  Panel  B  of  Table  D-3  gives  no  support  to  this  argument:  external 
financing  via  borrowing  takes  place  when  managers  of  bidding  firms  are  least  exposed  to 
monitoring  by  the  market  for  corporate  control.
  The  highest  likelihood  of  being  acquired  is 
observed for companies that issue shares as a means of financing (see column 8).  
 
AG2. Debt Overhang: 
The bidder’s growth opportunities across acquisitions financed by different types of capital 
varies significantly (Panel B of Table D-3). The bidder’s Q-ratio for equity-financed acquisitions 
significantly  exceeds  that  for  debt-  and  cash-financed  bids.  Similarly,  equity  issuers  have  the 
highest average growth rate in capital expenditures, sales, and total assets over the 3 years prior to 
the year of the acquisition.  
 
AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility: 
The results reported in Panel B of Table D-3 support the ‘agency-cost-of-debt’ hypothesis. 
Although companies that finance the payment of an acquisition by debt sustain a high level of 
leverage, they have relatively low exposure to market risk. In contrast, bidders opting for equity 
financing have a high level of leverage and a high non-diversifiable systematic risk (both measures 
significantly exceed those of bidders in debt-financed deals). As expected, young firms fund their 
takeovers most frequently with equity.  
 
MP1. Risk Sharing: 
Bidders in takeovers with all-equity payment have on average significantly higher market 
capitalisations than their peers that make all-cash and mixed bids (column 11 versus a mean over 
columns 2, 3, 5 and 9, and a mean over columns 6 and10 in Panel C of Table D-3). However, the 
bidder’s size has a non-linear effect on the likelihood that a payment involving equity (all-equity or 
mixed bids) is chosen. We find that an equity payment is used by both very large and very small 
companies: bidders with the highest market value pay entirely with equity and bidders with the 
lowest market value pay with a combination of equity and cash (see columns 11 and a mean over 





MP2. The Threat of Control Change: 
Corporate governance concerns of bidding firms seem to have a significant impact on their 
choice of the payment method (Panel C of Table D-3). All-equity bids create new shareholders 
(the  former  target  shareholders)  in  the  combined  firm:  the  largest  new  shareholder  holds  an 
average voting stake of 16.2% (see column 11). If all-cash or mixed offers had been entirely paid 
with  equity,  the  new  largest  blockholder  would  control  an  average  stake  of  7.4%  and  13.9% 
respectively (means over columns 2, 3, 5 and 9, and 6 and 10 respectively).  
The emergence of a new controlling shareholder with block of 16.2% caused by all-equity 
acquisitions is unlikely to change the control positions of the major blockholders of the bidding 
firms.  The  reason  is  that  most  bidders  making  an  all-equity  offer  either  have  no  controlling 
blockholders (48% of firms) or they are controlled by blockholders holding a supermajority-voting 
stake (14% of firms). Strikingly, managers of widely-held bidding firms are not averse to equity 
offers, even though these deals may create an outside blockholder. In contrast, about half of the 
bidding  firms  in  all-cash  acquisitions  (49%  of  firms)  are  controlled  by  shareholders  with  an 
intermediate  level  of  voting  power  ranging  between  20%  and  60%  and  these  firms  are  most 
vulnerable to the treat of control loss (as shown by columns 2, 3, 5 and 9). This evidence is in line 
with predictions of the control threat hypothesis: the bidder’s management prefers cash over equity 
as a means of payment if an equity issue would threaten the continued control of their largest 
shareholders.      
 
MP3. Characteristics of Acquisition: 
Finally, Panel C of Table D-3 reports that the percentage of cross-border deals and hostile 
takeovers is highest among all-cash paid acquisitions (32% and 6% of the cases, respectively) and 
is lowest among acquisitions paid with a combination of equity and cash (12% and 4% of the 
cases, respectively) or fully with equity (19% and 4% of the cases, respectively). In contrast to 
hostile  bids,  unopposed  tender  offers  are  more  frequently  paid  with  equity  (39%  of  the 
transactions)  than  with  cash  (33%),  or  with  a  combination  of  equity  and  cash  (27%).
101 
Acquisitions of listed targets occur more frequently in form of all-equity bids (59% of the cases) 
than of all-cash bids (44%). There are no significant differences in the frequency of intra-industry 
acquisitions by different types of payment or of financing methods.  
 
                                                 
101 The high frequency of tender offers with equity can be explained by the fact that the bulk of the equity-paid tender 
offers in our sample are UK domestic acquisitions. The UK City Code obliges firms making a tender offer to 
provide target shareholders with a choice between payment alternatives including equity and cash. A preference for 
an equity payment (which is often made more attractive than a cash offer) is frequently the final outcome of such 




5.2.2 Multinomial logit model  
Whereas the conclusions in the above section are based on univariate analyses, we now 
explore the combined effect of the characteristics of target and bidding firms and of the takeover 
bid  itself  on  the  takeover  financing  structure.  As  section  4.2  describes,  we  consider  two 
econometric models of the bidder’s financing decision: multinomial logit and nested logit.  
The multinomial logit assumes that the bidder opts for a source of financing from four 
mutually exclusive (independent) alternatives: cash, debt, debt-and-equity, and equity. The model 
contains three binary logits that predict the probability that a particular source of financing is 
chosen in relation to equity financing. In order to examine the validity of the multinomial logit 
model we conduct several Hausman specification tests.
102 As the tests fail to reject the assumption 
of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), we consider a multinomial logit model to be 
an appropriate specification for the bidder’s financing choice.
103 
Consistent with the pecking order predictions (CC1), Table D-4 documents that cash-rich 
bidders finance their takeovers by internally generated funds, whereas cash-constrained firms with 
sufficient debt capacity prefer debt to equity financing. Firms opt to raise capital via the stock 
market rather than employ internal funds when they experience significant share price increases 
prior to the bid announcement.  
The ‘regulatory environment’ hypothesis (CC2) is also supported by data. Acquisitions 
financed by equity (relative to those financed by cash) are more likely in countries with stronger 
protection of shareholder rights. This result is in line with the prediction that strong shareholder 
protection reduces the cost of equity capital and hence increases its attractiveness as a source of 
financing. Expectedly, when the creditor rights protection is high, bidders prefer borrowing to 
equity issues. Borrowing is also more likely than issuing equity when the bidder is from a country 
with better minority shareholder rights protection. This evidence confirms our expectation that 
bidders are less reluctant to issue equity when private benefits of control are high (resulting from 
low minority rights protection).  
 
                                                 
102 In each test, we exclude different financing alternatives from the sample and test whether their exclusion leads to a 
proportionate increase in the probability of the other alternatives.  
103 However, the IIA assumption no longer holds when we consider the bidder’s simultaneous choice between six 
possible payment/financing alternatives: (i) cash payment/cash financing; (ii) cash payment/debt financing; (iii) cash 
payment/equity financing; (iv) mixed payment/cash financing; (v) mixed payment/debt financing; and (vi) equity 




Table D-4. Multinomial logit model predicting bidder’s financing choice 
 
The table reports a multinomial logit model that describes the bidder’s choice of the financing method in corporate takeovers. 
Four  possible  choices  are  considered:  (i)  cash  financing  (cash-paid/cash-financed  deals);  (ii)  debt  financing  (cash-paid/debt-
financed  deals);  (iii)  equity-and-debt  financing  (cash-paid/equity&debt-financed  and  mixed-paid/debt  financed  deals);  and  (iv) 
equity financing (equity-paid/equity-financed, cash-paid/equity-financed, and mixed-paid/cash-financed deals). The multinomial 
logit model includes three binary logit models. Each binary logit predicts a probability of choosing one of the first three alternatives 
relative to the probability of choosing the benchmark, which is all-equity financing. A Wald test is used to test for significance of 
the estimated coefficients and the overall regression; the p-value of the Wald Chi-square statistic is reported (Pr > 
2). Total sample 
is  1361  acquisitions.  This  includes  459  acquisitions  financed  by  equity.  The  Chi-square  statistic  for  test  of  overall  model 
significance is 8021 (p-value .000). 
a/
b/
c stands for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
 
Explanatory variables  CASH Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
DEBT Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
DEBT & EQUITY Financing 
(vs EQUITY Financing) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Coeff  Pr > 
2  Coeff  Pr > 
2  Coeff  Pr > 
2 
             
INTERCEPT   0.64  .687  -8.32
a  .009  -9.63
a  .006 
Cost of Capital (CC1): Pecking Order and Market Timing 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL  0.02
c  .077  -0.03  .328  -0.09
c  .072 
COLLATERAL  1.88
c  .058  1.57
c  .051  1.83  .164 
FIN LEVERAGE  0.65  .438  0.18  .857  -0.94  .451 
RUNUP   -0.28
b  .049  -0.04  .933  -0.56
c  .073 
1997-1999  0.40  .254  0.34  .560  -0.46  .423 
2000-2001  0.02  .952  0.55  .169  0.10  .874 
Cost of Capital (CC2): Regulatory Environment 
SH PRT x RULAW  -0.05
b  .030  -0.01  .836  -0.02  .698 
CR PRT x RULAW  0.11  .235  0.11
b  .047  0.18
b  .033 
TRANSP x RULAW  -0.01  .755  -0.04  .434  0.00  .979 
MIN PRT x RULAW  0.00  .945  0.10
b  .050  0.09
b  .025 
Agency Costs  (AG1): Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat 
BLOCKHLDR>20  -1.14  .143  0.38  .690  0.51  .764 
TO THREAT  -1.65  .121  -3.61  .172  -2.94  .136 
Agency Costs (AG2): Debt Overhang and AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility 
Q-RATIO  -0.05
b  .045  -0.02  .415  -0.16
c  .057 
BETA  0.03  .898  -0.10  .790  -0.02  .952 
AGE  0.06  .581  0.01  .812  0.02  .808 
Means of Payment (MP1): Risk Sharing 
MVAL (log)  -0.03  .751  0.26
a  .009  0.32
a  .005 
RELVAL   -3.63
a  .000  -2.51
c  .051  1.31
b  .023 
Means of Payment (MP2): The threat of Control Change 
CONTROL THREAT   0.13  .135  0.11
c  .086  0.10
c  .065 
20<CONTROL<60  1.69
c  .076  0.30  .772  -1.82  .429 
Means of Payment (MP3): Characteristics of Acquisition 
CROSSBORDER BID  0.01  .983  -0.42  .385  -1.75
a  .005 
TENDER OFFER  -0.49  .249  0.29  .665  0.32  .654 
HOSTILE BID  1.14
c  .074  1.33
c  .065  0.95  .199 
LISTED TARGET  -0.45  .181  -0.16  .821  -1.50
b  .042 





The  multinomial  logit  analysis  reveals  no  support  for  the  agency  cost  of  equity  and 
takeover threat hypotheses (AG1). Neither the presence of a large blockholder nor the threat of 
being acquired has a significant impact on the bidder’s decision to finance an acquisition by debt.  
The probability of equity financing increases with the Q-ratio of the bidding firm. This 
confirms that companies with strong growth opportunities prefer issuing equity to borrowing to 
finance takeover transactions in order to avoid conflicts of interests between shareholders  and 
debtholders and to maintain flexibility in managing corporate funds (hypothesis AG2). There is no 
evidence  that  risky  firms  (as  proxied  by  beta  and  age)  systematically  prefer  equity  financing 
(hypothesis AG3). Therefore, we conclude that equity-issuing firms are unlikely to suffer from 
agency problems of debt.  
Consistent with the view that large companies have better access to external financing than 
small  and  medium-sized  companies,  large  bidders  more  frequently  use  debt  capital  to  fund 
takeovers. This finding is also consistent with the risk-sharing hypothesis (MP1). Because of their 
size, large firms are least sensitive to the risk of misvaluation of the target firm, and hence they 
have no needs to pay for the acquisitions with equity.
104 However, this argument is true only if the 
size of the target firm is relatively low compared to that of the acquirer. When the relative size of 
the target increases, the bidder is more likely to offer equity to the shareholders of the target firm 
(hence choose equity financing). The multinomial logit analysis confirms this hypothesis.  
Table D-4 shows that the threat of control loss to the bidder’s largest shareholder makes the 
bidding firm averse to raising capital via equity issues (hypothesis MP2). Bidders are more likely 
to choose cash or debt financing over equity financing if their largest  shareholders control an 
intermediate voting stake (between 20% and 60%), which could be eroded by an equity payment to 
the shareholders of a closely held target firm.  
The relative size of the target firm and potential control loss are not the only takeover 
characteristics that affect the bidder’s choice of financing sources (or the payment method). Other 
characteristics  include:  bid  hostility,  geographical  scope,  and  legal  status  of  the  target  firm 
(hypothesis MP3). Equity financing is more frequently involved in friendly takeovers, whereas 
hostile  bids  are  financed  by  cash.  Equity  financing  is  preferred  to  debt  in  cross-border  bids. 
Apparently, bidding firms have more difficulties to obtain a bank loan or issue cheap debt to fund 
the acquisitions of foreign firms. Finally, bidders are more likely to issue stock (and to pay with 
stock) when the target is listed.  
To summarize, the results of the multinomial logit analysis suggest that equity issue takes 
place  for  the  reasons  of  cost  of  capital  considerations.  Pecking  order,  market-timing,  and 
financiers’ protection hypotheses are supported by the data. Debt overhang concerns of the bidding 
firm also play an important role in the choice of equity financing. Finally, we also find support for 
                                                 
104 An all-equity offer allows bidders to keep the target shareholders involved in the merged company and hence o 




the hypothesis that the bidder’s decision on the financing sources coincides with or depends on its 
preference for a specific payment method: the bidder’s or deal’s characteristics such as control 
threat, risk sharing, and the success of a takeover bid (depending on takeover bid characteristics) 
influence the choice of financing sources (and payment means).  
 
5.2.3 Nested logit model of the sequential payment-financing choice  
The nested logit model extends the multinomial logit framework by allowing the bidder to 
make its financing decision conditional on the preferred payment method.
105 That is, the model 
tests the conjectures about the decision on the transaction financing conditional on an all-cash or 
mixed payment structure being chosen.  
For  reasons  of  comparison,  Table  D-5  first  reports  the  estimates  of  the  bidder’s 
unconditional choice of the payment method (columns 1 and 2). Our conclusions are similar to 
those of Faccio and Masulis (2005), who provide a comprehensive analysis of the payment method 
determinants  in  European  corporate  takeovers.  Concerns  regarding  the  potential  change  in  the 
firm’s control structure drive the bidder’s decision to offer cash rather than equity. These concerns 
mainly  refer  to  the  bidders  which  control  structure  may  change  significantly  if  a  new  large 
shareholder emerges: widely-held firms (CONTROL<20) and firms controlled by a blockholder 
with an intermediate level of voting rights (20<CONTROL<60). A cash offer is also more likely in 
cross-border acquisitions and hostile takeovers. In contrast, takeover bids for a listed or a relatively 
large firm are more likely to be paid with equity rather than with cash or a combination of cash and 
equity. The probability of an equity offer also increases with the share price run-up prior to the bid 
announcement and exposure to the market risk of the bidding firm. Finally, an all-equity payment 
is  preferred  to  a  mixed  payment  when  the  bidder  is  from  a  country  with  strong  minority 
shareholder rights. While all these findings on means of payment are in line with the results by 
Faccio  and  Masulis  (2005),  we  find  no  significant  relationship  between  the  bidder’s  financial 
condition (leverage, collateral, cash flow) and the means of payment.  
Once the bidder decides upon the means of payment it will include in the takeover bid, it 
faces  another  dilemma:  how  to  finance  the  offer.  Columns  3  and  4  of  Table  D-5  report  the 
estimates  of  the  bidder’s  financing  options  conditional  on  an  all-cash  offer.  Column  5 
complements these results with the choice between debt-and-equity and cash-and-equity financing 
conditional on a mixed offer. The results of columns 1 and 2 yield similar conclusions to those 
from Table D-4, but columns 3-5 of Table D-5 reveal some interesting additional evidence.  
 
                                                 
105 We also consider an alternative nested logit model specification according to which the bidder makes a payment 
decision conditional on the financing choice, whereas the choice of financing sources is unconditional. We find that 
the results of this model regarding the financing choice are very similar to those of the multinomial logit model. 





Table D-5. Nested logit model: the payment-financing choice 
 
This table presents the estimates from a nested logit regression that predicts the unconditional probability of choosing a payment 
method and, conditional on the payment method choice, the probability of choosing a particular source of financing. The first stage 
is the decision on the mode of payment. The second stage is the choice of financing sources conditional on the payment method. 
The sample comprises 1,361 acquisitions. The Chi-square statistic for test of the overall model significance is 5612 (p-value .000). 
a/
b/
c stands for statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level, respectively. 
 
  First stage:  Second stage: 
  Choice of payment method  Choice of a means of financing 
Conditional on payment method 
















  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Coeff.  Pr > |t|  Coeff.  Pr > |t|  Coeff.  Pr > |t|  Coeff.  Pr > |t|  Coeff.  Pr > |t| 
                     
INTERCEPT   0.90  .655  -4.30
b  .048  3.42  .384  -15.14
a  .008  -4.22  .309 
Cost of Capital (CC1): Pecking Order and Market Timing 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL  0.01  .517  -0.04
b  .019  0.15
b  .027  -0.08  .529  -0.17
a  .008 
COLLATERAL  1.54  .187  -0.43  .728  -0.78  .709  0.73
c  .062  2.70
b  .043 
FIN LEVERAGE  0.69  .507  1.42  .267  1.91  .232  -0.86  .570  -2.75
b  .046 
RUNUP   -0.05
b  .039  -0.22  .615  -1.10
b  .023  -0.06  .933  -1.37
c  .098 
1997-1999  0.04  .933  -0.45  .433  0.60  .430  -0.94  .506  0.16  .826 
2000-2001  0.17  .752  -0.09  .884  0.61  .500  1.14
c  .087  1.12
c  .091 
Cost of Capital (CC2): Regulatory Environment 
SH PRT x RULAW  -0.01  .841  -0.03  .342  -0.09
b  .029  -0.18
c  .052  0.07  .406 
CR PRT x RULAW  -0.02  .853  0.03  .729  0.11  .525  0.37
b  .035  0.04  .894 
TRANSP x RULAW  -0.04  .374  -0.01  .325  -0.02  .511  -0.05  .483  -0.04  .656 
MIN PRT x RULAW  0.02  .606  0.05
b  .011  0.07  .221  0.46
b  .011  -0.08  .439 
Agency Costs (AG1): Agency Cost of Equity and Takeover Threat 
BLOCKHLDR>20          -0.31  .616  0.45  .762  -0.57  .662 
TO THREAT  -4.85  .202  0.58  .640  -1.55  .514  -4.41  .569  -1.51  .278 
Agency Costs (AG2): Debt Overhang and AG3. Agency Cost of Debt and Financial Flexibility 
Q-RATIO  -0.01  .563  0.00  .989  -0.06  .139  -0.09  .672  -0.22
b  .031 
BETA  -0.32
b  .047  0.56  .117  0.40  .340  0.97
c  .069  0.10  .848 
AGE                         0.01  .641  0.02  .250  0.01  .221  0.04  .176  0.00  .874 
Means of Payment (MP1): Risk Sharing 
MVAL (log)  -0.06  .558  -0.13  .240  -0.22
a  .010  0.54
b  .045  0.52
a  .003 
RELVAL   -4.13
a  .000  -2.24
b  .016  -1.79  .322  -0.96  .490  2.70
c  .083 
Means of Payment (MP2): The threat of Control Change 
CONTROL THREAT  0.07  .289  0.02  .235  -0.12  .247  0.26  .282  -0.10  .928 
20<CONTROL<60  3.33
b  .015  1.34  .352  0.88  .184  -0.19  .897  0.36  .573 
CONTROL<20  1.59
c  .092  -0.36  .826             
Means of Payment (MP3): Characteristics of Acquisition 
CROSSBORDER BID  0.29
a  .000  -0.40  .377  -0.42  .488  -0.47  .315  -2.80
b  .012 
TENDER OFFER  0.17  .697  -0.84  .233  -0.61  .174  -1.08  .205  1.37  .352 
HOSTILE BID  1.20
c  .056  0.90
b  .029  0.53  .569  0.54  .449  -0.72  .585 
LISTED TARGET  -0.69
a  .000  -1.05
b  .045  0.55  .587  1.13  .179  -1.46  .330 





Debt  financing  of  both  all-cash  and  mixed  offers  is  more  frequently  used  (relative  to 
equity(-and-cash) financing) in a period of stock market decline (2000-2001), which is consistent 
with our predictions based on the pecking order and market-timing. Large firms more frequently 
opt for financing by external funds (equity and debt). However, the largest firms tend to choose 
debt over equity. We interpret this finding as additional evidence in support to the pecking order 
theory. Larger firms are usually more diversified and have relatively lower expected bankruptcy 
costs, which makes debt capital less expensive relative to equity. However, risky firms are also 
more likely to opt for debt than for equity financing. This finding supports Bolton and Freixas 
(2000) who predict that risky firms prefer to finance their activities by debt as banks can help firms 
through times of financial distress. 
Poorer protection of shareholder  rights leads to  a higher  cost of equity  capital, so that 
companies are forced to finance their activities by debt. The negative coefficient on the variable 
SH PRT x RULAW in column 4 of Table D-5 confirms this hypothesis. We conclude that firms 
more frequently employ debt capital when the legal environment makes the cost of debt relatively 
low compared to equity.   
The analysis of the choice between cash and debt financing of mixed offers also reveals 
some marked results. The cash component of the mixed offers is more likely to be funded by debt 
when the bidder’s internal funds are insufficient. This is usually the case when the target firm is 
relatively large. However, debt financing would not be possible if the bidder had low debt capacity 
(i.e.  high  leverage  and  low  collateral).  Column  5  of  Table  D-5  confirms  these  predictions. 
Consistent with the debt overhang hypothesis, bidders with high growth opportunities are least 
likely  to  finance  their  acquisitions  with  debt.  Strikingly,  the  choice  of  debt  is  preceded  by  a 
significant decline in the share price of the bidding firm. Finally, the cash component of the mixed 
payment in cross-border bids is usually financed by internal funds,
106 which suggests that bidders 




We investigate the bidder’s choice of financing sources in European corporate takeovers 
launched during the period 1993-2001, the fifth takeover wave. To our best knowledge, this is the 
first empirical study that explicitly investigates how bidding firms finance their deals. In contrast, 
the previous literature only focuses on the means of payment. As such, these studies typically 
ignore  the  sources  of  transaction  financing  in  all-cash  offers  and  assume  that  these  offers  are 
entirely financed by cash. This chapter shows that external sources of financing (debt and equity) 
                                                 
106 It should be noted that this result refers to the financing (not payment) choice of the bidding firm. The results 




are  frequently  employed  even  in  cash-paid  acquisitions.  We  also  document  that  there  are 
fundamental differences in the market reaction to the announcement of all-cash offers financed by 
different types of capital. Furthermore, irrespective of the payment method, bidding firms seem to 
have systematic preferences for particular sources of funding, depending on the characteristics of 
bidder, target, the takeover bid and corporate governance regulation.  
We find that investors take into account the information signalled by both the payment 
method and the sources of takeover financing  when evaluating the takeover announcement. A 
significantly negative price revision following the announcement of a takeover is not unique to the 
all-equity offers; it is also observed in any other bids that involve equity financing (including cash-
paid and mixed-paid takeovers). We also find that, in sharp contrast to the negative returns of all 
the other deals, cash-paid but debt-financed acquisitions create substantial value (about 3%) to the 
bidding  firms  over  a  6-month  period  centred  around  the  takeover  bid  day.  Thus,  the  bidder’s 
choice of the sources of transaction financing conveys an important signal about the quality of the 
bidding firm, which investors use to update their beliefs about the firm’s prospects.  
Multinomial logit and nested logit analyses of the bidder’s financing choice show that cost 
of capital considerations, debt overhang problems, and the choice of specific payment methods are 
important determinants. Overall, our results can be summarized as follows:   
(i)  Asymmetric information and the anticipation of a negative market reaction to equity 
issues force companies to shift from equity to other sources of financing. Cash-rich firms fund 
their takeovers by internally generated funds. Cash-constrained firms with sufficient debt capacity 
opt for debt as a means of funding. Debt is systematically preferred to equity in periods of stock 
market  declines,  when  the  adverse  effects  of  equity  issues  are  especially  severe.  In  contrast, 
transactions funded with equity occurs when investors are positive about the firm’s fundamental 
value and hence tend to under-react to a negative signal triggered by the announcement of equity 
issues. Overall, the results confirm a firm’s pecking order preferences. Remarkably, our analysis 
fails  to  find  (as  does  Martin,  1996)  a  significant  relationship  between  the  bidder’  financial 
condition and the choice of payment mode.  
(ii) Companies with high growth opportunities tend to avoid debt financing but use equity 
financing as the dominant source of funding. This result is consistent with Myers’ (1977) debt 
overhang theory predicting that firms with good investment projects avoid borrowing in order to 
minimize the degree of underinvestment caused by conflicts of interests between shareholders and 
creditors.  However,  we  find  no  significant  relationship  between  the  bidder’s  investment 
opportunities and its payment choice. This is in contrast to the evidence documented in Jung, Kim, 
and Stulz (1996), Martin (1996), and Faccio and Masulis (2005).   
(iii)We reveal that the regulatory environment induces systematic corporate preferences 
with regard to the sources of funding. Equity financing is more likely in countries with better 




prefer borrowing to an equity issue as a means of financing. This evidence supports LaPorta et al. 
(1998) who argue that better protection of the providers of finance from expropriation facilitates 
the development of well-functioning capital markets and ensures lower costs of financing. Since 
legal protection of shareholders and creditors disproportionally affects the cost of debt and equity 
capital, it induces systematic corporate preferences with regard to the less expensive sources of 
financing.  In  line  with  Faccio  and  Masulis  (2005),  we  find  no  significant  impact  of  legal 
environment on the choice of a payment mode in takeovers. 
(iv) Finally, the data reveal that the bidders’ preferences for a specific means of payment 
affect the financing decision. As do Faccio and Masulis (2005), we show that the likelihood of an 
equity payment (and hence equity financing) increases with the relative size of the transaction. 
This  is  consistent  with  the  risk-sharing  hypothesis  of  Hansen  (1987):  by  offering  the  target 
shareholders  a  continued  participation  in  the  merged  firm,  the  bidder  shares  the  risk  of  a 
misvaluation of the target firm’s assets. Further, all-cash financed acquisitions are more likely 
when a bidding firm is controlled by shareholders with an intermediate level of voting power 
ranging  between  20%  and  60%.  This  evidence  supports  the  control  threat  hypothesis:  large 
shareholders of the bidding firm prefer cash over equity as a means of payment if an all-equity bid 
threatens  their  control  position.  In  addition,  takeover  characteristics  such  as  bid  hostility, 
geographical scope, and legal status of the target firm have an additional impact on the payment 
mode  in  takeovers.  However,  none  of  these  factors  have  significant  impact  on  the  bidder’s 
financing choice once we condition it on the payment mode.   
In sum, our results show that the decisions on the means of payment and the sources of 
takeover financing do not coincide. . Judging from the anticipated wealth effects, we conclude that, 
in addition to the means of payment, the way a takeover deal is financed transmits important 





Appendix D-I. Variable Definitions 
 
Variable  Definition 
(B) MVAL (m US$)  Market capitalization of the bidding firm 60 days prior to the initial bid announcement. Source: 
DataStream 
(T) BLOCKHDR>20  Indicator equals one if target firm is controlled by a blockholder owning more than 20% voting 
stake prior to the takeover. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
1993-1996  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1993 and December 
31, 1996; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
1997-1999  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 1997 and December 
31, 1999; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
20<CONTROL<60  Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a blockholder owing more than 20 but less 
than 60% of the voting rights (20%<=CONTROL<60%). Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the 
end of the book). 
2000-2001  Indicator equals one if the bid was initiated in the period between January 1, 2000 and December 
31, 2001; equals zero otherwise.  Source: SDC 
AGE  Number  of  years  since  the  firm  was  incorporated.  Source:  Amadeus/Fame/Reach  and 
DataStream 
BETA  Equity beta of the bidding firm, estimated using the market model over the period of 300 to 60 
days  before  the  M&A  announcement.  The  market  index  is  the  MSCI  Europe.  Source:  own 
computations  
BLOCKHDR>20  Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a blockholder owning a voting stake of 20% 
or more. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
CAPX 3YGR (%)  Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in capital expenditures (scaled by the total 
assets)  over  the  three-year  period  preceding  the  year  of  the  M&A  announcement.  Source: 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CASH FIN  Indicator equals one if internal sources are employed to finance cash component of the payment 
in corporate takeover, and equals zero otherwise Source: LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial 
Times 
CASH PMT  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is fully paid with cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CASH PMT- DEBT FIN  Indicator  equals  one  if  borrowing  is  used  to  finance  the  all-cash  payment,  and  equals  zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CASH PMT- EQTY FIN  Indicator equals one if an equity issue is used to finance the all-cash payment, and equals zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CROSSBORDER BID  Indicator  equals  one  if  the  bidder  and  target  are  from  different  countries,  and  equals  zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
CFLOW/TA  Ratio of total cash flow (including cash flow from operating, financial, and investment activities) 
to total assets, at the year-end prior to the deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
and DataStream 
CFLOW/TRANSVAL  Ratio  of  the  bidder’s  total  cash  flow  (including  cash  flow  from  operating,  financial,  and 
investment activities) over the price paid for the acquisition. Cash flow is at the year-end prior to 
the deal announcement. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CHLDG/TRANSVAL  Ratio of the bidder’s cash holdings (cash and cash equivalents in place) over the price paid for 
the acquisition. Cash and cash equivalents are at the year end prior to the deal announcement 
Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
COLLATERAL  Variable that takes the value of the tangible assets of the combined firm: sum of the bidder’s and 
target’s tangible assets scaled by the sum of their total assets. All measures are at the year prior 
to the deal announcement. Source: computed based on Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
CONTROL THREAT (%)  Target’s largest controlling share block multiplied by RELVAL. If the target is unlisted, the 
controlling  share  block  prior  to  the  takeover  deal  is  assumed  to  be  100%.  Source:  SDC, 
Amadeus/Fame/Reach and sources reported in Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
CONTROL (%)  Ultimate voting stake owned by the bidder’s largest shareholder. Source: see Data Appendix 1 
(in the end of the book). 
CONTROL<20 
WIDELY-HELD FIRM 
Indicator equals one if the bidding firm is widely-held: there is no shareholder owning 20% or 
more of the voting rights. Source: see Data Appendix 1 (in the end of the book). 
CONTROL>60  Indicator equals one if bidding firm is controlled by a large blockholder owning 60% or more of 




Variable  Definition 
CORRUPT  The corruption index, which indicates the extent to which one can exercise public power for 
private gain It quantifies indicators ranging from the frequency of “additional payments to get 
things done” to the effects of corruption on the business environment. The index ranges between 
0 and 5, with higher values corresponding to the better quality of law enforcement.  Source: The 
World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/) 
CR PRT x RULAW  Variable  that  takes  the  value  of  the  Creditor  rights  protection  index  (CREDITOR  PRT) 
multiplied by the Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
CREDITOR PRT  The  creditor  rights  protection  index,  which  hinges  on  the  regulatory  provisions  that  allow 
creditors to force repayment more easily, to take possession of the collateral, or even to gain 
control over the firm in case of financial distress. The details about the calculation of the creditor 
rights index are given in Appendix D-II. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with higher values 
corresponding to better regulatory protection of creditor rights. Source: own computations. 
DEBT FIN  Indicator equals one if a debt issue is used to raise cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
DEBT/EQUITY FIN  Indicator  equals  one  if  both  debt  and  equity  issues  are  used  to  raise  cash,  and  equals  zero 
otherwise. Source: LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
EQUITY FIN  Indicator equals one if an equity issue is used to raise cash, and equals zero otherwise. Source: 
LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
EQUITY PMT  Indicator  equals  one  if  the  acquisition  is  fully  paid  with  equity,  and  equals  zero  otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
FIN LEVERAGE  Bidding firm’s long-term debt prior to the M&A announcement plus deal value, all divided by 
the sum of the bidding firm’s total assets prior to the M&A announcement and the deal value. 
Source: computed based on DataStream, Amadeus/Fame/Reach, SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and 
Financial Times 
HOSTILE BID  Indicator equals one if initial takeover offer meets a negative reaction by the management of the 
target firm or if a competing bid is made. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial 
Times 
INTRA-IND BID  Indicator equals one if the bidder and target operate in the same industry (primary 2-digit SIC 
code coincides), and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC and Amadeus/Fame/Reach 
LEVERAGE  Ratio of the bidder’s total debt (short-term and long-term) to total assets at the year-end prior to 
the deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
LISTED TARGET  Indicator equals one if the target firm is listed on any stock exchange at the moment of bid 
announcement, and is zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
MIN PRT x RULAW  Variable that takes the value of the Minority shareholder rights protection index (MINORITY 
PRT) multiplied by the Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
MINORITY PRT  The  minority  shareholder  rights  protection  index,  which hinges  on  the  regulatory  provisions 
aiming at increasing the relative power of the minority shareholders in the presence of strong 
majority shareholders. For the constituting elements of the index and their coding: see Appendix 
D-II. The index ranges between 0 and 25, with higher values corresponding to more powerful 
minority shareholders (and lower private benefits of control). Source: own computations. 
MIX PMT - DEBT FIN  Indicator equals one if borrowing is used to finance the cash component of the mixed payment, 
and equals zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
MIXED PMT  Indicator equals one if the acquisition is paid with a combination of cash and equity, and equals 
zero otherwise. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
Q-RATIO  Bidder’s ratio of the market value of equity (ordinary and preferred) plus book value of long-
term debt over the sum of book value of equity and book value of long-term debt. The market 
value of equity is taken 60 days prior to deal announcement, book value of equity and debt are as 
of the year-end prior to deal announcement.  Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
RELVAL (%)  The  ratio  of  the  TRANSVAL  over  the  sum  of  the  TRANSVAL  plus  the  bidder’s  market 
capitalization. Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, Financial Times, Amadeus/Fame/Reach and 
DataStream 
RULE OF LAW  The Rule of Law index, which measures the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, and these include the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary and 
the enforceability of contracts. It quantifies indicators which measure the extent to which agents 
have confidence in and abide by the rules of society. The index ranges between 0 and 5, with 
higher values corresponding to the better quality of law enforcement.  Source: The World Bank 
(http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). 
RUNUP (%)  Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of the bidder over the window [-60, -20] preceding the 
takeover announcement day. Daily abnormal returns are computed as the difference between 
realized and market model benchmark returns. The market model uses the MSCI-Europe index 
and  the  parameters  are  estimated  over  240  days  starting  300  days  prior  to  the  acquisition 




Variable  Definition 
SALES 3YGR (%)  Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in sales revenues (scaled by total assets) 
over the three-year period preceding the year of takeover announcement. Source: DataStream 
and Amadeus/Fame/Reach  
SH PRT x RULAW  Variable that takes the value of the Shareholder rights protection index (SHAREHDR PRT) 
multiplied by the Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
SHAREHDR PRT  The shareholder rights protection index indicates shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial 
opportunistic  behaviour  For  the  constituting  elements  of  the  index  and  their  coding:  see 
Appendix D-II. The index ranges between 0 and 25, with higher values corresponding to better 
governance outcomes. Source: own computations 
TA 3YGR (%)  Bidder’s average annually compounded growth rate in total assets over the three-year period 
preceding the year of the deal announcement. Source: Amadeus/Fame/Reach and DataStream 
TENDER OFFER  Indicator variable equals one if the bidder makes a public offer to purchase shares of the target 
firm and the takeover is not classified as hostile (see HOSTILE BID), and is zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
TO THREAT  Measure of the bidder’s takeover vulnerability: the likelihood of being acquired, estimated with a 
probit  model  for  the  sample  of  European  firms  for  the  period  1993-2001.  The  sample  is 
constructed as unbalanced panel with 9-years time series. The dependent variable equals one if a 
firm was acquired during the year and is zero otherwise. The estimates of the probit model are 
available from the authors upon request. Source: own computations  
TOEHOLD  Percentage of the target firm’s shares that the bidder held prior to the bid announcement. Source: 
SDC, LexisNexis, Factiva, and Financial Times 
TRANSP x RULAW  Variable that takes the value of the Transparency index (TRANSPARENCY) multiplied by the 
Rule of Law index (RULE OF LAW). Source: own computations 
TRANSPARENCY  The transparency index reflects the degree to which the market is informed about the corporate 
policies and contracts directly related to the management, and the frequency with which this 
information is released. For the coding of the constituting elements of the index: see Appendix 
D-II.  The  index  ranges  between  0  and  10,  with  higher  values  corresponding  to  better 
transparency. Source: own computations 






Appendix D-II. Corporate governance regulation indices 
 
This appendix shows how specific regulations are quantified to construct four corporate governance regulation indices: the 
shareholder rights protection index, the creditor rights protection index, the transparency index, and the minority shareholders 
protection index. Some regulatory aspects are incorporated in several indices. 
 
 
1. The shareholder rights protection index (Max=25) reflects the shareholders’ ability to  mitigate  managerial opportunistic 
behavior (SHAREHDR PRT). The index is constructed by combining the following 3 sub-indices: 
 
1.1 The appointment rights index is based on the rules to appoint and replace executive and non-executive directors. It measures 
the degree of alignment of the interests of management and shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Tenure on the board: 0 if more than 4 years, 1 if 4 years, 2 if less then 4 years  
 Cross-shareholdings:  
o  Cross-shareholdings between 2 independent companies: 1 if regulated, 0 if not. 
o  Maximum shareholding of a subsidiary in its parent company: 1 if regulated, 0 if not 
 Election rules:  
o  Proxy voting by mail: 2 if allowed, 0 if not 
o  Requirement to Deposit/Register shares prior to a general meeting: 
Ö Bearer shares: 0 if deposit is required, 1 if only registration of shares is required, 2 if none is required 
Ö Nominal shares: 0 if deposit is required, 2 if deposit requirement is forbidden 
 
1.2 The decision rights index captures the shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial discretion. The decision rights index cover 
regulatory provisions that mandate direct shareholder decision-making. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Shareholders approval of anti-takeover defense measures: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Shareholders approval of preemption rights: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if no rule or more than 20%, 1 if 20% or less but more than 5%, 2 if 
5% and less. 
 Voting caps: 0 if allowed, 2 if not. 
 
1.3 The trusteeship index measures the efficiency of the board of directors in monitoring the actions of CEOs. The following 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Board independence:  
o  2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
o  2 if the overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Separate board of auditors: 1 if required, 0 otherwise 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the shareholders. 
 
2.  The  transparency  index    (Max=10):  The  transparency  index  is  based  on  the  quality  of  information  about  company,  its 
ownership  structure,  and  management  available  to  investors  (TRANSPARENCY).    The  following  regulatory  provisions  are 
quantified in this index: 
 
 Requirement to disclose managerial compensation: 0 if not required, 1 if required on aggregate basis, 2 if required on 
individual basis. 
 Requirement to disclose any transactions between management and company: 2 if required, 0 if not 
 Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the min percent is 25% or more; 1 if 10% or 
more (less then 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less then 10%); 3 if less then 5%. 
 Frequency of financial reports: 0 if once per year, 1 if twice per year, 2 if more than twice per year 
 Comply or explain rule: 1 if the requirement is present, 0 otherwise 
 






3. The creditor rights protection index (Max=5) is based on regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more 
easily, take possession of collateral, or gain control over firm in financial distress (CREDITOR PRT). The regulatory provisions are 
quantified as follows: 
 
 Debtor-oriented versus Creditor-oriented code: 1 if no reorganization option (liquidation only); 0 if reorganization + 
liquidation option; 
 Automatic stay on the assets: 1 if no automatic stay is obliged in reorganization (if debt-orient code) or liquidation 
procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Secured creditors are ranked first: 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the reorganization procedure (if debtor-
oriented code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 if government and employees are ranked first; 
 Creditor approval of bankruptcy: 1 if creditor approval is required to initiate reorganization procedure (if debtor-oriented 
code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Appointment of official to manage reorganization/liquidation procedure: 1 if it is required by law in a reorganization 
procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or a liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise. 
 
 
4. The minority shareholders protection index (Max= 25) is based on the regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative 
power of the minority shareholders in a context of strong majority shareholders (MINORITY PRT). The index is constructed by 
combining the following 4 sub-indices: 
 
4.1 Minority shareholders appointment rights index is based on the appointment rights that can be used to protect minority 
shareholders. These include rights to reserve seats on the board of directors for minority shareholders or to limit voting power of 
large shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Minority representation on the board: 2 if required, 0 otherwise.  
 Voting caps limiting power of large shareholders: 1 if voting caps are allowed, 0 if not. 
 One-share-one-vote rule: 0 if both multiple voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed; 1 if one of the two is allowed; 2 
if none is allowed. 
 
4.2 Minority shareholders decision rights index captures the ability of minority shareholders to affect fundamental corporate 
transactions that require a shareholder vote. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Supermajority requirement for approval of major company’s decisions: 0 if 50% or less; 1 if more then 50% but less then 
75%; 2 if 75% or more 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if the rule is not present or required percentage is 20% or more; 1 if 
the required percentage is between 20 and 5%; 2 if the percentage is 5% or less. 
 
4.3 The board independence (from the controlling shareholder) index indicates the extent to which the board of directors serves as 
a trustee for minority shareholder, i.e. the directors are independent from the firm’s controlling shareholders. The regulatory 
provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if shareholders voting to elect non-executive directors is not required (2-tier 
boards); 0 if required or 1-tier board 
 Board independence: 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure) or if the 
overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 
4.4 The minority shareholders reward and affiliation rights index groups the remaining regulatory provisions aimed at protecting 
minority  shareholders:  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  (or  shared  returns)  and  rights  for  entry  and  exit  on  fair  terms.  The 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Equal treatment rule: 2 if required, 0 if not, 
 Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the minimum percent is 25% or more; 1 if 
10% or more (less then 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less then 10%); 3 if less then 5%. 
 Mandatory bid rule: 0 if not required; 1 if 50% or control; 2 if between 50 and 30%; 3 if 30% or less. 
 Sell-out rule: The squeeze-out rule is used as a proxy for the sell-out rule, (assumption: sell-out is always in place if squeeze-
out is adopted, with the same terms as squeeze-out): 0 if no squeeze-out; 1 if squeeze-out at 95% or more; 2 if squeeze-out at 
90% or less. 
 Minority claim: 0 if no; 1 if 10% or more; 2 if 5% or more; 3 if less then 5%. 
 Break-through rule: 1 if required; 0 if not, 
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CHAPTER 6.  
 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE CONVERGENCE: EVIDENCE FROM TAKEOVER 






There are two polar systems of corporate governance: the market-based system and the 
blockholder-based system. The former prevails in the UK, US and the Commonwealth countries, 
and relies on legal rules largely resulting from case law and on the effective legal enforcement of 
shareholder rights. The blockholder-based system of Continental Europe relies on codified law and 
emphasizes rules protecting stakeholders such as creditors and employees. The two systems differ 
not only in terms of the rationale behind their legal rules, but also in terms of their ownership and 
control.  Most  Continental  European  companies  are  characterized  by  majority  or  near-majority 
stakes held by one or few investors. In contrast, the Anglo-American system is characterized by 
dispersed  equity.  The  increasing  economic  globalisation  has  fuelled  the  debate  on  the  best 
corporate governance system and the barriers to the development of a single system of corporate 
governance (see e.g. McCahery et al., 2002). 
Although the debate has generated an extensive body of theoretical and empirical work, the 
conclusions remain opaque. There is yet no consensus as to what system of corporate law is the 
best one and whether legal convergence should be encouraged on a global level. A number of 
theoretical studies  argue that regulatory and institutional convergence of corporate governance 
practice  worldwide  is  likely,  but  the  studies  are  in  disagreement  as  to  the  direction  of  the 
convergence. In particular, will the Anglo-American model dominate or will a new hybrid model 
emerge? This chapter comes up with some predictions as to the evolution of corporate governance 
that is likely to occur through the ongoing reforms of takeover regulation in Europe.  
Takeover regulation constitutes an important element of corporate governance. Not only do 
changes in takeover regulation affect the level of investor protection, the development of capital 
markets  and  the  market  for  corporate  control,  but  they  are  also  likely  to  cause  changes  in 
ownership and control. As such, reforms of takeover regulation constitute an important channel 
through  which  a  corporate  governance  system  can  evolve.  The  chapter  provides  a  detailed 
                                                 




assessment of established and newly introduced takeover rules. We identify and describe the main 
provisions in takeover regulation in 30 European countries and analyze how takeover regulation 
has changed in these countries over the past 15 years. About 150 legal experts throughout Europe 
have  contributed  to  our  unique  and  large  database  on  the  changes  in  corporate  governance 
regulation  (see  Data  Appendix  2  in  the  end  of  the  book).  We  make  predictions  as  to  the 
consequences of the reforms of takeover regulation in terms of ownership and control. 
Overall,  this  chapter  shows  that  there  is  convergence  of  European  takeover  regulation 
towards the UK regime. For example, the European countries have agreed that the equal treatment 
rule  constitutes  a  fundamental  principle  of  corporate  law.  There  is  also  gradual  convergence 
towards  the  adoption  of  the  mandatory  bid  and  squeeze-out  rules.  The  introduction  of  lower 
disclosure thresholds for control as well as the abolishment of shares with multiple voting rights, 
while still allowing for the use of non-voting shares, may also suggest that there is convergence 
towards the Anglo-American governance system. However, regulatory changes, which may at first 
sight  appear  similar  across  countries,  may  have  totally  different  effects  within  their  national 
system. While in some countries the adoption of a unified takeover code may disperse ownership, 
in others it may further concentrate ownership. We also conclude that, although the shareholder-
centred view of corporate governance is receiving widespread recognition, some economies seem 
to opt for the blockholder-based system. 
The  chapter  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  discusses  whether  there  is  an  optimal 
corporate governance  system and whether the different national systems are likely to converge 
towards it. Section 3 reviews the corporate governance functions of takeover regulation, while 
section 4 predicts the impact of takeover regulation on the evolution of corporate governance. 
Section 5 assesses the possible regulatory mechanisms and their impact on the development of a 
well-functioning  M&A  market,  on  the  improvement  of  shareholder  protection,  and  on  the 
evolution  of  ownership  and  control.  Using  a  unique  database  on  corporate  law  reforms  in  30 
European countries, section 6 documents the dynamics of takeover regulation and predicts the 
consequences  of  the  reforms  for  the  development  of  corporate  governance  systems.  Section  7 
concludes. 
 
2. The evolution of corporate governance regulation: the convergence debate 
 
The increasing economic globalisation has fuelled vivid debates on the similarities of and 
differences between national corporate governance systems and the barriers to the development of 
a single system of corporate governance (see e.g. McCahery et al. 2002). The key questions are 
whether a particular national corporate governance system has a competitive advantage over all 
other systems, and if yes, whether other systems ought to move towards it. These are important  
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questions as the choice of corporate governance regime has an impact on the availability and cost 
of capital, corporate performance and the distribution of corporate value in a country.
107 
Although  there  is  now  an  extensive  body  of  studies,  their  conclusions  remain  opaque. 
There is as yet no consensus as to the best system of corporate law and whether legal convergence 
should  be  encouraged  on  a  global  level.  Some  law  and  economics  academics  proclaim  the 
superiority  of  the  shareholder-oriented  corporate  governance  system,  characterized  by  well-
developed capital markets, the prevalence of institutional investors, good investor protection, a 
market for corporate control, and a focus on shareholder value. La Porta et al. (1997) argue that 
this system, which exists predominantly in countries with a common law system, ensures a higher 
willingness of investors to provide financing as it aims at guaranteeing shareholders a fair return 
on their investment. In turn, this results in higher company valuations and growth potential (e.g. La 
Porta et al. (2002), Himmelberg et al. (2002)) and more developed and efficient financial markets 
(e.g. La Porta et al. (1997) and Mork et al. (2000)). Similarly, Levine (1998, 1999) shows that 
countries with English legal origin have better prospects in terms of long-run economic growth. 
Despite the widely-held view on the superiority of the Anglo-American system, there are 
also supporters of the alternative systems such as the labour-oriented, state-oriented, and other 
stakeholder-oriented systems, prevailing in countries of German, French, Scandinavian, and Asian 
legal origin. The supporters of these alternative systems argue that the chief advantage of these 
systems  lies  in  the  way  they  address  the  misalignment  of  interests  between  managers  and 
shareholders. Whereas in common law countries this problem is resolved via the monitoring by the 
market  for  corporate  control  and  regulation  forcing  managers  to  follow  the  interests  of  the 
shareholders,  civil  law  countries  mainly  rely  on  large  shareholder,  creditor  or  employee 
monitoring.  
Given that the long-term interests of shareholders and stakeholders are not necessarily at 
odds, it is reasonable to expect the two monitoring mechanisms to produce similar outcomes in 
terms of long-term wealth creation. In line with this argument, the empirical literature
108 provides 
mixed  evidence  about  the  relative  merits  of  the  two  mechanisms,  but  still  suggests  that  the 
alternative systems of corporate governance can be as efficient as the ‘superior’ Anglo-American 
system.  The  lack  of  consensus  regarding  the  optimal  system  of  corporate  governance  has 
implications for the current law reforms. It raises the question as to the direction reformers of 
national systems should adopt.  
                                                 
107 The empirical literature documents that weak corporate governance, combined with weak enforcement of the law, 
distorts the efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability of companies to compete internationally, and 
hinders investment and economic development.  
108 For a review of this literature see Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003), Dennis and McConnell (2003). For empirical 
evidence see Rajan and Zingales (1998), Carlin and Mayer (2003), Franks, Mayer and Renneboog (2001).  
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Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) suggest that the increasing acceptance of a shareholder-
centred ideology of corporate law by international business, governments, and legal elites will be 
translated  into  corporate  law  reforms  and  is  likely  to  result  in  the  convergence  of  corporate 
governance  towards  Anglo-American  practice.  An  alternative  view  is  based  on  the  global 
competition hypothesis. It states that the two main competing systems should borrow the best 
practices from one another. This would result in a ‘hybrid model’ with the right mix of market 
discipline, corporate regulation, and power of corporate stakeholders. As an example of such a 
model one may think of the system proposed by the European Commission that is to provide firms 
with the freedom to select the model that best suits their needs (McCahery and Renneboog 2004). 
Bratton and McCahery (2000) have yet another view. They argue that each reform programme 
should focus on resolving the weaknesses of its national system, without attempting to change the 
system itself. This implies that worldwide convergence is not necessary.  
Those  predicting  convergence  of  corporate  governance  regimes  justify  themselves  by 
stating that convergence makes sense in terms of economic efficiency. However, others argue that 
economic efficiency may be an insufficient force to bring about convergence and that convergence 
may only be achieved if political and institutional barriers are eliminated. Thus, Roe (2002, 2003) 
and Coffee (2000) suggest that powerful interest and lobby groups are an important barrier to 
convergence. Roe (1991) claims that political constraints lead to a suboptimal system and prevent 
the  move  towards  a  more  efficient  system.  Furthermore,  Bebchuk  and  Roe  (2000)  stress  the 
importance of path dependency in terms of the evolution of corporate  governance. The initial 
institutional structures
109 and their effect on the legal rules governing the corporations
110 are two 
main factors that are likely to prevent convergence in practice.  
Nonetheless, even if global convergence is unlikely to occur through changes in regulation 
or  other  institutional  arrangements,  Gilson  (2000)  suggests  that  there  may  be  contractual 
convergence of best corporate practice. Firms may choose to deviate from the national corporate 
governance  standards  by  opting  into  another  corporate  governance  regime.  This  implies 
convergence at the company level rather than at the national (or federal state) level. The incidence 
of such contractual arrangements has significantly increased over the past decade via (i) cross-
listings,
111  (ii)  a  switch  of  the  state  of  incorporation,
112  and  (iii)  cross-border  mergers  and 
                                                 
109 As an example of initial structures Bebchuk and Roe (2000) mention ownership: the initial ownership affects ‘the 
identity of the corporate structure of the economy that would be efficient for any given company and, also, gives 
some parties both incentives and power to impede changes’. 
110 The initial ownership affects both the type of corporate rules that will be efficient and the interest group politics 
(lobbying) that can determine which rules will actually be chosen. 
111 Companies opting for an additional listing on another stock exchange have to adopt the listing requirements of that 
stock  exchange,  which  may  consist  of  different  accounting  standards,  disclosure  requirements,  and  governance 
structure (Karolyi (1997), Coffee (2002), Pagano, Röell and Zechner (2003), Licht (1998, 2003)).  
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acquisitions.
113 However, if contractual convergence were to take place, it would likely result in a 
‘race-to-the-bottom’. Bebchuk and Cohen (2003) and Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) show that the 
real reason to incorporate in another state is that companies are attracted to the states that provide 
managers with a wider range of anti-takeover measures. Hence, the competition between states to 
attract incorporations may actually worsen corporate governance. Similar trends may occur as a 
result  of  cross-border  mergers  and  acquisitions.  Companies  from  countries  with  less  friendly 
takeover regimes are less likely to be taken over (and hence have more opportunities to seek target 
companies abroad), whereas companies from countries with relatively friendly takeover regimes 
are  more  likely  to  become  targets.  Since  the  target  usually  adopts  the  acquirer’s  governance 
standards,  the  cross-border  market  for  corporate  control  may  evolve  towards  a  less  friendly 
takeover  regime:  either  a  blockholder-based  regime  or  a  market-based  regime  with  effective 
takeover defences. In turn, this may push countries to adopt takeover regulation resulting in a less 
friendly takeover regime and hence in less efficient market monitoring of managers. 
We conclude that the debate as to the worldwide convergence of corporate governance 
regimes is still ongoing. A growing number of studies predict global convergence of corporate 
governance  regimes  either  via  changes  in  the  regulatory  and  institutional  framework  or  via 
contractual arrangements. However, the predictions of these studies depart substantially from each 
other  with  respect  to  the  motives  for  and  the  direction  of  convergence.  While  regulatory  and 
institutional  convergence  may  be  driven  by  motives  of  economic  efficiency,  contractual 
convergence may be driven by other motives such as managerial entrenchment.  
 
3. The corporate governance functions of takeover regulation 
 
Although takeover regulation is mainly seen as a mechanism to facilitate efficient corporate 
restructuring (Burkart (1999)), it is also important in terms of mitigating conflicts of interests 
between  diverse  company  constituencies  such  as  management,  shareholders,  and  stakeholders. 
Takeover regulation does not only curb conflicts of interests related to transfers of control, but also 
has  a  more  general  impact  on  the  agency  problems  between  management  and  shareholders, 
minority  and  majority  investors,  and  other  stakeholders.  As  such,  it  constitutes  an  important 
element of a corporate governance system. Its corporate governance role, however, depends on 
                                                                                                                                                                
112 Companies may incorporate in countries or states with favourable corporate governance rules. For example, in the 
US, Delaware accounts for almost 60% of all incorporations. According to Daines (2001), a switch to the Delaware 
incorporation has a positive impact on corporate value. 
113 According to international law, when a foreign firm acquires 100% of a domestic firm, the nationality of the latter 
changes.  Hence,  the  target  firm  usually  adopts  the  accounting  standards,  disclosure  practices,  and  governance 
structures of the acquiring firm (Bris and Cabolis (2002) and Rossi and Volpin (2003)).  
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other  characteristics  of  the  governance  system  such  as  ownership  and  control  (Goergen  and 
Renneboog 2000, 2003).  
In a system with dispersed ownership, the primary corporate governance role of takeover 
regulation is to restrain opportunistic managerial behaviour. Small shareholders cannot effectively 
monitor the management due to coordination problems and have to rely on external monitoring via 
the market for corporate control. Hostile takeovers target poorly performing firms and replace 
poorly performing management. The threat of losing their jobs and perquisites provides managers 
with an incentive to focus on shareholder objectives. The role of takeover regulation is then to 
design rules and provide instruments that minimize the costs and inefficiencies associated with the 
(hostile)  takeover  mechanism
114  and  thereby  facilitate  a  transfer  of  control  towards  more 
productive owners and management. Examples of measures stimulating takeover activity are the 
squeeze-out rule, the break-through rule, and limitations to the use of takeover defence measures.  
In  a  system  with  concentrated  ownership,  takeover  regulation  functions  as  a  corporate 
governance  device  aiming  at  protecting  minority  shareholders’  interests.  The  concentration  of 
ownership  and  control  is  seen  as  an  alternative  mechanism  that  can  mitigate  the  conflict  of 
interests between management and shareholders. Major investors have strong incentives to monitor 
management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks, Mayer and Renneboog 2001). 
Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that the advantage of monitoring by blockholders is that it 
takes place on an ongoing basis. In contrast, external disciplining only occurs in crisis situations. 
However, the presence of a controlling shareholder is also associated with potential opportunistic 
behaviour towards minority shareholders. Although there are a number of standard company law 
techniques to resolve conflicts between the large shareholder and minority shareholders, takeover 
regulation plays an important role, as it can provide minority shareholders with an ‘exit on fair 
terms’ opportunity. Provisions such as the sell-out right, the mandatory  bid rule, or the  equal 
treatment principle, ensure such exit opportunities for minority shareholders. 
Specific provisions of takeover regulation apply to control transactions to regulate conflicts 
of interests between the management and shareholders of the target and bidder. Two major agency 
problems may emerge. First, control transfers may turn the target’s incumbent shareholders into 
minority  shareholders.  Second,  the  management  of  the  target  company  may  be  tempted  to 
                                                 
114 However, hostile takeovers may constitute a disruptive and costly mechanism to bring about a change in control as 
the  vast  majority  of  the  takeovers  does  not  yield  the  anticipated  synergistic  value  increase  (Gregory  (1997), 
Dickerson, Gibson and Tsakalotos (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Ghosh (2001), Louis (2004)). There is no 
evidence that hostile takeovers are able to create more (long-term) synergistic value than friendly ones and hostile 
acquisitions tend to be more disruptive than friendly ones. Therefore, even in the US and UK where widely-held 
firms prevail, hostile takeovers are relatively rarely used. Over the 1990s, 239 hostile takeovers were announced in 
the US and 158 in the UK. This constitutes 2.3 and 6.5 percent of the total number of announced tender offers, 
respectively. There were only 67 hostile bids in the 14 EU countries (excluding the UK), representing 1.3 percent of 
all tender offers announced during this period (Thomson Financial Securities Data (2004)). In most other countries 
they are even rarer.  
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implement unduly defence measures to obstruct the takeover, even if this clashes with shareholder 
interests. Takeover regulation should aim at minimizing both potential conflicts. In particular, a 
limit  on  the  use  of  anti-takeover  devices  is  seen  as  the  best  way  to  constrain  opportunistic 
managerial behaviour. In addition, the mandatory bid rule and the sell-out right provide the target 
shareholders with a right to exit the company at a fair price.             
Overall,  the  above  discussion  suggests  that  takeover  regulation  can  have  a  number  of 
provisions that perform corporate governance functions both in the case of a transfer of control and 
in terms of governance of ordinary corporate activity. There are, however, three important trade-
offs.  First,  in  countries  with  dispersed  ownership,  provisions  aiming  at  providing  an  exit 
opportunity for target shareholders are likely to discourage the monitoring of managers via the 
market for corporate control and vice versa.
115  
A second trade-off arises with respect to the two main functions of takeover regulation: the 
promotion  of  efficient  corporate  restructuring,  and  the  reduction  of  agency  conflicts  and  the 
protection of minority shareholders. The trade-off is similar to the previous one, but relates to the 
broader definition of corporate restructuring, which apart from the hostile takeover mechanism, 
includes the reallocation of capital to better managers. As such, the second trade-off is equally 
important in countries with dispersed ownership and those with concentrated ownership. Takeover 
regulation  also  indirectly  affects  the  incentives  for  a  company  to  seek  a  listing  on  the  stock 
exchange. If the incumbent owners value control, they will often be reluctant to take their firm 
public if this exposes them to an active market for corporate control. Their reluctance to take their 
firm public depends on the distribution of gains from a future takeover bid, which is determined by 
takeover regulation. Furthermore, regulation that is likely to reduce the power of the blockholders 
discourages a listing. This constitutes a third trade-off of the regulation: promoting the expansion 
of financial markets, and supplying corporate governance devices aimed at protecting the rights of 
corporate constituencies. 
No clear guidelines are available as to how the above trade-offs should be made. The way 
the  trade-offs  are  made  critically  depends  on  the  broader  (national)  corporate  governance 
framework and the economic and political objectives of national regulators.    
 
4. Reforms of takeover regulation and corporate governance convergence 
 
                                                 
115 Regulatory provisions that allocate more takeover surplus to the bidding firm increase the bidder’s incentive to 
make a bid to acquire a poorly performing firm and replace its inefficient management upon the acquisition of 
control. However, such provisions may dilute rights of the target company’s incumbent shareholders. Takeover 
provisions that provide exit opportunities for minority shareholders redistribute the takeover surplus from the bidder 
to the target shareholders and hence make a takeover bid less attractive for the former.  
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As  takeover  regulation  is  an  important  corporate  governance  device,  any  attempts  to 
change its provisions have a significant impact on the wider corporate governance system. Not 
only do changes in takeover regulation affect the level of investor protection and the development 
of a country’s takeover market, but they may also bring about changes in ownership and control. 
As such, takeover regulation reforms provide an important channel for a corporate governance 
system to evolve. It would be misleading to conclude that the harmonization of takeover regulation 
across countries will lead to global convergence of corporate governance regimes as the corporate 
governance  functions  of  takeover  regulation  depend  on  the  degree  of  ownership  and  control 
concentration.  
Takeover regulation reforms, which focus on the conflict of interests between management 
and  shareholders,  are  likely  to  improve  investor  protection.  Depending  on  the  provisions 
introduced by the regulation, the reforms either improve the efficiency of the external monitoring 
by the market for corporate control, or restrict managerial decision power with respect to the use of 
anti-takeover devices. Since both types of provisions force managers to satisfy the interests of the 
shareholders, shareholder protection is expected to improve, should these provisions be adopted. 
La Porta et al. (1999) argue that better protection increases shareholders’ confidence and hence 
their willingness to invest, which encourages a more dispersed ownership structure.     
Regulatory reforms that introduce exit opportunities for minority shareholders reduce the 
private benefits of control that the controlling blockholder can exploit at the detriment of these 
minority shareholders. This improves the protection of the latter. Low private benefits of control 
can be regarded as a requirement for ownership dispersion, as they reduce the incentives to hold a 
controlling block. However, regulatory provisions that reduce the private benefits of control may 
discourage  not  only  holding  controlling  blocks  of  ownership,  but  also  efficient  corporate 
restructuring as private gains to a bidder are often an incentive for a takeover bid. As a result, 
control may remain in the hands of inefficient blockholders. Hence, the effect of such reforms may 
result in either the upholding of the existing concentrated ownership and control or in a shift from 
dispersed to concentrated shareholdings.   
An increase in investor protection or a decrease in private benefits of control alone may be 
insufficient to induce changes in ownership. Bebchuk (1999) shows that, in the presence of large 
private  benefits  of  control  and  a  well-functioning  takeover  market,  ownership  is  unlikely  to 
become more dispersed. Since a third party acquiring a controlling block is unable to compensate 
the incumbent blockholder for the private benefits of control the latter enjoys, it is unlikely that the 
incumbent ever accepts a bid. Thus, where private benefits of control are high, regulatory reforms 
aimed at improving investor protection are likely to reinforce the existing ownership structure. Roe 
(2002) proposes an alternative scenario. In his view, if the costs of monitoring management are 
high, the development of a well-functioning market for corporate control may lead to a shift from  
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concentrated to dispersed ownership. An active takeover market incorporates the costs of potential 
agency costs caused by high managerial discretion by providing efficient external monitoring, and 
thus reducing the need for large-shareholder monitoring. This shift towards widely-held ownership 
may be further supported by other drawbacks of large share blocks such as the costs from low 
liquidity  and  undiversified  risk.  We  conclude  that  takeover  regulation  reforms  that  enhance 
investor  protection  are  likely  to  lead  towards  more  dispersed  ownership  provided  that  private 
benefits of control are relatively low. It also follows from Bebchuk (1999) and Roe (2002) that, 
when investor protection is already high, reforms aiming at reducing private benefits of control 
may  bring  about  ownership  dispersion.  However,  if  management  has  substantial  discretion  to 
apply  anti-takeover  measures,  the  preferred  ownership  distribution  may  shift  towards  a  more 
concentrated structure even if private benefits of control are reduced. Table E-1 summarizes the 
above conjectures. 
 
Table E-1. Reforms of takeover regulation and their expected impact on ownership and control 
within a particular corporate governance system 
 
Initial characteristics of the system   Takeover regulation reforms  Expected effect on the 
ownership structure 
 Low investor protection  
(High managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control   Remains concentrated  
 High investor protection 
(Effective external monitoring of managers) 
Decrease in private benefits of control   More dispersed  
 Low private benefits of control  Improve investor protection   More dispersed  
 High private benefits of control  Improve investor protection   Remains concentrated 
 
The European Commission tried to establish a global level-playing field for a takeover 
market. However, the adoption of such a unified takeover code by countries with different initial 
settings may disperse ownership in some of them, but may further consolidate the blockholder-
based system in others. Since the blockholder-based system lacks a market for corporate control, 
any further reinforcement of this system caused by the takeover law harmonization may disable the 
attempts to establish such an international level-playing field.
116 
 
5. Devices of takeover regulation 
 
As discussed in section 3, takeover regulation should ensure a well-functioning market for 
corporate control and protect the interests of minority shareholders and other types of stakeholders. 
The regulatory devices available to achieve these two aims are manifold and comprise: (i) the 
                                                 
116 For more details on this issue, see Becht (2003)  
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mandatory bid rule, (ii) the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, (iii) ownership and control 
transparency,  (iv)  squeeze-out  and  sell-out  rules,  (v)  the  one-share-one-vote  principle,  (vi)  the 
break-through rule, and (vii) board neutrality with respect to anti-takeover measures. This section 
discusses the role of each device as well as its potential consequences for the ownership structure. 
Table E-2 summarizes the conjectures presented below.  
 
5.1 The mandatory bid rule 
 
The mandatory bid rule provides the minority shareholders with an opportunity to exit the 
company on fair terms. The rule requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all the shareholders 
once she has accumulated a certain percentage of the shares. Whereas about a decade ago, a tender 
offer on all shares outstanding was only mandatory after an investor had acquired de facto majority 
control, nowadays thresholds are substantially lower. For instance, there has been a decrease in the 
thresholds in Denmark and Italy. In these countries, a tender offer needs to be made to all the 
remaining shareholders as soon as the bidder has accumulated one third of the company’s equity. 
The mandatory bid rule usually also dictates the price of the tender offer.  Depending on the 
national regulation, the price must not be lower than the highest price paid for the shares already 
acquired by the bidder or must not be lower than a certain percentage of the average share price of 
the previous 12 months (e.g. 75%). The mandatory bid requirement is justified on the grounds that 
an investor, who obtains control, may be tempted to exploit private benefits of  control at the 
expense of the minority shareholders. As such, the role of the mandatory bid rule in takeover 
regulation is to protect the minority shareholders by providing them with the opportunity to exit at 
a fair price.  
Although the mandatory bid requirement may mitigate the problem of expropriation of 
minority shareholders, it also decreases the likelihood of value-creating restructuring (Burkart and 
Panunzi, 2004). The main reason for this is that the rule makes control transactions more expensive 
and thereby discourages bidders from making a bid in the first place. There are several ways to 
reduce these costs. First, the costs can be reduced by increasing the threshold above which the 
acquirer has to make a mandatory offer. Second, the costs can be reduced by allowing the price in 
the  tender  offer  to  be  lower  than  the  highest  price  paid  for  any  of  the  shares  previously 
accumulated. Third, they can be reduced by granting further exceptions to the rule rather than just 
for financial distress of the target. However, any of the suggested modifications to the rule increase 
the likelihood that minority shareholders are expropriated and violate the equal treatment principle 
of corporate law.  
Introducing a mandatory  bid  rule has some implications for the  ownership and control 
structure  in  a  blockholder  system.  First,  it  makes  the  blockholder  system  less  efficient,  as  it  
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reduces the trade in controlling blocks which is the dominant way to transfer control in this system 
(Köke  and  Renneboog,  2004).  Consequently,  control  may  remain  in  the  hands  of  inefficient 
blockholders. Second, it restricts the size of the stake a blockholder is allowed to acquire without 
triggering a tender offer. Third, the higher the bid price in a mandatory tender offer, the lower is 
the acquirer’s incentive to make a bid such that ownership and control in the blockholder system is 
likely to remain concentrated. 
In contrast to the blockholder system, the shareholder-oriented system with its dispersed 
ownership structure is almost unaffected by the introduction of the mandatory bid rule. Although 
the  requirement  to  make  a  tender  offer  may  reduce  the  intensity  of  M&A  activity  and  hence 
provide managers with greater discretion, it is unlikely to result in a more concentrated ownership 
structure.  
 
5.2 The principle of equal treatment  
 
While  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  constitutes  an  important  principle  of  corporate 
governance regulation, it is particularly important in takeover regulation where the possibilities of 
violations of the rights of minority shareholders are far-reaching. The principle requires controlling 
shareholders,  the  management,  and  other  constituencies  to  treat  all  shareholders  within  each 
individual  class  of  shares  equally.  The  equal  treatment  requirement  became  a  fundamental 
principle  in  almost  all  Western  European  countries  prior  the  1990s.  During  the  1990s,  it  was 
introduced in Switzerland
117 as well as in Central and Eastern European countries.
118 
The  equal  treatment  principle  requires  an  acquirer  the  opportunity  to  offer  minority 
shareholders to exit on terms that are no less favourable than those offered to the shareholders who 
sold a controlling block. Overall, the role of the equal treatment principle in takeover regulation is 
similar to the mandatory bid rule as both aim at protecting minority shareholders.  
The  adoption  of  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  substantially  affects  the  blockholder 
system,  but  has  virtually  no  effect  on  the  market-based  system.  In  target  companies  with 
concentrated  ownership,  an  acquirer  usually  has  to  offer  a  control  premium  to  the  incumbent 
blockholder  reflecting  the  potential  private  benefits  of  control.  If  there  is  a  mandatory  bid 
                                                 
117 Until 1992, the principle was unwritten, but generally recognized at the level of company law. As from the 1992-
revision, it was incorporated in the law (art. 717 sec. 2 CO) in a qualified manner, providing for equal treatment 
under equal circumstances. Although the principle refers to the treatment of shareholders by the board of directors, it 
is recognized as a general principle. At the level of stock exchange regulations, takeover offers have had to comply 
with the principle of equal treatment of shareholders (art. 24 sec. 2 SESTA) since 1998. 
118 For example, in Bulgaria, the principle is contained in Art.181, Para. 3 of the Trade Act of 2000. In Cyprus, Section 
69A  of  the  Companies  Law  introduced  in  2003  states  that:  “the  shareholders  of  a  class  of  shares  of  a  public 
company shall be equally treated by the company”. In the Czech Republic, it was introduced in 2001 (§ 155/7 of the 
Commercial Code)..  
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requirement, the bidder has to repurchase the remaining shares at a price no less that the one she 
paid for the controlling block. Therefore, the combination of the mandatory bid and the equal 
treatment principle increases the costs of an acquisition and decreases the price that a bidder is able 
to offer to the controlling shareholder (Davies and Hopt, 2004). This discourages the incentives to 
make a bid, as well as the incentives for incumbent blockholders to accept one. Consequently, the 
equal treatment principle is an additional barrier to a well-functioning market for corporate control 
in  a  blockholder-based  governance  regime.
119  Nonetheless,  the  equal  treatment  principle  may 
cause a shift towards more dispersed ownership, as it discourages the accumulation of controlling 
share blocks in the long run. Conversely, Bebchuk (1999) predicts that concentrated ownership 
will prevail, especially when the principle of equal treatment is not enshrined in corporate law. 
 
5.3  Transparency of ownership and control 
 
An important element of corporate governance consists in the disclosure of voting and cash 
flow rights. In all Western countries, the disclosure regulation relates to voting rights rather than 
cash  flow  rights  (see  the  country  studies  in  Barca  and  Becht  (2001)).  Virtually  all  of  these 
countries have recently lowered the thresholds above which the ownership of control rights need to 
be disclosed. In some countries, the ‘strategic intent’ or the purpose for which the share stake was 
acquired also has to be disclosed. Thus, in the early 1990s, the average threshold for disclosure in 
Western Europe and Scandinavia was about 9 percent, with the UK having the lowest threshold (3 
percent), and Germany the highest threshold (25 percent). In countries such as Italy and Sweden, a 
mandatory disclosure of voting rights was introduced for the first time as late as 1992. By 2004, 
the average threshold was reduced to 5 percent with the lowest threshold of 2 percent in Italy and 
the highest one of 10 percent in Luxembourg and Sweden. Information about major share blocks 
allows the regulator, minority shareholders and the market to monitor large blockholders in order 
to avoid that the latter extract private benefits of control at the expense of other stakeholders. In 
other words, transparency minimizes potential agency problems ex ante. Moreover, transparency 
allows  the  regulator  to  investigate,  for  instance,  insider  trading  or  self-dealing  by  large 
blockholders.  
Conversely,  a  higher  threshold  for  the  mandatory  control  disclosure  improves  the 
efficiency  of  the  hostile  takeover  mechanism  (Grossman  and  Hart,  1980).  Bidders  can  make 
substantial profits on the toehold stake they built up prior to reaching the disclosure threshold. The 
disclosure of the acquisition of a major stake may alert the market that a bid is likely to take place. 
                                                 
119 It is only in the absence of large private benefits of control that private negotiations with the incumbent controlling 
blockholder are likely to result in lower costs for a control transfer than an open market purchase from dispersed 
shareholders (Bagnoli and Lipman, 1988, Holmström and Nalebuff,1990, and Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi,1997). 
The presence of controlling shareholders in companies may then facilitate an active market for corporate control.   
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This will lead to a revision of the share price  that may then reflect the likely  gains from the 
takeover. The higher the thresholds for the ownership disclosure and the mandatory bid, the lower 
is the number of shares for which the bidder pays the full takeover premium. Conversely, lowering 
the disclosure and mandatory bid thresholds will cause a fraction of potential takeovers not to be 
undertaken.
120  
However, a decrease in the disclosure threshold is unlikely to have a substantial impact on 
control. On the one hand, lowering the disclosure threshold reduces the bidder’s incentives to 
make a bid, which may lead to less efficient external monitoring of management. On the other 
hand,  a  lower  threshold  enhances  the  disclosure  of  information  and  hence  positively  affects 
investor protection. As it is unclear which effect dominates, the impact of a tightening of control 
disclosure on the shareholding structure is ambiguous.          
 
5.4  The squeeze-out and sell-out rules 
 
The  squeeze-out  rule  gives  the  controlling  shareholder  the  right  to  force  minority 
shareholders, who hold out in a tender offer, to sell their shares to the bidder at or below the tender 
offer price (Boehmer (2002), and Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003)). The squeeze-out rule only kicks 
in, if the bidder has acquired a specific percentage of the equity, usually 90%.
121 The rule allows 
the  bidder  to  obtain  100%  of  the  equity  and  frees  him  from  having  to  deal  with  minority 
shareholders. The squeeze-out rule affects the behaviour of the target shareholders during a tender 
offer  as  it  reduces  the  hold-out  problem  and  may  lead  to  a  decrease  in  the  tender  price.
122 
According to Yarrow (1985) and Maug (2004), the economic efficiency of the squeeze-out rule 
depends  on  how  the  price  at  which  the  minority  shares  are  squeezed  out  is  determined.  For 
example, Maug’s model predicts that economic efficiency worsens if minority shareholders extract 
higher premiums in squeeze-outs. If these premiums are higher than those offered in the tender 
offer, then few will be tempted to tender in the first place. 
The  sell-out  rule  is  another  provision  aiming  at  protecting  the  remaining  minority 
shareholders who have the right to demand the controlling shareholder to buy their shares at a fair 
price. The rule reduces the pressure on the target shareholders to tender. As a consequence, this 
                                                 
120  See e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Hirshleifer and Titman (1990), Kyle and Vila (1991), and Burkart (1999). 
121 Across countries, there is some variation in the threshold above which the bidder can squeeze out the remaining 
minority shareholders. Ireland has the lowest threshold with 80 percent. The usual threshold in Western European 
countries is 90 percent, while Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands impose the highest threshold, 95 
percent. However, 95 percent became the highest threshold only in 1998 when Italy and Switzerland reduced their 
squeeze-out threshold from 98 to 90 percent. 
122 When a bid is conditional on the squeeze-out threshold, shareholders cannot gain from retaining shares. Hence, they 
are willing to tender at prices below post-takeover minority share value. Therefore, bidders who condition their bid 
on a squeeze-out threshold should earn higher returns.  
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rule has a negative impact on the likelihood of acquisitions occurring. Although the sell-out rule is 
seen  as  a  counter-provision  to  the  squeeze-out  rule,  the  two  rules  are  used  jointly  in  many 
jurisdictions. The proposed European Takeover Directive contains both the squeeze-out and sell-
out rights.  
Summarizing  the  above  discussion,  the  squeeze-out  rule  mitigates  potential  free-riding 
behaviour by small shareholders, thereby allocating more of the takeover gains to the bidder. In 
addition,  the  rule  eliminates  the  potential  problems  that  may  arise  between  the  controlling 
shareholder and the remaining minority shareholders after most of the target’s shares have been 
acquired. Hence, the squeeze-out rule is expected to facilitate takeovers and its introduction may 
have a positive impact on the development of a takeover market. In contrast, the sell-out rule 
reduces  the  share  of  takeover  gains  allocated  to  the  bidder,  thereby  discouraging  some  value-
creating takeovers. The rule is aimed at protecting minority shareholders. Like the squeeze-out 
rule, the sell-out right also eliminates potential conflicts between the majority shareholder and the 
minority  shareholders.  The  adoption  of  the  two  rules  may  reduce  the  incentives  of  holding 
controlling blocks and may thus reduce ownership concentration in the long run.      
 
5.5  The one-share-one-vote principle 
 
The one-share-one-vote principle speaks against any arrangements restricting voting rights. 
Dual-class shares with multiple voting rights, non-voting shares and voting caps are forbidden if 
this legal principle is upheld. The issue of dual class shares or non-voting shares allows some 
shareholders to accumulate control while limiting their cash investment. Another way to deviate 
from the one-share-one-vote principle is via pyramids of control. The use of intermediate holding 
companies allows the investor at the top of the pyramid  í WKH XOWLPDWH VKDUHKROGHU í WR KDYH
control with reduced cash flow rights. Renneboog (2000) and Köke (2004) show that for Belgium 
and  Germany,  respectively,  it  is  the  ultimate  shareholder  rather  than  direct  shareholders  who 
monitors the firm and exercises control.  
The potential benefit from introducing differentiated voting rights is that more firms may 
seek a stock exchange listing. Company owners who value control are often reluctant to take their 
firm public if they risk losing control in the process. A deviation from the one-share-one-vote rule 
allows them to minimize the risk of losing control. Hart (1988) argues that a deviation from the 
one-share-one-vote principle is unlikely to hurt minority shareholders as the lack of control rights 
is compensated by the lower offer price at the flotation.  
Becht, Bolton and Röell (2003) review the theoretical literature which addresses whether 
deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule improve the efficiency of the takeover mechanism. 
Grossman and Hart (1988) show that, if shareholdings are dispersed, the one-share-one-vote rule  
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ensures a socially efficient outcome of a takeover bid because it enables the bidder who values the 
target the most to gain control. Furthermore, deviations from the rule may harm the development 
of a market for corporate control. First, given that differentiated voting rights facilitate the control 
by a few owners, this makes a takeover virtually impossible without a break-through rule (see sub-
section 5.6). Second, although violations of the one-share-one-vote rule such as voting agreements 
can  curb  the  power  of  the  controlling  shareholder  and  provide  greater  protection  to  minority 
shareholders,  they  may  also  increase  managerial  discretion  and  discourage  potential  value-
increasing takeovers (Crespi and Renneboog, 2003). Third, voting restrictions such as voting caps 
represent important anti-takeover devices that discourage potential bidders from making an offer. 
However, such voting restrictions provide greater protection to minority shareholders.  
Preventing  deviations  from  the  one-share-one-vote  principle  has  a  two-fold  effect  on 
ownership and control. First, it eliminates barriers to the takeover market, and therefore protects 
investors against opportunistic managerial behaviour. This may translate into a greater willingness 
of small investors to participate in equity financing which leads to a more dispersed shareholding 
structure. Thus, the one-share-one-vote rule may be an important corporate governance device, 
especially for firms with a dispersed ownership structure. Second, a reform that bans deviations 
from  the  rule  reduces  minority  shareholder  protection,  increases  the  potential  private  gains  of 
control and encourages ownership concentration. Thus, the impact of the introduction of the one-
share-one-vote principle to the blockholder system is still ambiguous, as it depends on whether the 
effect from the protection against opportunistic behaviour of incumbent managers or that from the 
reduced shareholder protection resulting from the abolition of voting caps dominates.  
 
5.6  The break-through rule 
 
The effects of a violation of the one-share-one-vote principle via dual class shares, non-
voting shares or voting caps, can be undone if corporate law allows for a break-through rule. This 
rule enables a bidder who has accumulated a given fraction of the equity, to break through the 
company’s existing voting arrangements and exercise control as if the one-share-one-vote principle 
were upheld. For example, a recently acquired block consisting of a majority of non-voting rights 
may be converted into a voting majority by means of the break-through rule. The rule facilitates 
corporate restructuring as it allows the bidder to bypass anti-takeover devices and redistributes the 
takeover  gains from the incumbent shareholders to the bidder.
123 Thus, the break-through rule 
                                                 
123 Berglöf and Burkart (2003) argue that the break-through rule reduces the costs associated with the acquisition of all 
minority shares as imposed by the mandatory bid rule. They compare the takeover price that a bidder is expected to 
pay in order to acquire 100% of the company’s equity under two scenarios: (1) the case of a negotiated block trade 
with an incumbent shareholder and a subsequent mandatory bid, and (2) the case of a direct tender offer to non-
controlling shareholders (bypassing the incumbent shareholder controlling a majority of the voting rights) with the  
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makes transfers of control feasible that would otherwise have been made impossible due to the 
opposition by a target shareholder holding a majority of voting shares. 
However,  the  break-through  rule  also  has  some  major  disadvantages.  First,  there  is 
inconsistency between the break-through rule and the mandatory bid rule. The break-through rule 
gives control by circumventing the provisions in the articles of association rather than by acquiring 
a certain percentage of voting shares. As such, the break-through rule violates the principle of 
shareholder  decision-making.  Second,  in  addition  to  making  value-increasing  takeover  bids 
possible, the break-through rule also facilitates takeover attempts by inefficient bidders who would 
otherwise  be  discouraged  by  the  mandatory  bid  requirement.  Third,  the  rule  not  only  makes 
inefficient  acquisitions  possible,  but  also  frustrates  attempts  by  the  incumbent  shareholders  to 
prevent such bids. Finally, the main concern is that the break-through rule will induce the creation 
of even more complex pyramids and cross-holdings (Bebchuk and Hart, 2002). The reason is that 
such voting structures are not covered by the break-through rule which only targets voting caps, 
non-voting shares and multiple-voting shares. Technically, shifts towards pyramidal ownership 
structures could disable most of the advantages of the break-through rule.  
The  direct  effect  of  the  break-through  rule  within  the  blockholder-based  system  is  the 
decrease in the costs of successful bids. This decrease promotes takeover activity and facilitates 
transfers of control. However, Berglöf and Burkart (2003) argue that the rule fundamentally alters 
the initial contracts of the controlling owners resulting in uncertainty about property rights, and 
thus reducing the incentives of the controlling owners to invest in corporate governance actions. 
The rule also eliminates their veto over transfers of control and reduces their prospects of getting 
compensated for their private benefits of control. Overall, this suggests that the introduction of the 
rule should eventually increase ownership dispersion. However, as argued above, the emergence of 
more  complex  control  structures  such  as  pyramids  and  cross-shareholdings  to  circumvent  the 
breakthrough rule may reinforce the blockholder model. Therefore, we conclude that the long-run 
impact of the break-through rule on ownership is unclear as it depends on the blockholders’ ability 
to build up share stakes via pyramids. 
  
5.7   Board neutrality and anti-takeover measures 
 
Although  the  takeover  market  is  considered  to  be  an  external  corporate  governance 
mechanism that forces managers to act in the interests of the shareholders, it can also be a source 
of even greater divergence of interests between these two parties. In the wake of a takeover threat, 
the management of the target company potentially faces  a conflict of interests: the transaction may 
                                                                                                                                                                
subsequent application of the break-through rule. They show that the break-through rule reduces the acquisition 
costs compared to a negotiated block trade followed by a mandatory bid.  
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create shareholder value, but also endangers their jobs and perquisites. If the management of the 
target firm has unrestricted power, the line of actions chosen may focus on their own interests and 
hence on the prevention of a takeover. This calls for a set of rules that govern the behaviour of 
management and shareholders when a takeover offer is imminent. The rules deal with the issues of 
who  decides  whether  to  reject  or  accept  the  offer,  the  adoption  of  takeover  defences  and  the 
bargaining strategy with the bidder. The rules mainly apply to widely-held companies where the 
problem of managerial discretion is especially pronounced.   
There are two solutions for mitigating the managerial agency problem in a takeover context 
(Davies and Hopt (2004)). The first is to transfer the decision as to the acceptance of a bid to the 
shareholders of the target company and to remove it from the management. Unless the regulator 
forbids this, the management can only influence the decision by taking actions that discourage 
potential  bidders  from  making  an  offer  in  the  first  place  or  by  prolonging  the  offer  process. 
Examples of such actions are the attempt to make the company less attractive to a potential bidder, 
the advice to the target shareholders to reject the bid, and the search for a white knight.  
Currently,  several  jurisdictions impose  board  neutrality  with  respect  to  takeover  offers, 
preventing  the  board  of  directors  from  taking  actions  that  may  frustrate  a  potential  bid.  For 
example, the use of poison pills is forbidden in most European countries. The main argument in 
favour of board neutrality is that it limits the potential coercive effect of a bid (Bebchuk (2002), 
Arlen and Talley (2003)). In most jurisdictions, the board should indeed remain neutral and limit 
the use of anti-takeover devices unless an anti-takeover strategy was approved by the shareholders 
at a general meeting and only once a bid has been made.
124  
The second solution is to provide the board with substantial decision power, but to give the 
shareholders the possibility to veto its decisions. The board has then the right to negotiate with a 
bidder  on  behalf  of  the  shareholders.  This  arrangement  mitigates  the  coordination  problem 
between  small  shareholders  in  case  of  dispersed  ownership  and  the  agency  problems  of  other 
stakeholders such as the employees. In a second stage, the shareholders are asked to approve or 
reject  the  managerial  advice.  Although  this  arrangement  gives  more  flexibility  to  the  target 
management to act against potentially undesired bids by setting up an anticipatory anti-takeover 
strategy, there is also more opportunity for the managers to pursue their own interests. Therefore, 
additional corporate governance devices should be introduced, such as the strengthening of the 
independence of the non-executive directors, and the use of executive compensation contracts that 
align managerial interests with those of the shareholders. 
                                                 
124 Where ownership and control are concentrated, if the law requires the approval of a defensive  measure by a 
majority of shareholders at the AGM, a controlling shareholder can easily oppose any takeover attempt. Therefore, it 
is important to allow for deviations from the one-share-one-vote rule in favour of the minority shareholders when 
the adoption of defensive measures is up for a vote.  
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The first solution effectively addresses the potential agency problems between shareholders 
and  management  of  the  target  in  the  wake  of  a  takeover.  However,  its  weakness  is  that  the 
defensive tactics can only be applied once a bid has been received and not prior to receiving a bid. 
In  contrast,  the  second  solution  provides  management  with  the  flexibility  to  prevent  value-
destroying takeovers ex ante. However, this mechanism may increase the agency problem between 
management and shareholders. Both solutions are applied in the real world. The first one is used 
mainly in the UK and in most of Continental Europe, whereas the second one is applied in the US 
and some European countries such as the Netherlands. Germany has opted for a mix of the two.   
The two solutions have implications not only in terms of the relative importance of agency 
problems and the development of the market for corporate control, but also in terms of ownership. 
Roe (2002) predicts that, under the second solution, ownership may become more concentrated as 
management has substantial discretion to apply anti-takeover measures and costs associated with 
managerial  discretion  are  high.  If  ownership  is  concentrated,  the  first  solution  may  encourage 
better  minority  shareholder  protection  as  it  reduces  the  power  of  the  managers  acting  in  the 
interests of the large blockholder. In this case, ownership is likely to become more dispersed. 
However, this may be true only if the voting power of the controlling blockholder is also restricted. 
Otherwise,  ownership  will  become  even  more  entrenched  in  the  hands  of  the  controlling 




Table E-2. Expected consequences of takeover regulation reform (summary of the conjectures discussed in section 5) 
 
Concentrated ownership structure  Dispersed ownership structure    Elements of Takeover regulation 
Impact on 
M&A activity 





















Fewer M&As  Better protection  No impact 
1.1  Lower mandatory bid threshold  Fewer M&As  Better protection  More 
dispersion 
Fewer M&As  Better protection  No impact 
1.2  Higher price at which the bid should be made  Fewer M&As 
 
Better protection  Ambiguous  Fewer M&As  Better protection   No impact 
1.3  No equal treatment requirement  More M&As 














1.4  Equal treatment requirement (in the presence of 
high private benefits of control) 
Fewer M&As  Better protection  Ambiguous 
(more 
dispersion) 
No impact  Better protection  No impact 
1.5  Equal treatment requirement (in case of low 
private benefits of control) 
More M&As  No impact  More 
dispersion 
No impact  No impact  No impact 




No impact  No impact  No impact 
3  Ownership and control transparency 
(Lower disclosure threshold) 
Fewer M&As  Better ex-ante 
protection  
Ambiguous  Fewer M&As  Better ex-ante 
protection  
Ambiguous 
4  The Squeeze-out Rule  More M&As  Better protection  More 
dispersion 
More M&As  Better protection  No impact 




Fewer M&As  Better protection  No impact 
6  Ban on the deviation from the  
One share/One vote principle 
More M&As   Ambiguous  
(Less protection) 
Ambiguous  More M&As  Ambiguous 
(Less protection) 
No impact 
7  Breakthrough rule  More M&As   Less protection 
 
Ambiguous  More M&As   Less protection  Ambiguous 
8  Management neutrality and limitations on 
anti-takeover measures: 
More M&As   Ambiguous  
(Better protection) 
Ambiguous  More M&As  Ambiguous 
(Less protection) 
No impact 
8.1  Management is decision-taker, anti-takeover 
devices can be installed only when a bid occurs 
More M&As   Ambiguous  Ambiguous  More M&As   Less protection  No impact 
8.2  Management is decision-maker, anti-takeover 
devices can be installed prior to a bid 
Fewer M&As  Ambiguous  Ambiguous  Fewer M&As  Better protection   More 
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6. Reforms of takeover regulation in Europe over the period of 1990-2004 
 
The history of takeover regulation in Europe goes back to 1968 when the UK introduced a 
voluntary code, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in response to a series of large takeovers. 
Since then, the Code has been frequently amended. The two main provisions of the City Code are a 
mandatory bid rule with a threshold of 30 percent beyond which a tender offer becomes compulsory, 
and the prohibition to discriminate against certain shareholders. Other important provisions concern 
the actions of the bidder prior to the bid announcement, the information about the bid issued to the 
target shareholders, and the defensive measures available to the target. The Code also stipulates 
managerial neutrality as it prohibits management to take any  actions against a takeover without 
shareholder consent.  
Takeover  regulation  in  Continental  Europe  was  only  put  in  place  during  the  late  1980s 
following a dramatic increase in takeover activity. Many Continental European jurisdictions used the 
British  City  Code  as  a  benchmark  (Hopt  (2002),  and  Berglöf  and  Burkart  (2003)).  Initially, 
Continental Europe came up with voluntary codes which were replaced by binding rules in the mid-
1990s. However, even to date some countries have purely voluntary codes in place. In the late 1990s, 
there was a new wave of reforms in response to the fifth takeover wave. A third of these takeovers 
were  cross-border  transactions.  The  European  Commission  set  up  the  High  Level  Group  of 
Company  Law  Experts  headed  by  Professor  Jaap  Winter  to  make  recommendations  on  the 
harmonization  of  European  corporate  law,  and  takeover  regulation  in  particular.  In  2002,  the 
Commission presented the first draft of the Takeover Directive based on the recommendations of the 
Group. This draft focused on the introduction of five provisions regarding: (i) a mandatory bid rule, 
(ii) the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, (iii) a squeeze-out rule and sell-out right, (iv) the 
principle  of  board  neutrality,  and  (v)  a  break-through  rule.  The  fifth  provision  of  the  proposed 
Directive met with substantial opposition from EU member states and was not approved.  
While  the  European  Commission  attempted  to  harmonize  takeover  regulation  at  the 
European level, most member countries were already engaged in reforming their national takeover 
legislation. The dynamics of the European takeover reforms are presented in Figures E-3 to E-10. 
We classify all countries into six groups according to their legal origin and economic development, 
following  La  Porta  et  al.  (1997).  Countries  from  the  former  communist  block  are  classified 
according to their (staged) accession to the European Union, as this event has probably an important 
impact on their legislative reforms. Figures E-1 and E-2 show an overview of the ultimate control in 
European countries in the late 1990s.
125 Since major takeover regulation reforms took place in the 
late 1990s, we predict how these ownership patterns may evolve as a result of the reforms. 
                                                 
125 Faccio and Lang (2002) argue that the ownership and control structure in Western countries was relatively stable over 
the 1990s. Hence, the ownership and control structures in Figures 1 and 2 are also representative for the early and mid  
176 
 


































































Figure E-1. Percentage of listed companies  Figure E-2. Percentage of listed companies with a 
under majority   blocking control minority of at least 25%  
 
Data source: Faccio and Lang (2002) for the countries with law of English, German, French, and Scandinavian origin, the ECGI 
project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession Process”(2001) for the EU accession countries. 
 
Figures E-1 and E-2 show that the blockholder-based regime prevails in most of Continental 
Europe and is characterized by majority or near-majority holdings of stock held in the hands of one, 
two, or a small group of investors. In contrast, the market-based system, which is found in the UK 
and  the  Republic  of  Ireland,  is  characterized  by  dispersed  equity.  Although  the  difference  in 
ownership between Continental Europe, on the one hand, and the UK and Ireland, on the other, is 
remarkable, there is also some variation in the percentage of companies under majority or blocking 
minority control across the Continental European countries. Thus, Figure E-1 shows that countries of 
Scandinavian  legal  origin  have  the  lowest  percentage  of  companies  controlled  by  a  majority 
blockholder whereas countries of German legal origin and recent EU accession countries (except for 
Slovenia) have the highest percentage. The percentage varies from just above 10 percent in Slovenia 
to more than 60 percent in Estonia and Latvia. Figure E-2 reports that the percentage of Continental 
European companies controlled by investors with blocking minorities of at least 25 percent is very 
high.  The  difference  across  countries  is  less  pronounced  though,  as  in  almost  all  more  than  50 
percent of listed companies have a controlling blockholder. As discussed in sections 3 and 4, the 
effects of the reforms and their effectiveness may be different in each country given the differences 
                                                                                                                                                                   
1990s. However, this is not a valid statement for the recent EU accession countries, which experienced a wave of 
privatisations in the early 1990s.   
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in control. However, different patterns of voting power also imply that different types of takeover 
provisions are likely to be introduced in the takeover law.               
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Figure E-3. Adoption of the mandatory bid rule  Figure  E-4.  Adoption  of  the  equal  treatment 
principle 
 
Notes: Countries are grouped according to their legal origin following the classification by La Porta et al. (1997) and according to the 
EU enlargement process. Countries are grouped as follows: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland and the UK), German legal 
origin (Switzerland, Austria, Germany), French legal origin (Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
and Greece), Scandinavian legal origin (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland), 2004 EU Accession (Slovenia, Hungary, 
Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Cyprus), 2007 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Romania, and 




Figure E-3 shows that the mandatory bid rule had been widely adopted across the different 
groups of countries by 2004. Resistance towards the rule remains in countries of Scandinavian (e.g. 
Sweden) and French (e.g. Luxembourg and the Netherlands) legal origin. Amongst the countries that 
became EU members in 2004, only Cyprus did not adopt it. All three candidates earmarked for EU 
membership in 2007 – Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania – have already adopted the rule. Despite the 
widespread adoption of the rule, its settings vary substantially across the countries both with respect 
to the threshold and the price at which the offer must be made. The threshold varies between 20 
percent and two-thirds of the voting capital, with the majority of countries having a threshold of one-
third of the voting rights. However, a number of countries have not specified a threshold and instead 
require  a  mandatory  bid  as  soon  as  control  has  been  obtained.  Moreover,  Switzerland
127  allows 
shareholders of a potential target to choose whether to apply the mandatory bid rule or not. The rules 
on the fixing of the price in the mandatory offer also differ across jurisdictions. For example, the 
                                                 
126 The Martynova-Renneboog (2004) database is described in the Appendix. 
127 Art. 22(2) and 32(1) Loi sur les bourses. However, to use this option companies need to mention this option explicitly 




129 require the price to be equal to the highest price paid for pre-bid purchases. 
Other jurisdictions have opted for a more flexible approach. In Italy, the price has to be equal to the 
average market price over the 12 months prior the bid announcement
130 whereas in Switzerland is 
has to be at 75 percent of the highest pre-bid market price.
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Figure E-5. Adoption of the squeeze-out rule  Figure E-6. The use of voting caps  
(See comments to the Figure E-3) 
 
In contrast to the diversity in terms of the adoption and provisions of the mandatory rule, 
Figure E-4 reports that there is widespread consensus in Europe with respect to the principle of equal 
treatment of shareholders. In the US, there is no such consensus at the state level. Davies and Hopt 
(2004) report that two-tier offers, which violate the equal-treatment requirement, ‘do not offend the 
provisions of the Williams Act in the US’.
132 The equal treatment requirement had already been 
adopted as a fundamental principle by almost all the Western European countries prior to the 1990s. 
During  the  1990s,  it  was  introduced  in  Switzerland
133  and  in  Central  and  Eastern  European 
countries.
134 
                                                 
128 Rule 9.5, 6, and 11 City Code. 
129 Par. 4 Übernahmegesetz – Angebotsverordnung and Par. 31 Übernahmegesetz. 
130 Art. 106(2) Legislative Decree 58. 
131 Art. 32(4) Loi sur les bourses. 
132 The Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78a, prohibits first-come, first-served offers but not two-tier tender offers. The latter 
involve two parts: in the first tier offer, the bidder pays a premium above the market price for a controlling block, 
whereas in the second tier, the terms are much less favourable. Although this system mitigates the shareholders’ hold-
out problem in a tender offer and hence stimulates the takeover market, it also pushes shareholders to tender even if 
they believe the bid is inadequate. To resolve this problem, US companies resort to poison pills (Subramanian (1998)). 
133 Until 1992, the principle was unwritten, but generally recognized at the level of company law. As from the 1992-
revision, it was incorporated in the law (art. 717 sec. 2 CO) in a qualified manner, providing for equal treatment under 
equal circumstances. Although the principle refers to the treatment of shareholders by the board of directors, it is  
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The pan-European acceptance of the equal-treatment principle can be regarded as the result 
of  regulatory  competition  between  the  jurisdictions.  Only  the  central  European  countries  were 
lagging  but  have  since  2001  all  adopted  this  principle.  Under  the  equal-treatment  requirement, 
countries  with  a  low  ownership  threshold  triggering  a  mandatory  bid  are  more  likely  to  move 
towards dispersed ownership than countries that make a tender offer conditional on the acquisition of 
control. The recent trend to reduce the mandatory bid threshold in many European countries may 
result in some degree of convergence towards a market-based model.  
According to Figure E-5, the squeeze-out provision is now commonly used in the English, 
German,  and  Scandinavian  law  countries.  However,  less  than  two-thirds  of  the  French  law 
jurisdictions had adopted the squeeze-out rule by 2004. About half the countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 also do not such a rule in place. However, it is likely that these countries will soon adopt the 
rule. As in the case of the mandatory rule, the provisions of the squeeze-out rule vary substantially 
across countries. Thus, the threshold beyond which a bidder can force any remaining shareholders to 
sell their shares ranges from 80 percent (in Ireland) to 95 percent (in Belgium, France, Germany and 
the Netherlands), with a threshold of 90 percent in the majority of countries. The provisions for the 
fixing of the price for the squeeze-out purchase also differ between the jurisdictions. Although the 
adoption  of  the  squeeze-out  rule  may  encourage  more  control  transactions,  its  impact  on  the 
ownership structure in countries with concentrated ownership is likely to be small, as the private 
benefits of holding control in these countries remain relatively high (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). To 
achieve  ownership  dispersion,  the  regulator  needs  to  make  control  more  contestable  and  thus 
combine the rule with provisions that reduce the incentives to hold controlling blocks.      
An interesting result arises from the analysis of the deviation from the one-share-one-vote 
principle. Figures E-6 – E-8 present the evolution of the adoption or rejection of voting arrangements 
in the form of non-voting shares, multiple voting shares, and voting caps, respectively. Figure E-6 
shows the changes in the legal attitude towards voting caps. There is slow convergence towards the 
abolishment of voting caps. Voting caps limit the power of blockholders and may be a powerful 
takeover  defence.  Therefore,  their  abolishment  in  some  European  countries  í VXFK DV WKRVH RI
French legal origin and the EU accession countries íLVPRWLYDWHGE\UHJXODWRUVZDQWLQJWRVWLPXODWH
the takeover market. However, banning voting caps in countries with concentrated ownership makes 
it impossible to cap the power of large new shareholders. Therefore, we project that the abolishment 
                                                                                                                                                                   
recognized as a general principle. At the level of stock exchange regulations, takeover offers have had to comply with 
the principle of equal treatment of shareholders (art. 24 sec. 2 SESTA) since 1998. 
134 For example, in Bulgaria, the principle is explicitly provided in Art.181, Para. 3 of the Trade Act of 2000. In Cyprus, 
Section 69A of the Companies Law which was introduced in 2003 provides that: “the shareholders of a class of shares 
of a public company shall be equally treated by the company”. In the Czech Republic, the principle has existed since 
2001 according to § 155/7 Commercial Code.  
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of voting caps in countries of French legal origin and the EU accession countries is likely to lead to 
even more concentrated voting power. 
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Figure E-7. The use of non-voting shares   Figure  E-8.  The  use  of  dual-class  and  multiple 
voting shares 
 (See comments to the Figure E-3) 
 
Most countries, with the notable exception of the Scandinavian ones, allow the issue of non-
voting shares, mainly in the form of preference shares which benefit from a preferential treatment in 
terms  of  dividend  payments  and/or  in  the  case  of  a  liquidation.  The  shares  issued  by  most 
Scandinavian companies are voting shares, although they may bear each a different number of votes. 
For example, the votes from B-shares in Sweden are typically one tenth of the votes from A-shares. 
Usually, the law restricts the issue of non-voting shares to a maximum percentage of the equity. This 
percentage varies from 25 to 100 percent with 50 percent in the majority of the countries. In some 
countries, such as the UK, corporate law does not regulate the issue of differentiated voting shares, 
but the London Stock Exchange has discouraged such issues. This gentlemen’s agreement is well 
abided by as ‘it is just not cricket’ to issue non-voting shares (Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2004). 
In contrast to the wide acceptance of non-voting shares (Figure E-7), the use of dual class 
and multiple voting shares is declining (Figure E-8). By 2004 only one third of the countries allowed 
shares with multiple voting rights, down from more than one half in the early 1990s. This trend 
towards  abolishing  multiple  voting  shares  may  be  seen  as  a  step  towards  similar  corporate 
governance practice, the development of efficient M&A market, and greater ownership dispersion in 
the long run. 
The European Commission’s proposed Takeover Directive received much resistance mainly 
as a consequence of the proposed break-through rule. Although Figure E-9 may suggest that overall  
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there is increasing adoption of the rule, this is mainly due to the countries that have recently joined 
the  European  Union.  The  only  other  country  that  has  adopted  the  break-through  rule  is  Italy. 
However,  the  break-through  rule  in  Italy  only  applies  to  contractual  agreements  between 
shareholders,  since  shares  cannot  bear  multiple  voting  rights.  Pending  a  takeover  bid,  any 
shareholder  who  is  willing  to  tender  has  the  legal  right  to  withdraw  from  voting  or  transfer 
agreements binding his shares. No minimum ownership percentage is required to qualify for this 
break-through rule. In addition, as outlined in sub-section 5.6, the rule may promote the creation of 
more complex ownership and control structures such as pyramids and cross-shareholdings thereby 
cancelling out most of the benefits from the break-through rule.  
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Figure E-9. Adoption of the break-through rule   Figure  E-10.  Adoption  of  the  requirement  of 
shareholders’  approval  to  install  anti-takeover 
measures 
(See comments to the Figure E-3) 
 
Figure E-10 refers to one of the hotly debated issues regarding the distribution of decision-
making in companies, namely the adoption of anti-takeover measures. Although some countries have 
opted for the American-style approach by allowing managers to apply anti-takeover devices when 
necessary, there is a clear move in Europe towards the British model which gives decision power to 
the shareholders. In general, in most countries, the board of directors may only take anti-takeover 
measures after receiving the shareholders’ approval. However, there is variation with respect to the 
point  in  time  when  the  adoption  of  anti-takeover  measures  can  be  solicited.  For  example, 
shareholders in Germany can vote for defence measures prior to a takeover bid, while in the UK they 
can only do so after the bid has been announced. General Principle 7 of the City Code ‘prohibits any 
action to be taken by the board of the offeree company in relation of the affairs of the offeree  
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company, without the approval of the shareholders in general meeting’. The rule does not prohibit 
corporate actions which have a frustrating effect on a takeover attempt, but it does require that such 
actions be approved by the shareholders at a general meeting and, crucially, that the approval be 
given ‘in the face of the bid’ (Davies and Hopt (2004)). There is a trend towards reducing the power 
of management in takeover-related decision-making. This suggests that the shareholder-centred view 
of corporate governance is receiving more widespread recognition. Consequently, this may result in 
convergence, albeit at a very slow rate, towards the market-based model as predicted by Hansmann 




This chapter argues that the effectiveness of the various functions of the takeover regulation 
depend on the corporate governance systems they are part of. However, at the same time, takeover 
regulation  also  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  efficiency  of  the  corporate  governance  system. 
Therefore, a regulator who wants to reform takeover regulation needs to place this reform in the 
wider context of reforming corporate governance as a whole. Over the past 10 years, the European 
Commission has attempted to harmonize takeover regulation to create a level-playing field for an 
international  market  for  corporate  control.  These  attempts  have  nevertheless  met  with  strong 
opposition  from  national  lawmakers  arguing  that  a  unified  takeover  regulation  may  harm  their 
national  corporate  governance  system.  Consequently,  the  proposed  Takeover  Directive  was  not 
adopted in 2004. To date, no consensus has been achieved about the best corporate governance 
system and whether individual EU member countries should change their regulation in order to 
move to a common corporate governance system. 
This chapter shows that, despite all the controversies, the EU countries have individually 
undertaken  steps  towards  the  convergence  of  takeover  and  corporate  governance  regulation. 
Currently,  the  European  countries  agree  that  the  equal  treatment  rule  constitutes  a  fundamental 
principle of corporate law. There is also gradual convergence towards the adoption of the mandatory 
bid and squeeze-out rules. The introduction of lower thresholds for the disclosure of control as well 
as  the  abolishment  of  multiple  voting  rights,  while  allowing  non-voting  shares,  may  also  be 
considered  as  further  signs  of  convergence  towards  the  Anglo-American  system  of  corporate 
governance.  
However, it is important to note that similar regulatory changes may have very different 
effects within different corporate governance systems. For example, while in some countries the 
adoption of a specific takeover rule may lead towards more dispersed ownership, in others it may 
further reinforce the blockholder-based system. Moreover, there are still major differences across 
Europe in terms of the provisions of the mandatory bid rule (threshold and minimum offer price), the 
squeeze-out rule, and the distribution of the decision power between the board of directors and  
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shareholders. Therefore, although there is some evidence of increasing convergence, this does not 






CHAPTER 7.  
 
A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDEX: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY OF 





Triggered by the seminal work of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 
1998;  hereafter  LLSV),  the  economic  effects  of  corporate  governance  regulation  have  received 
notable academic attention in recent years. The new stream of literature on law and finance does a 
comparative  analysis  of  institutional  frameworks  around  the  world  and  studies  their  impact  on 
economic behaviour  and on the  governance of firms. Although the importance of  regulation on 
economic activities has been stressed since the late 1930s (see e.g. Coase, 1937; Pigou, 1938), LLSV 
have moved this topic to the top of the research agenda by documenting empirically the relationship 
between the law and economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms. 
Importantly, LLSV develop the tools that enable researchers to compare institutional environments 
across countries and to study empirically the effects of corporate regulation. These tools comprise, 
amongst others, a country classification by legal origin and indices that characterize the quality of 
regulatory provisions covering the protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, as well as law 
enforcement.  
Nowadays, virtually every cross-country study employs the LLSV legal origin classification 
and corporate  governance indices. However, the  LLSV indices have some limitations. First, the 
indices are static and refer to national legal environments in 1995. In the late 1990s, many countries 
have  undergone  substantial  reforms  of  their  corporate  legislations.  It  is  therefore  likely  that  the 
LLSV indices of 1995 no longer reflect the true differences in national legal systems since 1996 and 
hence require an update.  
A  second  limitation  of the  LLSV  corporate  governance  indices  is  that  the  authors  use  a 
comparative approach to construct them. LLSV opt for the US corporate law as the reference legal 
system and identify the key legal provisions in the governance of US companies. Subsequently, they  
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verify whether the same types of provisions are present in the law of other countries. It follows that 
countries with legal systems most closely resembling that of the US receive the highest score on the 
LLSV rating. This approach, however, typically ignores the regulatory  principles that prevail in 
other  countries  but  not  in  the  US.  Moreover,  the  system  of  corporate  governance  in  the  US  is 
characterized  as  a  shareholder-based  system  in  which  the  main  objective  of  corporate  law  is  to 
protect  (atomistic)  corporate  investors  from  being  expropriated  by  the  firm’s  management.  In 
contrast,  the  systems  prevailing  in  most  European  and  Asian  countries  are  characterized  as 
stakeholder-based  systems  (such  as  the  blockholder-oriented,  labour-oriented,  or  state-oriented 
systems). In these countries, the expropriation of investors by the management is typically prevented 
via monitoring by the firm’s large shareholders, creditors or employees such that there is less need to 
address the problem at the regulatory level. It is therefore not surprising that most of the countries 
with a stakeholder-based system only have a low score on the LLSV shareholder rights protection 
rating. What is however vital in these countries is how well the law protects the interest of corporate 
investors  from  being  expropriated  by  the  controlling  stakeholders  (i.e.  larger  shareholders, 
employees, the state). This question goes beyond the scope of the LLSV index. 
In this paper we address the limitations of the LLSV corporate governance indices. First, we 
develop three new corporate governance indices that reflect the quality of national laws aimed at 
protecting  (i)  corporate  shareholders  from  being  expropriated  by  the  firm’s  management,  (ii) 
minority shareholders from being expropriated by the large blockholder, and (iii) creditors from 
being expropriated by the firm’s shareholders. When constructing the indices, we depart from the 
comparative  approach  employed  by  LLSV  and  use  a  functional  approach  instead.  That  is,  we 
identify all major provisions of corporate laws by country and classify them according to the degree 
of protection they offer to the above mentioned principals. Subsequently, we quantify the regulatory 
provisions using three indices that characterize the effectiveness of the legal system in reducing the 
three basic agency problems: those arising between the management and the shareholders, between 
majority and minority shareholders, and between creditors and shareholders. The advantage of the 
functional approach is that it covers all regulatory provisions currently in existence in all European 
countries and the US and allows us to construct indices that capture both the weak and strong aspects 
of the various corporate governance regimes. 
Second, we empirically document the evolution of corporate governance regulations for all 
(30) European countries and the US. We analyse whether regulatory convergence has been started, 
and, if so, detect the main patterns of the converge process. Using the three indices we examine how 
corporate governance regulation has changed in countries over the past 15 years. The study of the 
evolution of corporate governance regulations is appealing because it contributes to the ongoing 
debate on whether a single system of corporate governance is likely to develop (see e.g. McCahery 
et al. 2002). To our best knowledge, this is the first study that intends to address this question 
empirically.   
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The analysis in this paper is based on a unique corporate governance database that comprises 
the main changes in corporate governance regulations in the US and all European countries between 
1990-2005. The database is based on studying various corporate legislations, a questionnaire sent to 
leading  corporate  governance  specialists  as  well  as  direct  interview  with  these  specialists.  The 
questionnaire is on the various aspects of the corporate governance regimes and their evolution since 
the early 1990s. The questionnaire contains 55 questions that cover the most important provisions of 
company law, stock exchange rules, and bankruptcy and reorganization law at both the national and 
supranational level.  In particular, the questions cover the following: (i) shareholder and creditor 
protection  regulation,  (ii)  accounting  standards,  (iii)  disclosure  rules,  (iv)  takeover  regulation 
(mandatory bid, squeeze-out rule, takeover defence measures, etc.), (v) insider trading regulation, 
(vi) regulation regarding the structure of the board of directors and voting power distribution, (vii) 
and adoption of codes of good practice. In total, about 150 legal experts throughout Europe and the 
US have contributed to our database on the changes in corporate governance regulation (see Data 
Appendix 2 in the end of the book).  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the role of corporate 
regulation.  Section  3  describes  our  unique  database  on  corporate  law  reforms  in  30  European 
countries and the US. Section 4 discloses the compositions of the corporate governance indices. 
Section  5  documents  the  dynamics  of  corporate  governance  regulation  reforms  and  predicts  the 
consequences of these reforms for the (lack of) evolution towards a single corporate governance 
system. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The role of corporate governance regulation 
 
2.1. Agency problems between corporate constituents  
 
A  typical  public  corporation  represents  a  legal  entity  with  limited  liability,  transferable 
shares,  delegated  management  under  a  board  structure,  and  investor  ownership  (Hansmann  and 
Kraakman, 2004). Together, these characteristics make a corporation the most attractive form of 
business organization. However, they also generate the potential for agency problems. 
The  conflicts  of  interests  between  management  and  shareholders  frequently  arise  in 
companies  with  a  dispersed  ownership  structure.  In  these  firms,  small  shareholders  cannot 
effectively manage the firm due to coordination problems and hence have to delegate the control 
over the firm to professional managers. However, the separation of ownership and control leads to a 
divergence  of  interests  between  the  managers  and  shareholders  (Berle  and  Means,  1932).  The 
managers may forgo the shareholders’ wealth maximization objective and undertake actions which 
maximize  their  personal  interests  but  not  the  value  of  the  company.  Research  on  corporate 
governance shows that shareholders may prevent the misuse of corporate assets by managers either  
186 
by aligning the managerial interests with their own through executive compensation contracts or by 
effectively monitoring managerial actions (see e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1986; Becht et al., 2005.). Since the coordination problem among small shareholders does not allow 
them to effectively monitor the management, they have to rely on external monitoring via the market 
for corporate control (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1988).
135  
  The conflict of interests between management and shareholder is less severe in companies 
with  concentrated  ownership  structure.  In  these  firms,  the  controlling  shareholders  have  strong 
incentives to monitor management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks, Mayer 
and Renneboog, 2001).  However, the presence  of a  controlling shareholder may induce  another 
agency problem: the potential opportunistic behaviour of the large blockholder towards minority 
shareholders  (see  e.g.  Faccio  and  Stolin,  2004).  The  activities  aimed  at  expropriating  minority 
shareholders are reduced when the management is held accountable to the interests of all shareholder 
including minority shareholders. Companies may formulate such accountability in the bylaws of the 
company e.g. by ensuring the delegation and concentration of control to a board of directors which is 
independent  from  the  controlling  shareholder;  by  aligning  managerial  interests  with  those  of 
(minority)  shareholders  through  managerial  compensation  contracts;  and  by  clearly  defining  the 
fiduciary duties of managers and directors. 
The legal entity status of public corporations and limited liability of their shareholders may 
engender another potential conflict of interest, namely that between creditors and shareholders.
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The equity of a leveraged firm can be viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets whose value 
increases with the volatility of future cash flows (Black and Scholes, 1973). This means that the 
management can maximize shareholder wealth by increasing the risk of the projects it invests in, and 
hence  re-distribute  wealth  from  creditors  to  its  shareholders.  This  conflict  of  interests  between 
creditors and shareholders is likely to be resolved when the creditors are able to perform effectively 
monitor the corporate activities. 
 
2.2 Why do we need corporate governance regulation? 
 
It  is  in  the  interests  of  companies  and  their  management  to  implement  mechanisms  that 
mitigate the agency problems mentioned above. Companies that can credibly commit themselves to 
act in the best interests of their constituents benefit from lower costs of equity and debt capital, 
labor, and other inputs and from a higher value of their products or services to clients (Becht, Bolton 
                                                 
135 Hostile takeovers can target poorly performing firms and replace poorly performing management. The threat of losing 
their jobs and perquisites provides managers with an incentive to focus on shareholder objectives.  
136 The legal status of the company entails that creditors are first in line in the absolute priority ranking and hence have 
the first claim on the corporation’s assets while the shareholders are residual claimants. Limited liability implies that 
the shareholders are not personally liable for the debt obligations of the corporation. For more details see Hansmann 
and Kraakman (2004).  
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and Roell, 2005). The mechanisms available to companies to resolve the agency problems include 
managerial  compensation  contracts,  (hostile)  takeovers,  concentrated  ownership  structures, 
delegation to and concentration of control by the board of directors which acts independently from 
executive directors and controlling shareholders, and clearly defined in corporate bylaws fiduciary 
duties. However, if companies were able to provide adequate protection to their investors, regulatory 
intervention  is  unnecessary.  This  raises  a  question  as  to  why  we  need  corporate  governance 
regulation aimed at protecting the rights of corporate (minority) shareholders and creditors? 
The  theoretical  literature  gives  a  number  of  reasons.  First,  regulatory  intervention  helps 
markets to achieve the maximization of social welfare rather than the welfare of individual investors 
(see e.g. Pigou, 1938). To illustrate this in the context of corporate governance regulation, consider 
an  example  of  the  disclosure  requirements  related  to  corporate  activities.  In  the  absence  of  the 
disclosure requirements, managers may be tempted to conceal some details of the projects (such as 
R&D spending) in which their company is involved for perfectly legitimate reasons, e.g. to keep 
their  competitors  uninformed  and  gain  a  competitive  advantage  in  the  future.  However,  more 
detailed information about corporate projects allow investors to assess the corporate growth potential 
better and to invest their money into companies that can generate the highest returns. Therefore, if all 
companies were to conceal information about their activities, a more inefficient allocation of capital 
would  arise,  leading  to  lower  economic  growth.  Hence,  a  re-distribution  of  wealth  between 
competing companies caused by a higher level of disclosure seems less harmful for the economy 
than the misallocation of capital caused by the lack of transparency. As such, mandatory rules that 
impose more disclosure enable economies to achieve a more optimal outcome. 
The second reason for adopting a specific corporate governance regulation is that it enables 
companies  to  commit  credibly  to  a  higher  quality  of  governance  (Becht  et  al.,  2005).  Even  if 
companies initially design efficient governance rules, they may break or alter them at a later stage. 
Investors  anticipate  this  and  are  willing  to  provide  firms  with  funds  at  lower  costs  only  when 
companies find ways to commit credibly to good governance. However, credible pre-commitment 
mechanisms  may  be  expensive  or  unavailable  in  countries  lacking  an  effective  institutional 
framework (Doidge et. al., 2004). For instance, a well-functioning infrastructure (in terms of internal 
control structures, audit mechanisms, voting procedures at the annual meetings etc.) is required to 
enable investors to verify the information that companies disclose (see e.g. Black, 2001).
137  
The importance of corporate governance regulation for corporate activities and economic 
growth has been further emphasized in a growing number of empirical studies. These papers show 
that a corporate governance regime has a significant impact on the availability and cost of capital, 
corporate  performance,  and  the  distribution  of  corporate  value  between  the  firm’s  stakeholders: 
                                                 
137 For example, investors are able to sue a company if it had concealed particular information that is required to be 
reported by law. It would be a difficult task for investors to prove corporate negligence in the absence of mandatory 
disclosure requirements.   
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shareholders, creditors, employees, consumers, and suppliers. Weak legal environment combined 
with weak enforcement of the law distorts an efficient allocation of resources, undermines the ability 
of companies to compete internationally, and hinders investment and economic development (see 
e.g. Levine, 1998, 1999; La Porta et al., 2002; Djankov et al., 2004).  
 
2.3 Evolution of legal systems and corporate governance regimes 
 
Given the beneficial impact of corporate governance regulation (as documented above) on 
economic growth, the development of markets, and the governance of firms, a natural question to 
ask is whether or not a particular national legal system has a competitive advantage over other legal 
systems, and if so whether the alternative regimes ought to converge towards it. 
In this extensive body of research, there is yet no consensus as to the best system of corporate 
law (for an overview of this literature see Goergen et al., 2005). Some law and economics academics 
proclaim the superiority of the UK and US legal system, characterized by a focus on shareholder 
value and good shareholder protection. There are also supporters of the alternative legal systems 
characterized by a focus on the welfare of employees, creditors, and other types of stakeholders and 
weak  shareholder  protection.  They  claim  that  the  long-term  interests  of  shareholders  and 
stakeholders are not necessarily at odds, such that the different types of governance regimes may 
produce similar outcomes in terms of long-term economic growth (Bratton and McCahery, 2000).  
Bebchuk and Roe (2000) argue that the direction of legal reforms is typically pre-determined 
by initial institutional structures in a country. In particular, ownership and control concentration is an 
important factor that affects the role and function of corporate legislation and hence the direction of 
its reforms. This is because the degree of ownership and control concentration plays a key role in the 
relationships  between  the  different  corporate  stakeholders.  In  countries  where  widely-held 
companies prevail, the main function of corporate governance regulation is to protect shareholders 
from being expropriated by the management. In countries where a vast majority of companies have a 
concentrated ownership and control structure, the function of corporate governance regulation is to 
minimize  the  extent  of  agency  problems  between  majority  and  minority  shareholders  and  that 
between shareholders and creditors.  
The differences in the role and functions of corporate governance regulation across countries 
with  dispersed  and  concentrated  ownership  structures  imply  that  the  convergence  of  corporate 
governance  regulations  towards  a  single  legal  system  may  not  be  an  issue.  However,  legal 
convergence  is  not  a  necessary  (nor  sufficient)  condition  for  achieving  more  harmonisation  of 
corporate  governance  systems.  The  reason  is  that  a  corporate  governance  system  is  a  broader 
concept  than  corporate  governance  regulation  and  covers  a  broader  set  of  institutional  settings 
typically characterized by the quality of legal protection of corporate constituencies, concentration of 
ownership and control, and the development of capital markets.   
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Bebchuk  (1999)  shows  that,  in  the  presence  of  large  private  benefits  of  control,  better 
protection of shareholders is unlikely to affect the degree of ownership concentration. Even if better 
protection from the expropriation by the management were introduced, an incumbent blockholder is 
unlikely to sell his stake because a third party acquiring a controlling block is unable to compensate 
him for his private benefits of control. Thus, where private benefits of control are high, regulatory 
reforms aimed at improving investor protection are likely to reinforce the existing ownership and 
control structures.  
Roe  (2002)  proposes  an  alternative  scenario.  In  his  view,  if  the  costs  of  monitoring 
management are high relative to the private benefits of control a blockholder enjoys, better legal 
protection from expropriation by the management may lead to a shift from concentrated to dispersed 
ownership. This shift may be further enhanced by some other drawbacks of concentrated control, 
such as the costs of low liquidity and undiversified risk. We conclude that corporate law reforms that 
improve  investor  protection  are  likely  to  lead  towards  more  dispersed  ownership  provided  that 
private benefits of control are relatively low.  
 
Table F-1. Reforms of corporate governance regulation and their expected impact on ownership and 
control within a particular corporate governance system 
 
Initial characteristics of the system   Corporate governance regulation reforms  Expected effect on the 
ownership structure 
     
 Low minority shareholders 
protection  
(High private benefits of control) 
Improve in investor protection   Remains concentrated 
 High minority shareholders 
protection  
(Low private benefits of control) 
Improve in investor protection   More dispersed  
     
     
 Low investor protection  
(High managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control   Remains concentrated  
 High investor protection 
(Low managerial discretion) 
Decrease in private benefits of control   More dispersed  
     
 
It also follows from Bebchuk (1999) and Roe (2002) that, when investor protection is already 
high, reforms aiming at reducing private benefits of control may bring about ownership dispersion. 
However,  if  the  management  has  substantial  discretion  to  apply  anti-takeover  measures,  the 
preferred ownership distribution may shift towards a more concentrated structure even if private 
benefits of control are curbed. Table F-1 summarizes the above conjectures. 
In sum, this section has shown that the adoption of a unified corporate governance regulation 
by countries with different initial institutional structures (in terms of voting structure, ownership and 
control, capital market development etc.) may not necessarily lead to the convergence of their legal  
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corporate governance regimes. However, the adoption of country-specific corporate legislations may 
induce the convergence of wider corporate governance systems.  
 
3. Corporate governance database 
   
In this paper, we explore a unique corporate governance database that comprises the main 
changes  in  corporate  governance  regulation  in  the  US  and  all  European  countries  (including 
countries from Central and Eastern Europe) over the last 15 years. The database is based on the 
study of various corporate governance regulations, on the results from a detailed questionnaire sent 
to more than 150 legal experts, and on direct interviews with some of these experts. 
Our  approach  can  be  summarized  as  follows:  based  on  corporate  legislation,  corporate 
governance codes and the scientific literature, we have drafted a detailed set of questions about the 
main aspects of corporate governance regulation that applies to listed companies. A final set of 50 
questions was put to leading corporate governance experts (mostly academic lawyers but also some 
practitioners from law firms). As we focus on listed companies, we have asked the contributors to 
this project to consider soft law, comprising: (i) (hard) corporate law; (ii) stock exchange regulations 
(listing requirements); (iii) codes of good practice provided there is a legal basis for these codes (the 
law refers to a code of good practice which is itself not incorporated in the law); and (iv) corporate 
practice.
138 The names and affiliations of the corporate governance experts who have contributed to 
the mapping of the corporate governance regulation of their own countries are presented in Data 
Appendix 2 (in the end of the book).   
Somewhat to our surprise, our straightforward questions on the presence or application of 
specific corporate governance regimes frequently received conflicting answers. Consequently, we 
have re-contacted the involved experts to ask additional questions and have sought the advice of 
additional experts in order to reach clear answers. Still, from this experience, we must conclude that 
the  current  corporate  governance  regulations  (corporate  law,  legally  binding  codes,  and  stock 
exchange regulations) leave room for interpretation and sometimes cause confusion even among 
legal experts.  
 
4. Corporate Governance indices 
   
As  discussed  in  section  2,  corporate  law  plays  an  important  role  in  mitigating  the  three 
central conflicts of interest between the main corporate constituencies: the agency problems which 
                                                 
138 In some cases, corporate practice deviates from corporate law. For instance, the regulator in the UK allows that firms 
issue shares with and without voting rights. Still, since the early 1990s virtually all listed firms on the London Stock 
Exchange have shares outstanding with voting rights as the issuance of non-voting shares was frowned upon by the 
stock  exchange.  Hence,  in  practice,  the  UK-system  hinges  on  the  ‘one-share-one-vote’  principle.  We  accept  this 
principle as a corner stone concept of the UK corporate governance regime.  
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arise between the management and the shareholders, between majority and minority shareholders, 
and  between  creditors  and  shareholders.  In  this  section,  we  provide  a  concise  overview  of  the 
existing corporate governance regulations in Europe and the US. We classify the main provisions of 
the existing regulations according to their efficiency in mitigating the conflicts of interests within a 
corporation. Based on this classification, we quantify the regulatory provisions for each country and 
combine them into three indices that characterize how well national legislations minimize the extent 
of the agency issues.  
The economic literature suggests two main approaches to resolve principal-agent problems: 
(i) create incentives such that agents act in the interest of their principals; and (ii) enhance the 
disciplining power of principals (see e.g. Becht et al., 2005). To implement these approaches, the 
law can deploy a number of governance strategies. Hansmann and Kraakman (2004) suggest the 
following classification of such strategies: (i) strengthening the appointment rights of principals, (ii) 
reinforcing  the  decision  rights  of  principals,  (iii)  augmenting  the  trusteeship,  (iv)  enhancing 
corporate transparency, and (v) adopting an affiliation strategy.
139 The appointment rights strategy 
regulates  shareholders’  power  to  select  or  remove  directors.  The  decision  rights  strategy  grants 
shareholders with the power to intervene and initiate or ratify managerial decisions. The trusteeship 
strategy allows shareholders to appoint an independent body (a trustee) that will represent their 
interests in the firm and monitor managers. The transparency strategy seeks to eliminate conflicts of 
interests  by  enforcing  strict  disclosure  requirements  on  corporate  policies  and  contracts  directly 
related to managers. Finally, an affiliation strategy sets the terms on which shareholders affiliate 
with  managers.  These  typically  involve  shareholder  rights  to  entry  and  exit  on  fair  terms.  The 
strategies are not limited to reducing the agency problem between shareholders and managers, but 
can also be deployed to address any other agency problems (e.g. between minority and majority 
shareholders or between shareholders and creditors).  
The  analysis  of  regulatory  provisions  within  the  framework  of  the  above  governance 
strategies enables us to understand better how corporate law works in a particular country and which 
strategies regulators adopt to achieve their goals. Hence, we classify the regulatory provisions (i) by 
type of agency problems and, (ii)  by  governance strategies within each type of agency problem. We 
model our corporate governance indices as a sum of sub-indices that indicate the scope of legal 
protection through different strategies.  
 
4.1 Regulatory provisions addressing management-shareholder relations 
 
                                                 
139 There are a number of other strategies open to the law, such as a reward strategy that seeks to alter managerial 
incentives to act in the interests of shareholders. However, these strategies are usually applied by companies directly 
rather than imposed by the law. We therefore do not consider  them in our legal indices.  
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When shareholders have limited power, agency problems may be substantial: management 
may  then  pursue  their  own  interests  (among  others;  corporate  growth  at  the  expense  of  value 
creation, excessive remuneration, value-reducing mergers and acquisitions (M&As) or a so-called 
‘empire  building’  strategy).  These  managerial  objectives  may  be  detrimental  to  shareholders’ 
interests (which is corporate value or getting a fair return on their investment). To assess the relative 
shareholder  power  granted  by  law,  we  study  the  regulatory  provisions  that  aim  at  mitigating 
managerial  opportunistic  behavior.  Such  provisions  grant  shareholders  the  right  to  appoint  and 
dismiss the board of directors and to control most of the important corporate decisions (for instance, 
on equity issues or takeovers). We also consider the regulation that requires corporate transparency, 
and demands that the board of directors acts on behalf of the shareholders and effectively monitors 
top management. 
 
4.1.1  The appointment rights strategy 
Appointment and replacement rights enable shareholders to shape the basic structure, power, 
and the composition of a firm’s internal governance structure. Voting rules and requirements on the 
board’s composition are the main components of these shareholder rights.  
Among the voting rules, we distinguish between the requirements for the nomination to the 
board  by  shareholders,  the  voting  procedures  (whether  or  not  proxy  voting  by  mail is  allowed, 
whether or not shareholders are required to register and deposit shares prior to the general meeting), 
and restrictions imposed on the length of directors’ contracts. With their right to elect the directors, 
shareholders  can  affect  the  composition  of  the  board.  This  power  should  ensure  the  board’s 
responsiveness to shareholder interests. Some jurisdictions like the Netherlands restrict shareholders’ 
election power in order to ensure the representation of labor interests in the boardroom. However, 
labor representation may erode shareholder power. A similar problem arises when a jurisdiction 
mandates  employee  representation  on  the  board  (as  is  the  case  in  Germany,  Luxembourg,  and 
Norway).  The  presence  of  employee  representatives  (co-called  codetermination)  on  the  board 
reduces the power of directors elected by shareholders which may make it more difficult for them to 
implement corporate strategies in the best interest of shareholders.  
Whereas  codetermination  redistributes  the  power  from  shareholders  to  employees,  cross-
shareholdings between two firms increase the relative power of management. Company’s shares 
held by its subsidiary (or a firm in which the company has a controlling stake) are typically more 
under the discretion of the company’s management. The management may use these shares to affect 
corporate decisions that are to be approved by the shareholder assembly (board members’ election, 
in  particular)  to  its  own  benefit.  This  makes  the  agency  problems  between  management  and 
shareholders more severe. Regulatory restrictions on cross-shareholdings are seen as an instrument 
mitigating  these  potential  distortions.  We  expect  shareholder  interests  to  be  better  protected  in  
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countries where cross-shareholdings are addressed at a regulatory level and limits are imposed on 
share stakes held by a subsidiary in its parent firm.  
When shareholders cannot vote by mail and are required to register and/or deposit shares 
prior  to  the  meeting,  their  participation  in  management  elections  may  be  substandard  and  may 
augment inside managers’ power to appoint their own candidates. The requirement to register
140 and 
block
141 shares several days prior to the general meeting is seen as a barrier for many shareholders to 
participate in the meeting, and decreases shareholders’ participation in corporate decision-making. 
Therefore, we consider the election rules that enable shareholders to send their votes by mail and 
prohibit companies to require share deposits prior to the meeting as instruments that ensure better 
representation of the shareholder interests in the boardroom.  
Restrictions  on  the  length  of  managerial  contracts  encourage  shareholders  to  assess 
managerial performance on a regular basis and replace board members when they do not satisfy 
shareholder requirements. Long-term contracts with board members are seen as a barrier to replace 
inefficient directors. The shorter the contractual tenure, the more incentives directors have to act in 
the interests of shareholders in order to be re-elected for another term
142. In countries where the 
mandatory  frequency  of  managerial  rotation  is  high,  the  management-shareholders  conflict  of 
interests is likely to be less pronounced.  
We consider the regulatory provisions mentioned above to be important legal mechanisms 
that grant shareholders appointment and replacements rights. We therefore quantify these provisions 
into an index capturing the efficiency of appointment and replacement rules that align the interests of 
management and shareholders. The components of the index and their coding are given in Table F-2. 
A  higher  index  score  indicates  higher  likelihood  that  management  acts  in  the  interest  of 
shareholders. 
 
                                                 
140 In many Continental European countries, bearer shares are issued. Therefore, companies may require the shareholders 
to register prior to a general annual meeting such that they will be able to participate to the meeting.  
141 Companies may require shareholders to deposit their shares several days prior to a general annual meeting such that 
investors that acquire shares during the deposit period are unable to participate in the meeting. This way, firms can 
prevent strategic trades in shares (votes) in the period around the meeting. .  
142 However, short-term contracts have a negative impact on managerial incentives to focus on long-term investment 
projects. Managers that anticipate to be fired in the end of their term are more likely to focus on short-term projects 
and short-term profits. Therefore, very short contracts may be undesirable.   
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Table F-2. Methodology employed to construct corporate governance regulation indices 
 
The table shows how specific regulations are quantified to construct three corporate governance regulation indices: the shareholder 
rights protection index, the minority shareholders protection index, and the creditor rights protection. Some regulatory aspects are 
incorporated in several indices. 
 
 
1.  The  shareholder  rights  protection  index  (Max=32)  reflects  the  shareholders’  ability  to  mitigate  managerial  opportunistic 
behavior. The index is constructed by combining the following 4 sub-indices: 
 
1.1 The appointment rights index (Max=12) is based on the rules to appoint and replace executive and non-executive directors. It 
measures the degree of alignment of the interests of management and shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as 
follows: 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Tenure on the board: 0 if more than 4 years, 1 if 4 years, 2 if less then 4 years  
 Cross-shareholdings:  
o  Cross-shareholdings between 2 independent companies: 1 if regulated, 0 if not. 
o  Maximum shareholding of a subsidiary in its parent company: 1 if regulated, 0 if not 
 Election rules:  
o  Proxy voting by mail: 2 if allowed, 0 if not 
o  Requirement to Deposit/Register shares prior to a general meeting: 
Ö Bearer shares: 0 if deposit is required, 1 if only registration of shares is required, 2 if none is required 
Ö Nominal shares: 0 if deposit is required, 2 if deposit requirement is forbidden 
 
1.2 The decision rights index (Max=8) captures the shareholders’ ability to mitigate managerial discretion. The decision rights 
index cover regulatory provisions that mandate direct shareholder decision-making. The regulatory provisions are quantified as 
follows: 
 Shareholders approval of anti-takeover defense measures: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Shareholders approval of preemption rights: 2 if required, 0 if not. 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if no rule or more than 20%, 1 if 20% or less but more than 5%, 2 if 
5% and less. 
 Voting caps: 0 if allowed, 2 if not. 
 
1.3 The trusteeship index (Max=5) measures the efficiency of the board of directors in monitoring the actions of CEOs. The 
following regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Board independence:  
o  2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
o  2 if the overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 Employee representation: 0 if required, 2 if not.  
 Separate board of auditors: 1 if required, 0 otherwise 
 
1.4  The  transparency  index  (Max=7)  is  based  on  the  quality  of  information  about  company,  its  ownership  structure,  and 
management available to investors 
 Requirement to disclose managerial compensation: 0 if not required, 1 if required on aggregate basis, 2 if required on 
individual basis. 
 Requirement to disclose any transactions between management and company: 2 if required, 0 if not 
 Frequency of financial reports: 0 if once per year, 1 if twice per year, 2 if more than twice per year 
 Comply or explain rule: 1 if the requirement is present, 0 otherwise 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the shareholders. 
 
2. The minority shareholders protection index (Max= 27) is based on the regulatory provisions aimed at increasing the relative 
power of the minority shareholders in a context of strong majority shareholders. The index is constructed by combining the 
following 4 sub-indices: 
 
4.1 Minority shareholders appointment rights index (Max=5) is based on the appointment rights that can be used to protect 
minority shareholders. These include rights to reserve seats on the board of directors for minority shareholders or to limit voting 
power of large shareholders. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Minority representation on the board: 2 if required, 0 otherwise.  
 Voting caps limiting power of large shareholders: 1 if voting caps are allowed, 0 if not. 
 One-share-one-vote rule: 0 if both multiple voting rights and non-voting shares are allowed; 1 if one of the two is allowed; 2 
if none is allowed.  
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4.2 Minority shareholders decision rights index (Max=4) captures the ability of minority shareholders to affect fundamental 
corporate transactions that require a shareholder vote. The regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Supermajority requirement for approval of major company’s decisions: 0 if 50% or less; 1 if more then 50% but less then 
75%; 2 if 75% or more 
 Percentage needed to call for extraordinary meeting: 0 if the rule is not present or required percentage is 20% or more; 1 if 
the required percentage is between 20 and 5%; 2 if the percentage is 5% or less. 
 
4.3 The minority shareholders trusteeship rights index (Max=4) indicates the extent to which the board of directors serves as a 
trustee  for  minority  shareholder,  i.e.  the  directors  are  independent  from  the  firm’s  controlling  shareholders.  The  regulatory 
provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Nomination to the board by shareholders: 2 if shareholders voting to elect non-executive directors is not required (2-tier 
boards); 0 if required or 1-tier board 
 Board independence: 2 if CEO cannot be the chairman of the board of directors (in 1-tier board structure) or if the 
overlap between management and supervisory board is forbidden (in 2-tier board structure), 0 otherwise 
 
4.4 The minority shareholders affiliation rights index (Max=14) groups the remaining regulatory provisions aimed at protecting 
minority  shareholders:  the  principle  of  equal  treatment  (or  shared  returns)  and  rights  for  entry  and  exit  on  fair  terms.  The 
regulatory provisions are quantified as follows: 
 Equal treatment rule: 2 if required, 0 if not, 
 Mandatory disclosure of large ownership stakes: 0 if disclosure is not required or the minimum percent is 25% or more; 1 if 
10% or more (less then 25%); 2 if 5% or more (less then 10%); 3 if less then 5%. 
 Mandatory bid rule: 0 if not required; 1 if 50% or control; 2 if between 50 and 30%; 3 if 30% or less. 
 Sell-out rule: The squeeze-out rule is used as a proxy for the sell-out rule, (assumption: sell-out is always in place if squeeze-
out is adopted, with the same terms as squeeze-out): 0 if no squeeze-out; 1 if squeeze-out at 95% or more; 2 if squeeze-out at 
90% or less. 
 Minority claim: 0 if no; 1 if 10% or more; 2 if 5% or more; 3 if less then 5%. 
 Break-through rule: 1 if required; 0 if not, 
 
The higher each index, the better is the protection of the minority shareholders. 
 
3. The creditor rights protection index (Max=5) is based on regulatory provisions that allow creditors to force repayment more 
easily, take possession of collateral, or gain control over firm in financial distress. The regulatory provisions are quantified as 
follows: 
 
 Debtor-oriented versus Creditor-oriented code: 1 if no reorganization option (liquidation only); 0 if reorganization + 
liquidation option; 
 Automatic stay on the assets: 1 if no automatic stay is obliged in reorganization (if debt-orient code) or liquidation 
procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Secured creditors are ranked first: 1 if secured creditors are ranked first in the liquidation procedure; 0 if government and 
employees are ranked first; 
 Creditor approval of bankruptcy: 1 if creditor approval is required to initiate reorganization procedure (if debtor-oriented 
code) or liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise; 
 Appointment of official to manage reorganization/liquidation procedure: 1 if it is required by law in a reorganization 
procedure (if debtor-oriented code) or a liquidation procedure (if liquidation code); 0 otherwise. 
 
The higher the index, the better is the protection of the creditors 
 
 
4.1.2  The decision rights strategy 
The right to participate in corporate decisions enables shareholders to effectively monitor the 
management and prevent the misuse of corporate assets. However, due to coordination problems, 
(atomistic) shareholders are unable to participate in daily decision-making but can only be expected 
to weigh on major corporate decisions (e.g. the use of takeover defence measures, new equity issues, 
and mergers and acquisitions). Shareholders have the power to affect these activities if corporate 
legislation  grants  them  with  preemption  rights,  rights  to  approve  the  adoption  of  anti-takeover 
measures, and rights to call for an extraordinary general meeting.   
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Hostile  takeovers  constitute  a  real  threat  for  corporate  managers  of  losing  their  jobs. 
Therefore,  managers  may  be  tempted  to  unduly  implement  takeover-defence  measures  that 
discourage potential buyers from taking over the company, even if this violates the shareholders’ 
interests.  The  shareholders’  right  to  approve  anti-takeover  measures  is  a  mechanism to  mitigate 
managerial discretion over the firm’s cash flows. Preemption rights can also be considered as an 
anti-takeover  mechanism;  therefore  shareholders  vote  on  their  approval  is  required  to  lessen 
managerial discretion. 
Shareholders disagreeing with certain managerial should have a right to call an extraordinary 
general meeting. The lower the minimum percentage needed to call such a meeting is, the easier 
shareholders can intervene in critical situations and present their concerns of any mismanagement of 
the company.  
A major shareholder in a firm typically has a decisive power and strong incentives to monitor 
management and replace it in poorly performing companies (Franks at al., 2001). Bolton and von 
Thadden (1998) argue that the advantage of monitoring by blockholders is that it takes place on an 
ongoing basis. In contrast, the disciplining by atomistic shareholders only occurs in crisis situations. 
If the interests of the major shareholder coincide with those of minority shareholders, managerial-
shareholder conflict of interests is likely to be mitigated via monitoring by blockholders. However, 
an introduction of voting caps may reduce major shareholders’ power to affect corporate decisions 
and may hence weaken the monitoring of management. Therefore, a regulation prohibiting voting 
caps can be considered as an additional mechanism to reduce managerial opportunism.  
 Using the regulatory provisions discussed above, we construct a decision rights index that 
captures  the  legal  power  of  shareholders  to  participate  in  corporate  decision-making.  The 
constitutuants of the index and their coding are given in table F-2; a higher index score indicates that 
managers have less discretion. 
 
4.1.3  The trusteeship strategy 
Another  way  for  shareholders  to  monitor  corporate  managers  (indirectly)  is  through  the 
appointment of the board of directors. The board’s independence from the management is essential. 
In practice, two board models are used: one-tier and two-tier board structures. Under the two-tier 
board,  the  governance  functions  are  granted  to  a  supervisory  board  (a  board  consisting  of  non-
executive directors) who monitors top management assembled in the management board. In a unitary 
board system, both top management and non-executive directors make up the board. In order to 
guarantee board independence, the overlap between the management and supervisory boards in 2-
tier systems is restricted. In a one-tier system, the CEO is usually forbidden to hold a position of 
chairman  simultaneously.  Separating  the  executives’  and  non-executives’  roles  on  the  board 
enhances the monitoring of management.   
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Some countries also require companies to establish a separate board of auditors (for e.g. 
Italy). The main purpose of the board of auditors, which consists of people who do not serve as non-
executive directors, is to ensure that the management provides sufficient and truthful information 
about  all  corporate  activities  to  regulatory  authorities  and  shareholders.  As  such,  it  facilitates 
monitoring  by  the  market  and  thereby  contributes  to  the  improvement  in  the  management-
shareholder relationship. In contrast, employee representation on the board is likely to have negative 
effect on the management-shareholder relation. Labor interests are often in conflict with those of 
company’s shareholders. The lack of consensus on corporate strategy, caused by a conflict of interest 
between  directors  representing  employees  and  shareholders,  enlarges  the  discretion  of  the 
management  to  implement  corporate  policies  to  their  own  benefit.  Therefore,  employee 
representation on the board is considered to be harmful for the shareholders. 
 
4.1.4  Transparency 
Transparency regulation intends to improve the quality of information about company and 
management. It should be noted that the intention of this legal strategy is not to improve the quality 
of the accounting procedures as these are usually not incorporated in corporate law but are set by 
accounting standards boards. More disclosure increases the informativeness of the market on e.g. 
corporate policies and contracts directly related to the management.   More specifically, corporate 
legislation regulates the extent to which information is released on the managerial compensation 
package  (on  an  aggregate  or  individual  basis,  if  at  all)  and  the  requirement  to  disclose  any 
transactions between management and company (e.g. consulting contracts, interest-free loans). The 
quality of the transparency is more reliable when the law or the stock exchange regulations include a 
comply-or-explain principle. It is important that the codes of best practice which exist in almost 
every country are legally enshrined. 
Therefore, we collect information on the following transparency provisions : (i) requirement 
to disclose managerial compensation on aggregate or individual basis; (ii) requirement to disclose 
any transactions between management and company; (iii) frequency of financial reporting (annually, 
semi-annually,  quarterly);  and  (iv)  the  presence  of  comply  or  explain  rules.  We  quantify  these 
provisions into the transparency index. The composition of the index is presented in table F-2; a 
higher index score reflects more transparency about corporate and managerial activities and profits. 
 
4.2 Regulatory provisions addressing majority-minority shareholders relationship 
 
We  also  study  the  relative  power  of  the  minority  shareholders,  which  is  particularly 
important when strong majority shareholders are present. This aspect of corporate governance is 
particularly important in Continental Europe where most of the listed firms are closely-held with one 
shareholder (group) often controlling a majority of the voting rights. In a firm with concentrated  
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ownership, it is possible that the dominant shareholder influences managerial decisions to his own 
benefit and at the expense of minority shareholders. The minority shareholder legal protection rests 
on the regulatory provisions that increase the relative power of the minority shareholders and reduce 
the private benefits of control that the controlling blockholder can exploit at the detriment of these 
shareholders.  In  this  respect,  vital  rules  are  the  direct  minority  shareholder  rights  (board 
representation, minority claims, extraordinary general meetings, blocking minorities), the one-share-
one-vote principle (dual class shares, voting caps, break-through rule, equal treatment principle), 
ownership transparency, and the relative power in case of a takeover threat.  
 
4.2.1  Appointment rights strategy 
The appointment rights strategy aims at protecting minority shareholders as it gives minority 
shareholders a say in the appointment of the management and the internal governance system (the 
body  of  non-executive  directors).  The  most  straightforward  legal  approach  is  to  grant  minority 
shareholders with a right to nominate their representative to the board. This director is independent 
from the large blockholders and monitors the management in order to prevent it from acting to the 
benefit of the large shareholders only.  
Additional  legal  solutions  to  increase  the  power  of  minority  shareholders  when  a  strong 
blockholder  is  present  include  the  use  of  voting  caps  and  adherence  to  the  one-share-one-vote 
principle. Voting caps curb the voting power of the large shareholder and hence reduce its influence 
on  managerial  actions,  leaving  more  scope  for  minority  shareholders  to  participate  in  corporate 
governance. The one-share-one vote principle aligns the blockholder’s cash flow and voting rights. 
Issuing dual class shares or non-voting shares allows some shareholders to accumulate control while 
limiting their cash investment. A ban on a deviation from the one-share-one-vote principle should 
discourage controlling blockholdings, as this makes them relatively more expensive than when the 
deviation from the principle is allowed. Less power concentration in the hands of large blockholders 
improves  the  status  of  minority  shareholders  in  the  firm  and  their  role  in  the  firm’s  corporate 
governance.  
Overall, we expect the following regulatory provisions of an appointment rights strategy to 
contribute to minority shareholder protection: (i) mandatory minority shareholder representation on 
the board; (ii) rules that allow to apply voting caps; and (iii) a ban on the dual class shares (non-
voting  and  multiple-votes  shares).  We  quantified  the  use  of  these  regulations  in  our  minority 
shareholders appointment rights index. The components of the index and their coding are disclosed 
in  table  F-2;  a  higher  index  score  reflects  that  the  law  upholds  the  rights  of  the  minority 
shareholders. 
 
4.2.2  The decision rights strategy  
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The most powerful regulatory strategy to enable minority shareholders to participate in the 
governance  of  their  firm  is  to  grant  them  strong  decision  rights.  This  is  achieved  either  by 
introducing the need of a supermajority approval for major corporate decisions such that minorities 
who own a combined blocking minority are able to block corporate policies that may harm their 
interests. Therefore, the higher is the majority percentage the law requires for a corporate decision to 
be approved by shareholders, the more powerful are the minority shareholders. Regulations that 
grant  shareholders  the  right  to  call  for  extraordinary  meeting  may  also  strengthen  minority 
shareholders’ incentives to monitor management. The level of protection depends on the minimum 
percentage of share capital ownership required to call for an extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. 
The  lower  the  percentage,  the  easier  the  minority  shareholders  can  pass  their  concerns  to  the 
company’s management.  
We quantify the two types of legal provisions discussed above into the minority shareholders 
decision rights index, while the details on the coding are given in table F-2. A higher index score 
reflects more power for minority shareholders to affect corporate decisions. 
 
4.2.3  The trusteeship strategy: Independence of directors from controlling shareholders 
The right to elect the directors to the board gives large shareholders the opportunity to affect 
the board composition as well as the board’s decisions. This may harm the interests of minority 
shareholders. Some jurisdictions, like the Netherlands, restrict the election power of the shareholders 
such  that  large  shareholders’  influence  on  the  board’s  decision-making  process  is  limited. 
Consequently, potential opportunistic behavior by the large blockholder is strongly reduced which 
thereby increases the protection of small shareholders.   
We quantify the provisions open to the trusteeship strategy into the minority shareholders 
trusteeship rights index. A higher index score reflects that the board of directors acts independently 
from  the  controlling  shareholder  and  hence  is  more  accountable  for  the  interests  of  minority 
shareholders. The components of the index and their coding are given in table F-2.  
 
4.2.4  The affiliation rights strategy 
Our final, but probably most powerful strategy of corporate law to enhance the power of 
minority  shareholders  is  to  provide  them  with  entry  and  exit  rights  on  fair  terms.  Most  of  the 
regulatory  provisions  of  this  category  are  part  of  the  takeover  regulation.  The  relevant  clauses 
include the mandatory bid, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, the sell-out rule, and the 
break-through rule. The mandatory bid rule requires the acquirer to make a tender offer to all the 
shareholders  once  she  has  accumulated  a  certain  percentage  of  the  shares.  The  mandatory  bid 
requirement is justified on the grounds that an investor who obtains control, may be tempted to 
exploit private benefits of control at the expense of the minority shareholders. As such, the role of 
the  mandatory  bid  rule  is  to  protect  the  minority  shareholders  by  providing  them  with  the  
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opportunity to exit at a fair price. The principle of equal treatment complements the mandatory bid 
rule by requiring  controlling shareholders, the  management, and other  constituencies to treat  all 
shareholders  within  each  individual  class  of  shares  equally.  Although  the  principle  of  equal 
treatment constitutes an important principle of corporate governance regulation with respect to any 
type  of  corporate  activities,  it  is  particularly  important  in  takeovers  where  the  possibilities  of 
violations  of  the  rights  of  minority  shareholders  are  far-reaching.  The  equal  treatment  principle 
mandates an acquirer to offer minority shareholders to exit on terms that are no less favourable than 
those offered to the shareholders who sold a controlling block. Both the mandatory bid rule and the 
equal  treatment  principle  have  received  wide  recognition  at  the  regulatory  level  in  European 
countries. The sell out and the break-through rules are less accepted at the regulatory level, though 
they also aim at protecting the minority shareholders (for an overview see Goergen et al., 2005).  
A minority claim is another legal device that grants shareholders the right to exit a company 
on fair terms when they fear their rights are expropriated. Some regulations stipulate a minimum 
(combined)  percentage  which  enables  shareholders  to  launch  a  minority  claim.  The  lower  the 
percentage of ownership required, the easier it is for shareholders to use the minority claim rights to 
challenge important managerial decisions.  
A fundamental element of corporate governance that provide minority shareholders with the 
entry right consists of the disclosure of voting and cash flow rights. Information about major share 
blocks allows the regulator, minority shareholders and the market to monitor large blockholders in 
order to avoid that the latter extracts private benefits of control at the expense of other stakeholders. 
In other words, transparency minimizes potential agency problems ex ante. Moreover, transparency 
allows the regulator to investigate, for instance, insider trading or self-dealing by large blockholders. 
The legal devices that provide minority shareholders with the right to entry and exit on fair 
terms  are  quantified  into  a  minority  shareholders  affiliation  rights  index.  A  higher  index  score 
reflects that the expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling blockholder is less likely 
(the components of this index and their coding is given in table F-2).  
 
4.3 Regulatory provisions aimed at creditor rights protection  
 
Creditor  protection  hinges  on  the  regulatory  provisions  that  allow  creditors  to  force 
repayment more easily, take possession of the collateral, or even gain control over firm. We closely 
follow the LLSV’s approach to assess the efficiency of national bankruptcy and reorganization laws 
in terms of protecting the interests of creditors from being dismissed by managers acting in the 
interests  of  shareholders.  LLSV  argue  that  creditors  are  less  vulnerable  to  the  opportunism  and 
negligence of managers (shareholders) when the law enables them with the right to pull collateral 
from  a  firm  without  waiting  for  the  completion  of  the  reorganization  procedure;  when  they  are 
ranked first in the distribution of the proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a  
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bankrupt  firm;  and  when  they  have  the  decision  power  to  approve  or  veto  the  reorganisation 
(liquidation) procedure initiated by management (shareholders). The protection of creditor rights 
also increases when the law requires the court or the creditors to appoint an independent official 
responsible for the operation of the business during the reorganization (or liquidation) procedure. 
We  complement  the  LLSV  set  of  regulatory  provisions  on  creditor  rights  protection  by 
emphasizing  the  difference  between  creditor-oriented  and  debtor-oriented  insolvency  codes.  A 
creditor-oriented  code  is  a  pure  liquidation  bankruptcy  code  according  to  which  an  insolvent 
company (or its creditors) has to initiate a liquidation procedure and all of the company’s (bankrupt) 
property is claimed in the interest of the creditors. The key point of a pure liquidation bankruptcy 
code is that it does not provide for the possibility for a reorganization procedure, such that the 
insolvent company has to be declared bankrupt and its assets sold on behalf of the creditors. In 
contrast, a debtor-oriented code incorporates a reorganization option which may enable the company 
to  continue  its  operations  after  restructuring.  The  purpose  of  the  reorganization  is  to  enable 
companies in financial distress but which still have prospects of continued profitable activity to 
restructure  without  resorting  to  bankruptcy.  Asset  restructuring  usually  also  involves  financial 
restructuring whereby creditors are writing down their claims. Examples of debtor-oriented codes 
are the Chapter 11 procedure in the US and Administration procedure in the UK. As insolvency 
codes that facilitate corporate reorganization focuses on corporate survival which leads to substantial 
write-downs of creditor claims, the (more senior) creditors may lose more in debtor-oriented codes 
than in creditor-oriented ones. Details about the calculation of the creditor rights index are given in 
Table F-2; a higher index score signifies stronger creditor rights. 
 
5. Evolution of corporate governance regulations around the world 
 
5.1 Ownership structure around the world 
 
As  discussed  in  section  2,  the  need  to  reform  corporate  governance  regulation  may  be 
different in each country  because of the differences in control structures. Therefore, in order to 
understand the evolution of the legal environments better, we exhibit in figures F-1 and F-2 the 
ownership and control concentration and structures in Europe and the US in the late 1990s. Since 
major corporate governance regulation reforms took place in the late 1990s, we predict how these 
ownership patterns may evolve as a result of the corporate governance reforms. 
Figures F-1 and F-2 show that the stakeholder-based regime prevails in most of Continental 
Europe and is characterized by majority or near-majority holdings of stock held in the hands of one 
shareholder or a small group of investors. In contrast, the shareholder-based system of the US, UK, 
and the Republic of Ireland, is characterized by a dispersed equity structure. Although the difference 
in ownership between Continental Europe, on the one hand, and the UK, US, and Ireland, on the  
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other,  is  remarkable,  there  is  still  variation  in  the  percentage  of  companies  under  majority  or 
blocking minority control across the Continental European countries. In particular, Figure F-1 shows 
that the countries of Scandinavian legal origin have the lowest percentage of companies that are 
controlled by a majority blockholder, whereas countries of German legal origin and the countries 
that recently acceded to the EU (with exception of for Slovenia) have the highest percentage. Figure 
F-2  reports  that  the  percentage  of  Continental  European  companies  controlled  by  investors 
controlling a blocking minority of at least 25 percent is very high. The difference across countries is 






































































Figure F-1. Percentage of listed companies  Figure F-2. Percentage of listed companies with a 
under majority control    blocking minority of at least 25%  
 
Data source: Faccio and Lang (2002) for European countries with law of English, German, French, and Scandinavian 
origin, Barca and Becht (2001) for the US, and the ECGI project “Corporate Governance & Disclosure in the Accession 
Process”(2001) for the EU accession countries. 
 
 
5.2 The protection of shareholder rights  
 
We develop two indices capturing the protection of shareholder rights: an ‘anti-directors’ 
right index employing the LLSV-methodology and a broader index. While the former captures a 
limited set of criteria, the broader shareholder rights index also measures the shareholders’ power to 
appoint directors, shareholder decision power, the board structure and the information available to 
shareholders (as discussed in section 4.1). 203 
Figure F-3 shows the updated and corrected ‘anti-directors’ right index of LLSV. We classify 
all countries into six groups according to their legal origin and economic development. Countries 
from  the  former  communist  block  are  classified  according  to  their  (staged)  accession  to  the 
European Union, as this event has had an important impact on their legislative reforms prior to the 
accession. Column 1 of Table F-2 reports changes in the index for each individual country. Most of 
European countries have reformed their corporate law during the 1990s in order to ensure better 
shareholder protection. The countries that were not involved in the reforms are those of English legal 
origin. However, these countries already had high standards of protection in place.  
It is important to note that although we apply the same methodology as LLSV to construct 
the index, we find that our index score differs for some countries from the one reported by LLSV. 
For instance, the difference is pronounced for the countries of English legal origin.
143 An example of 
the differences between the LLSV index and our index is summarized in Appendix F-I where we 
compare the Delaware Code and UK Company law provisions.
144  
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Figure F-3. Anti-director index based on LLSV  Figure F-4. Shareholder rights protection index 
methodology: Total index    Total index  
 
Notes: The countries are categorized based on their legal origin and based on the EU enlargement process. The countries belong to 
these types: English legal origin (Republic of Ireland, UK, and US), German legal origin (Austria, Germany, Switzerland,), French 
legal origin (Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain), Scandinavian legal origin (Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), 2004 EU Accession (Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia, and Slovak Republic), 2007-09 likely EU Accession (Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania). The X-axis shows the mean value of 
each index 
                                                 
143 We find that, for some countries, the LLSV records of regulatory provisions do not coincide with those of our 
database. When we find inconsistencies we contacted our legal experts again to clarify the issue. We replace LLSV 
records with new information only when our legal experts confirm that our information is correct.  
144 Most of corporate governance regulatory provisions in the US are on the state level rather than on federal level. 
Therefore, there is a considerable variation in legal regimes across the American states. In our analysis we only focus 
on Delaware where a majority of US companies is incorporated. 204 
Table F-3. Anti-director index (LLSV) and newly constructed shareholder rights protection indices by country and over time  
 
  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 
ANTI-DIRECTOR 
INDEX (LLSV)  Total Index  Appointment Rights 
strategy 






  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005 
English Legal Origin: 
Ireland      3  3  3  3  16  16  18  21  8  8  8  8  3  3  5  5  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  5 
UK           3  3  3  3  19  22  24  24  9  9  9  9  5  5  5  5  2  4  4  4  3  4  6  6 
US (Delaware)  3  3  3  3  15  15  15  17  6  6  6  6  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  3  6  6  6  7 
Average   3.0  3.0  3.0  3.0  16.7  17.7  19.0  20.7  7.7  7.7  7.7  7.7  3.0  3.0  3.7  3.7  2.0  2.7  2.7  3.3  4.0  4.3  5.0  6.0 
                                                 
French Legal Origin: 
Belgium      2  2  2  2  15  17  18  18  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  4  5  5 
France       2  2  2  4  11  11  11  16  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  5  0  0  0  0  2  2  2  6 
Greece       3  3  3  3  12  12  15  20  4  4  4  4  5  5  7  7  2  2  2  3  1  1  2  6 
Italy        1  1  3  4  15  15  22  26  8  8  9  9  2  2  5  7  3  3  3  3  2  2  5  7 
Luxembourg   0  0  0  0  11  11  11  12  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  0  0  0  0  4  4  4  5 
Netherlands  1  1  1  1  15  15  15  19  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  6 
Portugal     2  2  3  3  15  15  17  20  6  6  7  7  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  4  7 
Spain        3  3  3  4  15  15  15  19  5  5  5  6  5  5  5  5  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  6 
Average  1.8  1.8  2.1  2.6  13.6  13.9  15.5  18.8  5.0  5.0  5.3  5.5  4.1  4.1  4.8  5.0  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.3  2.4  2.6  3.4  6.0 
                                                 
German Legal Origin: 
Austria      3  3  4  4  9  10  14  14  2  2  4  4  3  3  5  5  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3 
Germany      2  2  3  3  12  14  16  18  3  3  3  3  3  5  7  7  2  2  2  2  4  4  4  6 
Switzerland  1  1  1  1  10  10  13  17  5  5  5  5  3  3  5  5  2  2  2  2  0  0  1  5 
Average  2.0  2.0  2.7  2.7  10.3  11.3  14.3  16.3  3.3  3.3  4.0  4.0  3.0  3.7  5.7  5.7  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.3  2.7  4.7 
                                                 
Scandinavian Legal Origin: 
Denmark      2  2  2  2  9  9  9  11  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  0  0  0  0  2  2  2  4 
Finland      1  1  2  2  15  15  17  19  6  6  7  7  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  4  4  5  7 
Iceland      2  2  2  2  20  18  18  22  8  8  8  8  5  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  7 
Norway       3  3  3  3  14  14  16  16  4  4  4  4  5  5  5  5  2  2  2  2  3  3  5  5 
Sweden       2  2  2  2  9  12  12  12  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  0  3  3  3 
Average  2.0  2.0  2.2  2.2  13.4  13.6  14.4  16.0  5.2  5.2  5.4  5.4  3.8  3.4  3.4  3.4  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.4  3.0  3.6  5.2  
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  SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 
ANTI-DIRECTOR 
INDEX (LLSV)  Total Index  Appointment Rights 
strategy 






  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005 
                                                 
EU Accession 2004: 
Cyprus       4  4  4  4  14  15  15  18  9  9  9  9  3  3  3  5  2  2  2  2  0  1  1  2 
Czech Rep  0  1  1  3  5  7  10  13  2  2  3  3  1  1  3  6  2  2  2  2  0  2  2  2 
Estonia      0  1  1  2  9  15  17  19  4  5  5  5  3  5  5  5  2  4  4  4  0  1  3  5 
Hungary      0  0  1  2  6  6  10  15  3  3  3  5  1  1  3  5  2  2  2  2  0  0  2  3 
Latvia       0  1  1  2  13  15  15  17  6  6  6  6  3  3  3  3  4  4  4  4  0  2  2  4 
Lithuania    2  3  3  3  9  18  20  24  4  6  6  7  3  5  5  7  2  4  4  4  0  3  5  6 
Poland       2  2  2  2  13  18  14  15  6  6  4  2  3  3  3  5  4  4  2  2  0  5  5  6 
Slovak Rep   0  1  1  2  8  8  8  10  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  5  2  2  2  2  1  1  1  1 
Slovenia     1  3  3  4  8  9  11  16  3  4  4  4  3  3  5  7  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  3 
Average  1.0  1.8  1.9  2.7  9.4  12.3  13.3  16.3  4.3  4.8  4.7  4.8  2.6  3.0  3.7  5.3  2.4  2.9  2.7  2.7  0.1  1.7  2.3  3.6 
                                                 
EU (likely) Accession 2007: 
Bulgaria     0  0  2  3  11  12  14  18  4  4  4  4  5  5  7  7  2  2  2  2  0  1  1  5 
Croatia      1  2  2  4  12  14  14  23  6  5  5  6  2  5  5  7  4  4  4  4  0  0  0  6 
Romania      0  0  1  2  11  11  14  19  5  5  5  5  3  3  3  5  3  3  5  5  0  0  1  4 
Average  0.3  0.7  1.7  3.0  11.3  12.3  14.0  20.0  5.0  4.7  4.7  5.0  3.3  4.3  5.0  6.3  3.0  3.0  3.7  3.7  0.0  0.3  0.7  5.0 
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Figure F-4 (and, more in detail, column 2 of Table F-2) shows the dynamics in the protection 
of  shareholder  rights  captured  with  our  shareholder  rights  protection  index  and  reveals  that  in 
virtually every European country significant changes in corporate law were implemented during the 
past 15  years. Nonetheless, countries of English legal origin remain the leaders in terms of the 
quality of shareholder protection. However, in the mean time, the French legal origin countries have 
evolved  and  reach  a  level  close  to  the  English  origin  standard.  The  lowest  level  of  investor 
protection is nowadays observed in countries of German and Scandinavian legal origins, as well as 
in the EU 2004 accession countries. 
The countries achieving the strongest improvement in their legal environment over the period 
1990 to 2005 are the former communist-block countries that have recently joined the EU, whereas 
the least improvement is observed in Scandinavian countries (where shareholder protection has even 
decreased  somewhat).  The  EU  Accession  process  has  already  had  an  important  impact  on  the 
legislative reforms in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania. However, a discussed in section 2, one needs 
to  put the  shareholder  protection  index in  the  right  perspective;  an  improvement  in shareholder 
protection may not be meaningful if the enforcement of these rights in courts is difficult. This may 
be particularly difficult in Italy, and in Central and Eastern Europe.  
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Figure F-5. Shareholder rights protection index  Figure F-6. Shareholder rights protection index 
by legal origin: Appointment rights sub-index  by legal origin: Decision rights sub-index  
 
Note: For the classification of legal origins see notes to figures F-3 and F-4. The X-axis shows the mean value of the index 
 
Figures  F-5  through  F-8  (as  well  as  the  detailed  columns  3-6  of  Table  F-2)  dissect  the 
shareholder protection index of Figure F-4 into an appointment rights sub-index, a decision rights 
sub-index, a trusteeship sub-index, and a transparency sub-index. For each of these constituting 
elements, there are striking differences across legal origins. Whereas the German origin countries 
and the EU 2004 Accession countries focus on reforms that provide shareholders with more decision 
rights in the firm (see Figure F-6), countries of English legal origin and those of likely 2007 EU  
207 
accession direct their reforms to the establishment of a trusteeship relation; a board of directors 
representing the interest of shareholders (see Figure F-7). A strategy that all countries deploy to 
improve shareholder protection is to provide investors with more transparency. Figure F-8 shows 
dramatic changes in transparency standards overall. Introducing (more strict) disclosure regulation is 
likely to affect the broader corporate governance system because it reduces the private benefits of 
control to major blockholders and also helps investors to monitor the management better. This may 
induce  further  convergence  towards  the  shareholder-based  corporate  governance  regime  with 
dispersed ownership and control structures and strong shareholder protection.  
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Figure F-7. Shareholder rights protection index  Figure F-8. Shareholder rights protection index 
by legal origin: Trusteeship sub-index           by legal origin: Transparency sub-index  
 
Note: For the classification of legal origins see notes to figures F-3 and F-4. The X-axis shows the mean value of the index 
 
 
5.3 The protection of minority shareholder rights  
 
Fewer regulatory changes have taken place for the protection of minority shareholders since 
1990. Figure F-9 exhibits the changes in the minority shareholder rights protection index by legal 
origin, while columns 1-5 of table F-3 detail the changes by country.  
The problem of the misalignment of interests between minority and majority shareholders 
has been addressed on a regulatory level in almost all countries with the exception of the US, the 
Netherlands, and Spain (see column 1 of Table F-3). Countries of French and German legal origin 
and  former  communist  countries  are  the  leaders  among  the  reformers,  whereas  English  and 
Scandinavian legal origin countries are much less involved in the reforms (Figure F-9). Until about 
ten years ago, the highest level of minority protection was observed in the countries of English legal 
origin, but nowadays, the level of minority rights protection is relatively similar across all countries, 
with Scandinavian countries being lagging somewhat behind.   
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 Figure F-9. Minority shareholder rights  Figure  F-10.  Minority  shareholder  rights 
protection index by legal origin: Total index  protection index by legal origin: Appointment 
  rights sub-index  
Note: The X-axis shows the mean value of the index 
 
We  also  dissect  the  minority  shareholders  protection  index  into  three  parts:  appointment 
rights,  decision  rights,  trusteeship  strategies  and  affiliation  strategies.  As  in  the  case  of  the 
shareholder rights protection index, countries are able to achieve an increase in minority shareholder 
protection using different strategies (see Figures F-10 – F-13 and columns 2-5 of Table F-3). The 
appointment rights, decision rights, and trusteeship strategies are mainly employed by the EU 2004 
and EU 2007 (likely) accession countries and by only a few countries of French and Scandinavian 
legal  origins  (Italy,  Finland,  and  Iceland).  In  these  countries,  the  relative  power  of  minority 
shareholders vis-à-vis a strong blockholder has been increased by stronger board representation, 
blocking minorities, minority claims, and voting caps.  
The affiliation strategy is pursued in virtually all countries to improve minority protection 
(see Figure F-13). It is associated with granting minority shareholders the right to entry and exit the 
company on fair terms. The entry right is strengthened by the introduction of (more strict) disclosure 
requirements  regarding  corporate  control  structures  and  managerial  activities.  This  should  make 
investors aware of the firm’s governance structure and potential agency problems before they decide 
to  buy  a  firm’s  shares.  Reforms  of  takeover  regulation,  introduction  of  equal  treatment  of 
shareholders, mandatory bid, and sell-out rules in particular, enable minority shareholders to exit 
without being expropriated.  209 
Table F-4. Newly constructed minority shareholder rights and creditor rights protection indices by country and over time  
 
  MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 
Total Index  Appointment Rights 
strategy 









  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005 
English Legal Origin: 
Ireland      13  13  16  16  1  1  1  1  3  3  3  3  0  0  0  0  9  9  12  12  2  2  2  2 
UK           14  16  16  16  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  3  0  2  2  2  8  8  8  8  2  2  2  2 
US (Delaware)  8  8  8  8  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  5  5  5  5  0  0  0  0 
Average   11.7  12.3  13.3  13.3  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  0.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  7.3  7.3  8.3  8.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3 
                                                 
French Legal Origin: 
Belgium      12  13  13  13  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  8  9  9  9  5  5  2  2 
France       12  12  12  14  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  9  9  9  11  1  1  1  1 
Greece       7  7  8  9  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  4  4  5  6  4  4  4  4 
Italy        7  11  18  17  2  2  4  3  1  1  2  2  0  0  0  0  4  8  12  12  2  2  2  1 
Luxembourg   3  4  4  4  0  0  0  0  1  1  1  1  0  0  0  0  2  3  3  3  2  2  2  2 
Netherlands  13  13  13  13  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  6  6  6  6  4  4  4  4 
Portugal     6  6  11  13  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  1  1  6  8  4  4  4  3 
Spain        15  15  15  15  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  9  9  9  9  1  1  1  1 
Average  9.4  10.1  11.8  12.3  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.0  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  5.4  6.1  7.4  8.0  2.9  2.9  2.5  2.3 
                                                 
German Legal Origin: 
Austria      15  15  17  17  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  6  6  8  8  2  2  2  2 
Germany      9  11  12  16  1  1  1  1  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  3  5  6  10  3  3  2  2 
Switzerland  5  7  11  10  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  2  4  8  7  5  5  3  3 
Average  9.7  11.0  13.3  14.3  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.7  1.3  1.3  1.3  1.3  3.7  5.0  7.3  8.3  3.3  3.3  2.3  2.3 
                                                 
Scandinavian Legal Origin: 
Denmark      10  10  12  12  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  6  6  8  8  3  3  3  3 
Finland      9  10  10  10  2  2  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  4  5  5  5  2  2  2 
Iceland      7  8  11  12  0  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  6  7  2  2  2  2 
Norway       11  11  11  12  1  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  6  6  6  7  3  3  3  3 
Sweden       9  10  10  10  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  3  4  4  4  4  4  1  1 
Average  9.2  9.8  10.8  11.2  1.4  1.6  1.4  1.4  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.6  1.6  1.6  1.6  4.2  4.6  5.8  6.2  3.4  2.8  2.2  2.2  
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  MINORITY SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS PROTECTION INDEX: 
 
Total Index  Appointment Rights 
strategy 









  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005  1990  1995  2000  2005 
                                                 
EU Accession 2004: 
Cyprus       5  5  7  9  1  1  1  1  3  3  3  3  0  0  0  0  1  1  3  5  5  5  5  5 
Czech Rep    6  10  12  20  2  2  2  4  2  2  2  4  2  2  2  2  0  4  6  10  0  4  4  4 
Estonia      2  7  9  12  0  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  2  2  2  0  2  4  7  0  2  2  3 
Hungary      8  8  14  16  2  2  2  2  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  1  1  7  9  0  2  2  3 
Latvia       8  9  9  14  1  1  1  1  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  2  3  3  8  0  5  5  5 
Lithuania    11  11  12  13  2  1  1  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  5  6  7  8  0  5  5  3 
Poland       12  17  15  18  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  3  8  6  9  2  2  2  3 
Slovak Rep   6  12  12  15  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  0  6  6  9  2  2  2  2 
Slovenia     7  12  18  17  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  1  6  12  12  0  1  1  1 
Average  7.2  10.1  12.0  14.9  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.4  2.4  2.4  2.7  1.6  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.4  4.1  6.0  8.6  1.0  3.1  3.1  3.2 
                                                 
EU (likely) Accession 2007: 
Bulgaria     3  7  11  11  0  0  1  1  2  2  2  2  0  0  0  0  1  5  8  8  0  2  2  2 
Croatia      7  10  14  15  1  1  2  1  2  3  3  3  2  2  2  2  2  4  7  9  5  5  4  4 
Romania      4  9  12  14  2  2  2  4  2  2  2  2  0  0  2  2  0  5  6  6  1  2  2  3 
Average  4.7  8.7  12.3  13.3  1.0  1.0  1.7  2.0  2.0  2.3  2.3  2.3  0.7  0.7  1.3  1.3  1.0  4.7  7.0  7.7  2.0  3.0  2.7  3.0 
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Figure F-11. Minority shareholder rights  Figure  F-12.  Minority  shareholder  rights 
protection index by legal origin:  protection index by legal origin: 
Decision rights sub-index    Trusteeship sub-index  
 
Note: For the classification of legal origins see notes to figures F-3 and F-4. The X-axis shows the mean value of the index 
 
An increase in the power of minority shareholders when a large blockholder is present in the 
firm reduces the private benefits of control of this blockholder which may lead to more ownership 
dispersion. Therefore, one could expected a shift towards more dispersed ownership in the leading 
reformers  in  the  area  of  minority  shareholder  protection,  namely:  the  French  and  German  legal 
origin countries and the former communist countries. To conclude, also on this aspect of corporate 
governance  we  observe  more  convergence  towards  a  shareholder-based  system  with  lower 
ownership concentration. 
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Figure F-13. Minority shareholder rights  Figure F-14. Creditor rights protection index by 
protection index by legal origin:  legal origin: Total index 
Affiliation rights sub-index      
 
Note: For the classification of legal origins see notes to figures F-3 and F-4. The X-axis shows the mean value of the index  
212 
 
5.4 The protection of creditor rights  
 
Figure F-14 reports the evolution of the legal environment with respect to creditors rights 
protection. Strikingly, we find that countries have very different perspectives on the protection of 
creditor  rights  (see  column  6  of  Table  F-3).  There  are  three  different  scenarios:  first,  creditor 
protection  in  countries  of  French,  German,  and  Scandinavian  legal  origin  has  weakened 
significantly. Second, former communist countries have in contrast moved towards more creditor 
protection. Finally, English legal origin countries have abstained from reforming their bankruptcy 
and reorganization legislation and have currently the system which is least protective for creditors.  
Most of the French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have reorganized their 
bankruptcy  legislation  by  introducing  a  reorganization  procedure  that  enables  companies  to 
restructure their debts and escape liquidation. By the late 1990s, a large majority of Continental 
European  countries  (with  exception  of  the  former  communist  block)  have  a  debtor-oriented 
corporate insolvency code that includes two tracks: a reorganization part (e.g. Administration in the 
UK) and a pure liquidation code (e.g. Receivership in the UK). It is in fact not that surprising that in 
a number of countries the creditor protection has diminished as in these countries one can observe an 
increase in shareholder protection. We believe that the lack of a well-developed equity market is one 
of the main reasons for the regulators of EU accession countries to increase creditor protection. 
Better protection of creditors reduces the costs of debt financing, which is essential for companies in 
such countries. Further equity market development in these countries may lead to a new wave of the 
bankruptcy law reforms, which will reduce creditor rights.  
 
6. Conclusion 
   
This paper performs a comparative analysis of the corporate governance legal regimes and 
their evolution in 30 European countries and the US. The analysis is based on a unique corporate 
governance database that comprises the main changes in corporate governance regulations over the 
period 1990 to 2005. We develop three new corporate governance indices that reflect the quality of 
national  laws  aimed  at  protecting  (i)  corporate  shareholders  from  being  expropriated  by 
management,  (ii)  minority  shareholders  from  being  expropriated  by  large  blockholder,  and  (iii) 
creditors from being expropriated by shareholders. We further dissect these indices along various 
dimensions of regulator strategies (as captured by e.g. the sub-indices expressing relative decision 
power, appointment rights, trusteeship, or corporate transparency). We find that, in contrast to the 
LLSV ranking system, our new governance indices capture a broader scope of corporate governance 
regulation reforms and their dynamics.  
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The time-series analysis of the newly constructed indices reveals that virtually every country 
from our sample has been involved in substantial changes in their corporate legislations since 1990. 
The changes relate to all three major types of  agency problems. The improvement of corporate 
transparency has been a dominant legal strategy across countries to address both the protection of 
shareholders  from  the  misuse  of  corporate  assets  by  managers,  and  the  protection  of  minority 
shareholders from expropriation by a strong blockholder. A large majority of continental European 
countries  also  has  also  strengthened  the  protection  of  minority  shareholders  in  their  takeover 
regulations.  
We  also  detect  some  differences  in  the  patterns  of  legal  reforms  across  countries.  For 
instance, in their attempts to improve shareholder protection, German legal origin and EU 2004 
accession countries focus on reforms that provide shareholders with more decision rights in the firm, 
while the countries of English legal origin (and those of the EU 2007 accession) direct their reforms 
to the representation of investors on the board of directors (trusteeship) and the effective monitoring 
by boards. Furthermore, countries have very different perspectives on the how to deal with financial 
distress and bankruptcy. Whereas French, German, and Scandinavian legal origin countries put less 
emphasis on creditor protection, the former communist countries move in the opposite direction and 
strengthen creditor protection. Countries of English legal origin have not modified their bankruptcy 
and reorganization codes.  
While  varying  degrees  of  creditor  protection  that  were  recently  introduced  in  national 
bankruptcy  laws  show  that  the  global  convergence  of  legal  systems  towards  a  single  system  of 
corporate regulation is unlikely, there are still signs of increasing convergence by national corporate 
governance  regulations  towards  a  shareholder-based  regime  when  the  protection  of  (minority) 
shareholders is considered. The recent legislative changes in countries of French and German legal 
origin may bring about more ownership dispersion in time. A stakeholder-based system is likely to 
be  maintained  in  Scandinavian  and  former  communist  countries.  Over  the  past  15  years, 
Scandinavian  countries  have  substantially  lagged  other  West-European  countries  in  terms  of 
increasing the level of (minority) shareholder rights protection, such that their legal reforms may be 
insufficient to induce changes in corporate control. In contrast to Scandinavian countries, the former 
communist countries have undertaken dramatic revisions of their national corporate legislation in 
order to guarantee (theoretically) more (minority) shareholder protection. However, the ownership 
structure  is  unlikely  to  evolve  towards  more  dispersion  because  their  reforms  also  augment  the 
creditor rights in case of financial distress. This regulatory choice may discourage the development 
of efficient equity markets and hence changes in corporate control.  
The  countries  of  English  legal  origin  still  provide  the  highest  quality  of  shareholder 
protection. In the mean time, many Continental European countries have improved their legal system 
up to the standard set by the English legal system. Whether and to what extent these reforms will  
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lead to changes in the degree of ownership and control concentration remains an appealing topic for 
future research.  
 
 
Appendix F-I.  
 
The table summarizes the provision of the Delaware and UK Company Law with regard to the shareholder rights 
employed to construct the LLSV anti-director index. The classification of shareholder rights closely follows the one 
deployed in LLSV. If a particular provision is in the law, we denote this with 1; it is 0 otherwise.   
 
Shareholder rights  UK 
LLSV data 
UK Company Law  US 
LLSV data 
Delaware Code 
One-share-one-vote  0  0 
(The law does not forbid non-
voting shares) 
0  0  
(Non-voting shares are allowed subject 
to inclusion in the certificate of 
incorporation, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
§151(a)) 
Proxy by mail 
allowed 
1  1 
(The law requires this) 
1  1 
(The Code also permits the use of 
electronic or telegraphic proxies. 
Telephonic proxies or internet website 
proxies are used as well, Del. Code. 
Ann. tit. 8 § 212(c)(2)) 
Shares are not 
blocked before a 
general meeting 
1  1 
(A deposit is not wholly forbidden 
but the practice is not present) 
1  1 
(No provisions in the Code  
but the practice is not present) 
Cumulative voting / 
proportional 
representation 
0  0 
(There are no requirements by law 
and the practice is not present) 
1  0  
(Cumulative voting is optional, subject 
to inclusion in the certificate of 
incorporation, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
§214) 
Oppressed minority  1  0 
(No provisions in the Law and the 
practice is not present) 
1  1 
(Any shareholder can bring a fiduciary 
duty claim against a management 
decision that is a breach/conflict of 
interest favoring majority 
shareholders) 
Preemptive right to 
new issues 
1  1 
(The law grants preemptive rights 
in relation to the issue of equity 
shares for cash) 
0  0 
(Prior to 1967, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 
provided for stockholders preemptive 
rights, unless limited by the certificate 
of incorporation. In 1967 an opposite 
rule was enacted) 
Total, 
Anti-director rights 
4  3  4  3 
         
Percentage of share 
capital to call an 
extraordinary 
meeting 
.10  .10  .10  Majority  
(In Delaware shareholders may not call 
a special shareholders meeting, unless 
otherwise provided in the certificate of 
incorporation or bylaws, see Del. 
Code. Ann. tit. 8 §211(d). The Code 
lets a majority of shares act without a 
meeting, Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 §228) 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
 
 
Een  uitgebreide  literatuur  zegt  dat  de  corporate  governance  omgeving  een  belangrijke 
invloed  heeft  op  het  economisch  gedrag  en  de  bestuur  van  bedrijven.  Corporate  governance 
beïnvloedt  de  kapitaalkost  alsook  hoe  de  winst  wordt  verdeeld  over  de  betrokkenen  bij  de 
bedrijfsvoering (La Porta et al., 1997, 2002; Mork et al., 2000; and Levine, 1998, 1999). Hierdoor 
duikt  de  vraag  op  of  en  in  welke  mate  men  de  inzichten  en  bevindingen  van  het  corporate 
governance literatuur over de VS en het VK kunnen transponeren naar een Europese context. De 
twee belangrijkste elementen van een corporate governance systeem zijn de regulering en de markt 
voor bedrijfscontrole. Hun impact op economische groei, marktontwikkeling, en bedrijfsbestuur zijn 
al grondig bestudeerd zowel in de theoretische als empirische literatuur. Nochtans is het empirische 
onderzoek in dit gebied grotendeels beperkt tot de VS and het VK en is er weinig geweten over de 
effecten  van  de  overnamemarkt  en  regulering  in  Continentaal  Europa.  In  deze 
doctoraatsverhandeling, geef ik een overzicht van de overnamemarkt en de corporate governance 
regulering  in  de  Europese  landen  en  documenteer  ik  hun  evolutie  over  de  laatste  15  jaar.  Ik 
onderzoek de impact van bedrijfsovernames en de regulering op de winstgevendheid en op de keuze 
van financieringsbronnen in een overname. 
Hoofdstuk 2 is een literatuuroverzicht met de titel ‘De geschiedenis van fusies en overnames 
in de wereld: een overzicht van de literatuur. In dit hoofdstuk concentreer ik me op het cyclische 
golfpatroon  in  de  overnamemarkt  en  beantwoord  ik  vragen  zoals:  ‘Waarom  observeren  we  een 
systematische groei en val in the activiteit van fusies en overnames doorheen de tijd? Wordt de 
overname  activiteit  aangespoord  door  kapitaalmarktontwikkelingen? Wat  veroorzaakte  de  creatie 
van conglomeraten in de overnamegolf van de jaren 1960 en de de-conglomeratie in de golven van 
de jaren 1980 en 1990? Waarom zien we tijds- en landclustering bij vijandige overnameactiviteit? 
En  ten  slotte,  wordt  er  aandeelhouderswaarde  gecreëerd  bij  een  transfer  van  bedrijfscontrole? 
Hoofdstuk 3 geeft een overzicht van de Europese overnamemarkt voor de periode 1990-2001. Het 
hoofdstuk documenteert ook de belangrijkste eigenschappen van de binnenlandse en internationale 
overnames van Europese bedrijven en contrasteert deze bevindingen met die uit de tweede overname 
golf van 1984-1989.  
Ik toon gedetailleerde informatie over de grootte en de dynamiek van overnameactiviteit in 
28 Continentaal Europese landen en het VK en Ierland. Het materiaal in het derde hoofdstuk wordt 
verder ontwikkeld in hoofdstuk 4 dat gaat over de ‘Performantie van de Europese overnamemarkt: 
lessen uit de 5e overnamegolf’. Hierin onderzoek ik de marktreactie na overnameaankondigingen 
van Europese bedrijven in de periode 1990-2001 en onderzoek ook verder de determinanten van de 
markt reacties. Ik toon aan dat men verwacht dat Europese fusies en overnames synergieën zullen  
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creëren aangezien de aankondigingen grote toenames in de aandelenkoersen veroorzaken. Nochtans 
wordt het leeuwenaandeel van de aankondigingreacties binnengehaald door de aandeelhouders van 
het doelbedrijf. We zien ook dat de kenmerken van zowel de prooi als de bieder een significante 
impact  hebben  op  de  overnamerendementen.  Hoewel  sommige  van  onze  resultaten  al  zijn 
gedocumenteerd in andere overnamemarkten (bv. de VS), zijn andere resultaten uit de vergelijking 
tussen  de  overnamemarkten  in  het  VK  en  Continentaal  Europa,  elk  met  hun  respectievelijke 
wettelijke  kaders,  nieuw:  (i)  Als  een  bedrijf  uit  het  VK  wordt  overgenomen,  is  het  abnormale 
rendement bij een bod op een Continentaal Europees bedrijf hoger, (ii) De aanwezigheid van een 
grote  aandeelhouder  in  het  biedend  bedrijf  heeft  een  significant  positief  effect  op  de 
overnamerendementen  in  het  VK  en  een  negatief  in  Continentaal  Europa.  (iii)  Zwakke 
beleggerbescherming en lage transparantie in Continentaal Europa laat biedende bedrijven toe om 
overname strategieën (bieden op slechts een deel van de aandelen of een bod waarbij een deel van de 
informatie niet aan de markt wordt bekend gemaakt) toe te passen zodat ze de aandeelhouders van 
het doelbedrijf opportunistisch kunnen behandelen.          
Hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt de financieringsbronnen in Europese fusies en overnames voor de 
periode 1993-2001 (de 5e overname golf). Aan de hand van een unieke dataset, toon ik aan dat de 
externe financieringsbronnen (vreemd en eigen vermogen) frequent worden gebruikt bij overnames 
waarbij een cash of een gemengd bod wordt gedaan. Ik toon ook aan dat de beslissingen aangaande 
de betalingswijze en de financieringswijze bij overnames niet samenvallen. Ik documenteer ook dat 
de financieringskeuzes sterk afhangen van de wettelijke context (vooral wat betreft de bescherming 
van de aandeelhouders, crediteuren en kleine aandeelhouders, alsook de bedrijfstransparantie).  
Hoofdstuk 6 concentreert zich op de wetgeving ivm. bedrijfsovernames. Dit hoofdstuk bevat 
een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de overname regulering in Europese landen. Ik onderzoek of de 
recente hervormingen van de overname wetgeving in Europen leiden tot een grotere harmonisering 
van de nationale wetgevingen. Ik concludeer dat in sommige landen de overname wetgeving zal 
leiden tot een verspreide eigendomsstructuur, in andere landen overname codes kunnen leiden tot het 
versterken van een geconcentreerde eigendomsstructuur. Dit artikel werd gepubliceerd in het Oxford 
Review of Economic Policy (2005).  
Het laatste, 7e, hoofdstuk ‘Een corporate governance index: convergentie en diversiteit van 
nationale corporate governance reguleringen’ analyseert de regulering in Continentaal Europa en het 
VK verder. In dit hoofdstuk documenteren we de wetgeving en beursregulering alsook hun evolutie 
over  de  voorbije  15  jaar.  We  construeren  een  aantal  corporate  governance  indexen  die  de 
verschillende potentiële agency conflicten tussen aandeelhouders en managers, tussen meerderheid- 
en minoriteitaandeelhouders, tussen aandeelhouders en obligatiehouders etc. in kaart brengen. De 
tijdreeks van 15 jaar van deze indexen die alle (32) Europese landen alsook de VS bevat, laat ons toe 
conclusies te trekken over de convergentie van corporate governance regimes tussen landen.   
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DATA APPENDIX 1 
 
The  name  of  researchers  who  contributed  to  our  ownership  and  control  database  are  presented 
below. The ownership and control data that are not available from the sources below are gathered 
from annual reports and the shareholder registers of national stock exchanges.  
 
 
Country  Data sources 
Austria  Prof. Dr. Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Belgium  Prof. Dr. Christoph van der Elst (Tilburg University); Prof. Dr. Luc Renneboog (Tilburg University) 
Cyprus  Stockwatch Cyprus (http://www.stockwatch.com.cy)  
Czech Rep.  SCP- The Prague Securities Centre (http://www.scp.cz) 
Denmark  Prof. Dr. Steen Thomsen and Mr. Michael Emil Olinger (Copenhagen Business School) 
Estonia  Tallinn Stock Exchange (http://www.ee.omxgroup.com) 
Finland  Prof. Dr. Benjamin Maury (HANKEN Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration) 
France  Prof. Dr. Alain Alcouffe (Toulouse University); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Germany  Prof.  Dr.  Luc  Renneboog  (Tilburg  University);  Prof.  Dr.  Ekkehart  Boehmer  (Texas  A&M 
University); Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Ireland      Thomson Financial Research: annual reports of individual firms; Faccio and Lang (2002) 
Italy  Prof. Dr. Marcello Bianchi (CONSOB) 
Latvia  Riga Stock Exchange (http://www.rfb.lv); Dr. Anete Pajuste (Riga Business School) 
Lithuania  Vilnius Stock Exchange (http://www.nse.lt) 
Netherlands  Annual reports and the Financieele Dagblad 
Norway  Prof. Dr. Bernt Arne Odegaard (Norwegian School of Management BI) 
Poland  Dr. Grzegorz Trojanowski (University of Exeter) 
Portugal  Prof. Dr. Carlos Ferreira Alves (Porto University); Mr. Pedro Verga Matos (Universidade Técnica 
de Lisboa); CMVM - Comissão do Mercado de Valores Mobiliários (www.cmvm.pt) 
Romania  Bucharest Stock Exchange (http://www.bvb.ro) 
Slovenia  Dr. Aleksandra Gregoric (Ljubljana University) 
Spain  Prof. Dr. Rafael Crespí (Universitat de les Illes Balears); CNMV- Comisión Nacional del Mercado 
de Valores (http://www.cnmv.es)  
Sweden  Prof. Dr. Martin Holmen (Uppsala University) 
Switzerland  Dr. Markus Schmid (University of Basel); Mr. Diego Dimitri Liechti (Universität Bern): data source 
Swiss Stock Guide (Schweizer Aktienfuehrer) 
UK  Dr.  Grzegorz  Trojanowski  (University  of  Exeter);  Faccio  and  Lang  (2002); Thomson  Financial 
Research: annual reports of individual firms 
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DATA APPENDIX 2 
 
The names of the legal experts who contributed to our corporate governance database are presented 
below:  
 
Austria:  Prof.  Susanne  Kalls  (University  of  Klagenfurt),  Prof.  Christian  Nowotny  and  Mr.  Stefan  Fida  (Vienna 
University of Economics and Business Administration); 
Belgium:  Prof.  Eddy  Wymeersch  (University  of  Ghent,  Chairman  of  the  Commission  for  Finance,  Banking  and 
Assurance), Prof. Christoph Van der Elst (University of Ghent); 
Bulgaria: Dr. Plamen Tchipev (Institute of Economics, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences), Ms. Tania Bouzeva (ALIENA 
Consult Ltd., Sofia), Dr. Ivaylo Nikolov (Centre for Economic Development, Sofia); 
Croatia: Dr. Domagoj Racic and Mr. Josip Stajfer (The Institute of Economics, Zagreb0U$QGUHM*DORJDåD (Zagreb 
Stock  Exchange),  3URI 'UDJR ýHQJLü  (IVO  PILAR  Institute  of  Social  Sciences),  Prof.  Edita  Culinovic-Herc 
(University of Rijeka); 
Cyprus: Mr. Marios Clerides (Chairman) and Ms. Christiana Vovidou (Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission); 
Czech Republic: Prof. Lubos Tichy, Mr. Martin  Abraham, and Mr. Rostislav Pekar (Squire, Sanders  & Dempsey, 
Cousellors at Law), Dr. Petr Kotáb and Prof. Milan Bakes (Charles University of Prague), Dr. Stanislav Myslil 
(ýHUPiN +R HMã 0\VOLO Dspol, Lawyers and Patent Attorneys), Dr. Jan Bárta (Institute of State and Law, The 
Academy of Science of Czech Republic), Ms. Jana Klirova  (Corporate Governance Consulting, Prague); 
Denmark: Prof. Jesper Lau Hansen and Prof. Ulrik Rammeskow Bang-Pedersen (University of Copenhagen);  
Estonia: Prof. Andres Vutt  (University of Tartu), Mr. Toomas Luhaaar, Mr. Peeter Lepik, and Ms Katri Paas (Law 
Office of Lepik & Luhaäär); 
Finland: Prof. Matti J. Sillanpää (Turku School of Economics and Business Administration), Mr. Ingalill  Aspholm  
(Rahoitustarkastus/Financial Supervision Authority), Ms Ari-Pekka Saanio  (Borenius & Kemppinen, Attorneys at 
Law, Helsinki), Ms Johan Aalto (Hannes Snellman, Attorneys at Law; Helsinki); 
France: Prof. Alain Couret  (Université Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Ms. Joëlle Simon (MEDEF - French Business 
Confederation), Prof. Benoit Le Bars (MC Université de Cergy-Pontoise), Prof. Alain Pietrancosta (Universities 
of Tours and Paris I- Panthéon-Sorbonne), Prof. Viviane de Beaufort (ESSEC-MBA), Prof. Gerard Charreaux 
(Université de Bourgogne Pôle d'économie et de gestion); 
Germany: Prof. Peter O. Muelbert (University of Mainz), Prof. Klaus Hopt and Dr. Alexander Hellgardt (Max Planck 
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